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
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
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ELEMENTS

OF

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY

EMBRACING THE TWO DEPARTMENTS OF THE

INTELLECT AND THE SENSIBILITIES.

BY THOMAS C UPHAM,

Professor of Moral and Mental Philosophy in Bowdoin College.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

NEW YORK:

HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,

323 & 331 PEARL STREET,

FRANKLIN SQUARE.

1856.

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1840, by

THOMAS C UPHAM,

In the Clerk's office of the District Court of Maine.

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MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

DIVISION SECOND.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

SENTIENT OR SENSITIVE STATES OF THE MIND

SENTIMENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE SENSIBILITIES.

§ 1. Reference to the general division of the whole mind.

It will be recollected that we proposed, as the basis of our inquiries, the general division of the mind into the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. These great departments of the mind are not only generically distinct, but the difference between them is so clear and marked, it is surprising they should have been so often confounded together. They are not only different in their nature, a fact which is clearly ascertained by Consciousness, in its cognizance of their respective acts, but are separated from each other, as all observation shows, by the relations which they respectively sustain. The Intellect or Understanding comes first in order, and furnishes the basis of action to the other great departments of the mind. It is this portion of the mind which we have endeavoured to examine, and which we are now about to leave for the purpose of advancing into departments of our mental nature, which, considered in reference to the Intellect, may be regarded as more remote and interior.

In examining the Intellect, we were aided by adopting the classification, founded in nature, into intellectual states of External origin, and intellectual states of Internal origin. A classification which seems sufficiently to authorize the expressions External Intellect and Internal Intellect; expressions founded on the fact that the intellectual action sometimes takes place in direct connexion with outward objects, and sometimes independently of such connexion. This distinction is important in enabling us to get a true idea of the intellect itself and in

suggesting the best methods of cultivating and applying our perceptive powers; but, considered in relation to the Sensibilities, is perhaps of less consequence. In both of its great departments alike, as also in its more subordinate modes of action, the Intellect furnishes the broad and deep foundation for that vast variety of mental states which are commonly included under the denomination of the emotions and passions.

§ 2. Difference between intellections or states of the intellect, and sentiments or states of the sensibility.

In advancing into what we assert to be a different part of our spiritual being, we are aware that some may be disposed to inquire whether the assertion of such difference, notwithstanding the general remarks of the last section, is well founded; whether, in other words, there is such a marked line of distinction between the intellectual and sensitive nature as to authorize our speaking of them as distinct and different mental departments. We do not propose, however, nor does it appear necessary, to go into this topic here, any further than to refer briefly to what has already been said upon it on a former occasion. In the chapter in the Introduction to the first volume, the object of which was to ascertain the outlines of a General Classification, we attempted to show the difference between the intellect and the sensibilities, between intellections and sentiments or sensitive states of the mind, by a reference to consciousness, to the terms found in different languages, to the incidental remarks frequently found in English writers, besides the more direct and specific testimony of those who have written professedly on the mind. That this distinction is involved, wholly or almost without an exception, in the structure of languages, is a well-known fact; and that it is commonly made by the leading writers on the philosophy of the mind, is no less undeniable. Not only this, it finds its way incidentally into the remarks of writers (and, such is the nature of their convictions, it cannot well be otherwise) who were writing upon other subjects, and who, at the time, were far from being aware that they were enunciating, either directly or indirectly, any

doctrines of mental philosophy. The following passage of Southey, in addition to those already quoted, will illustrate what we mean; involving, like the others, not only a distinction between the Understanding and the Heart, but separating both from the Will. "Believing in them [the Prophets and the Evangelists] with a calm and settled faith, with that consent of the WILL, and HEART, and UNDERSTANDING which constitutes religious belief, I find in them the clear annunciation of the kingdom of God upon earth."*

But on a question of this kind we must rest ultimately, and it is presumed we can do it in this case with entire confidence, on the testimony of Consciousness. In a multitude of cases we are obliged to rely upon knowledge from this source; and certainly, on no subject whatever, is its testimony more clear than in respect to the acts of the intellect and the acts of the heart. When we have perceptions, when we think, we know the existence of such perceptions or thought to be one thing; when we have emotions and desires, we know the existence of such emotions and desires to be another thing; and we have an internal conviction, strong as any conviction can well be, that there is no possibility in ordinary cases of confounding them together.

§ 3. Action of the sensibilities implies that of the intellect.

As a general thing, there is and can be no movement of the sensibilities, no such thing as an emotion, desire, or feeling of moral obligation, without an antecedent action of the intellect. If we are pleased or displeased, there is necessarily before the mind some object of pleasure or displeasure; if we exercise the feeling of desire, there must necessarily be some object desired, which is made known to us by an action of the intellect. So that if there were no intellect, or if the intellectual powers were entirely dormant and inactive, there would be no action of the emotive part of our nature and of the passions. —And we may not only say in general terms that the action of the sensibilities implies the antecedent action of the intellect, but may even assert more specifically (ma-

* Southey's Progress of Society, Colloquy ii.

king allowance for those constitutional differences which pervade every part of the mental structure), that the activity of the sensibilities will be nearly in *proportion* to that of the intellect. In other words, on all subjects which are calculated to excite any interest at all, those who have the broadest and most satisfactory views will be likely to feel more intensely than others; the sensibilities expanding and exerting themselves in conformity with the expanded and energetic action of the perceptive and cognitive powers.

§ 4. Importance of the study of the sensibilities.

The department of the mind on which we now propose to enter is not only distinct from the other great divisions, having a nature and characteristics of its own, but possesses, we may venture to assert, equal importance and interest. If man had been formed of intellect only, of cold and unimpassioned perceptivity; if he could merely have perceived, compared, associated, and reasoned, without a solitary emotion or desire, without any of the various affections of our nature, without sorrow for suffering or sympathy in joy; in a word, if he had been all head and no heart, the human soul would have shown not only a different, but a depressed and inferior aspect, compared with what it does at present. But, happily and wisely, it is far otherwise. We find him constituted with a sensitive as well as an intellectual nature; with powers of feeling as well as of thought. It is the sensitive part of human nature (including in the term the moral as well as the natural affections) which Socrates, if we may rely on the doctrines and conversations that are handed down to us, particularly turned his attention to, and on account of which he was pronounced by the Oracle the wisest of all men living. It is here that we are let into the secrets of men's actions. It is in this department of the mind we find the causes which render them restless and inquisitive, which prompt to efforts both good and evil, and make the wide world a theatre, where vice and virtue, hope and fear, and joy and suffering, mingle in perpetual conflict.

Much is said, and with a good deal of truth, of the

value of a knowledge of human nature; a species of knowledge which is useful to all persons, and in many situations is clearly indispensable; but this knowledge, to any available extent, can never be supposed to exist separate from an acquaintance with that portion of our nature which we now propose to investigate. A knowledge of human nature, in the common apprehension of the phrase, does not so much imply a knowledge of the powers of perception and reasoning as a knowledge of the springs of action, back of the intellect, which, in the shape of the emotions and passions, give an impulse and a character to the conduct both of individuals and communities. In other words, a knowledge of human nature is essentially a knowledge of the HEART; a term by which men commonly distinguish the sensitive from the intellectual nature; and, consequently, all the value, and it is by no means inconsiderable, which pertains to the study of human nature, attaches equally to the interesting inquiries now before us.

§ 5. Difficulties attending the prosecution of this study.

But while we may properly and very justly maintain that no series of topics in the whole range of mental philosophy is either more fitted or more worthy to secure and interest the attention than those now before us, it cannot be denied that the discussion of them is attended with some difficulties, which do not perplex, certainly not in an equal degree, the examination of other parts of the mind. The perplexity to which we now refer will be better understood if we reflect a moment on the distinctive nature of the sensibilities. It is well known that the sensibilities, in their more decided action, are characterized by a sort of excitement, a stirring and breaking up of the inward depths, an agitation of the otherwise calm surface of the soul. It is this trait, so familiar to our consciousness, though difficult to be imbodied in language, to which we refer, and which undoubtedly characterizes the action of some portion of the sensibilities more than of others. The term PASSIONS is frequently employed to express that portion in particular.

Now it is the business of philosophy to give an accurate

view of the passions, to dissect them, and to show precisely what they are. But that excitement which has been mentioned is the appropriate element of the passions; the very breath of their existence is dependant on tumult and agitation. Such a state of things seems to be, and is in fact, inconsistent, to no inconsiderable extent, with that calm and critical examination which is desirable. We are obliged to wait till the excitement which exists has greatly subsided. In the interval of this delay, which cannot well be avoided, the true and important moment of examination has departed; and we are accordingly under the necessity of relying upon memory rather than upon direct consciousness for those intimations which are involved in a full knowledge of the subject of inquiry. It is different with the intellectual powers; their progress is calm and unruffled; we can mark them distinctly and accurately at every step, and in the very moment of their movement. But if it be otherwise in the Sensibilities, particularly in that portion of them known as the AFFECTIONS or PASSIONS, the only remedy is to use the greater caution, and to compare and combine our own internal experience, so far as we can ascertain what it is, with what we can gather from the outward observation of others. The difficulty is, indeed, considerable; but not so great as to discourage efforts to examine a portion of the mind, which has been less accurately surveyed than the intellect, but which promises, as the result of its examination, an equally ample reward.

CHAPTER II.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES.

§ 6. Natural or pathematic sensibilities and moral.

As we pass onward from the percipient and cognitive nature to the distinct and more remote region of the emotions and passions, it seems proper, before we enter more minutely into the various inquiries which may be expect-

el to present themselves, to consider whether the department of the Sensibilities itself is not susceptible of being resolved into some subordinate yet important divisions. In accordance with this suggestion, our first remark is, that the Sensibilities, when subjected to a careful examination, will clearly be found to separate themselves into the great divisions of the Natural or Pathematic, and the Moral. These leading departments will be found to run, if we may be allowed the expression, in two separate channels, which, although they are for the most part parallel with each other, are nevertheless essentially and sufficiently distinct; each being characterized by its own attributes and by its appropriate results. Our examination of the Sensibilities will accordingly proceed upon the basis of this division.

In reference to the use of the term Pathematic, as applicable to the states of mind embraced in one of these great divisions, it is proper to observe, that it appears to have been formed from its Greek original, and first used by Sir James Mackintosh. He repeatedly speaks of that part of our nature which includes the emotions and passions as *unnamed;* and in the progress of his discussions, appears at times to be embarrassed for the want of suitable English words to express it. And under these circumstances he proposes the term in question, which, in its etymological import, appears to involve the ideas of emotion and desire (the feelings that are particularly characteristic of the natural sensibilities), and adds the remark, which we are not aware is in the process of being realized, "until some more convenient and agreeable name shall be hit on by some luckier or more skilful adventurer in such new terms as seem to be *absolutely necessary.*"* The term, in the present state of our philosophic language, is certainly convenient; and such is the grea weight deservedly attached to the name of its proposer, that we shall at least be pardoned for using it.

§ 7. Relation of the natural to the moral sensibilities in time.

When we use the term HEART as expressive of a part of our mental nature, we commonly have reference to the

* Progress of Ethical Philosophy. Remarks on Hartley.

natural or pathematic sensibilities; when we use the term CONSCIENCE, we have reference to our moral sensibilities; so that the distinction now in question is obviously involved in the common usage of language. In truth, all the considerations, consciousness, the ordinary structure of language, and the incidental as well as the more formal and considered remarks of writers, which were formerly brought forward to show the distinction between the intellect and the sensibilities, in the more extended sense of the latter term, may also be adduced to show a well-founded distinction between the Natural and the Moral sensibilities. But abundant proof on a subject of this nature naturally flows out, if the fact in question actually exists, from a careful and philosophical examination of the departments of the mind, of which it is predicated. Without, therefore, delaying our inquiries by attempting to draw proof of its existence from other sources, we may proceed to notice some of those circumstances which may be enumerated as involved in and as incidental to the distinction which has been asserted.

And, in the first place, it appears to be the fact, as a general thing, that the exercise of the natural or pathematic sensibilities is the first in the order of time. Nor, if we reflect upon the subject, can we well suppose it to be otherwise. If there were no such thing as the Natural Sensibilities (in other words, if man were constituted without possessing the capability of emotion, desire, and passion), it is obvious that there would be no adequate basis in his mind for the operation of the Moral sensibilities. The pathematic sensibilities or the heart is the great, we do not say the exclusive, but still the great seat of the motives of men's actions; and consequently furnishes a principal field of operations for the conscience to act upon. We do not mean to assert, however, that there is not and cannot be any action of the moral, until there has been an entire, a *complete* developement of the pathematic nature, embracing, as it does, the whole circle of natural emotions and passions. It is true, when we descend to particular cases and specific acts, we find from observation that the natural sensibilities are first in the order of time, as they obviously are in the order of na-

ture. And we say that they are first in the order of nature for the reason just hinted at, viz., that they include a large portion of the subjects which it is the business of our moral constitution to act upon, scrutinize, and judge. It is, nevertheless, equally true, that these two great departments of the emotive or sensitive man, taken in their general history and as a *whole*, develope themselves nearly at the same time, and, as it were, side by side and parallel to each other.

In respect to the matter under consideration, they seem to bear much the same relation to each other which the External intellect bears to the Internal. When we look at specific acts of the External intellect, we shall find that some of them, absolutely and necessarily so, are first in the order of time; but when we look at the two departments as a *whole*, we find the developement, to a considerable extent, going on simultaneously. And so in regard to the Natural and Moral Sensibilities, considered in relation to each other, in reference to the time when they are respectively brought into action.

§ 8. The moral and natural sensibilities have different objects.

Another, and perhaps a still more decisive mark of distinction may be found in the views which these two great departments respectively take of the objects in respect to which they are called into exercise. The one considers objects chiefly as they have a relation to ourselves; the other, as they relate to all possible existences. The one looks at things in the aspect of their desirableness; the other fixes its eye on the sublime feature of their rectitude. The one asks what is GOOD, the other what is RIGHT.

Obliterate from man's constitution his Conscience (what may be called, if we may be allowed the expression, the *moralities* of his nature), and you at once strike from the mind one half of its motives to action; for, in respect to everything which is considered by us desirable to be done, the question always recurs, is it *right* to be done? At one time, on the supposition of an entire erasure of the moral sensibilities, all his movements are dictated by the suggestions and cravings of the appetites. At

other times he covets knowledge, or seeks society, or indulges in the refinements of the arts; but it will be found in these instances, as well as when he is under the influence of the appetites, that pleasure is still his leading object, and that he is disappointed in not securing it. In his higher moods of action, when raised in some degree above the influence of the subordinate propensities, his movements will be based on calculations of interest; and although the various suggestions which influence his conduct may have an extensive range, they will never fail to revolve within the limits of a circle, the centre of which is HIMSELF. On the supposition which has been made, viz., the extinction of the moral nature, even his Benevolence, so far as it is not purely *instinctive*, will necessarily assume the character of the prudential or self-interested. It is his moral nature, and that alone, which places him beyond the limits of this circle, and enables him, on suitable occasions, to act with exclusive reference to God, his fellow-men, and the universe.

§ 9. The moral sensibilities higher in rank than the natural.

And such being the objects of these two great departments of our nature, it is not surprising that they do not hold the same place in our estimation. There is obviously a sort of graduation in the feelings of regard and honour which we attach to different parts of the mind. We at once, and, as it were, instinctively, regard some as higher than others. We may not be able always to tell why it is so; but such is the fact. We never hesitate, for instance, to assign a lower place to the instincts than to the appetites; and, on the other hand, we always allot to the appetites, in the graduation of our regard, a place below that of the affections. And entirely in accordance with this general fact, we find it to be the case, that the moral sensibilities excite within us higher sentiments of regard; in other words, hold, in our estimation of them, a higher rank than the appetites, propensities, and passions, which constitute the leading divisions of our pathematic nature.

In this respect also, viz., in the comparative rank of the two departments under consideration, there seems to

be some analogy between the great divisions of the sensibilities and those of the intellect. There can be no question that men commonly locate, in the scale of the mind's regard and honour, the internal intellect above the external. The latter simply perceives; the former not only perceives, but exercises the additional and higher function of comparing, estimating, and combining. And so in respect to the topic now before us. The moral sensibility appears to hold, in respect to the other great division of our sensitive nature, the position of a consultative and judicial power; it stands above it and over it, in the exercise of a higher authority; it keenly scrutinizes the motives of action; it compares emotion with emotion, desire with desire; it sits a sort of arbitress, holding the scales of justice, and dispensing such decisions as are requisite for the due regulation of the empire of the passions.

§ 10. The moral sensibilities wanting in brutes.

It will perhaps throw light upon the distinction we are endeavouring to illustrate, if we call to recollection here that the natural or pathematic sensibilities exist in brute animals essentially the same as in man. They are susceptible of various emotions; they have their instincts, appetites, propensities, and affections, the same as human beings have, and perhaps even in a higher degree. They rush with eagerness in the pursuit of whatever is calculated to gratify their appetites, and are deeply interested in everything that is addressed to the natural affections. They are pleased and displeased, they have their prepossessions and aversions, they love and hate, with as much vehemence, at least, as commonly characterizes human passion.—But if we look for the other and more elevated portion of the sensibilities, it is not there. And here, we apprehend, is the great ground of distinction between men and the brutes. The latter, as well as human beings, appear to know what is good, considered as addressed simply to the natural affections; but man has the higher knowledge of moral as well as of natural good. The brute, as well as man, knows what is desirable, considered in the light of the natural appetites and passions;

but man enjoys the infinitely higher prerogative of knowing what is worthy of pursuit, considered in the light of moral and conscientious perceptions.

§ 11. Classification of the natural sensibilities.

Beginning, in the examination of the wide and interesting subject before us, with the natural or pathematic sensibilities, we shall find this portion of our sensitive nature resolving itself into the subordinate divisions of the Emotions and Desires. These two classes of mental states follow each other in the order in which they have been named; the Emotions first, which are exceedingly numerous and various; and then the Desires, embracing under the latter term the Appetites, Propensities, and Affections. This is not only the order in succession or time, but it is also the order in nature.—In other words, and stated more particularly, such is the constitution of the human mind, that, when we pass from the region of the intellect to that of the sensibilities, we first find ourselves (and there is no other possible position which, in the first instance, we can occupy) in the domain of the EMOTIONS. We are at first pleased or displeased, or have some other emotion in view of the thing, whatever it is, which has come under the cognizance of the intellect. And emotions, in the ordinary process of mental action, are followed by Desires. As we cannot be pleased or displeased without some antecedent perception or knowledge of the thing which we are pleased or displeased with, so we cannot desire to possess or avoid anything without having laid the foundation of such desire in the existence of some antecedent emotion. And this is not only the matter of fact, which, as the mind is actually constituted, is presented to our notice; but we cannot well conceive how it could be otherwise. To desire a thing which utterly fails to excite within us the least emotion of pleasure seems to be a sort of solecism or absurdity in nature; in other words, it seems to be impossible, from the nature of things, under any conceivable circumstances. At any rate, it is not possible as the mind is actually constituted, whatever might have been the fact if the mind had been constituted differently.

§ 12. Classification of the moral sensibilities.

If we look at the conscientious or Moral sensibilities, we find that they divide themselves in a manner entirely analogous to the division which is found to exist in the Natural. The first class of mental states which presents itself to our notice under this general head is that of moral Emotions; corresponding in the place which they occupy in relation to the Intellect, as well as in some other respects, to the natural emotions. The moral emotions are followed by another class of moral feelings, which may be designated as Obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation, which hold the same relation to the moral emotions which the Desires do to the natural emotions. If we had not moral emotions (that is to say, feelings of moral approval and disapproval), it would not be possible for us to feel under moral obligation in any case whatever; the latter state of the mind being obviously dependant on the former.—It will be noticed, that in this place we scarcely do more than simply state the fact of this subordinate classification, without entering into minute explanations. The precise relation which the two departments of our moral nature sustain to each other, will be more fully stated and clearly understood, when, in their proper place, they come particularly under examination.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

PART FIRST.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENSIBILITIES.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENTIMENTS.

CLASS FIRST.

EMOTIONS OR EMOTIVE STATES OF THE MIND.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS.

§ 13. We have a knowledge of emotions by consciousness.

In prosecuting the examination of the Sensibilities, in accordance with the plan which has been marked out in the Introduction, we begin with the Emotions. It is, of course, implied in the arrangement we have made, which assigns them a distinct place, that this class of mental states has a nature and characteristics of its own, in virtue of which they are distinguished from all others. At the same time, it cannot be denied, that it is extremely difficult to explain by mere words what that precise nature is. We do not suppose, indeed, that any one is ignorant of what is meant when we have occasion to speak of an emotion, whether it be an emotion of melancholy, of cheerfulness, of surprise, or of some other kind. But, whatever may be the fact as to our knowledge, it is unquestionable that we are unable to give a verbal explanation of them, *in themselves considered.* In this respect they are like all other states of the mind which are truly simple. The fact of their entire simplicity necessarily renders them undefinable; because a definition implies a separation of the thing defined into parts. So that we are dependant for a knowledge of the interior and essential nature of emotions, not upon verbal explanations and definitions, which are inadequate to the communication of such knowledge, but upon consciousness. It is a species of knowledge which the soul reveals to itself by its own act, directly and immediately. While, therefore, we do not profess to define emotions in any proper and legitimate sense of defining, we may commend them without impropriety to each one's internal examination. And certainly we may rely upon the intimations which consciousness, when properly interrogated, can hardly fail to disclose, in this case as well as in others.

§ 14. The place of emotions, considered in reference to other mental acts.

Although, in attempting to give some idea of Emotions, we are obliged, for a knowledge of them, in themselves considered, to refer each one to his own consciousness, we may nevertheless mention some circumstances which throw an indirect light on them; and, at any rate, render more clear to our perception the relation which they sustain to other mental states. The first circumstance which we propose to indicate has reference to the position which they occupy (of course it will be understood that we mean their position, not in the material sense of the term, but in time or succession). It will be found on examination to be the fact, as we have already had occasion to suggest, that Emotions always occupy a place between intellections or acts of the intellect and the desires, if they are natural emotions; and between intellections and feelings of moral obligation, if they are moral emotions. That they are subsequent to intellections, we believe must be abundantly clear. It is as obvious as any axiom of geometry, that we cannot have any feeling, any emotion, in respect to that, whatever it is, which we have no knowledge of.

In regard to the Desires, it is true, that, like the emotions, they are subsequent to the perceptive and cognitive acts; but it is well understood that they are not in *immediate* proximity with them. It is perfectly obvious, that no act of perception, or of cognition in any shape, can lay the foundation for a desire, unless the object of perception is pleasant to us; in other words, unless it excites within us pleasant emotions. For, whenever we speak of a thing as pleasant to us, we certainly involve the fact that we have pleasant emotions in view of it.—Nor, furthermore, can any perceptive or intellectual act lay the foundation for Obligatory feelings (that is to say, feelings of moral obligation) without the intervention and aid of moral emotions. It may be regarded as self-evident, that we never could feel under moral obligation to do or not to do a thing, unless the thing to be done or not to be done had first excited within us an emotion of approval or disapproval. So that the desires, and those feelings in the moral sensibilities which correspond to

them, are based upon emotions, as really as the emotions are based upon intellections. In the order of nature, therefore, emotions are found in the place which has now been allotted them, and they are found nowhere else; being always and necessarily posterior to a knowledge of the things to which they relate; and, on the other hand, antecedent, by an equally strict natural necessity, to the other states of the mind which have been mentioned.

§ 15. The character of emotions changes so as to conform to that of perceptions.

It is important to impress upon the recollection that the order of succession, in fact and in nature, is precisely that which has been stated, viz., intellections, emotions, and desires in the case of the natural sensibilities, and obligatory feelings in the case of the moral sensibilities. The two last mentioned being followed immediately, as their natural results, by acts of the will, which terminate and complete the entire process of mental action. But as we must take them and examine them in their order, we say further, in regard to the Emotions, which is the topic before us at present, that the fact of their subsequence to intellections and of their being based upon them is confirmed by the circumstance of their always changing or varying in precise accordance with the perceptive or intellective acts. If it were otherwise (that is to say, if they had any other foundation than intellective acts), how does it happen that these changes so uniformly take place? We are looking, for instance, on some extended landscape; but are so situated that the view of certain objects is interrupted, and, of course, the relations of the whole are disturbed. At such a time the emotions we have are far from being pleasant; perhaps they are decidedly unpleasant. But, as soon as our imperfect perceptions are corrected, as soon as we are able to embrace the portions which were previously thrust out of view, and thus restore the interrupted proportions and harmony of the whole scenery, our emotions change at once, and we experience the highest pleasure.—Again, if we look at a painting which has come from the hand of

some master of his art, we are distinctly conscious at first sight of a pleasing emotion; but we examine it further, and make ourselves acquainted with a number of things, less prominent than others, but still decidedly showing the skill of the painter, which escaped our first view, and we are conscious of a distinct change in that emotion It becomes more decided, more full, in precise conformity with the increased knowledge which we have obtained of the merit which the picture actually possesses. And it is so, if no unusual disturbing influence is interposed, in every other case, showing not only the intimate but proximate connexion between the emotions and the intellective acts, and the dependance of the former on the latter.

§ 16. Emotions characterized by rapidity and variety.

When we assert that the position of the emotions is between intellections on the one hand, and desires and obligations on the other, we imply, of course, that there is a real and marked distinction between them and the latter mental states. And this distinction exists. If consciousness gives us a knowledge of emotions, the same consciousness can hardly fail to give us a knowledge of the mental states that are subsequent to them; and the difference of knowledge resulting from these different acts of consciousness, involves necessarily a difference in the things known. Among other things, if we consult our consciousness for the purpose of ascertaining the comparative nature of the mental states in question, we shall undoubtedly be led to notice that the emotions, as compared with the others, are generally more prompt and rapid in their origin, as well as more evanescent. They arise and depart on the surface of the mind, swelling and sinking almost instantaneously, like the small waves and ripples that play upon the scarcely agitated surface of a summer's lake, and which have no sooner arrested the eye of the beholder than they are gone. The desires and feelings of obligation not only arise subsequently and more slowly, but obviously possess a greater tenacity and inflexibility of nature. When a strong desire or a decided sentiment of duty has once intrenched itself in the

soul, it is well known that it is comparatively difficult to dislodge it.

There is another circumstance involved in the distinction between them. The emotions have less unity in kind; in other words, are more various. Desires and obligations, although liable, like other mental states, to be modified by peculiar circumstances, are, in themselves considered, always one and the same. But of emotions we find many varieties, such as the emotions of cheerfulness and joy, of melancholy and sorrow, of shame, of surprise, astonishment, and wonder. We have furthermore the emotions, differing from all others, of the ludicrous, the emotions of beauty and sublimity, also the moral emotions of approval and disapproval, and some others.—If the reader will bear these statements in mind, taken in connexion with some things to be said hereafter, he will feel less objection than he might otherwise have felt to the general and subordinate classifications which we have thought ourselves authorized to make. These divisions we hold to be fundamental. They are necessarily involved, as we apprehend, in a thorough and consistent knowledge of the mind. Important points, for instance, in the doctrine of the Will, will be found to depend upon distinctions which are asserted to exist in the sensibilities. It is desirable, therefore, that the grounds of such distinctions should be understood, so that they may not only be above rejection, but above doubt

CHAPTER II.

EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY.

§ 17. Characteristics of emotions of beauty.

We do not not profess to enter into an examination of every possible emotion. They are so various and multiplied it would be difficult to do it; nor would any important object be answered. Proceeding on the principle of selecting those which, either in themselves or by reason of their relation to the arts and to human conduct, ap-

pear to be most interesting and important, we shall begin with emotions of Beauty.—We have already had occasion to remark, that all emotions are undefinable. This remark is applicable to those under consideration as well as others. Of the emotions of beauty it will be as difficult to give a definition, so as to make them clearer to any one's comprehension than they really are, as to define the simple sensations of colour, sound, or taste. We find in them, however, these two marks or characteristics:

(1.) The emotion of beauty, in the first place, is always a pleasing one. We never give the name to one which is painful, or to any feeling of disgust. Whenever, therefore, we speak of an emotion of beauty, we imply, in the use of the terms, some degree of satisfaction or pleasure. All persons, the illiterate as well as the scientific, use the phrase with this import.—(2.) We never speak of emotions of beauty, to whatever degree may be our experience of inward satisfaction, without referring such emotions to something external. The same emotion, which is called satisfaction or delight of mind, when it is wholly and exclusively internal, we find to be termed an emotion of beauty, if we are able to refer it to something without, and to spread its charms around any external object.

§ 18. Of what is meant by beautiful objects.

There are many objects which excite the emotion of beauty; that is, when the objects are presented, this emotion, in a greater or less degree, immediately exists. These objects we call beautiful.—There are other objects which, so far from exciting pleasant emotions within us, are either indifferent, or cause feelings of a decidedly opposite character, so that we speak of them as deformed or disgusting. If there were no emotions, pleasant or unpleasant, excited by either of these classes, or if the emotions which they cause were of the same kind, we should apply to them the same epithets. So that the ground of distinction, which, in speaking of these different objects, we never fail to make, appears to exist in our own feelings. In other words, we call an object BEAUTIFUL because it excites within us pleasant emotions, which, in the

circumstances of the case, we cannot well ascribe to any other cause. And when we prefer to say, in other terms, that an object has beauty, we obviously mean the same thing, viz., that the object has a trait or quality (perhaps we may find it difficult to explain precisely what it is) which causes these emotions.

§ 19. Of the distinction between beautiful and other objects.

In view of what has been said, we may venture to make two remarks.—(I.) Every beautiful object has something in itself which truly discriminates it from all other objects. This something, this peculiar trait, whatever it is, lays the foundation for those results in the human mind, which, on being experienced, authorize us to speak of the object as beautiful. This is clear, not only from what, on a careful examination, we shall frequently find in the objects themselves, but also from the fact that the operations of the mind always have their appropriate causes. If the mind experiences a pleasant emotion in view of a certain object, it is because there is something in the object which has a determinate and permanent relation to that particular mental state which distinguishes it from other objects. If it were not for that distinctive trait in the object, the human mind is so constituted that it could not have experienced the corresponding emotion.

(II.) Beautiful objects are distinguished from all others, not only by something in themselves, certain original and inherent traits characteristic of them, but also, and perhaps still more, by a superadded trait, a species of borrowed effulgence, derived and reflected back from the mind itself. When we contemplate a beautiful object, we are pleased; we are more or less happy. We naturally connect this emotion of pleasure with the object which is its cause; and we have been in the habit of doing this, no doubt in most instances unconsciously to ourselves, from early life. The consequence is, the association between the inward delight and the outward cause becomes so strong that we are unable to separate them; and the objects, additional to their own proper qualities, appear to be surrounded and to beam out with an effulgence which comes from the mind.

These remarks will be found to have an application to certain speculations which have sometimes been promulgated on the subject of beauty. In accordance with what has just been said, we do not feel at liberty to deny absolutely and without qualification, as the philosophy of some writers seems to authorize them to do, that there is actually beauty in the objects which are generally considered as possessing it; in the rising or setting sun, in the moon walking in her majesty, and in the multitude of stars that rejoice in her presence. On the contrary, we have already intimated that there is something in all these cases, as there is in blossoms, and flowers, and waving trees, and falling cascades, which distinguishes them from other objects that are not beautiful. God has made them glorious in themselves. But, at the same time, we have no doubt that they are invested, in the eye of the beholder, with a new and additional radiance, which flows out from his own bosom. The mind seems to act on the principle of *compensation;* it receives from the lustre of the outward object a happiness, which it repays by throwing around it the appropriate tribute of superadded splendour

§ 20. Grounds or occasions of emotions of beauty various.

The next remark which we have to make on the subject of Beauty is, that the objects by which it is occasioned are not always the same, but are very various; differing from each other not only in their general nature, but also in their subordinate incidents. This may occasion a degree of surprise and difficulty in the minds of some, who cannot readily perceive how the results can be identical, while there is such a want of unity and accordance in their antecedents. It has frequently been the case, that writers, under the bias of mind originating from this difficulty, have endeavoured to resolve the various grounds or causes of beauty into one. In other words, they are disposed to maintain, that in every object which men agree in denominating beautiful, there is one common quality, one predominant element, however different the objects may be in other respects, which is the ground of the internal emotion. Accordingly, some announce the general and somewhat indefinite doctrine, that beauty

consists in the perception of relations; others, more precise and definite in their views, maintain that it consists in a fixed and determinate proportion (that is to say, a proportion which is known and measurable) of the parts of the object; others, again, assert that the emotion of beauty is based upon the perception of utility; in other words, in the perception of the fitness of the beautiful object for some profitable purpose.

It is not our object to endeavour in this place, as we shall have occasion to refer to the subject again, to show the futility of these and other kindred attempts, which aim, and in some instances with no small show of plausibility, to resolve the basis of all beauty into a single principle. We simply state here, in general terms, the fact, as we understand it to be, that the grounds or causes of beauty, while the result or internal emotion is always identical in its nature, are multiplied and various. In other words, we assert that beauty in the mind is one, while outward beauty, or, rather, the causes of beauty in outward objects, is many; accompanying the statement with the additional and explanatory remark, that this state of things, anomalous as it may appear at first, is supported by the analogy of the mind in some other instances.

§ 21. Illustrations of the foregoing statement.

Take, as an illustration, the state of the mind denominated Belief. The grounds or occasions of belief, it is well known, are very various; so much so as scarcely to exhibit any likeness or to admit of any comparison; but belief itself, although it admits of various degrees, is always the same in nature. It is occasioned alike (and this is obviously a fundamental principle of the mind) by the senses, by original suggestion, by consciousness, by memory, by relative suggestion or judgment, by reasoning, and testimony; and the operation of all these various causes results in an identity of feeling.—We have another instance of the same thing in Association. This term does not appear to express a state or feeling of the mind, so much as a general fact in the mind's operations, a principle or law of its action. When association takes

place, there is always a sameness or unity of result; the issue is not discordant with itself, but is one, viz., a regular consecution of the mental states. But, although the result is identical, the antecedents or causes are various, viz., resemblance, contrast, contiguity in time and place, and cause and effect, which are greatly modified also by other causes.

And so in regard to emotions of beauty. There is a want of identity in the grounds of their existence, but not in the result which follows. The causes, like different roads conducting to the same termination, are various; but the issue is one.—It ought to be added, however, although the emotion of beauty is the same in nature under every variety of circumstances, it exists in different and various *degrees*. We speak with entire propriety of the beauty of an object being greater or less, the same as we speak of any event which is alleged to have taken place, as being, in our opinion, more or less probable; expressions indicative of differences in the degree of belief which the mind under the particular circumstances of the case entertains.

§ 22. Of the objects in general which excite emotions of beauty.

Keeping in view what was said in the last section, we may with propriety regard the term BEAUTY, not so much a particular as a *general* or *common* name, expressive of numerous emotions which always possess the characteristic of being pleasant, and are in every respect always the same in nature; but which may differ from each other both in the occasions of their origin, and also in the degree or intensity in which they exist.—(I.) In regard to the occasions on which they arise, we may remark further, that emotions of beauty are felt, and frequently in a very high degree, in the contemplation of material objects that are addressed to the sense of sight, such as woods, waters, cultivated fields, and the visible firmament. We look abroad upon nature, in the infinite variety of her works, as she is exhibited in the depths below and in the heights above; in her shells and minerals; in her plants, and flowers, and trees; in her waters, and her stars and suns; and we find the mind kindling at the

sight; fountains of pleasure are suddenly opened within us; and we should do violence to our mental structure if we did not pronounce them beautiful.

(II.) Again, emotions of beauty are felt in the contemplation of intellectual and moral objects. In other words, mind, as well as matter, furnishes the occasion on which they arise. The means or instruments by which mind, which is not a direct object of sight or of any of the senses, is revealed to us, are various, such as the natural signs of the countenance, the tones of the voice, conventional language, and the actions of men in trying situations. Whenever, and in whatever way, we discover intelligence, wisdom, truth, honour, magnanimity, benevolence, justice, or other traits of a mind acting as it was created and designed to act, we have a foundation laid (varying, it is true, with the degree in which they exist, with the combinations they form with each other, and with the circumstances in which they are put forth) for the emotions of beauty. The human countenance, considered merely as a material object, and as presenting nothing more than outline and colour, is undoubtedly beautiful, but becomes more so when it distinctly indicates to us intelligence and amiability. This is particularly true when moral traits are made known to us. The approbation which we yield when the poor are relieved, the weak are defended, and the vicious are reclaimed, and when, in general, any other striking deeds of a virtuous kind are performed, is always attended with a delightful movement of the heart, which, as it is reflected back upon it, gives to the action a decided character of beauty.

(III.) But emotions of beauty are not exclusively limited to these occasions. Feelings, which not only bear the same name, but are truly analogous in kind, exist also on the contemplation of many other things.—The sentiment or feeling of beauty exists, for instance, when we are following out a happy train of reasoning; and hence the mathematician, who certainly has a delightful feeling, analogous to what we experience in contemplating many works of nature, speaks of a *beautiful* theorem.—The connoisseur in music applies the term *beautiful* to a favourite air; the lover of poetry speaks of a

beautiful song; and the painter discovers beauty in the design and in the colouring of his pictures. We also apply the term beauty to experiments in the different departments of physics, especially when the experiment is simple, and results in deciding a point which has occasioned doubt and dispute. We speak of it, and, as we suppose, with a degree of propriety, as a beautiful experiment.

So that all nature, taking the word in a wide sense, is the province of beauty; the intellectual and the sensitive, as well as the material world. We do not, however, mean by this to descend into particulars, and to say that everything which exists within the range of these departments is beautiful, but merely that from none of the great departments of nature are the elements of beauty excluded.

§ 23. All objects not equally fitted to cause these emotions.

From what has been said, it must be evident that there is a correspondence between the mind and the outward objects which are addressed to it. This has already been clearly seen in respect to the sensations and external perceptions, and it is not less evident in respect to that part of our nature which we are now attending to. The mind, and the external world, and the external circumstances of our situation, are reciprocally suited to each other. Hence, when we ascribe the quality of beauty to any object, we have reference to this mutual adaptation. An object is ordinarily called beautiful when it has agreeable qualities; in other words, when it is the cause or antecedent of the emotion of beauty. However it might appear to other beings, it would not have the character of beauty to us if there were not a sort of correspondence, an adaptedness to each other, between our mental constitution and such outward object.

But no one can be ignorant that not all objects cause the emotions in question; and of those which possess this power, some have it in a greater and some in a less degree. This brings us to a very important inquiry. It is no unreasonable curiosity which wishes to know why the effect is so limited, and why all objects are not em-

braced in it. Why different objects cause the same emotion in different degrees. And why the same objects produce a diversity of emotions in different individuals, and even in the same individual at different times.

§ 24. A susceptibility of emotions of beauty an ultimate principle of our mental constitution.

In answering these questions, something must be taken for granted; there must be some starting-point; otherwise all that can be said will be involved in inextricable confusion. That is, we must take for granted that the mind has an original susceptibility of such emotions. Nor can we suppose there can be any objection to a concession which is warranted by the most general experience. We all know that we are created with this susceptibility, because we are all conscious of having had those emotions which are attributed to it. And if we are asked how, or why it is, that the susceptibility at the bottom of these feelings exists, we can only say, that such was the will of the Being who created the mind; and that this is one of the original or ultimate elements of our nature.

Although the mind, therefore, is originally susceptible of emotions of beauty, as every one knows, still it is no less evident, from the general arrangements we behold, both in physical and intellectual nature, that these emotions have their fixed causes or antecedents. We have seen that these causes are not limited to one class or kind, but are to be found under various circumstances; in the exercises of reasoning, in the fanciful creations of poetry, in musical airs, in the experiments of physics, in the forms of material existence, and the like. Perhaps we may assert as a general statement (that is to say, in a great number or majority of cases), these objects cannot be presented to the mind, and the mind be unmoved by it; it contemplates them, and it necessarily has a feeling of delight, of a greater or less degree of strength, which authorizes us in characterizing them as beautiful.

In asserting that this is correct as a *general statement*, it is implied that some objects do not originally cause these emotions. And hence we are led to enter into more

particular inquiries, having reference to this difference in what may be called, in the phraseology of some recent writers, the ÆSTHETIC power of objects. Accordingly, our purpose in the remarks which are to follow, is to point out some of those objects, and forms and qualities of objects, which seem from their very nature, and in distinction from other objects which do not have this power, fitted to create within us the feelings under consideration.

§ 25. Remarks on the beauty of forms.—The circle.

In making that selection of those objects and qualities of objects which we suppose to be fitted, in the original constitution of things, to cause within us pleasing emotions of themselves, independently of any extraneous aid, we cannot profess to speak with certainty. The appeal is to the general experience of men; and all we can do is to give, so far as it seems to have been ascertained, the results of that experience. Beginning, therefore, with material objects, we are justified by general experience in saying that certain dispositions or forms of matter are beautiful; for instance, the CIRCLE.

We rarely look upon a winding or serpentine form without experiencing a feeling of pleasure, and on seeing a circle this pleasure is heightened. Hence Hogarth, who, both by his turn of mind and by his habits of life, has claims to be regarded as a judge, expressly lays it down in his Analysis of Beauty, that those lines which have most variety in themselves, contribute most towards the production of beauty; and that the most beautiful line by which a surface can be bounded is the waving or serpentine, or that which constantly, but imperceptibly, deviates from the straight line. This, which we frequently find in shells, flowers, and other pleasing natural productions, he calls the line of beauty.

Without entering into the question whether the circular form has absolutely, all other things being equal, more beauty than any other form, it can certainly be said, without hesitation, that it possesses the power of exciting this emotion, at least in a considerable degree. We might safely refer it to almost any man's experience, whatever his mental character or situation in life, and let him say,

when he contemplates the waving features of numberless flowers, when he gathers on the seashore wreathed and variegated shells, or beholds through distant meadows the winding stream, or pauses in the pathless wood to gaze on the constantly-changing position of its branches, whether he does not at once feel within him a spontaneous movement of delight. Is not the object, which is directly before him, in itself a source of this feeling? Although he may have a superadded pleasure from some other source, as we shall have occasion to see; still, considering the subject particularly in reference to the object before him, may not the true philosophy be summed up in the single assertion that he sees and he feels; he beholds and he admires; the intellect, through the instrumentality of the eye, has a knowledge of the object, and the awakened heart expands with the homage of its voluntary joy.

§ 26. Original or intrinsic beauty.—The circle.

It is necessary, in examining the subject of beauty, to look at it in two points of view, viz., as Intrinsic and as Associated. In the remarks which we may have occasion to make in this chapter, we have reference exclusively to what may be denominated Original or Intrinsic beauty; by which we mean that which is founded in the nature of the object, independently of accidental or merely accessory circumstances.—Accordingly, in view of the remark at the close of the last section, it seems to result from the common experience of mankind, that objects which are circular, or approach that form, exhibiting a constantly varying outline, have in themselves, and on account of this configuration, a degree, and not unfrequently a *high* degree, of beauty. The bending stem of the tulip, the curve of the weeping willow, the windings of the ivy, the vine wreathing itself around the elm, the serpentine river, are highly pleasing. The vast circular expanse of the visible sky, when seen in a cloudless night, is a beautiful object, independently of the splendour that is spread over it by its brilliant troops of stars. The arch of the rainbow, expanding its immense curve over our heads, could hardly fail to be regarded as an object of great beauty, even if nothing but the form and outline

were presented to our vision, without the unrivalled lustre of its colours. And the same of other instances, scattered in profusion through the works of nature, but too numerous to be mentioned here.

On this question, as on many others in mental philosophy, we appeal to the common feelings of mankind. And it is on this account that what we now say on the subject of the intrinsic beauty of some objects and combinations of objects, we take to be no "fable of man's device," no tinkering of an earthly philosophy; but the response of a higher oracle, the voice of nature, the announcement of the universal heart of humanity. We are aware that some may object to such an appeal; they perhaps regard it as below the dignity of science; but no one is ignorant that philosophers, who were not wanting in sagacity, have frequently made it. Their great inquiry on subjects of this nature is, what men generally have thought and felt. "I never remember," says Mr. Burke, "that anything beautiful, whether a man, a beast, a bird, or a plant, was ever shown, though it were to a hundred people, that they did not all immediately agree that it was beautiful, though some might have thought that it fell short of their expectation, or that other things were still finer. I believe no man thinks a goose to be more beautiful than a swan, or imagines that what they call a Friezland hen excels a peacock."

§ 27. Of the beauty of straight and angular forms.

Although the circular or constantly varying outline is thought, more than any other, to excite the delightful emotions under consideration, we are not to suppose that the power of beauty is excluded from other forms. In examining the works of nature, it is hardly necessary to say that we find numerous instances of straight and angular forms, as well as of the serpentine and winding, although perhaps less frequently. It can hardly be doubted that these forms, as they are operated upon and moulded in nature's hands, possess more or less beauty. It is almost a matter of supererogation to attempt to illustrate this statement to those who have a heart and eye open to the great variety of her works, which on every side

are presented to our notice. Her forms, either original or in their combinations, are without number; and if it be true that beauty does not claim a relationship with all, it is equally so that it is not restricted to one, or even a small portion of them. The intertwining shrubbery, which spreads itself abroad upon the ground, emits, if we may be allowed the expression, its sparkles and gleams of beauty around our feet. The elm, which rises upward towards the heavens, and forms its broad and green arch over our heads, is radiant with beauty also, although it is exceedingly diverse in its appearance. We readily admit, for we cannot well do otherwise without violence to the suggestions of our nature, that the curve of the weeping willow possesses beauty. But, at the same time, we are not prepared to assert that the solitary palm-tree is absolutely destitute of it, although it displays, as it arises on the bosom of the desert, nothing but a tall, straight, branchless trunk, surmounted at the top, like a Corinthian column, by a single tuft of foliage.

"There are an infinite number of the feebler vegetables," says Mr. Alison, "and many of the common grasses, the forms of which are altogether distinguished by angles and straight lines, and where there is not a single curvature through the whole, yet all of which are beautiful." He ascribes, in another place, a high degree of beauty to the knotted and angular stem of the balsam. And remarks also, in regard to the myrtle, that it is "generally reckoned a beautiful form, yet the growth of its stem is perpendicular, the junctions of its branches form regular and similar angles, and their direction is in straight or angular lines."

Although it seems to be unnecessary to delay at much length on this topic, we take the liberty to refer to a single instance more, because it has probably escaped the notice of many persons, and has never, so far as we know, been adduced in illustration of the subject under review. One would hardly look for symmetrical and beautiful configurations in the falling flakes of snow. It appears, however, that the snow, at different times, and under the different circumstances in which it falls, assumes about a hundred different forms; not merely accidental, but de-

terminate and permanent forms. Exact delineations of these forms have been executed; particularly of those which were observed by Mr. Scoresby in the Polar Seas; and although the circular or waving outline is almost entirely excluded from them, they are, in general, highly beautiful.

§ 28. Of square, pyramidal, and triangular forms.

The remarks of the last section, going to show that beauty is not limited to circular forms, is confirmed by what we observe in the works of art as well as of nature. The square, for instance, although we do not suppose it presents very high claims, comes in for a share of notice. On account of its practical convenience, and also for the reason of its being more entirely within the reach of human skill than some other forms, it is frequently introduced into architecture; generally with a pleasing effect, and sometimes with a high degree of beauty.

In the Gothic architecture, the pyramidal, a form still further removed from any relationship with the circle, has a conspicuous place; and, when properly combined with other forms, gives a decided pleasure. Hogarth, in illustration of his remark, that variety has a great share in producing beauty, explicitly observes that the pyramid, which gradually diminishes from its basis to its points, is a beautiful form. And it is in consequence of being so regarded that we find it so frequently employed, not only as a characteristic feature in the order of architecture just referred to, but in steeples, sepulchral monuments, and other works of art.

Triangular forms also are not without beauty. Mr. Alison states that the forms of Grecian and Roman furniture, in their periods of cultivated taste, were almost universally distinguished by straight or angular lines. What is there, he inquires, more beautiful than the form of the ancient tripod? "The feet gradually lessening to the end, and converging as they approach it; the plane of the table placed, with little ornament, nearly at right angles to the feet; and the whole appearing to form an imperfect triangle, whose base is above. There is scarcely, in such a subject, a possibility of contriving a more an-

gular form, yet there can be none more completely beautiful."

In connexion with these statements, it is proper to add a single explanatory remark. We have much reason to believe that the emotion will be stronger in all cases in proportion as the beautiful object is distinctly and immediately embraced by the mind. It may be asserted, with undoubted good reason, that the square form has a degree of beauty as well as the circle, although it is generally conceded that it has less. But it is a matter of inquiry whether the difference in this respect is owing so much to the original power of the forms themselves as to the circumstance just alluded to. In other words, whether it be not owing to the fact that the circle, being more simple, makes a more direct, entire, and decided impression; whereas the attention is divided among the sides and angles of the square and other similar figures.

§ 29. The variety of the sources of that beauty which is founded on forms illustrated from the different styles of architecture.

The doctrine that all beauty is limited to a particular form or a small number of forms, does not appear to be sustained, but rather to be discountenanced and rebuked, by what we notice in the different orders of architecture: as it is, in fact, by all the arts that are based on the feelings now under review. An interesting field of inquiry is here opened, which we are not at liberty to enter, but must merely glance at and leave.

The simple facts which it is important for us to notice are, FIRST, that all the acknowledged styles of architecture are more or less beautiful; and, SECOND, that they all differ from each other, being respectively distinguished by their own characteristics.—We cannot be expected to go into particulars. We read, however, of the architecture of Egypt; and the monuments of its existence, surprising for their number and extent, still remain. No one, if we are at liberty to receive the statements of travellers, can walk amid the desolate cities on the banks of the Nile, and amid the splendid ruins of its sacred islands, without profound emotions of delight and admiration, as he contemplates the remains of sculptured grot-

toes, obelisks, columns, sphinxes, colossal statues, and pyramids. But his delight and admiration would not be less if he could the next moment be set down amid the hills of Greece, crowned with the multitude of her temples and the groups of her statuary; although he would find the principles which predominate in her great works of art, the Doric severity and strength, the Ionic lightness and grace, the Corinthian ornament, and other characteristic features, exceedingly different, in many respects, from what he had witnessed just before. And even the Gothic architecture, the product of a later and comparatively barbarous age, but inspired by a new insight into nature, and adventuring upon new combinations, has opened in its light and clustered pillars, its pinnacles, capitals, and pointed arches, rich and before unexplored sources of beauty.

It is to this fact simply that we wish to direct attention, viz., that all the acknowledged styles of architecture are more or less beautiful; but are all, in many particulars, different from each other. The authors of them seem to have wandered forth into the great universe of beauty, and to have gathered up, from the exemplars which nature so richly furnishes, such forms as pleased them best; being guided, of course, in some measure, by the circumstances of their time and country. But this could not have been; they could not have gathered so richly and so variously as is testified by the splendid but diversified monuments they have left, if nature had been so restricted, as some have supposed, in her liberality, and if the forms of beauty had not been many, but one.

§ 30. Of the original or intrinsic beauty of colours.

We proceed to remark, as we advance in the further consideration of this interesting subject, that we experience emotions of beauty in beholding the colours, as well as in contemplating the outlines or forms of bodies. The doctrine which we hold is, that some colours of themselves, independently of the additional interest which may subsequently be attached to them in consequence of certain associations, are fitted to excite within us those feelings of pleasure, which authorize us in this, as well as in

other analogous cases, to speak of the cause of them as beautiful. In other words, there are some colours which possess, as we suppose, an original or intrinsic beauty.—In support of this opinion, we are merely able to allude to some of the various considerations which naturally present themselves, without entering into that minute exposition of them which would be admissible in a treatise professedly and exclusively devoted to the subject before us.

(1.) The pleasure which results from the mere beholding of colours may be observed in very early life. It is in consequence of this pleasing emotion that the infant so early directs its eyes towards the light that breaks in from the window, or which reaches the sense of vision from any other source. It is pleasing to see with what evident ecstasy the child rushes from flower to flower, and compares their brilliancy. Casting his eyes abroad in the pursuit of objects that are richly variegated, he pauses to gaze with admiration on every tree that is most profusely loaded with blossoms, or that is burdened with fruit of the deepest red and yellow. It is because he is attracted with the brightness of its wings that he pursues the butterfly with a labour so unwearied, or suspends his sport to watch the wayward movements of the humming-bird.

(2.) The same results are found also, very strikingly and generally, among all savage tribes. The sons of the forest are not so wholly untutored, so wholly devoid of natural sensibility, that they will not sometimes forget the ardour of the chase in the contemplation of the flowers which bloom in the neighbourhood of their path. Seeing how beautiful the fish of their lakes and rivers, the bird of their forests, and the forest tree itself are rendered by colours, they commit the mistake of attempting to render their own bodies more beautiful by artificial hues. They value whatever dress they may have in proportion to the gaudiness of its colours; they weave rich and variegated plumes into their hair; and as they conjectured, from his scarlet dress, that Columbus was the captain of the Spaniards, so they are wont to intimate and express their own rank and dignity by the splendour of their equipments.

(3.) And the same trait, which had been so often noticed in Savages, may be observed also, though in a less degree, among the uneducated classes in civilized communities. In persons of refinement, the original tendency to receive pleasing emotions from the contemplation of colours seems to have, in a measure, lost its power, in consequence of the developement of tendencies to receive pleasure from other causes. In those, on the contrary, who have possessed less advantages of mental culture, and whose sources of pleasure may in consequence be supposed to lay nearer to the surface of the mind, this tendency remains undiminished. Coloured objects generally affect them with a high degree of pleasure; so much so that the absence of colour is not, in their estimation, easily compensated by the presence of any other qualities. We cannot well suppose that there is any intermediate influence between the beautiful object and the mind, of which this pleasure is the product, but must rather conclude, in the circumstances of the case, that the presence of the object, and that only, is the ground of its existence. It is this view of the subject which seems to be taken in a passage of Akenside, that is interesting for its poetical merit as well as its philosophical truth.

"Ask the swain,
Who journeys homeward from a summer day's
Long labour, why, forgetful of his toils
And due repose, he loiters to behold
The sunshine gleaming, as through amber clouds,
O'er all the western sky; full soon, I ween,
His rude expression and untutored airs,
Beyond the power of language, will unfold
The form of Beauty smiling at the heart."

§ 31. Further illustrations of the original beauty of colours.

We may derive additional proof of the fact, that colours are of themselves fitted to cause emotions of beauty, from what we learn in the case of those persons who have been blind from birth, but in after-life have suddenly been restored by couching, or in some other way.—"I have couched," says Dr. Wardrop,* speaking of James

* As quoted by Mr. Stewart in his account of Mitchell.

Mitchell, "one of his eyes successfully; and he is much amused with the visible world, though he mistrusts information gained by that avenue. One day I got him a new and *gaudy* suit of clothes, which delighted him beyond description. It was the most interesting scene of sensual gratification I ever beheld."

But this person, it appears, had some faint notions of light and colours previous to the operation by which his powers of vision were more fully restored. And the facts, stated in connexion with his exercise of this imperfect vision, are equally decisive in favour of the doctrine under consideration. The statements to which we refer are as follows.—"At the time of life when this boy began to walk, he seemed to be attracted by bright and dazzling colours; and though everything connected with his history appears to prove that he derived little information from the organ, yet he received from it much sensual gratification. He used to hold between his eye and luminous objects such bodies as he found to increase by their interposition the quantity of light; and it was one of his chief amusements to concentrate the sun's rays by means of pieces of glass, transparent pebbles, or similar substances, which he held between his eye and the light, and turned about in various directions. These, too, he would often break with his teeth, and give them that form which seemed to please him most. There were other modes by which he was in the habit of gratifying this fondness for light. He would retire to any outhouse or to any room within his reach, shut the windows and doors, and remain there for a considerable time, with his eyes fixed on some small hole or chink which admitted the sun's rays, eagerly watching them. He would also, during the winter nights, often retire to a dark corner of the room and kindle a light for his amusement. On these occasions, as well as in the gratification of his other sen ses, his countenance and gestures displayed a most inter esting avidity and curiosity."

The conclusion which we deduce from these sources of proof is, that colours are fitted, from our very constitution, to produce within us emotions of beauty

§ 32. Of sounds considered as a source of beauty.

We next propose to inquire into the application of these principles in respect to sounds. And here also we have reason to believe that they hold good to a certain extent; in other words, that certain sounds are pleasing of themselves; and are hence, agreeably to views already expressed, termed BEAUTIFUL.—In proceeding, however, to the consideration of beauty as it exists in connexion with sounds, it may be proper to recur to the remark which was made near the commencement of the chapter, that the sources or grounds of beauty, although the emotions they excite within us are all of essentially the same kind, are very various. In view of what was there said, we do not feel at liberty to doubt, as some may be disposed to do, whether there is beauty in sounds, merely because sounds are obviously altogether different from some other objects which constitute sources of beauty, such as colours or forms. It is not the intention of nature that the empire of the beautiful shall be limited in this manner. On the contrary, if certain sounds have something within them, which, from its very nature, is calculated to excite pleasing emotions, they are obviously distinguished by this circumstance from other sounds, and furnish a sufficient reason for our regarding them and speaking of them as BEAUTIFUL.

(I.) In asserting, however, that there is an original beauty in sounds, we do not wish to be understood as saying that all sounds, of whatever kind, possess this character. There are some sounds which, in themselves considered, are justly regarded as indifferent, and others are positively disagreeable. No one would hesitate in pronouncing the discordant creaking of a wheel, the filing of a saw, the braying of the ass, the scream of a peacock, or the hissing of a serpent, to be disagreeable. There are other sounds, such as the bleating of the lamb, the lowing of the cow, the call of the goat, and other notes and cries of animals, which appear to be, in themselves, entirely indifferent. We are aware that they are sometimes spoken of as beautiful, nor is it necessary to deny that they are sometimes heard with a high degree of pleasure. But we regard the beauty in this case as

rather associated than intrinsic; the result rather of accessory circumstances than of the thing itself. The happy remarks of Mr. Alison, going to show the nature of the beauty which is ordinarily felt at such times, will be read with interest.

"The bleating of a lamb is beautiful in a fine day in spring: in the depth of winter it is very far from being so. The lowing of a cow at a distance, amid the scenery of a pastoral landscape in summer, is extremely beautiful: in a farmyard it is absolutely disagreeable. The hum of the beetle is beautiful in a fine summer evening, as appearing to suit the stillness and repose of that pleasing season: in the noon of day it is perfectly indifferent. The twitter of the swallow is beautiful in the morning, and seems to be expressive of the cheerfulness of that time: at any other hour it is quite insignificant. Even the song of the nightingale, so wonderfully charming in the twilight or at night, is altogether disregarded during the day; in so much so, that it has given rise to the common mistake that this bird does not sing but at night."

§ 33. Illustrations of the original beauty of sounds.

(II.) Other sounds, those which are properly termed musical, have a beauty which is original or intrinsic, and not merely accessory. It is true that different nations have different casts or styles of music, modified by the situation and habits of the people; but everything that can properly be called music, whatever occasional or accidental modification it may assume, is in its nature more or less beautiful. Musical sounds, independently of their combinations and expressions, are characterized in a way which distinguishes them from all others; viz., by the circumstance of their possessing certain mathematical proportions in their times of vibration. Such sounds please us originally; in other words, whenever, in all ordinary circumstances, they are heard, they please naturally and necessarily.—We are aware that attempts have sometimes been made to explain the pleasure which is received from musical sounds, as well as from those of a different character, on the doctrine of association. But there are various difficulties in this explanation, some of which will now be referred to.

(1.) In the first place, we are led to expect, from the analogy of things which we witness in other cases, that we shall find in the human heart also an original sensibility to the beautiful in the matter under consideration. We refer now to what we frequently notice in the lower animals; and although we do not claim that very much weight should be attached to this view of the subject, it certainly furnishes some matter for reflection. Why should brute animals be originally pleased with musical sounds, and man, whom we may well suppose to have as much need of this pleasure, be naturally destitute of the capability of receiving it? In regard to brute animals (we do not say all, but many of them), there is no possible question as to the fact involved in this inquiry. Through all the numberless varieties which they exhibit, from the mouse, of which Linnæus says with strict truth, "DELECTATUR MUSICA," to the elephant on the banks of the Niger, that responds with his unwieldly dance to the rude instrument of the untutored African, they yield their homage to the magic of sweet sounds. To attempt to explain the pleasure they receive on the ground of association would be difficult, perhaps ridiculous. The simple fact is, that they listen and are delighted. It is the sound, and nothing but the sound, which excites the joy they exhibit. In this case, as in some others, the fact and the philosophy are one. And if the doctrine which we oppose be true, then the sluggish hippopotamus, if we may credit the statements of Denham, the late distinguished traveller in the interior of Africa, has a power which man, elevated as he is, has not. "We had a full opportunity," he expressly remarks, "of convincing ourselves that these uncouth and stupendous animals are very sensibly attracted by musical sounds, even though they should not be of the softest kind. As we passed along the waters of the lake Muggaby at sunrise, they followed the drums of the different chiefs the whole length of the water, sometimes approaching so close to the shore, that the water they spouted from their mouths reached the persons who were passing along the banks."* So great is the acknowledged power of music over many brute ani-

* Denham and Clapperton's Narrative, p. 121, 6°

mals, that the classical traditions which celebrate the achievements of the early poets and musicians scarcely transcend the bounds of truth.

> "For Orpheus' luto was strung with poets' sinews,
> Whose golden touch could soften steel and stones,
> Make tigers tame, and huge leviathans
> Forsake unsounded deeps to dance on sands."

(2.) In the second place, children at an early period of life, before they have had an opportunity of connecting associations with them to any great extent, are highly pleased with musical sounds. This is a fact which we cannot suppose has escaped the notice of any one. Let a wandering musician suddenly make his appearance in a country village with his fife, bagpipe, or hand-organ (instruments which are not supposed to possess the highest claims to musical power), and it is surprising to see with what an outburst of joy the sound is welcomed to the heart of childhood. Delighted countenances cluster at the windows; and merry groups, that just before made the streets ring with their noise, suddenly leave their sports, and rush with a new and delighted impulse to the presence of the strolling minstrel. This is universally the fact; and when we consider the early age at which it takes place, it seems to be inconsistent with any other view than that which ascribes to sounds of a certain character an original or intrinsic attraction.

(3.) We witness, furthermore, the same result in Savage tribes when they first become acquainted with the instruments of music, however simple or imperfect they may be, which have been fabricated by European skill. It is said of the native inhabitants of this country, that they frequently purchased of the Spaniards, when they first came to America, small bells; and when they hung them on their persons, and heard their clear musical sounds responding to the movement of their dances, they were filled with the highest possible delight. At a later period in the history of the country, it is related by one of the Jesuit missionaries, "that once coming into the company of certain ignorant and fierce Indians, he met with a rude and menacing reception, which foreboded no very favourable termination. As it was not his design, how-

ever, to enter into any contention if it possibly could be avoided, he immediately commenced playing on a stringed instrument; their feelings were softened at once; and the evil spirit of jealousy and anger, which they exhibited on his first approach to them, fled from their minds."* —We cannot suppose it necessary to multiply instances to the same effect.

§ 34. Further instances of the original beauty of sounds.

(4.) In the fourth place, deaf persons, who have been suddenly restored to the sense of hearing, and also persons who, in consequence of their peculiar situation, have never heard musical sounds till a certain period of their life, and have therefore been unable, in either case, to form associations with such sounds either pleasant or unpleasant, have been found, on hearing them for the first time, to experience a high degree of pleasure.—So far as we have been able to learn, we believe this to be the fact. At the same time, as instances of this kind seldom occur, and are still less frequently recorded, we do not profess to rely upon the statement as universally true, with an entire degree of confidence. The circumstances which are related of Caspar Hauser, on hearing musical sounds for the first time, are one of the few instances in point. The statement is as follows: "Not only his mind, but many of his senses, appeared at first to be in a state of stupor, and only gradually to open to the perception of external objects. It was not before the lapse of several days that he began to notice the striking of the steeple clock and the ringing of the bells. This threw him into the greatest astonishment, which at first was expressed only by his listening looks and by certain spasmodic motions of his countenance; but it was soon succeeded by a stare of benumbed meditation. Some weeks afterward, the nuptial procession of a peasant passed by the tower with a band of music close under his window. He suddenly stood listening, motionless as a statue; his countenance appeared to be transfigured, and his eyes, as it were, to radiate his ecstasy; his ears and eyes seemed continu-

* See Irving's Life and Voyages of Columbus, chap. ix., London Quarterly Review, vol. xxvi., p. 287.

ally to follow the movements of the sounds as they receded more and more; and they had long ceased to be audible, while he still continued immoveably fixed in a listening posture, as if unwilling to lose the last vibrations of these, to him, celestial notes, or as if his soul had followed them, and left his body behind it in torpid insensibility."*

§ 35. The permanency of musical power dependant on its being intrinsic.

On the subject of the original or intrinsic beauty of certain sounds, one other remark remains to be made here. —It will be recollected that the doctrine which we are opposing is, that all the power which musical sounds have, considered as a source of beauty, is wholly resolvable into association. If this be true, then it seems to be the proper business of professed composers of music to study the nature and tendency of associations rather than of sounds. The common supposition in this matter undoubtedly is, that the musical composer exercises his invention and taste, in addition to the general conception or outline of his work, in forming perfect chords, varied modulation, and accurate rhythm. This is a principal, not the only one, but a principal field of his labours; the theatre on which his genius is especially displayed; and without these results of chord, modulation, and rhythm, it is certain that his efforts will fail to please. But if the doctrine which we are opposing be true, would it not be the fact that he could bring together the most harsh and discordant sounds, and compose, by means of them, the great works of his art, provided he took the means to cover their deformity by throwing over them some fascinating dress of association? But we presume it will not be pretended that mere association possesses this power as a general thing, even in the hands of genius.—Furthermore, we do not hesitate to say that, from the nature of the case, the musical genius which composes its works for immortality must deal chiefly with the elements and essentialities of things, and not with the mere incidents and accessories. Permanency in the works of art of course implies a corresponding permanency in their foundation. Associations are correctly understood to be, from their very nature, un-

* Life of Caspar Hauser, chap. iii.

certain and changeable, while the beauty of some musical compositions (we speak but the common sentiment of mankind in saying it) is imperishable; a fact which seems to be inconsistent with its being founded on an unfixed and evanescent basis.

§ 36. Of motion as an element of beauty.

Motion also, a new and distinct object of contemplation, has usually been reckoned a source of the beautiful, and very justly.—A forest or a field of grain gently waved by the wind, affects us pleasantly. The motion of a winding river pleases; and this, not only because the river is serpentine, but because it is never at rest. We are delighted with the motion of a ship as it cleaves the sea under full sail. We look on as it moves like a thing of life, and are pleased without being able to control our feelings, or to tell why they exist. And the waves, too, around it, which are continually approaching and departing, and curling upward in huge masses, and then breaking asunder into fragments of every shape, present a much more pleasing appearance than they would if profoundly quiet and stagnant.

With what happy enthusiasm we behold the foaming cascade, as it breaks out from the summit of the mountain, and dashes downward to its base! With what pleasing satisfaction we gaze upon a column of smoke ascending from a cottage in a wood: a trait in outward scenery which landscape-painters, who must certainly be accounted good judges of what is beautiful in the aspects of external nature, are exceedingly fond of introducing. It may be said in this case, we are aware, that the pleasure arising from beholding the ascending smoke of the cottage is caused by the favourite suggestions which are connected with it, of rural seclusion, peace, and abundance. But there is much reason to believe that the feeling would be to some extent the same if it were known to ascend from the uncomfortable wigwam of the Savage, from an accidental conflagration, or from the fires of a wandering horde of gipsies.—And if motion, on the limited scale on which we are accustomed to view it, be beautiful, how great would be the ecstasy of our feelings

if we could be placed on some pinnacle of the universe, and could take in at one glance the regular and unbroken movements of the worlds and systems of infinite space.

§ 37. Explanations of the beauty of motion from Kaimes.

The author of the Elements of Criticism, who studied our emotions with great care, has the following explanations on this subject: "Motion is certainly agreeable in all its varieties of quickness and slowness; but motion long continued admits some exceptions. That degree of continued motion, which corresponds to the natural course of our perceptions, is the most agreeable. The quickest motion is for an instant delightful; but it soon appears to be too rapid: it becomes painful by forcibly accelerating the course of our perceptions. Slow continued motion becomes disagreeable for an opposite reason, that it retards the natural course of our perceptions.

"There are other varieties in motion, besides quickness and slowness, that make it more or less agreeable: regular motion is preferred before what is irregular; witness the motion of the planets in orbits nearly circular: the motion of the comets in orbits less regular, is less agreeable.

"Motion uniformly accelerated, resembling an ascending series of numbers, is more agreeable than when uniformly retarded; motion upward is agreeable by the elevation of the moving body. What, then, shall we say of downward motion regularly accelerated by the force of gravity, compared with upward motion regularly retarded by the same force? Which of these is the most agreeable? This question is not easily solved.

"Motion in a straight line is no doubt agreeable; but we prefer undulating motion, as of waves, of a flame, of a ship under sail: such motion is more free, and also more natural. Hence the beauty of a serpentine river."

§ 38. Of intellectual and moral objects as a source of the beautiful.

But we are not to suppose that there is nothing but matter, and its accessories of form, motion, and sound, which are the foundations of the beautiful. The world of mind also, so far as it can be brought before our con-

templation, calls forth similar emotions.—The human countenance, in itself considered, is a beautiful object. Nature has decidedly given that character to the curving outline of the lips and forehead, the varying tints of the cheek, and the gentle illuminations of the eye. But these interesting traits, additional to what they are in themselves, convey ideas of mind; they may be regarded as natural indications and signs of the soul, which is lodged behind them; and although the human countenance is pleasing of itself, it is beyond question that the thought, and feeling, and amiability of which it is significant, are pleasing also. We may illustrate what we mean by an instance of this kind. If we fix our attention upon two men, whose outward appearance is the same, but one of them is far more distinguished than the other for clearness of perception, extent of knowledge, and all the essentials of true wisdom, we certainly look upon him with a higher degree of complacency. And this complacency is greatly heightened if we can add to these intellectual qualities certain qualities of the heart or of the moral character, such as a strong love of truth, justice, and benevolence.

It is true, that in the present life intellectual and moral objects are brought before our contemplation only in a comparatively small degree, surrounded and almost encumbered, as we are, with material things; but they are, nevertheless, proper objects of knowledge, and are among the great sources of beauty. There is no object of contemplation more pleasing and even enrapturing than the Supreme Being; but, in contemplating the Deity, we do not contemplate an outward and accessible picture, or a statue of wood and stone, but merely a complex internal conception, which embraces certain intellectual and moral qualities and powers, and excludes everything of a purely material kind. Now when we dwell upon the parts of this great and glorious conception, and follow them out into the length and breadth of infinite wisdom, of infinite benevolence, of unsearchable power and justice, and of other attributes, which are merged together and assimilated in this great sun of moral perfection, we find such a splendour and such a fitness in them that we cannot but

be filled with delight. The object before us, unless we may more properly speak of it as sublime, is obviously one of transcendent natural and moral beauty.

§ 39. Of a distinct sense or faculty of beauty.

From the views which have been presented in this chapter, we are prepared, in some degree, to estimate the opinion of those writers who are understood to maintain that there is a distinct SENSE or faculty of beauty. The doctrine referred to is, that, by means of this sense or faculty of beauty, which seems to be regarded as entirely analogous to the external senses of sight and feeling, the mind experiences the emotions of beauty constantly, or almost constantly, whenever a particular object is present. That is, having this supposed sense, we can no more be without the appropriate emotion whenever the beautiful object is presented, than we can be without sight or feeling when our eyes are open to behold objects, or when our hands are impressed upon them. And, moreover, the beauty which is thus discovered has, according to this system, a precise and definite character, concerning which there cannot ordinarily be any possible mistake.

There are some parts, undoubtedly, of this doctrine of emotions of beauty, to which it is by no means necessary to object. Its advocates hold, with good reason, that certain objects give us pleasure of themselves; and also that the emotions arise in the mind at once whenever the objects are presented to it, and therefore, in some degree, the same as when vision follows the opening of the eyelids. But here it cannot be denied that the analogy between the susceptibility of emotions of beauty and the external senses ceases.

The opinion that we have a distinct sense or faculty of beauty would give to its appropriate emotions a character more exact and particular than is justified by what is known to be the fact; there would in this case be no more difference of opinion concerning the beauty and deformity of objects than concerning their sensible qualities, their taste, sound, or colour. If this doctrine, taken in its full extent, were true, the peasant, who can tell whether the taste of the apple be sweet or sour, and

whether the colour of the clouds of heaven be bright or dark, can sit in judgment on the beauty of the works of nature and art, no less than persons of the most critical taste.

While, therefore, we contend that there is in the mind an original susceptibility of emotions of beauty, it is to be regarded as something quite different in its nature from the external senses; and these emotions, therefore, much more than our sensations, will differ in vividness or degree with a variety of circumstances.

CHAPTER III.

ASSOCIATED BEAUTY.

§ 40. Associated beauty implies an antecedent or intrinsic beauty.

THE views on the subject of beauty which we think it important to enforce, involve the positions, FIRST, that there is an original or intrinsic beauty; and, SECOND, that there is a beauty dependant on association.—In opposition to those persons who may be disposed to maintain that no object is beautiful of itself, but that all its beauty depends on association, we wish, in this connexion, to introduce what we regard as an important remark of Mr. Stewart. "The theory," he remarks, "which resolves the *whole* effects of beautiful objects into Association, must necessarily involve that species of paralogism to which logicians give the name of *reasoning in a circle.* It is the province of association to impart to one thing the agreeable or the disagreeable effect of another; but association can never account for the *origin* of a class of pleasures different in kind from all the others we know. If there was nothing originally and intrinsically pleasing or beautiful, the associating principle would have no materials on which it could operate."*

This remark, if it be true, appears to be decisive on the subject before us. And that it is true, we think must

* Essay on the Beautiful, chap. vi.

appear from the very nature of association. What we term association, it will be recollected, does not so much express a state of the mind, a thought, a feeling, a passion, as it does a principle or law of the mind; in other words, the circumstance under which a new state of mind takes place. Association, therefore, as Mr. Stewart intimates, does not of itself originate or create anything, but acts in reference to what is already created or originated. Something must be given for it to act upon. If it imparts beauty to one object, it must find it in another. If the beauty exists in that other object in consequence of association, it must have been drawn from some other source still more remote. If, therefore, association merely takes the beauty on its wings, if we may be allowed the expression, and transfers it from place to place, there must, of necessity, be somewhere an original or intrinsic beauty which is made the subject of such transfer.

§ 41. Objects may become beautiful by association merely.

In accordance with what has thus far been said on this whole subject, it will be kept in mind, that some of the forms of which matter is susceptible are pleasing of themselves and originally; also that we are unable to behold certain colours, and to listen to certain sounds, and to gaze upon particular expressions of the countenance, and to contemplate high intellectual and moral excellence, without emotions in a greater or less degree delightful. At the same time, it must be admitted, that, in the course of our experience, we find a variety of objects that seem, as they are presented to us, to be unattended with any emotion whatever; objects that are perfectly indifferent. And yet these objects, however wanting in beauty to the great mass of men, are found to be invested, in the minds of some, with a charm allowedly not their own. These objects, which previously excited no feelings of beauty, may become beautiful to us in consequence of the associations which we attach to them. That is to say, when the objects are beheld, certain former pleasing feelings peculiar to ourselves are recalled.

The lustre of a spring morning, the radiance of a summer evening, may of themselves excite in us a pleasing

emotion; but, as our busy imagination, taking advantage of the images of delight which are before us, is ever at work and constantly forming new images, there is, in combination with the original emotion of beauty, a superadded delight. And if, in these instances, only a part of the beauty is to be ascribed to association, there are some others where the whole is to be considered as derived from that source.

Numerous instances can be given of the power of association, not only in heightening the actual charms of objects, but in spreading a sort of delegated lustre around those that were entirely uninteresting before. Why does yon decaying house appear beautiful to me, which is indifferent to another? Why are the desolate fields around it clothed with delight, while others see in them nothing that is pleasant? It is because that house formerly detained me as one of its inmates at its fireside, and those fields were the scenes of many youthful sports. When I now behold them, after so long a time, the joyous emotions which the remembrance of my early days call up within me are, by the power of association, thrown around the objects which are the cause of the remembrances.

§ 42. Further illustrations of associated feelings.

He who travels through a well-cultivated country town cannot but be pleased with the various objects which he beholds; the neat and comfortable dwellings; the meadows that are peopled with flocks and with herds of cattle; the fields of grain, intermingled with reaches of thick and dark forest. The whole scene is a beautiful one; the emotion we suppose to be partly original; a person, on being restored to sight by couching for the cataract, and having had no opportunity to form associations with it, would witness it for the first time with delight. But a considerable part of the pleasure is owing to the associated feelings which arise on beholding such a scene; these dwellings are the abode of man; these fields are the place of his labours, and amply reward him for his toil; here are contentment, the interchange of heartfelt joys, and "ancient truth."

Those who have travelled over places that have been signalized by memorable events will not be likely to suspect us of attributing too great a share of our emotions to association. It is true that, in a country so new as America, we are unable to point so frequently as an European might do, to places that have witnessed achievements and sufferings of such a character as to become sacred in a nation's memory. But there are some such consecrated spots. With whatever emotion or want of emotion the traveller may pass by other places of our wild and stormy coast, he would do violence to the finest impulses of the heart if he did not stop at the Rock of Plymouth, the landing-place of the Pilgrim Fathers. Not because there is anything in the scenery either of the ocean or the land which presents claims upon him more imperative, or so much so as that of some other places. But there is a moral power, the spirit of great achievements, hovering around the spot (explainable on the principles of association, and on them alone), which spreads itself over the hard features of the soil, and illuminates the bleakness of the sky, and harmonizes what would be otherwise rugged and forbidding into a scene of touching loveliness and beauty.

The powerful feeling which exists on visiting such a spot, whether we call it an emotion of beauty or sublimity, or give it a name expressive of some intermediate grade, is essentially the same with that which is caused in the bosom of the traveller when he looks for the first time upon the hills of the city of Rome. There are other cities of greater extent, and washed by nobler rivers, than the one which is before him; but upon no others has he ever gazed with so much intensity of feeling. He beholds what was once the mistress of the world; he looks upon the ancient dwelling-place of Brutus, of Cicero, and of the Cæsars. The imagination is at once peopled with whatever was noble in the character and remarkable in the achievements of that extraordinary nation; and there is a strength, a fulness of emotion, which would never have been experienced without the accession of those great and exciting remembrances.—It is in connexion with the principles of this chapter, and in al-

lusion to places of historical renown, that Rogers, in his Pleasures of Memory, has said, with equal philosophical truth and poetical skill,

> "And hence the charms historic scenes impart;
> Hence Tiber awes, and Avon melts the heart,
> Aerial forms, in Tempe's classic vale,
> Glance through the gloom, and whisper in the gale;
> In wild Vaucluse with love and Laura dwell,
> And watch and weep in Eloisa's cell."

§ 43. Instances of national associations.

The influence of association in rousing up, and in giving strength to particular classes of emotions, may be strikingly seen in some national instances.—Every country has its favourite tunes. These excite a much stronger feeling in the native inhabitants than in strangers. The effect on the Swiss soldiers of the Ranz des Vaches, their national air, whenever they happened to hear it in foreign lands, has often been mentioned. So great was this effect, that it was found necessary in France to forbid its being played in the Swiss corps in the employment of the French government. The powerful effect of this song cannot be supposed to be owing to any peculiar merits in the composition, but to the pleasing recollections which it ever vividly brings up in the minds of the Swiss, of mountain life, of freedom, and of domestic pleasures.

The English have a popular tune called Belleisle March. Its popularity is said to have been owing to the circumstance that it was played when the English army marched into Belleisle, and to its consequent association with remembrances of war and of conquest. And it will be found true of all national airs, that they have a charm for the natives of the country, in consequence of the recollections connected with them, which they do not possess for the inhabitants of other countries.

We have abundant illustrations of the same fact in respect to colours. The purple colour has acquired an expression or character of dignity, in consequence of having been the common colour of the dress of kings; among the Chinese, however, yellow is the most dignified colour, and evidently for no other reason than because yellow is

that which is allotted to the royal family. In many countries, black is expressive of gravity, and is used particularly in seasons of distress and mourning; and white is a cheerful colour. But among the Chinese white is gloomy, because it is the dress of mourners; and in Spain and among the Venetians black has a cheerful expression, in consequence of being worn by the great.

Many other illustrations to the same purpose might be brought forward. The effect of association is not unfrequently such as to suppress entirely and throw out the original character of an object, and substitute a new one in its stead. Who has not felt, both in man and woman, that a single crime, that even one unhappy deed of meanness or dishonour, is capable of throwing a darkness and distortion over the charms of the most perfect form? The glory seems to have departed: and no effort of reasoning or of imagination can fully restore it.

§ 44. The sources of associated beauty coincident with those of human happiness.

It would be a pleasing task to point out more particularly some of the sources of associated beauty, if it were consistent with the plan which we propose to follow. But it has been our object throughout to give the sketch or outline of a system, rather than indulge in minuteness of specification. And as to the subject which we now allude to, it could hardly be expected that we should attempt to examine it extensively, much less exhaust it, when we consider that the sources of associated beauty are as wide and as numerous as the sources of man's happiness.

The fountains of human pleasure connected with the senses, the intellect, the morals, and the social and religious relations, are exceedingly multiplied. And whenever the happiness we experience, from whatever source it may proceed, is brought into intimacy with a beautiful object, we generally find that the beauty of the object is heightened by that circumstance. In other cases, the association is so strong, that a beauty is shed upon objects which are confessedly destitute of it in themselves.—We might, therefore, dismiss this topic with the simple re-

mark, that the sources of associated beauty are necessarily as wide as the unexplored domain of human joy There are, however, a few of its elements which seem to be worthy of a separate and specific notice.

§ 45. Of fitness considered as an element of associated beauty.

In conformity with what has just been said, we proceed to remark, that the degree of the emotion of beauty will be likely to vary in accordance with the suggestions of congruity or fitness which attend the beautiful object, considered in its relations with other objects.—In regard to the origin of the idea of congruity or fitness, it is proper to remark, that the state of the mind thus denominated, which is intellectual rather than sensitive, naturally and necessarily arises on the contemplation of those objects where such fitness actually exists. It arises, therefore, in the first place, on the contemplation of natural objects. As creation comes from the hand of a God of order and not of confusion, everything has its appropriate character, its appropriate place and time. And as the human mind is obviously, in its very structure, adapted to this state of things, suggestions of congruity or fitness, when the works of nature constitute the object in view, are constantly arising.

They arise also in connexion with the works of human skill. It is in these works particularly that we find the application of the remark, that the degree of beauty will vary in accordance with the suggestions of congruity which attend the object, considered in relation to other objects. Whatever may be the beauty of an object in itself considered, if we distinctly perceive in it an incongruity with other objects, such as result, for instance, from an entire discordance of time and place, the displeasure or disgust which we feel in view of such want of fitness is so great as to diminish, and perhaps to annul entirely, the emotions of pleasure which would otherwise exist.

It is in accordance with these views that Hogarth has been led to remark, that twisted columns, which naturally convey an idea of weakness, always displease when they are employed to support anything which is bulky, or has

a heavy appearance. "The bulks and proportions of objects," he immediately adds, "are governed by fitness and propriety. It is this that has established the size and proportion of chairs, tables, and all sorts of utensils and furniture. It is this that has fixed the dimensions of pillars, arches, &c., for the support of great weight, and so regulated all the orders in architecture, as well as the sizes of windows and doors, &c. Thus, though a building were ever so large, the steps of the stairs, the seats in the windows must be continued of their usual heights, or they would lose their beauty with their fitness: and in ship-building, the dimensions of every part are confined and regulated by fitness for sailing. When a vessel sails well, the sailors always call her a beauty; the two ideas have such a connexion!"

§ 46. Of utility as an element of associated beauty.

Another element of associated beauty is the perception of utility. Some writers, among others Mr. Hume, have imagined that they were able to discover the origin or foundation of all emotions of beauty in this perception; understanding by the term utility a fitness or adaptation of the beautiful object to some beneficial purpose. And it is undoubtedly true, that we contemplate this quality, whenever we discern it, with a degree of complacency and approbation. Many objects, when their use or adaptation to some beneficial purpose has become known to us, have at once been clothed with an interest which they did not before possess. We do not hesitate, therefore, to admit, that a share of our emotions of associated beauty may be traced to this source. But when the perception of utility (that is to say, of the fitness of the object for some profitable ends) is proposed as the ground and origin of all emotions of beauty, including those that are original as well as those that are associated, the doctrine evidently cannot be sustained.

Mr. Burke, in his Treatise on the Sublime and Beautiful, has paid some attention to this doctrine. He rejects it altogether, considered as the universal basis of beauty. If it be admitted to be true, he considers it a fair inference from it that the wedgelike snout of the swine, with

its tough cartilage at the end, and the general make of its head, so well adapted to digging and rooting, are extremely beautiful; and that hedgehogs and porcupines, which are so admirably secured against all assaults by their prickly hides, can justly be considered creatures of no small elegance.

On the theory, therefore, which proposes the perception of utility as the true ground of all emotions of beauty, both associated and original, it is enough for us to say that it goes too far. It does, indeed, in connexion with the laws of association, suggest a happy explanation of many such emotions coming under the class of associated; but by no means of all even of these.

§ 47. Of proportion as an element of associated beauty.

There are some who imagine they find the source of beauty in a certain symmetry and determinate proportion of parts. This idea has been particularly advocated by artists, who seem to have supposed that the elements of beauty might not only be discovered, but even measured in the great models of architecture, statuary, and painting. They assign, perhaps, to the height of a column, the measurement of six or seven of its own diameters, and designate to an inch the length and breadth which constitute the beautiful in other cases. Mr. Burke has examined this opinion also; directing his inquiries to vegetables, the inferior animals, and man. He has shown that, in all cases, there are no certain measures on which the beautiful can justly be said to depend.

For instance, in the vegetable creation we find nothing more beautiful than flowers, but there is a very great variety in their shape, and in the disposition of the parts which pertain to them. In the rose, the stalk is slender, but the flower is large. The flower or blossom of the apple, on the other hand, is very small, but the tree large. Now if one of these be in proportion, the other wants it; and yet, by general consent, both the rose and the apple blossom possess beauty; and the bush of the one and the tree of the other allowedly present a very engaging appearance.—If, again, we inquire in respect to man and in respect to the inferior animal creation, we

are brought to the same result, viz., that beauty does not depend upon a fixed relative size of the parts, that is, upon proportion.

It is proper to remark, however, that the word proportion is sometimes used, not to signify something which is definite, fixed, and invariable, but as synonymous with a fitness or propriety which is gathered up from the general relations and aspects of the object, and is represented by a state of the mind itself. This subject we have already briefly considered. And we readily admit, wherever there is a distinct suggestion of such an idea of fitness, there is also an additional sentiment of the beautiful; and, wherever there is a perception of unfitness or want of propriety, there is a diminution of it.

"The sense of propriety," says Kaimes, in some remarks on Gardening and Architecture, "dictates the following rule, That every building ought to have an expression corresponding to its destination. A palace ought to be sumptuous and grand; a private dwelling neat and modest; a playhouse gay and splendid; and a monument gloomy and melancholy." And it is entirely obvious, whenever this sense of propriety is violated, whether in these cases or in others like them, we fail to experience that pleasure, or to regard the object with that degree of complacency which we otherwise should.

§ 48. Relation of emotions of beauty to the fine arts.

The remarks of the last section lead us further to observe, that the study of this part of our constitution is exceedingly important in its applications to the fine arts. As a general statement, the true measurement of beauty in outward objects is the amount of pleasure or satisfaction which is caused within ourselves The fine arts are outward representations, addressed in the first instance to the senses of sight and hearing in particular, and through them to that susceptibility of the beautiful which exists in the interior of the soul; and we can judge of their excellence only by their effects in relation to that susceptibility. How great ignorance, therefore, must we discover in all inquiries where the fine arts are concerned, if

we are not thoroughly acquainted with this part of our sentient nature!

Perhaps these remarks should be accompanied with a precautionary suggestion. The observation we wish to make is this. We are not at liberty, as a general thing, to pass a positive judgment on works of art, founded on our own emotions merely, and wholly exclusive of any consideration of the feelings of others. Some accidental circumstance, or some casual association of a more permanent kind, may either unduly increase or diminish the precise effects which would otherwise have been produced; and we shall not be likely to be sensible of this perversion of feeling if we rely on ourselves alone. Although, therefore, it is important that we should correct our own judgments by comparing them with the emotions and judgments of others, it will still remain true that the great grounds of decision, in all cases of beauty or deformity in the works of art, will be found in ourselves

§ 49. Differences of original susceptibility of this emotion.

Supposing it to be true that we possess an original susceptibility of emotions of beauty, independently of what we derive from association, it seems, however, to be the fact, that this susceptibility is found existing in different degrees in different persons. Let the same beautiful object be presented to two persons, and one will be found to be not only affected, but ravished, as it were, with feelings of beauty; while the other will have the same kind of emotions, but in a very diminished degree.—A great degree of susceptibility of emotions of beauty, with a somewhat restricted import of the word, is usually termed SENSIBILITY.

The differences of men in this respect may justly be thought, where we cannot account for it by anything in their education or mental culture, to be constitutional. Nor is it more strange that men should be differently affected by the same beautiful objects, in consequence of some difference of constitution, than that they should constitutionally have different passions; that one should be choleric, another of a peaceable turn; that one should be mild and yielding, another inflexible.

§ 50. Objection to the doctrine of original beauty.

We stop here to notice one of the objections which may occur to the views which have been given on the subject of beauty. Supposing, as we do, that the mind has originally certain tendencies to emotions of beauty, we readily admit the power of various circumstances in modifying, and, in some cases, of overcoming such original tendencies. Nor, in point of fact, can it be denied, that the character of our feelings of beauty sometimes changes; that is, what is regarded by us as beautiful at one time, is not at another; what is beautiful in the eyes of one age or of one nation, sometimes loses its lustre in the view of another.—The objection is, that such changes of feeling in regard to the beautiful are inconsistent with an original susceptibility of such emotions.

(1.) In answer to this difficulty, we would suggest, in the first place, that we experience analogous variations in other parts of the mind.—Take, for instance, the susceptibility of Belief; that power by which we are led to regard anything as true or false. It will surely be admitted that there is in the mind an original tendency to assent to certain propositions, rather than others of an opposite kind. It cannot be supposed that the characteristic of mind, which leads us to regard one thing as true and another as false, is something which is wholly superinduced; the result merely of accidental circumstances. But that which is felt by us to be true to-day, may be felt by us to be false to-morrow; because we have then new facts before the mind, and new sources of evidence are disclosed.

(2.) It is also well known, that our estimates of subjects in a moral point of view frequently alter. Those objects which appeared just and worthy in youth, have sometimes a different appearance in manhood, and again have a different aspect in old age. This is not because the mind, particularly the moral susceptibility, in its intrinsic nature, alters; but because objects are seen by us under different lights. Changes of opinion, similar to what may be noticed in individuals, may also be clearly noticed in the moral and religious history of different ages and nations.

(3.) Again, we find the same tendency to frequent fluctuations in the feelings of cheerfulness and melancholy, of mere pleasure and pain, of desire and aversion, as well as of beauty, and grandeur, and sublimity. The reason is, we take different views of objects. And this is much the same as to say that truly different objects are presented to the mind from what we had contemplated before; which is a cause amply sufficient for the changes we sometimes notice in these feelings.

It is the same in regard to the objects addressed to the susceptibility under consideration. To-day we regard some work of art as beautiful; and if we find that it appears different to us to-morrow, it is because we have discovered in it some new touches, some new relations, which escaped our notice before, and which justly have the effect to diminish our estimate of the merit of the whole work. These considerations go no little ways in explaining the changes that sometimes take place, so far as intrinsic or original beauty is concerned. But we are to recollect, furthermore, that a considerable portion of beauty is confessedly built upon association; and for this portion no one ever claimed an absolute permanency or uniformity.

§ 51. Summary of views in regard to the beautiful.

As the subject of emotions of beauty is one of no small difficulty, it may be of advantage to give here a brief summary of some of the prominent views in respect to it.

(1.) Of emotions of beauty it is difficult to give a definition, but we notice in them two marks or characteristics.—They imply, first, a degree of pleasure, and, secondly, are always referred by us to external objects as their cause.

(2.) Every beautiful object has something in itself which discriminates it from other objects that are not beautiful. On this ground we may with propriety speak of beauty in the object. At the same time, a superadded lustre is reflected back upon it from the mind; and this, too, whether the beauty be original or associated.

(3.) The feeling which we term an emotion of beauty is not limited to natural scenery, but may be caused also

by the works of art, by the creations of the imagination, and by the various forms of intellectual and moral nature, so far as they can be presented to the mind. All these various objects and others may excite within us feelings of pleasure; and the mind, in its turn, may reflect back upon the objects the lustre of its own emotions, and thus increase the degree of their beauty.

(4.) There is in the mind an original susceptibility of emotions in general, and of those of beauty in particular; and not only this, some objects are found, in the constitution of things, to be followed by these feelings of beauty, while others are not; and such objects are spoken of as being originally beautiful. That is, when the object is presented to the mind, it is of itself followed by emotions of beauty, without being aided by the influence of accessory and contingent circumstances.

(5.) Without pretending to certainty in fixing upon those objects, to which what is termed original or intrinsic beauty may be ascribed, there appears to be no small reason in attributing it to certain forms, to sounds of a particular character, to bright colours, to some varieties of motion, and to intellectual and moral excellence in general, whenever it can be made a distinct object of perception.

(6.) Many objects, which cannot be considered beautiful of themselves, become such by being associated with a variety of former pleasing and enlivening recollections; and such as possess beauty of themselves may augment the pleasing emotions from the same cause. Also, much of the difference of opinion which exists as to what objects are beautiful and what are not, is to be ascribed to differences of association.—These are some of the prominent views resulting from inquiries into this subject.

§ 52. Of picturesque beauty.

We apply the term PICTURESQUE to whatever objects cause in us emotions of beauty, in which the beauty does not consist in a single circumstance by itself, but in a considerable number in a happy state of combination. The meaning of the term is analogous to the signification of some others of a like termination, which are derived

to us from the Italian through the medium of the French Mr. Stewart remarks of the word *arabesque*, that it expresses something in the style of the Arabians; *moresque*, something in the style of the Moors; and *grotesque*, something which bears a resemblance to certain whimsical delineations in a grotto or subterranean apartment at Rome. In like manner, *picturesque* originally implies what is done in the style and spirit of a painter, who ordinarily places before us an object made up of a number of circumstances, in such a state of combination as to give pleasure.

The epithet may be applied to natural scenery, and also to paintings and to poetical descriptions.—The following description from Thomson, which assembles together some of the circumstances attending the cold, frosty nights of winter, is highly picturesque.

> "Loud rings the frozen earth and hard reflects
> A double noise; while, at his evening watch,
> The village dog deters the nightly thief;
> The heifer lows; the distant waterfall
> Swells in the breeze; and, with the hasty tread
> Of traveller, the hollow-sounding plain
> Shakes from afar."

CHAPTER IV.

EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY.

§ 53. Connexion between beauty and sublimity.

THOSE emotions which, by way of distinction, we designate as SUBLIME, are a class of feelings which have much in common with emotions of beauty; they do not appear to differ so much in nature or kind as in degree. When we examine the feelings which are embraced under these two designations, we readily perceive that they have a progression; that there are numerous degrees in point of intensity; but the emotion, although more vivid in one case than the other, and mingled with some foreign elements, is, for the most part, essentially the same. So that

it is by no means impossible to trace, in a multitude of cases, a connexion even between the fainter feelings of beauty, and the most overwhelming emotions of the sublime.

This progression of our feelings from one that is gentle and pleasant to one that is powerful and even painful, has been illustrated in the case of a person who is supposed to behold a river at its first rise in the mountains, and to follow it as it winds and enlarges in the subjacent plains, and to behold it at last losing itself in the expanse of the ocean. For a time, the feelings which are excited within him, as he gazes on the prospect, are what are termed emotions of beauty. As the small stream, which had hitherto played in the uplands and amid foliage that almost hid it from his view, increases its waters, separates its banks to a great distance from each other, and becomes the majestic river, his feelings are of a more powerful kind. We often, by way of distinction, speak of the feelings existing under such circumstances as emotions of grandeur. At last it expands and disappears in the immensity of the ocean: the vast, illimitable world of billows flashes in his sight. Then the emotion, widening and strengthening with the magnitude and energy of the objects which accompany it, becomes sublime.—Emotions of sublimity, therefore, chiefly differ, at least in most instances, from those of beauty in being more vivid.

§ 54. The occasions of the emotions of sublimity various.

As the emotions of sublimity are simple, they are consequently undefinable. Nevertheless, as they are the direct subjects of our consciousness, we cannot be supposed to be ignorant of their nature. It may aid, however, in rendering our comprehension of them more distinct and clear in some respects if we mention some of the occasions on which they arise.—But, before proceeding to this, it is proper to recur a moment to a subject more fully insisted on in the chapter on Beauty, but which also properly has a place here. We have reference to the unquestionable fact, that the occasions of sublime emotions are not exclusively one; in other words, are not found in a single element merely, as some persons may

be likely to suppose, but, like those of beauty, are multiplied and various. The measure of the sublimity of the object is the character of the emotion which it excites; and if the sublime emotion exists, as unquestionably it does on various occasions, this of itself is decisive as to the remark which has been made. Accordingly, the proper object before us, in the first instance, seems to be to indicate some of these occasions.

§ 55. Great extent or expansion an occasion of sublimity.

In endeavouring to point out some of the sources of sublimity, our first remark is, that the emotion of the sublime may arise in view of an object which is characterized by vast extent or expansion; in other words, by the attribute of mere horizontal amplitude. Accordingly, it is with entire propriety that Mr. Stewart makes a remark to this effect, that a Scotchman, who had never witnessed anything of the kind before, would experience an emotion approaching to sublimity on beholding for the first time the vast plains of Salisbury and Yorkshire in England. Washington Irving also, in a passage of the Alhambra, has a remark to the same purport. "There is something," he observes, "in the sternly simple features of the Spanish landscape that impresses on the soul a feeling of sublimity. The immense plains of the Castiles and La Mancha, extending as far as the eye can reach, derive an interest from their very nakedness and immensity, and have something of the solemn grandeur of the ocean." In regard to the ocean, one of the most sublime objects which the human mind can contemplate, it cannot be doubted that one element of its sublimity is the unlimited expanse which it presents.

§ 56. Great height an element or occasion of sublimity.

Mere height, independently of considerations of expansion or extent, appears also to constitute an occasion of the sublime. Every one has experienced this when standing at the base of a very steep and lofty cliff, hill, or mountain. When, in the silence of the night, we stand under the clear open sky, we can hardly fail, as we look upward, to experience a sublime emotion, occasion-

ed partly by the immensity of the object, but also, in part, by its vast height. Travellers have often spoken of the sublime emotion occasioned by viewing the celebrated Natural Bridge in Virginia from the bottom of the deep ravine over which it is thrown. This bridge is a single solid rock, about sixty feet broad, ninety feet long, and forty thick. It is suspended over the head of the spectator, who views it at the bottom of the narrow glen, at the elevation of two hundred and thirty feet; an immense height for such an object. It is not in human nature to behold without strong feeling such a vast vault of solid limestone, springing lightly into the blue upper air, and remaining thus outstretched, as if it were the arm of the Almighty himself, silent, unchangeable, eternal.

§ 57. Of depth in connexion with the sublime.

It is a circumstance confirmatory of the view that it is impossible to resolve the grounds of sublimity into a single occasion or element, that we find the depth as well as the height of things, the downward as well as the upward, the antecedent and cause of this emotion. We are doubtful, however, whether depth is so decisively, as it is certainly not so frequently a cause, as elevation or height; which last, on account of its frequent connexion with their existence, has given the name to this class of feelings. But others may think differently. Mr. Burke has the following passage on this point: "I am apt to imagine that height is less grand than depth, and that we are more struck at looking down from a precipice than looking up at an object of equal height; but of that I am not very positive."

But, however this may be, there is no doubt that sublime emotions may arise from this cause. When we are placed on the summit of any high object, and look downward into the vast opening below, it is impossible not to be strongly affected. The sailor on the wide ocean, when in the solitary watches of the night he casts his eye upward to the lofty illuminated sky, has a sublime emotion; and he feels the same strong sentiment stirring within him, when, a moment afterward, he thinks of the vast unfathomable abyss beneath him, over which he is

suspended by the frail plank of his vessel. No one, we imagine, can read Shakspeare's description of Dover Cliffs without feeling that there is a sublimity in the depths beneath as well as in the heights above.

"How fearful
And dizzy 'tis, to cast one's eyes so low!
The crows and choughs that wing the midway air,
Show scarce so gross as beetles. Half way down
Hangs one that gathers samphire, dreadful trade!
Methinks he seems no bigger than his head.
The fishermen, that walk upon the beach,
Appear like mice; and yon tall anchoring bark
Diminished to her boat; her boat a buoy,
Almost too small for sight. The murmuring surge,
That on the unnumbered idle pebbles chafes,
Cannot be heard so high. I'll look no more,
Lest my brain turn, and the deficient sight
Topple down headlong."

§ 58. Of colours in connexion with the sublime.

The colours, also, as well as the forms of bodies, may, to a limited extent, furnish the occasion of sublime emotions. The lightning, when at a distance it is seen darting to the earth in one continuous chain of overpowering brightness; the red meteor shooting athwart the still, dark sky; the crimson Aurora Borealis, which occasionally diffuses the tints of the morning over the hemisphere of midnight, are sublime objects; and although there are other elements which unite in forming the basis of the sublime emotion, it is probably to be ascribed in part to the richness and vividness of colours. What object is more sublimely impressive than the contrasted hues of the mingling fires and smoke of a burning volcano! Darkness particularly is an element of the sublime. When the clouds are collecting together on some distinct and distant portion of the sky, how intently the eye fixes itself on those masses, which wear the visage of the deepest gloom! Forests, and frowning cliffs, and mountains, and the wide ocean itself, and whatever other objects are susceptible of sublimity, are rendered still more sublime by the shades and darkness that are sometimes made to pass over them. The poets of all countries have represented the Deity, the most sublime object of

contemplation, as enthroned in the midst of darkness.—"He bowed the heavens also, and came down; and *darkness was under his feet.* He made *darkness* his secret place; his pavilion round about were *dark* waters, and *thick clouds* of the skies."

§ 59. Of sounds as furnishing an occasion of sublime emotions.

We find another element of the sublime in sounds of a certain description. There are some cries and voices of animals which are usually regarded as sublime. The roar of the lion, not only in the solitudes of his native deserts, but at all times, partakes of the character of sublimity. The human voice, in combination with a suitable number of other voices, is capable of uttering sublime sounds, and does in fact utter them, in performing many of the works of the great masters and composers of music. There is no small degree of sublimity in the low, deep murmur of the organ, independently of the moral and religious associations connected with it. It is presumed no one will doubt that the trumpet, in the hands of a skilful performer, is capable of originating sublime sounds. Almost every one must have noticed a peculiarly impressive sound, sent forth by a large and compact forest of pines when waved by a heavy wind, which obviously has the same character. The heavy and interminable sound of the ocean, as it breaks upon the shore, is sublime; and hardly less so, the ceaseless voice of the congregated waters of some vast cataract. To these instances may be added the sound of a cannon, not only when it comes from the field of battle, but at any time; and still more, the mighty voice of thunder. The latter sound is often mentioned in the Scriptures, in connexion with the attributes of the Supreme Being, and apparently for the purpose of heightening the idea of his sublimity. "The Lord also thundered in the heavens, and the Highest gave his voice."—"The voice of the Lord is upon the waters; the God of glory thundereth."

We leave this part of the subject with introducing a remark from Coleridge, which goes to confirm the general doctrine of the sublimity of some sounds. He had been saying something of the scenery of the Lake of Ratzeburg

when he adds: "About a month ago, before the thaw came on, there was a storm of wind. During the whole night, such were the thunders and howlings of the breaking ice, that they left a conviction on my mind that there are sounds more sublime than any sight *can* be, more absolutely suspending the power of comparison, and more utterly absorbing the mind's self-consciousness in its total attention to the object working upon it."*

§ 60. Of motion in connexion with the sublime.

It will be noticed, from the train of thought which has been pursued, that there is a close analogy between beauty and sublimity, not only in the feelings which are originated, but also in the occasions of their origin. As the sentiments of beauty were found to be connected not only with the forms of objects, but also with colours and sounds, so also are those of sublimity. And, furthermore, as we found beauty connecting itself with certain kinds of motion, we find motion the basis likewise, in some of its modifications, of emotions of the sublime.

We often experience, for instance, emotions of sublimity in witnessing objects that move with great swiftness. This is one source of the feelings we have at beholding bodies of water rushing violently down a cataract. For the same reason, although there are undoubtedly other elements of the emotions we feel, the hurricane, that hastens onward with irresistible velocity, and lays waste whatever it meets, is sublime. And here also we find a cause of part of that sublime emotion which men have often felt on seeing at a distance the electric fluid darting from the cloud to the earth, and at witnessing the sudden flight of a meteor.

§ 61. Indications of power accompanied by emotions of the sublime.

The contemplation of mental objects as well as of material, may be attended with this species of emotion. Power, for instance, is an attribute of mind, and not of matter; and the exhibition of it is frequently sublime. It is hardly necessary to say, in making this remark, that power is not anything which is directly addressed to the

* The Friend, Am. ed., p. 323.

outward senses, but is rather presented to the mind as an object of inward suggestion. Nevertheless, the causes of this suggestion may exist in outward objects; and, whenever this is the case, the feelings with which we contemplate such objects are generally increased. In other words, whatever sublimity may characterize an object, if, in addition to its other sublime traits, it strongly suggests to us the idea of power, the sublime feeling is more or less heightened by this suggestion.

Nothing can be more sublime than a volcano throwing out from its bosom clouds, and burning stones, and immense rivers of lava. And it is unquestionable, that the sublime emotion is attributable, in part, to the overwhelming indications of power which are thus given. An earthquake is sublime; not only in its mightier efforts of destruction, but hardly less so in those slighter tremblings and heavings of the earth which indicate the footsteps of power rather than of ruin. The ocean, greatly agitated with a storm, and tossing the largest navies as if in sport, possesses an increase of sublimity on account of the more striking indications of power which it at such a time gives. The shock of large armies, also, which concentrates the most terrible exhibition of human energy, is attended with an increased sublimity for the same reason. But in all these instances, as in most others, the sublime emotion cannot be ascribed solely to one cause; something is to be attributed to vast extent; something to the original effect of the brilliancy or darkness of colours; and something to feelings of dread and danger

§ 62. Of moral worth in connexion with sublimity.

A consciousness of the feeling of the sublime is not limited to suggestions of POWER. There are other mental attributes which, under certain circumstances, are attended with the same effect. In general, all those feelings which are of a praiseworthy character, such as sympathy, benevolence, and the sentiment of justice, may become sublime when put forth under such circumstances as strongly to affect our hearts. The man who, in support of some great moral or religious principle, not only surrenders his property, but calmly and triumphantly sac

rifices his life, is, in the highest sense, a sublime object of contemplation.—This is a topic of no small interest. But as, under the head of the Moral Sublime, it will be made the subject of a distinct chapter, it is unnecessary to de lay upon it here.

§ 63. Sublime objects have some elements of beauty.

We have seen at the commencement of this chapter, that a regular progression may in most instances be traced from the beautiful to the sublime. It seems, therefore, to follow, that instances of the sublime will, on the removal of some circumstances, possess more or less of the beautiful. And this, on examination, will be found to be generally the case. Take, as an example, the shock of powerful armies, which is confessedly a sublime scene. We have only to remove the circumstance of slaughter, and at once the regular order of the troops, their splendid dress and rapid movements, together with the floating of banners and the sound of music, are exceedingly picturesque and beautiful; nothing more so. And all this, in point of fact, is probably none the less beautiful when thousands are falling and dying in actual contest; although the painful emotion consequent on witnessing a scene of slaughter so much overpowers the sense of the beautiful, that it appears even not to have an existence. If the engagement between the armies should be without the accompaniments of military dress, and without order, and without strains of music, but a mere struggle between man and man, with such arms as came readiest into their power, the scene, however destructive and terrible, would be anything rather than sublime.

A multitude of other instances, particularly such as are drawn from the works of nature, would seem to illustrate the same general fact. Diminish the force of the whirlwind to that of the gentle breeze, and, as it playfully sweeps by us, we feel that emotion of pleasure which is an element of the beautiful. And so, when the mighty cataract is dwindled down to the cascade, we shall discover that the tumultuous emotions of the sublime are converted into the gentler feelings of beauty.

However true it may be, as a general statement, that sublimity implies some elements of the beautiful, it is not necessary to assert that this is *always* the case. Perhaps in some instances it is not. As an illustration, some will think it is not very evident that barren heaths and sandy plains of small extent have any portion of beauty; and still, when they are spread abroad before us to great extent, and especially when seen from the summit of some elevated object, they may have a considerable degree of the sublime. The statement given is meant as a general one, admitting certainly of but few exceptions.

§ 64. Emotions of grandeur.

For all the various emotions of which we are now speaking, as they rise from the lowest to the highest, we have the two general terms BEAUTY and SUBLIMITY. There is, however, another form of expression, which is, with some good reason, putting forth its claims to be received into use, viz., *emotions of grandeur*. We may happily apply this phraseology to various objects, which we hardly know whether to class with the beautiful or sublime; having too much of fulness and expansiveness for the former, and too little of power for the latter. The meandering river is beautiful; as it becomes deeper and wider, it assumes an appearance, not of mere beauty, but of grandeur; but the ocean only is more than either, is sublime.

§ 65. Of the original or primary sublimity of objects.

If there be a connexion between the beautiful and sublime; if beauty, grandeur, and sublimity are only names for various emotions, not so much differing in kind as in degree, essentially the same views which were advanced in respect to beauty will hold here. It will follow, if the contemplation of some objects is attended with emotions of beauty, independently of associated feelings; or, in other words, if they have a primary or original beauty, that there are objects also originally sublime. Hence we may conclude, that whatever has great height, or great depth, or vast extent, or other attributes of the sublime, will be able to excite in us emotions of sublimity of

themselves, independently of the subordinate or secondary aid arising from any connected feelings. We have much ground for regarding this as a correct supposition. We have good reason to believe that our Creator has appointed certain objects, or perhaps we should say, certain forms or conditions of objects, as antecedent to THE SUBLIME within us.

§ 66. Considerations in proof of the original sublimity of objects.

It may be inferred that there is such primary or original sublimity, not only in view of the connexion which has been stated to exist between the beautiful and sublime, but because it is no doubt agreeable to the common experience of men. But, in resting the proposition (where undoubtedly it ought to rest) on experience, we must inquire, as in former chapters, into the feelings of the young. And this for the obvious reason, that, when persons are somewhat advanced in age, it is difficult to separate the primary from the secondary or associated sublimity. They have then become inextricably mingled together.—Now take a child, and place him suddenly on the shores of the ocean, or in full sight of darkly-wooded mountains of great altitude, or before the clouds, and fires, and thunders of volcanoes, and in most cases he will be filled with sublime emotions; his mind will swell at the perception; it will heave to and fro, like the ocean itself in a tempest. His eye, his countenance, his gestures will indicate a power of internal feeling, which the limited language he can command is unable to express. This may well be stated as a fact, because it has been frequently noticed by those who are competent to observe.

Again, if a person can succeed in conveying to a child by means of words sublime ideas of whatever kind, similar emotions will be found to exist, although generally in a less degree than when objects are directly presented to the senses. By way of confirming this, a statement of the younger Lord Lyttleton, who seems to have been naturally a person of much sensibility, may be appealed to. He relates that, when quite a boy, he was very forcibly struck with reading the following sublime passage of Milton.

"He spake; and to confirm his words, out flew
Millions of flaming swords, drawn from the thighs
Of mighty Cherubim; the sudden blaze
Far round illumined Hell."

An instance still more to the purpose, because the precise age is specified, is that of Sir William Jones. "In his *fifth* year, as he was one morning turning over the leaves of a Bible in his mother's closet, his attention was forcibly arrested by the sublime description of the angel in the tenth chapter of the Apocalypse; and the impression which his imagination received from it was never effaced. At a period of mature judgment, he considered the passage as equal in sublimity to any in the inspired writers, and far superior to any that could be produced from mere human compositions; and he was fond of retracing and mentioning the rapture which he felt when he first read it." The passage referred to is as follows. "And I saw another mighty angel come down from Heaven clothed with a cloud; and a rainbow was upon his head, and his face was as it were the sun, and his feet as pillars of fire."*

§ 67. Influence of association on emotions of sublimity.

Granting, therefore, that sublime emotions are in part original, still it is unquestionably true that a considerable share of them is to be attributed to association. As an illustration, we may refer to the effects of sounds. When a sound suggests ideas of danger, as the report of artillery and the howling of a storm; when it calls up recollections of mighty power, as the fall of a cataract and the rumbling of an earthquake, the emotion of sublimity which we feel is greatly increased by such suggestions. Few simple sounds are thought to have more of sublimity than the report of a cannon; but how different, how much greater the strength of feeling than on other occasions, whenever we hear it coming to us from the fields of actual conflict! Many sounds, which are in themselves inconsiderable, and are not much different from many others, to which we do not attach the char-

* See Letters of Lord Lyttleton, xxv., and Teignmouth's Life of Sir William Jones, Am. ed., p. 14.

acter of sublimity, become highly sublime by association. There is frequently a low, feeble sound preceding the coming of a storm which has this character.

> "Along the woods, along the moorish fens,
> Sighs the sad genius of the coming storm,
> Resounding long in fancy's listening ear."
>
> THOMSON'S *Winter*.

It is sometimes the case, that people whose sensibilities are much alive to thunder mistake for it some common sounds, such as the noise of a carriage, or the rumbling of a cart. While they are under this mistake, they feel these sounds as sublime, because they associate with them all those ideas of danger and of mighty power which they customarily associate with thunder. The hoot of the owl at midnight is sublime chiefly by association; also the scream of the eagle, heard amid rocks and deserts. The latter is particularly expressive of fierce and lonely independence, and both are connected in our remembrance with some striking poetical passages.

§ 68. Further illustrations of sublimity from association.

The same results will be found to hold good in other cases. The sight of broken and heavy masses of dark clouds, driven about by the wind, is sublime. But how much more fruitful of emotion to those who, in the days of Fingal and Ossian, saw them, in their prolific imaginations, peopled with the ghosts of the dead; with the assemblies of those whose renown had continued to live long after their bodies had returned to the dust!—"Temora's woods shook with the blast of the inconstant wind. A cloud gathered in the West. A red star looked from behind its edge. I stood in the wood alone; I saw a ghost in the darkened air; his stride extended from hill to hill. His shield was dim on his side. It was the son of Semo."*

A view of the Egyptian pyramids animates us with sublime emotions; it is impossible to behold such vast efforts of human power and be unmoved; but the strength of these feelings is increased by means of the deeply-impressive recollection that they have stood unshaken while

* Ossian, Epic Poem of Temora, Bk. i.

successive generations have flourished and perished at their feet, and by their being connected with many ideas of ancient magnificence, and with the suggestion of once renowned, but now unknown kings and conquerors. Mount Sinai in Arabia Petræa is a rocky pile of considerable altitude, and, like other summits, must have always excited some emotion in those who beheld it; but when it is seen by a Christian traveller, the sublime emotion is greatly increased by the recollection of the importance which this summit holds in the history of the Jews, and of its consequent connexion with the belief and the hopes of all those who embrace the religion of the Bible

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CHAPTER V.

NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL TASTE.

§ 69. Definition of taste, and some of its characteristics.

At this point in the examination of the Sensibilities, we turn aside for a moment to consider a subject which is closely and indissolubly connected with those emotions which have thus far received our attention; we refer to intellectual TASTE. It is sometimes the case, that a strong light is thrown upon a subject by the mere position which it occupies in reference to other topics closely related to it. It is for this reason that the subject of taste, one both philosophically and practically of great importance, is introduced in this immediate connexion.

If we were required to give a definition, we should say that Taste, in the most general sense of the term, is the power of judging of the beauty or deformity of objects, founded on the experience of emotions; particularly those of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity.

In view of this definition there are two things to be noticed.—(1.) Taste is not a Sensitive, but an Intellectual power; its decisions, although, in consequence of its close connexion with the feelings, it may often seem to be otherwise, are not acts of the Heart, but of the Under

standing. So that, in the arrangement of the mental powers, notwithstanding its introduction here, it belongs strictly to the First rather than the Second great division of the mind.—(2.) Taste, as is obviously implied in the definition, is not an original power, distinct from every other, and having a nature of its own, but seems to be rather a modification or form of the Judgment. It differs from other exhibitions of the Judgment merely in the circumstance of its being exercised in a particular way, viz., in view of certain emotions and the causes of these emotions. In accordance with this view, an old English writer has correctly said, "What we call taste is a kind of *extempore* judgment; it is a settled habit of distinguishing, without staying to attend to rules or ratiocination, and arises from long use and experience."*

§ 70. Distinguishable from mere quickness of feeling or sensibility.

If taste be an intellectual power, originating in the understanding rather than the heart, then it seems to follow, and is unquestionably the fact, that it is not to be confounded with mere quickness of feeling, with mere sensibility. At the same time, it is to be recollected that there is no taste which is absolutely exclusive of sensibility; and that, though they are not identical, they are closely connected together. Without any degree of sensibility, there would be no possibility of emotion; and, consequently, as it is the peculiarity of taste, the very thing which constitutes it what it is, to sit in judgment on emotions, the extinction of the sensibility involves the extinction of taste. And it is for this reason we are led to say that they are closely connected, although they are not identical.

And that they are not identical is not only obvious from the fact that the sensitive and the intellectual, the understanding and the heart, are in their nature necessarily distinct from each other, but also from the fact that we sometimes find men of great sensibility, who are acknowledged by common consent to be deficient in the other attribute. Indeed, the excess of their sensibility seems in some cases to be an obstacle in the way of

* Hughes, as quoted by Stewart, Essay iii., chap iii.

the perfection of their taste; the very cause of that deficiency of taste which they are perceived to manifest. When the excitement of feeling attendant on viewing an object is very great, it is a matter of course that the powers of perception and judgment, which are employed in the examination of its qualities considered as the cause of this internal excitement, will be perplexed and hindered. So that it is sometimes necessary to check for a time the tide of feeling, to contract and embank the fountains of sensibility, in order that the taste, which penetrates back of feeling into the causes and conditions of feeling, may suitably discharge its appropriate office

§ 71. Of the process involved in the formation of taste.

Although every man of entire sanity of mind possesses the materials or elements which are prerequisite to taste, yet not every man is spoken of and regarded as possessing the thing itself. The materials must be moulded into a certain shape, the elements must be compacted into a specific form, before they will be considered as entitling their possessor to the honour of that valuable attribute. When we speak of a man of taste, we imply in the expressions that he has a knowledge of, and is able to foretell, with a considerable degree of accuracy, what works will be found generally pleasing, or the opposite. This ability, as it exists in the man of taste, has sometimes been thought to be original or implanted; but it is not so. Generally speaking, it is the result of a long, and frequently a laborious process of induction. He who aspires to the possession of this power must condescend, as preparatory to obtaining it, to subject his judgment to a course of training and discipline. Accordingly, he contemplates the works of nature and art, first, in reference to himself; he examines the nature of the emotions which are excited in his own bosom, whether of beauty or of a different kind, and is thus enabled to decide, so far as he is himself concerned, whether the object is to be regarded as beautiful or not. He accordingly sets down some objects and qualities of objects as pleasing, others as displeasing; or, what is the same thing, he characterizes some as beautiful and others as

deformed; and others, again, as possessing the marks of grandeur or of sublimity.

Not only this, he endeavours to ascertain the impressions which the same objects make upon the minds of others, and carefully compares the result of this inquiry with his own feelings, in order the more effectually to exclude from his decisions the possibility of mistake. In this way, sustained by the emotions of his own heart and the concurrent feelings of others, he is enabled to detect and to point out, in regard to a particular object, not merely the general fact of its beauty, but the elements of it; in other words, the specific things and relations in the object on which its beauty is based.—Having frequently repeated this process in respect to those objects which happen to come within his particular province or department, he becomes so familiar with the principles of beauty and sublimity within its limits, that he is, to that extent at least, regarded as a man of taste. A reputation which it is vain to suppose can be secured without some such process of repeated examination and comparison.

§ 72. Instantaneousness of the decisions of taste.

There is one distinctive peculiarity in the operations of taste, which may at first sight be thought to be inconsistent with that process of comparison and examination which has just been mentioned, viz., its rapidity of action, the instantaneousness of its decisions. It is this circumstance, probably, more than any other, which has originated and cherished the idea, too often prevalent, that taste is an original faculty, distinct from every other, and never possessed where it is not given by nature.—The instantaneousness of operation which has been mentioned is undoubtedly the result of Habit, and is easily explainable by a reference to the tendencies and effects of that great principle of the mind. By the term Habit, in its application to the mind, we express the well-known fact, that the mental action acquires facility and strength from repetition and practice. But so many instances in illustration of its nature and results have already been given, we cannot suppose it to be necessary to delay upon the subject here. And if the nature of habit is un-

derstood, and if it is applicable, as it unquestionably is, to the matter under consideration, then the mystery which may be thought to rest on the instantaneousness of the operations of taste at once vanishes.

The military engineer, by a single glance of the eye, detects the aptitudes and peculiarities of a military position; the experienced mechanician, in like manner, detects with a rapidity which to others has the appearance of intuition, the parts and the relations, the hinderances and the impulsions of a complicated machine. It is HABIT which is the secret of the power manifested in both of these cases, and in a multitude of others like them. And, for the same reason, the man of taste, availing himself of the immense power which habit has given to his critical judgment, discriminates in the works of genius, by an instantaneous perception, the elements of their beauty or sublimity.

§ 73. Of the permanency of beauty.

Before leaving this subject, there is one other topic which is deserving of a brief notice. We refer to the question whether we are to regard beauty as truly real and permanent, or as accidental and transitory. In other words, whether we are to look upon it as something essential to nature, so that, in its original and intrinsic elements, it will be found to affect all mankind nearly alike in all countries and ages, or as merely a pleasing illusion of the imagination, dependant wholly upon some interesting conjuncture of time and circumstances.—The doctrines which have been advanced help us in answering this interesting question. Various considerations point distinctly to the conclusion that beauty, so far as it may exist independently of association, has its foundation in nature, possesses its fixed causes and relations, and may justly be regarded, in respect to the human mind at least, as something permanent.

This view is sustained, in the first place, by the fact which has already appeared, that beauty in the first instance is original, and not associated. That beauty, in some proper and real sense of the term, exists, is a fact; that the human mind is readily accessible to its influence is a fact also; and, in the case of primary or intrinsic

beauty, no other reason can be given either of its existence or of its influence, than that such is the constitution of nature. And this state of things seems clearly to involve its permanency.—If all beauty were associated, as some seem to have contended, it would be very different; we could not, in that case, predicate of what is beautiful to-day that it would be so to-morrow; but it would be found constantly changing. But the fact that a large portion of it is intrinsic appears necessarily to furnish a basis of the permanency of that portion at least.

In the second place, the doctrine that beauty, in distinction from deformity, is permanent, and is in some way connected with the established nature of things, is confirmed by the fact that the standard of beauty in one age has been essentially the standard of beauty in another, from the beginning of time down to the present hour. The great works of literature, which secured the suffrages of the universal mind in the age of Homer and the Hebrew prophets, retain their ascendency yet. The song of Virgil and the eloquence of Tully come over the heart of those who are able to appreciate them, with as much power as when they were first uttered. No later age or country has ever pronounced the great works of ancient architecture, the Temple of Theseus, the Parthenon, the Coliseum, and numberless others, to be destitute of those high attractions which the nations of antiquity concurred in ascribing to them. And in the sister art of sculpture, it is well known that the specimens of statuary which were the boast of the age of Phidias, have formed the study of the era of Canova. And it is the same in all the departments of the polite arts. Intrinsic Beauty, where it appears at all, stands forth imperishable in fact, which is certainly an evidence of an imperishable nature. Accordingly, under the conviction of its being of this character, Sir Joshua Reynolds says of the painter, if he aims at distinguished excellence, "he must disregard all local and temporary ornaments, and look only on those general habits which are everywhere and always the same; he addresses his works to the people of every country and every age; he calls upon posterity to be his spectators, and says with Zeuxis, IN ÆTERNITATEM PINGO."

CHAPTER VI.

EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS.

§ 74 General nature of emotions of the ludicrous.

In prosecuting the general subject of emotions, we are next to consider another well-known class, which are of a character somewhat peculiar, viz., *emotions of the ludicrous.*

It is difficult to give a precise definition of this feeling, although the same may be said of it as in respect to emotions of beauty, that it is a pleasant or delightful one. But the pleasure which we experience receives a peculiar modification, and one which cannot be fully conveyed in words, in consequence of our perception of some incongruity in the person or thing which is the cause of it.—In this case, as in many other inquiries in mental philosophy, we are obliged to rely chiefly on our own consciousness, and our knowledge of what takes place in ourselves.

§ 75. Occasions of emotions of the ludicrous.

It may, however, assist us in the better understanding of them, if we say something of the occasions on which the emotions of the ludicrous are generally found to arise. And, among other things, it is exceedingly clear, that this feeling is never experienced except when we notice something, either in thoughts, or in outward objects and actions, which is unexpected and uncommon. That is to say, whenever this emotion is felt, there is always an unexpected discovery by us of some new relations.—But then it must be observed, that the feeling in question does not necessarily exist in consequence of the discovery of such new relations merely. Something more is necessary, as may be very readily seen.

Thus we are sometimes, in the physical sciences, presented with unexpected and novel combinations of the properties and qualities of bodies. But, whenever we dis-

cover in those sciences relations in objects which were not only unknown, but unsuspected, we find no emotion of ludicrousness, although we are very pleasantly surprised. Again, similes, metaphors, and other like figures of speech imply in general some new and unexpected relations of ideas. It is this trait in them which gives them their chief force. But, when employed in serious compositions, they are of a character far from being ludicrous.

Hence we infer that emotions of ludicrousness do not exist on the discovery of new and unexpected relations, unless there is at the same time a perception, or supposed perception, of some incongruity or unsuitableness. Such perception of unsuitableness may be expected to give to the whole emotion a new and specific character, which every one is acquainted with from his own experience, but which, as before intimated, it is difficult to express in words.

§ 76. Of Hobbes' account of the ludicrous.

There has not been an entire uniformity on the subject of the emotions of the ludicrous. It would seem that Hobbes (HUMAN NATURE, chap. ix.) considered feelings of this kind as depending on a modification of mere pride in a comparison of ourselves with others to our own advantage. He says of laughter, which, when considered in reference to the mind, and independently of the mere muscular action, is nothing more than a feeling of the ludicrous, that it is "a sudden glory, arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly." —To this notion of the origin of this class of our feelings there are some objections, viz.—(1.) In many instances we have the feeling in question when there is evidently no discovery of any infirmity, either in the witty person or in the subject of his wit, over which we can ourselves triumph with any good reason.—(2.) Further, if the doctrine which resolves the emotions of ludicrousness into a proud comparison of ourselves with others were correct, it would follow that the most proud and self-conceited men would be most inclined to mirth and sociability,

which we do not find to be the fact.—According to Hobbes' notion of the origin of these feelings, we have only to go into the company of the most ignorant and stupid if we wish to be exceedingly merry. In such company we could not fail to be sensible of some eminency in ourselves, in comparison with the infirmities of others. We should here be in a situation corresponding to his definition of laughter, but there can be no doubt that multitudes would be but very little inclined to indulge that feeling in the midst of such associates.

But while we cannot receive this writer's account of the feeling in question, we may undoubtedly be well agreed in respect to it, as far as this: That it implies a quick and playful delight of a peculiar kind, arising on the discovery of unexpected relations of ideas, and the perception or apparent perception of some incongruity.

§ 77. Of what is to be understood by wit.

The subject of emotions of the ludicrous is closely connected with what is termed Wit. This last-named subject, therefore, which it is of some importance to understand, naturally proposes itself for consideration in this place. In regard to WIT, as the term is generally understood at the present time, there is ground to apprehend, that an emotion of the ludicrous is always, in a greater or less degree, experienced in every instance of it.

This being the case, we are led to give this definition, viz., WIT consists in suddenly presenting to the mind an assemblage of related ideas of such a kind as to occasion feelings of the ludicrous.—This is done in a variety of ways; and, among others, in the two following.

§ 78. Of wit as it consists in burlesque or in debasing objects.

The first method which wit employs in exciting the feeling of the ludicrous is by debasing those things which are grand and imposing; especially those which have an appearance of greater importance, and gravity, and splendour than they are truly entitled to. Descriptions of this sort are termed burlesque.

An attempt to lessen what is truly and confessedly serious and important, has in general an unpleasant effect.

very different from that which is caused by true wit. And yet it is the case, that objects and actions truly great and sublime may sometimes be so coupled with other objects, or be represented in such new circumstances as to excite very different feelings from what they would otherwise. Among the various sayings of the Emperor Napoleon, none is more true than his very appropriate remark to the Abbé de Pradt, at the time of his secret flight on a sledge through Poland and Prussia, that there is but a single step from the sublime to the ridiculous.

In the practice of burlesque, as on all other occasions of wit, there is a sudden and uncommon assemblage of related ideas. Sometimes this assemblage is made by means of a formal comparison. Take, as an instance, the following comparison from Hudibras:

> "And now had Phœbus in the lap
> Of Thetis taken out his nap;
> And, like a lobster boiled, the morn
> From black to red began to turn."

We find illustrations of burlesque also in those instances where objects of real dignity and importance are coupled with things mean and contemptible, although there is no direct and formal comparison made. As in this instance from the above-mentioned book:

> "For when the restless Greeks sat down
> So many years before Troy-town,
> And were renowned, as Homer writes,
> For well-soled boots no less than fights."

In these instances we have related ideas. In the first there is undoubtedly an analogy between a lobster and the morning, in the particular of its turning from dark to red. But, however real it may be, it strikes every one as a singular and unexpected resemblance. In the other passage, it is not clear that Butler has done anything more than Homer in associating the renown of the Greeks with their boots as well as their valour. But to us of the present day the connexion of ideas is hardly less uncommon and singular, not to say incongruous, than in the former.

§ 79. Of wit when employed in aggrandizing objects.

The second method which wit employs in exciting emotions of the ludicrous is by aggrandizing objects which are in themselves inconsiderable. This species of wit may be suitably termed *mock-majestic* or *mock-heroic.* While the former kind delights in low expressions, this is the reverse, and chooses learned words and sonorous combinations. In the following spirited passage of Pope, the writer compares dunces to gods, and Grub-street to heaven.

"As Berecynthia, while her offspring vie
In homage to the mother of the sky,
Surveys around her in the bless'd abode
A hundred sons, and every son a god;
Not with less glory mighty Dulness crowned,
Shall take through Grub-street her triumphant round;
And her Parnassus glancing o'er at once,
Behold a hundred sons, and each a dunce."

In this division of wit are to be included those instances where grave and weighty reflections are made upon mere trifles. In this case, as in others, the ideas are in some respects related, or have something in common; but the grouping of them is so singular and unexpected, that we cannot observe it without considerable emotion.

"My galligaskins, that have long withstood
The winter's fury and encroaching frosts,
By time subdued (*what will not time subdue!*),
A horrid chasm disclose."

It may be proper to make the remark in this place, which is applicable to wit in all its forms, that many sayings, which would otherwise have appeared to us witty, lose no small share of their intended effect whenever we are led to suspect that they were premeditated. Hence an observation or allusion, which would be well received in conversation, would often be insipid in print; and it is for the same reason that we receive more pleasure from a witty repartee than a witty attack. Our surprise at the sudden developement of intellectual acuteness is much greater at such times.

§ 80. Of other methods of exciting emotions of the ludicrous.

But it is not to be supposed that wit is limited to the methods of assembling together incongrous ideas, which

have just been referred to. A person of genuine wit excites emotions of the ludicrous in a thousand ways, and which will be so diverse from each other, that it will be found exceedingly difficult to subject them to any rules. It would be difficult, for instance, to bring within any established classification of the specific sources of wit many passages of the poet Butler. In the first Canto of his poem of Hudibras, we have a particular account of the hero's horse, in which the writer very singularly compares the animal to a Spaniard in majesty and deliberation of gait, and in some other respects to the celebrated horse of Cæsar, as follows:

"He was well stay'd, and in his gait
Preserved a grave, majestic state.
At spur or switch no more he skipp'd,
Or mended pace, than Spaniard whipp'd;
And yet so fiery he would bound,
As if he grieved to touch the ground.
That Cæsar's horse, who, as fame goes,
Had corns upon his feet and toes,
Was not by half so tender hoof'd,
Or trod upon the ground so soft;
And as that beast would kneel and stoop
(Some write) to take his rider up,
So Hudibras's ('tis well known)
Would do the same to set him down."

§ 81. Of the character and occasions of humour.

Closely connected with the general subject of ludicrous emotions and of wit is that of Humour. It is well known that we often apply the terms *humour* and *humorous* to descriptions of a particular character, whether written or given in conversation, and which may be explained as follows.

It so happens that we frequently find among men what seems to us a disproportion in their passions; for instance, when they are noisy and violent, but not durable. We find inconsistencies, contradictions, and disproportions in their actions. They have their foibles (hardly any one is without them), such as self-conceit, caprice, foolish partialities, and jealousies.—Such incongruities in feeling and action cause an emotion of surprise like an unexpected combination of ideas in wit. Observing them, as we do, in connexion with the acknowledged high traits and

responsi ilities of human nature, we can no more refrain from an emotion of the ludicrous than we can on seeing a gentleman of fine clothes and high dignity making a false step and tumbling into a gutter. A person who can seize upon these specialities in temper and conduct, and set them forth in a lively and exact manner, is called a man of humour; and his descriptions are termed humorous descriptions.

Mr. Addison has given many examples of the humorous in the incidents and characters of the Tattler and Spectator. But excellence in this species of writing is not very frequently found, and is an attainment of considerable difficulty. In general it implies something peculiar in the character of the writer. There are some persons who seem to have a natural inclination for noticing those traits in the feelings and actions of men which cause ludicrous emotions. Whatever may be the cause of it, there can hardly be a question as to the fact that some possess this characteristic more than others. This was particularly true of Swift, and the same characteristic has been ascribed to Fontaine. Writers who have a natural turn of this sort will be more likely to excel in the humorous than others.

§ 82. Of the practical utility of feelings of the ludicrous.

It is not impossible that the feelings which we have examined in this chapter may have the appearance to some minds of being practically useless. If this were the fact, it would be at variance with the economy of the mind in other respects, which gives evidence everywhere that its original tendencies are ingrafted upon it for some practical ends. But it is not so. The feeling of the ludicrous (or, as it is sometimes called, the sense of ridicule) is attended with results which, although they may not be perfectly obvious at first, will be found, on a little examination, to be of no small moment. It is entirely clear that it constitutes one of the important guides and aids which nature has appointed of human conduct. Scarcely any one is willing to undergo ridicule even in its milder and more acceptable forms, much less to subject himself to the "world's dread laugh." And many per-

sons would be less attentive to the decencies and proprieties of personal conduct and of the intercourse of life, than they are in fact, were it not for the fear of this species of retribution. It is true, it is not powerful enough, nor is it the appropriate instrument, to attack the more marked depravities incident to our nature, the strongholds of its sin; but it is unquestionably an effective and useful agent in its application to whatever is mean, incongruous, and unseemly.—See, in connexion with this subject, Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, bk. i., ch. iii., and Beattie on Laughter and Ludicrous Compositions.

CHAPTER VII.

INSTANCES OF OTHER SIMPLE EMOTIONS.

§ 83. Emotions of cheerfulness, joy, and gladness.

UNDER the general head of Emotions there are many other simple feelings which merit some attention. Although they are, perhaps, not less essential to our nature, and not less important than those which have been already attended to, we do not find so many difficulties in their examination, and but a few remarks will be wanting to explain them.

We begin with the emotion of *cheerfulness*. Of the nature of this feeling none can be supposed to be ignorant. It exists, in a greater or less degree, throughout the whole course of our life. It is seen in the benignant looks, and is heard in the garrulity of old age; it sheds its consolations over the anxieties and toils of manhood, and reigns with a sort of perpetual spring in youth.

The words *joy* and *delight* express a high degree of cheerfulness; the feeling is the same; the difference is in its greater intensity. The word *gladness* is nearly synonymous with these last, but seems to be applied particularly when the joy is of a more sudden and less permanent character.

§ 84. Emotions of melancholy, sorrow, and grief.

While there are many things in life which are fitted to make us cheerful and happy, every one must know

that for wise purposes a degree of bitterness is mingled in our cup, and that circumstances occur from time to time which are of an opposite tendency. And these prove to us occasions of melancholy, which is the name of another specific simple emotion.

There are different degrees of this emotion, as well as of that of cheerfulness. We sometimes express the very slightest degree of it by the words uneasiness or discontent. When the feeling of melancholy is from any circumstance greatly increased, we usually give it the name of *sorrow;* so that sorrow seems to hold nearly the same relation to melancholy that joy does to cheerfulness.

The word *grief* also has nearly the same relation to sorrow that gladness has to joy. As far as the mere feeling is concerned which they represent, the two words grief and sorrow may be regarded as synonymous with each other; with this exception, that the term grief is commonly employed when the sorrow exists suddenly and with great strength. Hence grief sometimes shows itself by external signs, and even in frantic transports; while sorrow, even when it is deeply rooted, is more tacit, enduring, and uncommunicative.

§ 85. Emotions of surprise, astonishment, and wonder.

Whenever anything novel and unexpected presents itself to our notice, whether in nature or in ordinary events, we experience a new simple emotion, distinct from any which has hitherto been mentioned, which we call a feeling of *surprise.* We are aware that this view is not adopted by Dr. Adam Smith. "Surprise," he remarks, in one of his Philosophical Essays, "is not to be regarded as an original emotion, distinct from all others. The violent and sudden change produced upon the mind when an emotion of any kind is brought upon it, constitutes the whole nature of surprise." This remark, although coming from a person of acknowledged acuteness, seems to have been unadvisedly made. If there be actually no such feeling as that of surprise, it cannot easily be accounted for, that a term expressive of it is found in all languages. And, furthermore, the existence of such a feeling, of a specific nature and distinct from

all others, seems to be as fully warranted by our own consciousness and the general testimony of men, as that of any feeling whatever. If Mr. Smith had said, a violent and sudden change of the mind (that is, some new, sudden, and unexpected perception) constitutes, not the emotion itself, but, in general, the *occasion* of the emotion of surprise, his language would have been less objectionable.

We sometimes use the word *astonishment*, which does not express a different emotion, but the same emotion in a different degree. When the feeling is exceedingly strong, it seems to suspend for a time the whole action of the mind, and we say of a person in such a situation, not merely that he is surprised, but is astonished or amazed.

When the facts or events which occasion the surprise are of such a singular and complicated character as to induce us to dwell upon them for a length of time, the feeling arising is then often called *wonder*. It is not, however, a different emotion from what we ordinarily call surprise, but the same emotion, modified by different circumstances.

It may be added here, that this emotion is highly important to our preservation, security, and improvement. It is in new circumstances, in untried and unexplored situations, that we are particularly required to be upon our guard, since we know not what effects may attend them, nor whether these effects may prove good or evil to us.

Happily for us, the emotion of surprise and astonishment which we experience at such times is very vivid, so much so as to arrest for a time both our perceptions and our conduct, and to compel us to pause and consider where we are, and what is to be done. Certainly this is a beneficent provision; for if nature had formed us unsusceptible of such vivid feelings, we should have gone on without being apprehensive of the consequences, and in that way often have plunged amid inexpressible evils.

§ 86. Emotions of dissatisfaction, displeasure, and disgust.

There is another emotion, which approaches very near to the feeling of melancholy, and still slightly differs from

it, which we express by the term *dissatisfaction.* It is a painful feeling, though only in a small degree; but its nature, like that of all other simple emotions, cannot be fully understood, except by a reference to the testimony of our own inward experience.

When from any circumstance the emotion of dissatisfaction exists in an increased degree, we often express this difference, although the nature of the feeling remains the same, by another term, that of *displeasure.*

There appear to be other forms of the simple feeling of dissatisfaction. The feeling of *disgust* is the emotion of dissatisfaction, existing in an increased degree, but under such circumstances as to distinguish it, in the view of our consciousness, from the feeling of displeasure. The latter feeling approximates more closely to an emotion of hostility to the cause of it than the former. The terms are sometimes used together, and yet not as perfectly synonymous; as when we say that, on a certain occasion, we were both displeased and disgusted.

§ 87. Emotions of diffidence, modesty, and shame.

There is an emotion, often indicated outwardly by a half-averted look, and a shyness and awkwardness of manner, expressed by the term *diffidence.* An interesting modification of this feeling, as we suppose it to be, is *modesty;* differing from diffidence perhaps slightly in kind or nature, but probably only in degree. Although this feeling attracts but little notice in the genealogy of our mental operations, and occupies but a small space in its description, it is important in its results. It combines its influences, in connexion with the natural desire of regard or esteem, in keeping men in their place, and in thus sustaining that propriety of conduct and those gradations of honour and of duty which are so essential to the existence and the happiness of society.

A higher degree of this mental state is *shame.* When we find ourselves involved in any marked improprieties of conduct, this feeling exists, characterized outwardly by a downcast eye and a flushed countenance. It is not, however, exclusively attendant upon guilt, although guilt, among other consequences flowing from it, is in part punished in this way; but seems to be rather an

appropriate punishment attendant on those minor violations of decency and order, which may exist without an infringement on morals.

§ 88. Emotions of regard, reverence, and adoration.

Different from all the feelings which have now been mentioned is the emotion of regard or respect, which, in its simplest form at least, we exercise towards the great mass of our fellow-beings. The mere fact that they are creatures of God, and are possessed of intellectual and moral powers like our own, is deemed sufficient to lay the foundation of the exercise of this feeling towards them.

When we observe in any individuals marked traits of mental excellence, as wisdom, truth, and justice, especially when these traits are expanded and exalted by great age, the feeling of respect, which we exercise in ordinary cases, is heightened into *reverence.* Every country can boast of a few such men, the just objects of the deepened regard of reverence; and the eyes of successive generations have been turned with the same deep feeling towards those who are scattered along, in various places, in the long tract of history.

When the reverence or veneration is free from every inferior intermixture; in other words, when the object of it is regarded as without weakness and possessed of every possible perfection, it then becomes *adoration;* a homage of the soul so pure and exalted, that it properly belongs only to the Supreme Being. The wisdom of the wisest men is often perplexed with errors; the goodness of the best of men is marred by occasional infirmities; how much deeper, therefore, and purer, and more elevated will be our sentiments of veneration, when directed towards Him whose wisdom never fails, and who is not only just and kind in his administrations, but the original and inexhaustible source of beneficence and rectitude!

We conclude here the examination of the Emotions. We would not pretend that this part of our sentient nature has been fully explored in the views which have been taken, but would hope that so much has been said as to throw some satisfactory light upon it, and to leave us at liberty to turn to another class of subjects.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

PART FIRST.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENSIBILITIES.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENTIMENTS.

CLASS SECOND.

THE DESIRES.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE OF DESIRES.

§ 89. Of the prevalence of desire in this department of the mind.

We now proceed to enter upon a separate portion of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities, distinguished from that which has hitherto received our attention by the possession of its appropriate nature, and by sustaining its distinct and appropriate relations. The characteristic element of this region of the Natural Sensibilities, that which, in fact, constitutes the basis of its existence, is the state of mind, distinct from all others, which we denominate DESIRE. This state of mind not only stands at the threshold of the department which we now enter upon, but diffuses abroad its influence, and runs through, and gives a character to all the subordinate divisions into which this part of the Pathematic nature will be found to resolve itself. No appetite, no propensity, or affection exists in fact, nor can we suppose it possible for them to exist, exclusively of any intermixture of the ingredient of DESIRE.—It is for this reason that we denominate this portion of the sensitive nature Desires, as we called the other Emotions; and as we sometimes speak of the EMOTIVE sensibilities, so we might, with no impropriety, speak of the DESIROUS or DESIRIVE sensibilities.

§ 90. The nature of desires known from consciousness.

As DESIRES occupy so prominent a place in those principles of the mind which we now propose to give some account of, it is proper to delay here, in order briefly to attempt some explanation of their nature. And in doing this, we are obliged, in the first place, to repeat the remark already often made, that we must turn the acts of the mind inward upon itself, and consult the intimations of our own consciousness. We do not suppose that any definition of desire, inasmuch as it is obviously a simple state of the mind, could possibly throw any such light

upon it as to preclude the necessity of an internal reference. It is the light of the mind, if we will but turn our eyes to behold it, and that alone, which can truly indicate what may be called the essentiality of its nature.—At the same time, while we must obviously consult consciousness for a knowledge of its distinctive character, we may probably render our conceptions of it more distinct and perfect by considering some of the circumstances or incidents of its origin, and some of the relations it sustains.

§ 91. Of the place of desires in relation to other mental states.

It is important to possess a well-settled and definite idea of the place of Desires, considered in relation to other mental states, especially as a thorough understanding of this point throws light upon the important subject of the philosophy of the Will.—(1.) And the first remark to be made here is, that desires never follow, in direct and *immediate* sequence, to intellections or the cognitive acts of the mind. There is a distinct department or portion of the mind, *located*, if we may be permitted to use that expression, between the intellect and the mental states under consideration. It requires no further proof than the simple statement itself, when we say that we never desire a thing simply because we perceive it or have a knowledge of it. The mere perception of a thing is of itself no adequate reason why we should make the thing an object of pursuit. There must obviously be some intermediate state of the mind, existing as the proximate and causative occasion of desires, viz., an *emotion*. Accordingly, the prerequisite condition to desire is some antecedent feeling, generally of a pleasurable nature, which intervenes between the desire, and the perception or knowledge of the desired object.

(2.) In illustration of what has been said, it is the fact, that, whenever we desire the presence or possession of an object, it is because we are in some way pleased with it. Whenever, on the other hand, we desire its removal from our presence, it is because we are in some way displeased with it. And these expressions, indicative of pleasure or displeasure, obviously involve the existence of that

distinct state of the mind which we denominate an EMOTION; a state of feeling entirely different both from the perception of the object which goes before such emotion, and the desire of the object which follows after it. Accordingly, we may feel at liberty to state, in general terms, that no man ever desired an object, or could by any possibility desire it, in regard to which he had experienced no emotion, but had always been in a state of perfect indifferency. Such, in the matter under consideration, is obviously the fixed law of the mind.

(3.) In this connexion, and in view of what has now been said, we may properly recur a moment to the mind's general structure. The general division of the Mind, it will be recollected, is into the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. The External Intellect is first brought into action; followed, in greater or less proximity of time, by the developement of the Internal. The subsequent process of the mental action, when carried through in the direction of the Pathematic sensibilities, is from intellections to emotions, and from emotions to desires, and from desires to acts of the will. When carried through in the direction of the Moral sensibilities, it is from intellections to emotions (not natural, but moral emotions); and then, diverging into a different track, and avoiding the appropriate domain of the Desires, passes from emotions to feelings of moral obligation, and from the Obligatory feelings, like the corresponding portion of the sensibilities, to the region of the Voluntary or Volitive nature.

§ 92. Of an exception to the foregoing statement.

The statements of the last section to this effect, that emotions are the prerequisite condition of desires, and that the latter never exist except in connexion with the fulfilment of this condition, is probably subject to an exception, which, although it may be of no great importance, it is proper to notice in this place. We have reference to those modifications and acts of desire which are *instinctive*. It is worthy of inquiry, whether some instincts, and some mental acts of an instinctive nature, are not capable of existing, and do not in fact exist, inde-

pendently of antecedent emotions, considered as grounds of such existence. Such is the rapidity of their action, that they certainly have, in some cases, this appearance, although this circumstance may not of itself be decisive. They are also, in some cases, where this action is less rapid, directed and guided to their appropriate objects as *ultimate* ends, without any foresight of, or regard to the pleasure or pain which may be attendant, either antecedently or subsequently, on the acquisition of that object. The truth is, that some of the instincts (for it is probably not the fact, in an equal degree, in respect to all) receive their direction, not merely in the general sense of the term, but their *specific* direction, from a power out of the mind. They are moulded by a hand unseen to a particular object, and are impelled in its pursuit; without being at liberty to regard either the good or evil which may follow from it. And, under these circumstances, there is not that absolute necessity of the antecedence of intellections and emotions, which exists in the case of other desires.—With this slight exception, the general statement holds good. We speak of it as a slight exception, because, among other reasons, we are not obliged to suppose that it exists in respect to all even of the instincts. When, for instance, we make an instinctive effort to recover the balance which we have lost, may we not suppose, although the effort is instantaneous, that we have a perception of the danger, and a sentiment or emotion of fear, antecedent to making the effort?

§ 93. The desires characterized by comparative fixedness and permanency.

There is one mark or trait attending the feelings under consideration which appears to be worthy of notice. We refer to the fact, that the desires, as compared with the emotions, appear to possess a greater degree of fixedness or permanency. It is well known that our emotions rapidly go and come; sinking and rising on the mind's surface like the unfixed waves of a troubled sea. But the desires, which are subsequent to them in the time of their origin, and may be regarded as produced in and as emerging from the troubled waters of emotion, evi-

dently exhibit less facility and elasticity of movement. Having once entered their allotted position, although they are not absolutely immoveable, they occupy it with so much pertinacity as to render it proper to regard this as one of their characteristics.

There certainly can be no great effort necessary in understanding the statement which has been made, and no great difficulty, as we suppose, in recognising and substantiating its truth. Take, for instance, the case of a man who is an exile in a foreign land, or of the unfortunate individual who is unjustly condemned to the occupancy of a prison, and they will assuredly tell you that the desires they have to see once more the light of heaven, their native land, and the countenances of their friends, sustains itself in their bosoms with a pertinacity which defies all change; and that they might as well rend away the fibres of the heart itself as to separate from it a feeling so deeply rooted.—We give this as an illustration; but it is more or less so in every case where the desires have decidedly fixed themselves upon any interesting object.

§ 94. Desires always imply an object desired.

An additional characteristic of Desires is, that they always have an object, generally a distinct and well-defined one, and cannot possibly exist without it. To speak of a desire, without involving the idea of an object desired, would be an anomaly in language. They differ in this respect from emotions, which, although they have their antecedent causes or occasions, do not possess, in their own nature, a prospective or anticipative bearing, but terminate in themselves. Desires, on the contrary, are always pointing onward to what is to be hereafter. And this is probably one reason of their greater degree of fixedness or permanency. The desires lean upon the object which they have in view as a sort of pillar of support; they may be said, with strict truth at the bottom of the expression, to cling around it, as the vine encircles and rests itself upon the elm; and, of course, are not left loose and fluttering, which is substantially the case with the states of mind which immediately precede them, at the mercy of every passing wind.

§ 95. The fulfilment of desires attended with enjoyment.

As a general thing, it may be said of the emotions that they are either pleasant or painful, although in some instances even of those feelings, it might not be easy to predicate distinctly and confidently either the one or the other. And this last statement is true particularly of the desires; which, although they exist distinctly and well-defined in the view of the mind's consciousness, and constitute a powerful motive to action, can hardly be said, for the time being, to involve, in their own nature, either pleasure or its opposite. At any rate, we find it difficult, in ordinary cases, distinctly to detect either of these traits.

But, however this may be, there is still another characteristic circumstance which aids in distinguishing them from other mental states. It is this. Every desire, when the object towards which it is directed is attained, is attended with a degree of pleasure. It is absolutely inseparable from the nature of desire, that the acquisition of the object of its pursuit, whether that object be good or evil, will be followed by the possession of some enjoyment. Sometimes the enjoyment is very great, at others less, varying generally with the intensity of the desire.

§ 96. Of variations or degrees in the strength of the desires.

There is this further statement to be made in reference to the Desires, applicable, however, to a multitude of other states of the mind, that they exist in *different degrees*. As a general thing, they will be found to exist in a greater or less degree, in accordance with the greater or less vividness and strength of the antecedent emotions. The original cause, however, of these variations, making allowance for some occasional constitutional differences, is to be sought for in the intellect or understanding. The more distinctly we perceive or understand a thing, the more distinct and vivid, we may reasonably expect, will be our emotions. And as the Desires are based upon the emotions as the antecedent occasion or ground of their existence, they may, in like manner, be expected to exhibit, as has already been intimated, a vividness and strength corresponding in a very considerable degree to that of the feelings which preceded them.—It will be

noticed that we do not speak here of the permanency of desires, which is a very different thing, but simply of their intensity or strength for the time being.

§ 97. Tendency to excite movement an attribute of desire.

We shall conclude this notice of the nature of desire with remarking that there is one other characteristic attribute which particularly distinguishes it, and which undoubtedly must enter as an element into every perfect delineation of it. Such is the nature of desire, that it is of itself, in virtue of its own essence, a prompting, exciting, or, as Mr. Hobbes would term it, a *motive* state of the mind. In other words, its very existence involves the probability of action; it sets the mind upon the alert; it arouses the faculties, both mental and bodily, and places them in the attitude of movement.—It is true that the desire does not, in point of fact, always result in action. Before action can be consummated, another power, still more remote in the interior structure of the mind, must be consulted, that of the Will. If the Will decidedly opposes the desire, its tendency is, of course, frustrated in the object aimed at; but the tendency itself, although disappointed of its object, still remains. It is there, and cannot be otherwise than there, while the desire exists.

This important tendency does not exist, as a general thing, in other departments of the mind. It does not exist, for instance, in the cognitive or intellective part of the mind, in itself considered. If the intellect were insulated from the nature which is back of it, man would be a being of speculation merely, not of action. Nor does it exist in the emotions. If man were formed with the emotive sensibilities only, without the accompaniment of those ulterior sensibilities which are built upon them, he would be as unmoved and inoperative as if he were constituted with the single attribute of perceptivity. He would be like a ship anchored in the centre of the ocean, agitated, and thrown up and down on the rising and falling billows, but wholly incapable of any movement in latitude or longitude. The tendency to excite movement, as an inherent or essential characteristic, exists in the desires, and nowhere else, except in the corresponding por-

tion of the moral sensibilities, viz., the feelings of moral obligation.—The tendency in question belongs to these two mental states alike.—It is the office of the Will, as a separate and relatively a higher part of our nature, to act in reference to this tendency, either in checking or aiding, in annulling or consummating it.

§ 98. Classification of this part of the sensibilities.

If we were called upon to consider the Desires in their simplest form only, we might perhaps feel at liberty to dismiss the subject with what has already been said. But the circumstance that they are subject to many modifications and combinations, sets us upon a new field of inquiry of great extent and interest. The Desires are sometimes modified by being directed to particular ends In other words, they are constituted with specific tendencies, from which they seldom vary. This is the case with the Instincts, properly so called; and probably not less so, in their original and unperverted action, with the Appetites. In regard to the Affections, a distinct class of the active or sensitive principles which come under this general head, it seems, as far as we can judge, to be the fact, that DESIRES exist in a close and inseparable combination with certain emotions, and are thus made to assume an aspect which they would not otherwise possess. Accordingly, we have a basis, an ample and distinctly defined one, for a subordinate classification. And it is to the examination of the Desires, as they exist in this classification, that we now proceed; beginning with those which, in the gradations of regard we are naturally led to bestow upon them, are generally adjudged as lowest in point of rank, and proceeding upward to those which are higher. In accordance with this plan, they will present themselves to notice, and be made the subject of distinct consideration, in the order of the Instincts, the Appetites, the Propensities, and the Affections.—We will only add, that a classification in any case ought not to be made without reasons. In the present instance, however, it would clearly be out of place to anticipate the reasons, any further than what has already, in a general way, been said of that arrangement of the DESIRES which is now

proposed. As we advance in our inquiries, we shall see that it is founded in nature and authenticated by the forms of language, as well as by the prevalent practice and sentiments of mankind.

§ 99. The principles, based upon desire, susceptible of a twofold operation.

There is one important remark, which is applicable to all the principles, with the exception of the Instincts, which now present themselves for examination. It is, that, with the exception just mentioned, they all have a twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. This statement, of course, will not apply to the pure Instincts; for the very idea of their being instincts, in the proper sense of the term, seems to imply an absolute exclusion of their being voluntary. But as we advance from the Instincts to the Appetites, and still upward to the Propensities and Affections, we find each and all of these important principles susceptible of being contemplated in this twofold aspect. Each, under circumstances of such a nature as to preclude inquiry and reflection, is susceptible of an instinctive action; and each, under other circumstances more favourable to the exercise of reasoning, is susceptible of a deliberate or voluntary action.—This remark is important in our estimate of these principles, considered in a moral point of view.

CHAPTER II.

INSTINCTS.

§ 100. Of the instincts of man as compared with those of the inferior animals.

IN proceeding to examine that part of our sensitive constitution which is comprehended under the general name of Desires, we naturally begin with *instincts*, which are nothing more than desires existing under a particular and definite modification.—It is generally conceded that

there are in our nature some strong and invariable tendencies to do certain things, without previous forethought and deliberation, which bear that name. The actions of men are not always governed by feelings founded on reasoning, but are sometimes prompted by quick and decisive impulses, which set themselves in array before reason has time to operate. It is from this circumstance that these mental tendencies or desires are termed instinctive; a word which implies, in its original meaning, a movement or action, whether mental or bodily, without reflection and foresight.

Although such instinctive tendencies are undoubtedly found in men, it must be admitted that they are less frequent, and, in general, less effective, than in the lower animals. And, in truth, it could not be expected to be otherwise, when we remember that the brute creation are wholly destitute of the powers of abstraction and reasoning, or, at most, possess them only in a small degree. The provident oversight of the Supreme Being, without whose notice not a sparrow falleth to the ground, has met this deficiency by endowing them with instincts, the most various in kind, and strikingly adapted to the exigencies of their situation. We find the proofs of this remark in the nests of birds, in the ball of the silkworm, in the house of the beaver, in the return and flight of birds at their appointed seasons, and in a multitude of other instances.

§ 101. Of the nature of the instincts of brute animals.

So abundantly has the great Father of all things provided, by means of their instincts, for the preservation and enjoyment of the inferior animals, that they even, in some respects, seem to have the advantage over man, with all his high and excellent capacities. In the early periods of the human race, men looked abroad upon the great ocean with timidity; they launched their frail vessels, and directed their course by the heavenly bodies; but, with all their care and wisdom, they were often baffled, and obliged to put back again into the place of their departure, or run, perhaps, upon some unknown shore. But flocks of migratory birds are frequently seen naviga-

ting the boundless fields of air, passing wide tracks of unknown land and water, and returning again at the set time, and with scarcely making a mistake, or wandering a league from their course; and yet they are without any histories of former voyages, without chart or compass, and without the ability, so far as we are able to determine, of reading the way of their flight in the bright letters of the stars.

This is only one of the facts or classes of facts which illustrate this subject; but it shows very clearly the unerring guidance, the fixed and definite adaptation to a particular end, which is the characteristic of instincts.

> "Who bade the stork Columbus-like explore
> Heavens not his own, and worlds unknown before?
> Who calls the council, states the certain day,
> Who forms the phalanx, and who points the way?"

The ways in which this unerring tendency, this divine guidance, shows itself, are almost innumerable. The philosopher Galen once took a kid from its dead mother by dissection, and, before it had tasted any food, brought it into a certain room having many vessels full, some of wine, some of oil, some of honey, some of milk, or some other liquor, and many others filled with the different sorts of grain and fruit, and there laid it. After a little time the embryon had acquired strength enough to get up on its feet; and it was with sentiments of strong admiration that the spectators saw it advance towards the liquors, fruit, and grain, which were placed round the room, and, having smelled all of them, at last sup the milk alone. About two months afterward, the tender sprouts of plants and shrubs were brought to it, and, after smelling all of them and tasting some, it began to eat of such as are the usual food of goats.

The cells constructed by the united efforts of a hive of bees have often been referred to as illustrating the nature of instincts.—"It is a curious mathematical problem," says Dr. Reid, "at what precise angle the three planes which compose the bottom of a cell in a honeycomb ought to meet in order to make the greatest saving, or the least expense of material and labour. This is one of those problems, belonging to the higher parts of mathematics,

which are called problems of *maxima* and *minima*. It has been resolved by some mathematicians, particularly by the ingenious Mr. Maclaurin, by a fluxionary calculation, which is to be found in the Transactions of the Royal Society of London. He has determined precisely the angle required; and he found, by the most exact mensuration the subject could admit, that it is the very angle in which the three planes in the bottom of the cell of a honeycomb do actually meet.

"Shall we ask here, who taught the bee the properties of solids, and to resolve problems of maxima and minima? We need not say that bees know none of these things. They work most geometrically, without any knowledge of geometry; somewhat like a child, who, by turning the handle of an organ, makes good music without any knowledge of music. The art is not in the child, but in him who made the organ. In like manner, when a bee makes its comb so geometrically, the geometry is not in the bee, but in that great Geometrician who made the bee, and made all things in number, weight, and measure."

§ 102. Instincts susceptible of slight modifications.

We usually speak of the instincts of animals as fixed and inflexible; and they undoubtedly are so in a considerable degree. Of this inflexibility, or fixed and particular direction which is appropriate to them, a multitude of facts might be brought as proof. Mr. Stewart, speaking of a blind old beaver, that had been taken and kept for a number of years in a pond by itself, asserts that the animal showed no inconsiderable degree of sagacity and mechanical contrivance in accomplishing particular ends; but these ends were in no respect subservient to its accommodation or comfort in its actual situation, although manifestly parts of those systematic instincts which belong to it in its social state. The animal seemed, he further observes, like a solitary wheel of a machine, which exhibits in its teeth marks of a reference to other wheels with which it was intended to co-operate.

It must be admitted, however, whatever may be the correctness of this general view, that instincts are not always found in a pure and unmixed state, but are suscep-

tible of being modified from observation and experience The consequence is, that the naturally invariable tendency of the instinct is frequently checked and controlled; and it acquires, in that way, an appearance of flexibility which does not belong to it in its pure state. Hence there is often seen in old animals a cunning and sagacity which is not discoverable in those that are young; a difference which could not exist if both old and young were governed in all cases by an unmixed instinct.—It is necessary that this remark should be kept in view in considering the subject of instincts, if we are desirous of possessing a proper understanding of it.

§ 103. Instances of instincts in the human mind.

But it is not our design to enter particularly into the subject of the instincts of animals in this place, although this topic is undoubtedly one of exceeding interest both to the philosopher and the Christian. Such inquiries are too diverse and remote from our main object, which has particular, if not exclusive reference to the economy of human nature. There are certain instinctive tendencies in man as well as in the inferior animals; but they are few in number, and, compared with the other parts of his nature, are of subordinate importance. Some of them will now be referred to.

(I.) The action of respiration is thought, by writers who have given particular attention to the subject, to imply the existence of an instinct. We cannot suppose that the infant at its birth has learned the importance of this act by reasoning upon it; and he is as ignorant of the internal machinery which is put in operation, as he is of its important uses. And yet he puts the whole machinery into action at the very moment of coming into existence, and with such regularity and success that we cannot well account for it except on the ground of an instinctive impulse.

(II.) "By the same kind of principle," says Dr Reid (Essays on the Active Powers, iii., chap. ii.), "a new-born child, when the stomach is emptied, and nature has brought milk into the mother's breast, sucks and swallows its food as perfectly as if it knew the principles of

that operation, and had got the habit of working according to them.

"Sucking and swallowing are very complex operations. Anatomists describe about thirty pairs of muscles that must be employed in every draught. Of those muscles, every one must be served by its proper nerve, and can make no exertion but by some influence communicated by the nerve. The exertion of all those muscles and nerves is not simultaneous. They must succeed each other in a certain order, and their order is no less necessary than the exertion itself.—This regular train of operations is carried on according to the nicest rules of art by the infant, who has neither art, nor science, nor experience, nor habit.

"That the infant feels the uneasy sensation of hunger, I admit; and that it sucks no longer than till this sensation be removed. But who informed it that this uneasy sensation might be removed, or by what means? That it knows nothing of this is evident, for it will as readily suck a finger or a bit of stick as the nipple."

(III.) The efforts which men make for self-preservation, appear to be in part of an instinctive kind. If a man is in danger of falling from unexpectedly losing his balance, we say with much propriety that the instantaneous effort he makes to recover his position is instinctive. If a person is unexpectedly and suddenly plunged into a river, the first convulsive struggle which he makes for his safety seems to be of the same kind. His reasoning powers may soon come to his aid, and direct his further measures for his preservation; but his first efforts are evidently made on another principle. When a violent blow is aimed at one, he instinctively shrinks back, although he knew beforehand it would be aimed in sport, and although his reason told him there was no danger. We always instinctively close the eyelids when anything suddenly approaches them. Dr. Reid asserts that he has seen this tried upon a wager, which a man was to gain if he could keep his eyes open while another aimed a stroke at them in jest. When we are placed on the summit of a high tower or on the edge of a precipice, although we are perfectly assured of our safety by the rea-

soning power, the instinct of self-preservation is constantly suggesting other precautions.

§ 104. Further instances of instincts in men.

(IV.) There is also a species of resentment which may properly be called instinctive. Deliberate resentment implies the exercise of reason, and is excited only by intentional injury. Instinctive resentment, on the other hand, operates, whether the injury be intentional or not, and precisely as it does in the lower animals.

Whenever we suddenly experience pain, which is caused by some external object, this feeling arises in the mind with a greater or less degree of power, and prompts us to retaliate on the cause of it.—A child, for instance, stumbles over a stone or stick of wood, and hurts himself, and, under the impulse of instinctive resentment, violently beats the unconscious cause of its suffering. Savages, when they have been struck by an arrow in battle, have been known to tear it from the wound, break, and bite it with their teeth, and dash it on the ground, as if the original design and impetus of destruction were in the arrow itself. All persons, of strong passions in particular, show the existence and workings of this instinct when they wreak their vengeance, as they often do, on inanimate objects, by beating or dashing them to pieces.

(V.) There is undoubtedly danger of carrying the doctrine of the instinctive tendencies of the human mind too far, but we may consider ourselves safe in adding to those which have been mentioned the power of interpreting natural signs. Whenever we see the outward signs of rage, pity, grief, joy, or hatred, we are able immediately to interpret them. It is abundantly evident that children, at a very early period, read and decipher, in the looks and gestures of their parents, the emotions and passions, whether of a good or evil kind, with which they are agitated.

It must be admitted, that the power of interpreting natural signs depends in part on experience and on deductions drawn from that experience; but the power is evidently in some degree instinctive. Often, when we see, both in children and in older persons, the strong out-

ward manifestations of grief, when we are at the same time assured that there is but little of suffering in fact, we find ourselves very sensibly affected. So, when we see an actor on the stage with distorted countenance and accents of deep grief, the outward signs carry a momentary conviction and a momentary pang to our own hearts, in spite of the admonitions of reason; a circumstance which cannot well be accounted for, except on the ground that these signs speak to us with a natural power; that is to say, are instinctively interpreted.

§ 105. Of the final cause or use of instincts.

Although the instincts, as a general statement, commend themselves less decisively to our regard and admiration than some other portions of the mind, they still have their important uses. It seems, in particular, to be the design of the instinctive part of our nature to aid and protect us in those cases where reason cannot come seasonably to our aid. According as the reasoning powers acquire strength, and prepare themselves more and more for the various emergencies to which we are exposed, the necessity of instinctive aids is proportionally diminished. But there are some cases which the reasoning power never can reach; and, consequently, our whole protection is in instinct.

It is evident, therefore, that they are a necessary part of our constitution; that they help to complete the mental system; and although of subordinate power and value in man, compared with the inferior animals, they still have their worth. As the reasoning power predominates in man, so instincts predominate in the lower animals; and as we do not expect to find the glory of reasoning in brutes, so we should not expect to discover the full excellence of instinctive powers in men; but should rather look for them in the insect and the worm, in the beasts of the field, and the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, dwelling in them as a part of their nature, and blessing while they control and guide them.

CHAPTER III.

APPETITES.

§ 106. Of the general nature and characteristics of the appetites.

UNDER the general head of Desires, the subject of APPETITES seems next to propose itself for consideration But as it is one of limited extent, and of subordinate importance in a metaphysical point of view, only a few remarks will be necessary. The arrangement, which brings the subject forward for discussion under the head of Desires, will recommend itself on a very little attention. The prominent appetites are those of HUNGER and THIRST; but the appetite of hunger is nothing more than the desire for food; the appetite of thirst is a desire for drink.

Nevertheless, they appear to be sufficiently distinguished from the other desires. They are not, like the instincts, always gratified in a certain fixed and particular manner; nor are they like them in being wholly independent of the reasoning power. On the contrary, they may be restrained and regulated in some degree; and when it is otherwise, their demands may be quieted in various ways.

But, without dwelling upon such considerations, the statement has been made, with much appearance of reason, that they are characterized by these three things: (1.) They take their rise from the body, and are common to men with the brutes.—(2.) They are not constant in their operation, but occasional.—(3.) They are accompanied with an uneasy sensation.

It may be remarked here, that the feeling of uneasiness now referred to appears always to precede the desire or appetite, and to be essential to it.

§ 107. The appetites necessary to our preservation, and not originally of a selfish character.

Although our appetites do not present much of interest, considered as parts of our mental economy, they have their important uses in connexion with the laws and re

quirements of our physical nature.—"The appetites of hunger and thirst," says Stewart, "were intended for the preservation of the individual; and without them reason would have been insufficient for this important purpose. Suppose, for example, that the appetite of hunger had been no part of our constitution, reason and experience might have satisfied us of the necessity of food to our preservation; but how should we have been able, without an implanted principle, to ascertain, according to the varying state of our animal economy, the proper seasons for eating, or the quantity of food that is salutary to the body? The lower animals not only receive this information from nature, but are, moreover, directed by instinct to the particular sort of food that it is proper for them to use in health and in sickness. The senses of taste and smell, in the savage state of our species, are subservient, at least in some degree, to the same purpose

"Our appetites can with no propriety be called *selfish*, for they are directed to their respective objects as ultimate ends, and they must all have operated, *in the first instance*, prior to any experience of the pleasure arising from their gratification. *After* this experience, indeed, the desire of enjoyment will naturally come to be combined with the appetite; and it may sometimes lead us to stimulate or provoke the appetite with a view to the pleasure which is to result from indulging it. Imagination, too, and the association of ideas, together with the social affections, and sometimes the moral faculty, lend their aid, and all conspire together in forming a complex passion, in which the animal appetite is only one ingredient. In proportion as this passion is gratified, its influence over the conduct becomes the more irresistible (for all the active determinations of our nature are strengthened by habit), till at last we struggle in vain against its tyranny. A man so enslaved by his animal appetites exhibits humanity in one of its most miserable and contemptible forms."*

§ 108. Of the prevalence and origin of appetites for intoxicating drugs.

There are not only natural appetites, but artificial or

* Stewart's Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, bk. i., chap. i.

acquired ones. It is no uncommon thing to find persons who have formed an appetite for ardent spirits, for tobacco, for opium, and intoxicating drugs of various kinds. It is a matter of common remark, that the appetite for inebriating liquors in particular is very prevalent, especially among Savage tribes.—And it may be proper briefly to explain the origin of such appetites.

Such drugs and liquors as have been referred to, have the power of stimulating the nervous system; and by means of this excitement they cause a degree of pleasure. This pleasurable excitement is soon followed by a corresponding degree of languor and depression, to obtain relief from which resort is again had to the intoxicating draught or drug. This results not only in a restoration, but an exhilaration of spirits, which is again followed by depression and distress. And thus resort is had, time after time, to the strong drink, the tobacco, the opium, or whatever it is which intoxicates, until an appetite is formed so strong as to subdue, lead captive, and brutalize the subject of it. So that the only way to avoid the forming of such a habit, after the first erroneous step has been taken, is quietly to endure the subsequent unhappiness attendant on the pleasurable excitement of intoxication, till the system has time to recover itself, and to throw off its wretchedness by its own efforts.

§ 109. Of occasional desires for action and repose.

Our occasional desires for action and repose are, in some respects, allied to our appetites. Although it has so happened that these desires have not been marked by a separate and specific name, they may justly claim, as parts of our mental nature, some attention. Mr. Stewart remarks, that they have the three characteristics of the appetites, and proceeds to explain them as follows.

"They are common, too, to man and to the lower animals, and they operate, in our own species, in the most infant state of the individual. In general, every animal we know is prompted by an instinctive impulse to take that degree of exercise which is salutary to the body, and is prevented from passing the bounds of moderation by that languor and desire of repose which are the consequences of continued exertion.

"There is also something very similar to this with respect to the mind. We are impelled by nature to the exercise of its different faculties, and we are warned, when we are in danger of overstraining them, by a consciousness of fatigue. After we are exhausted by a long course of application to business, how delightful are the first moments of indolence and repose! *O che bella cosa di far niente!* We are apt to imagine that no inducement shall again lead us to engage in the bustle of the world; but, after a short respite from our labours, our intellectual vigour returns; the mind rouses from its lethargy like a giant from his sleep, and we feel ourselves urged by an irresistible impulse to return to our duties as members of society."

§ 110. Of the twofold operation and the morality of the appetites.

In accordance with the remarks in the last section in the chapter on the Nature of desires, we may add here the general statement, that the operation of all the Appetites, of whatever kind, is twofold, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. So far as they are directed to their objects as *ultimate* ends, without taking into consideration anything else, that operation is obviously analogous to that of the pure instincts. But, after the first instance of their gratification, they may be instigated to subsequent actions, not so much by a view of the ultimate object, as of the pleasure accessory to its acquisition. And thus it sometimes happens, that their action, in view of the enjoyment before them, is turbulent and violent. Nevertheless, we may avail ourselves of the aid of other principles of the mind to subject them to a degree of restraint, to regulate, and, in a certain sense, to cultivate them. And, so far as this can be done, they are obviously susceptible of what may be called a VOLUNTARY action.

And here is the basis of the morality of the appetites. So far as they are susceptible of a merely instinctive action, they cannot be said to possess any moral character, either good or bad. They are greatly useful in their place; but, in a moral point of view, are to be regarded simply as innocent. It is only so far as they are voluntary, so far as they can be reached and controlled by

the will, that they can by any possibility be morally good or evil, virtuous or vicious. So that virtue and vice, considered in relation to the appetites, is located, not in the appetites themselves in their intrinsic nature, but in their exercises. And in those exercises only which are subordinate to the influence of the will.

CHAPTER IV.

PROPENSITIES.

§ 111. General remarks on the nature of the propensities.

As we advance further in the examination of this portion of the natural or pathematic sensibilities, we meet with certain forms of Desire, which are different from any we have hitherto attended to, and which accordingly require a distinct consideration. There is certainly no danger of their being confounded with the Instincts, inasmuch as they do not exhibit that fixedness and inflexibleness of action which is usually characteristic of those states of mind. They differ from the Appetites also, first, because they are much less dependant for their existence and exercise upon the condition of the body; and secondly, because, in that comparative estimation which is naturally attached to the different active principles of our nature, they confessedly hold a higher rank. At the same time, they evidently, in the graduation of our regard, fall below the Affections, besides being distinguished from them in some other respects. Hence we may, with entire propriety, not only assign them a separate and distinct position, but shall find a convenience in designating them by a distinctive name.—Among the Propensities (for this is the name which we propose to attach to them) may be mentioned the principle of self-preservation, or the desire of continued existence; curiosity, or the desire of knowledge; sociality, or the desire of society; self-love, or the desire of happiness; the desire of esteem, the propensity to imitate, and some others.

Although we have briefly indicated some of the circumstances which separate the Propensities from the other leading principles coming under this general head, it will be noticed that we have not attempted to give a statement of what they are in themselves. It is true, they are all based upon desire, and they all have some object. But whatever is intrinsic or specifically characteristic in their nature will be best learned from the considerations that will necessarily arise as they pass successively under review.

§ 112. Principle of self-preservation, or the desire of continued existence.

The first of those original desires which we shall proceed to notice may be denominated the principle of SELF-PRESERVATION, or the desire of a continuance of existence. —The proof of the existence of such a desire is not only so abundant in what we see around us, but is so intimate also to our own consciousness, that it can hardly be necessary to enter into details. "All that a man hath will he give for his life," was a sort of moral axiom in the earliest antiquity; and it stands as little in need of the verification of proof now as it did then. It is true that the principle may, in its practical operation, be overcome by the ascendant influence of other principles, by the mere desire of esteem, by the love of country, or by the sentiments of duty; but, though annulled in its results, it can hardly be said to be extinct in its nature. It still lingers, unextinguished and unextinguishable, in the foundations and depths of the mind. Even in cases of suicide, the desire of the extinction of life, which is supposed to exist, is not absolute, but relative; the self-murderer would still cling to existence if it could be possessed separate from the evils which attend it; it is not life, in itself considered, which he hates, but the variety of unpleasant circumstances, either actual or imagined, which are connected with it.

§ 113. Of the twofold action of the principle of self-preservation.

The principle of self-preservation, or desire of the continuance of existence, as well as the appetites, has a two-

fold operation, viz., INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. These two aspects or methods of its operation are to be carefully distinguished from each other. The instinctive operation takes place when life is threatened or endangered on some sudden and unexpected emergencies. When a person is in danger of falling, he instinctively puts forth his hand to sustain himself; when a blow is suddenly aimed at him, he instinctively makes an effort to ward it off; and the operation of this instinctive form of the desire is exceedingly rapid, as well as effective. This instinctive action is highly important in all cases where an effort for self-preservation, based upon inquiry and reasoning, would come too late.—When the exercise of the desire under consideration exists in connexion with inquiry and reasoning, and, of course, is ultimately based upon decisions of the will, it is said to be VOLUNTARY. It is under the suggestions of this form of the principle in question that we are led to make all those prospective calculations and efforts which have particular reference to the continuance and protection of life. In either point of view, whether considered as instinctive or voluntary, it is a principle evidently adapted with great wisdom to man's situation and wants. It is practically a powerful motive to action; and in its voluntary exercise is always morally good, so far as it exists in entire conformity with the requisitions of an unperverted conscience.

§ 114. Of curiosity, or the desire of knowledge.

Another of the leading Propensive principles is CURIOSITY, or the desire of knowledge; in respect to which it scarcely admits of a doubt, that it is to be regarded as one of the implanted and original characteristics of our mental constitution. Although it must be acknowledged that this principle exists in very various degrees, from the weakest form of life and activity to almost irrepressible strength, yet a person utterly without curiosity would be deemed almost as strange and anomalous as a person without sensation. If curiosity be not natural to man, then it follows that the human mind is naturally indifferent to the objects that are presented to it, and to the discovery of truth: and that its progress in knowledge is

naturally unattended with satisfaction; a state of things which could not be expected, and is not warranted by facts. In what school of philosophy was it ever taught that the human mind, with this unbounded mental and material universe around it, adorned throughout and brilliant with truth, has no natural desire to possess and enjoy this beauty and radiance of knowledge, but is equally well-contented with the glooms of ignorance!

We see the operation of this principle everywhere. When anything unexpected and strange takes place, the attention of all persons is immediately directed towards it; it is not a matter of indifference, but all are anxious to ascertain the cause. Without the aids of this strong desire, how few persons would be found who would be willing to explore the intricacies of science, or search the labyrinths of history. And what an accession would there be to the multitude of volumes that remain unopened and untouched on the shelves where they are deposited!

There is at least one class of writers whose prospects of being read depend in a great measure on the workings of this principle; we refer to novelists and writers of romance. However commonplace may be their conceptions, and however uninteresting their style, if they lay the plan of their novel or romance with so much skill as strongly to excite the curiosity, they can command readers. And this undoubtedly is the whole secret of success in a multitude of cases.

§ 115. Further illustrations of the principle of curiosity.

In further proof of the existence of this propensity as a natural or implanted one, it may be proper to refer to the whole class of the Deaf and Dumb, and to those unfortunate individuals who are blind, as well as deaf and dumb. These persons almost uniformly give the most striking indications of a desire to learn; it seems to glow in their countenance, to inspire their gestures, and to urge them on with a sort of violence in their inquiries. Certainly, if the principle of curiosity were not implanted, and did not exist in great strength, they would be entirely overcome by the multitude of discouragements with which they are encompassed

Take, as an illustration, the case of James Mitchell, of whom Mr. Stewart has given a minute and interesting account. Although this unfortunate boy was afflicted with the threefold deprivation of being deaf, sightless, and without the use of speech, he exhibited a considerable degree of mental activity. The principle of Curiosity, in particular, existed in great strength. He showed a strong desire to examine, and to obtain a knowledge of all objects that came within his reach. We find him exploring the ground inch by inch; we see him creeping on his hands and knees on bridges and the tops of houses; examining not only men, but dogs, horses, carriages, furniture, and musical instruments; standing by the side of shoemakers, tailors, and bricklayers, and intently curious to know the mode and the result of their labours. Inspired by the desire of extending his acquaintance with things, he would rush forth (blind, and deaf, and dumb as he was), and rapidly travel miles in the neighbouring country; so that it was necessary to employ a lad to follow him, that he might be kept from the numerous dangers to which he was exposed in these excursions.

"Solitary as Mitchell is," says Mr. Stewart, "in the midst of society, and confined in his intercourse with the material world within the narrowest conceivable limits, what a contrast does he exhibit to the most sagacious of the lower animals, though surrounded with all the arts of civilized man, and in the fullest possession of all the powers of external perception. Even in his childish occupations and pastimes, we may discern the rudiments of a rational and improveable nature, more particularly in that stock of knowledge, scanty as it is, which he has been led to acquire by the impulse of his own spontaneous and eager curiosity."

But it is unnecessary to dwell upon these general considerations, or to refer to extraordinary instances, when we constantly witness in all infants and children the most ample proofs that the principle of curiosity is deeply implanted in the human mind. It seems to be their life; it keeps them constantly in motion; from morn till night it furnishes new excitements to activity, and new sources of enjoyment. The poets, many of whom are entitled to

the credit of an exact observance of human nature, have made this trait in infants and children the foundation of many striking passages, as in the following:

"In the pleased infant see its power expand,
When first the coral fills its little hand;
Throned in his mother's lap, it dries each tear,
As her sweet legend falls upon his ear;
Next it assails him in his top's strange hum,
Breathes in his whistle, echoes in his drum;
Each gilded toy, that doting love bestows,
He longs to break, and every spring expose."

§ 116. Of the twofold operation and the morality of the principle of curiosity.

The innate principle or propensity of curiosity, like that of self-preservation, has its twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY.—An action which is purely instinctive is always directed towards its object as an *ultimate* end; it looks at the object itself without regard to the good or evil which may be involved in it; it chooses and pursues it for its own sake. It is in this way that the principle of curiosity operates in the first instance. This is its instinctive operation. And, so far as it thus operates, it is neither selfish nor benevolent; neither morally good nor evil; but simply innocent and useful.

It possesses also a VOLUNTARY action, founded upon a view of consequences, and implying the exercise of reflection. We may direct it to proper objects; we may stimulate its exercise by considerations of interest or duty; we may restrain it when it becomes irregular or inordinate. And its action, so far as it exists under such circumstances, may, with entire propriety, be denominated voluntary. And, so far as it is of this character, morality is predicable of it; it may be either virtuous or vicious. If it be stimulated to action for good ends, and with a suitable regard to all other moral claims, its exercise is virtuous. If it have bad ends in view, or be put forth with such intensity as to violate other moral obligations, its exercise is vicious. It is in accordance with these views that Mr. Stewart remarks on, and disapproves of, the conduct of a certain ancient astronomer. It appears that, on a certain occasion, the astronomer was accused of indifference in respect to public transactions.

He replied to the charge by the remark that *his* country was in the heavens; distinctly implying that he had deliberately merged the duties of the citizen in those of the astronomer, and that love to his country was essentially annulled by the higher love which he cherished for his chosen science. We obviously have here an instance of the inordinate exercise of the principle under consideration. It was not duly subordinated. It became so intense as to conflict, in the view of an enlightened conscience, with the proper exercise of other feelings and with the discharge of other duties.

§ 117. Imitativeness, or the propensity to imitation.

Another of the original propensities of the human mind is the principle of Imitation, or the desire of doing as we see others do. We find the evidence of the existence of such a principle everywhere around us.

(I.) If this propensity be not natural, it will be difficult to account for what every one must have noticed in infancy and childhood. And we take this occasion to remark, that, on this whole subject, we shall refer particularly to the early periods of life. That is a time when human nature will be likely to show itself in its true features. And, in respect to the principle now before us, it is certain that children are early found to observe with care what others do, and to attempt doing the like. They are greatly aided by this propensity in learning to utter articulate sounds. It is not without long-continued efforts, in which they are evidently sustained by the mere pleasure of imitation, that they acquire the use of oral language.

At a little later period of life, after having learned to articulate, and having become old enough to take part in juvenile sports, we find the same propensity at work. With the animation and formidable airs of jockeys, they bestride a stick for a horse, and try equestrian experiments; they conduct their small and frail carriages through courts and streets, and journey with their rude sledges from one hill-top to another. Ever busily engaged, they frame houses, build fortifications, erect waterworks, and lay out gardens in miniature. They shoulder

a cane for a musket; practice a measured step and fierce look; and become soldiers, as well as gardeners and architects, before they are men.

(II.) But the operation of this propensity is not limited to children; men also do as their fathers have done before them; it often requires no small degree of moral courage to deviate from the line of precedents. Whether right or wrong, we feel a degree of safety so long as we tread in the path of others.

This is shown in the most solemn transactions, particularly in judicial decisions. Seldom does the judge appeal to original principles of right, and build his decisions on the immutable will of the Supreme Being, as it is revealed in the moral sentiments of mankind, if he must do it in the violation of a precedent. It is highly probable, that the idea of a system of law, built upon precedent, and essentially supported by the mere fact of antecedent authority, was suggested, at least indirectly, by the principle before us. So prone were men to follow in the steps of their fathers, that, even in cases of right and wrong, they were not willing to deviate from the beaten track; and although we are willing to admit that the decisions of the Common Law have ever been supported by various considerations of their safety and wisdom, it is nevertheless true that they derive a large portion of their stability from that effective trait in man's nature, which impels him, as if by a sort of enchantment, to walk in the path which his progenitors have trodden. If we could expel from the human bosom the principle of imitation, there would be far less efficacy attached to many of the opinions, and decrees, and doings of our ancestors than there is at present. But, undoubtedly for sufficient reasons, it is wisely ordered that such an expulsion is impossible.

§ 118. Practical results of the principle of imitation.

It may perhaps be supposed by some, whatever evidence may exist in favour of regarding the principle under consideration as an original one, that it has but a slight connexion with the advancement and the happiness of mankind. But it is a remark not unfrequently to

be made in respect to the principles of the mind, that of ten results of great magnitude are found to connect themselves with elements in human nature, that appeared in themselves exceedingly insignificant. Such, it is possible, may be the case here. We often speak of imitativeness as a principle which governs children; but are less willing to acknowledge, which is hardly less the fact, that it is a principle which governs men. We cannot doubt, from the reflection we have been able to bestow upon it, that the principle before us, whatever aspect it may present at first sight, was designed to be, and is in fact, one of the important supports of society; a source of knowledge, happiness, and power. If this principle were obliterated, the bond of union, which now holds so closely together the two great divisions of society, the old and the young, would be greatly weakened; an event in all points of view much to be deplored. Not only in childhood, but in mature age, as we have already had occasion to intimate, we walk in the steps of our fathers, following in arts and in manners the same practices, and sustaining the same institutions; and it is desirable, as a general thing, that we should do so. And we do it, not merely because we suppose them to be clothed with the attribute of superior wisdom, but also because we are prompted, often unconsciously to ourselves, by the influence of this powerful principle. And it is in this way, partly at least, that generation is connected with generation; that the torch of experience, lighted in the preceding age, is made to shed its beams over that which follows; and that society, kept in the vicinity of the beaten track, is not subject to sudden and disastrous convulsions.

We would merely add, if this principle has such vast influence, as we have no doubt that it has, it is incumbent on every one carefully to consider the nature and tendency of the example which he sets. He who sets a bad example, either in domestic or in public life, is not only blasted and withered in himself, but almost necessarily leads on in his train a multitude of others to the same results of degradation and ruin. On the contrary, he who does good in his day and generation, infuses, whether he designs it or not, the effulgence of his exam-

ple into a multitude of hearts, which nature has opened for its reception; and thus, with better and higher results, lights them upward to happiness and glory.

§ 119. Remarks on the subject of emulation.

In giving an account of those mental principles which we profess to introduce and examine under the general head of Propensities; we should probably be thought to have left the subject but partially explored if we were to say nothing on the topic of Emulation. By the term Emulation, for there does not appear to be a perfect agreement as to what is expressed by it, is sometimes understood the desire of equality, but more frequently the desire of SUPERIORITY. In regard to Emulation, the general view of Mr. Stewart, in which he would probably be followed by many persons, is this. He regards it, like those propensive principles which have come under our notice, as implanted or original; like them, too, although not very high in the comparative honour which we attach to it, he considers it as innocent and useful when restricted within the limits of its appropriate sphere of action. When it passes those limits, he describes it as being evil, and as being properly designated by the term Envy.

Whether to yield our assent to this opinion, supported by an authority from which, in most cases, it might not be safe to differ, we hardly know. There is one difficulty, however, in receiving it, which we propose for the reader's consideration. In all the active principles which constitute the department of our mental nature, which is now the subject of consideration, from instinct upward to conscience, there is obviously a gradation not only of honour, but of AUTHORITY. And as conscience is the highest on the list, they are all subordinate, in the determination of their respective claims, to the intimations and decisions of that paramount faculty. This we hold to be a great and irrefragable truth in mental philosophy, which nowhere finds an abler and more decided advocate than in Mr. Stewart himself.

But if Emulation be the desire of *superiority*, as it is generally understood to be, we do not readily perceive

how it can by any possibility subject itself to that rule of subordination which is a first principle in the structure of the sensitive or active mind.—The desire of superiority, if it actually exists implanted in the human constitution, must, from its very nature, throw defiance at the doctrine of subordination. Whatever, in virtue of any rule of comparison that can possibly be applied, sustains a higher rank, at once brings this principle into conflict; and the contest which is thus generated can never be quieted until the relative position of objects is changed, and that which previously stood foremost subsides to the inferior station of a dependant or a follower. As man, therefore, by the very conditions under which he is created, is in fact, and ever will be, in a state of inferiority, as compared either with the members of his own race or those of a higher race of beings, he is permanently located in the midst of a perpetual conflict. It is the very nature of a desire to prompt to action; to counteract every disposition to inertness; to urge forward in the race of acquisition or advancement. And as he is surrounded by beings that are in some respects superior, either physically or mentally, either in the gradations of existence, or in some of the situations and circumstances of existence, he finds no rest to the sole of his foot; it is his misery that he cannot, even if he had a disposition to, close his eyes to his situation; the sight of every object above him, even of angelic natures, kindles a consuming fire in his bosom. It would seem that the contemplation of the Supreme Being himself, if SUPERIORITY is truly the original and appropriate object of emulation, would excite the rivalries of this unhallowed ambition.—It is not easy to suppose that such a principle, leading to such fearful results, and placed so far beyond the regulation of any controlling influence, is implanted, as an original and essential element, in the mental constitution.

§ 120. Emulation resolvable into the principle of imitativeness.

We are inclined to the opinion, on such a consideration of the subject as seemed to be required by the difficulties attending it, that Emulation is not, as is commonly supposed, a separate and original principle. We sup-

pose it to be nothing more than the action of those other principles, which are known and admitted to be implanted, stimulated into increased activity by the principle of Imitativeness. That IMITATIVENESS is an original tendency of the human mind will probably not be regarded as a matter of doubt; and it is scarcely less evident, that it possesses, especially in early life, great activity and strength. Now, in regard to this principle, it will be recollected that it naturally and appropriately exists only in reference to those things which are in fact, or which are supposed to be, above us. It is undoubtedly the case, that men sometimes very much mistake in this matter; but, in point of fact, the object which calls the principle of imitation into action, sustains, in the view of the imitator, at least for the time being, a share, greater or less, of comparative pre-eminency.

Imitativeness, therefore, keeping this consideration in view, is obviously capable of effectuating what is commonly ascribed to the more mitigated forms of emulation We see a person, for instance, exerting his ingenuity in the formation of some curious and interesting object; and the principle of imitation prompts us to attempt doing the same thing. We see a person, in some superior walk of life, adopting a novel dress and equipage, and, under the operations of this principle, we experience a degree of uneasiness until we have done the same. It is the nature of the principle to set us upon being equal to, or being like others. And when it operates in reference to persons who were before nearly on an equality, we do not, in common parlance, feel any impropriety in speaking of it as a case of rivalry or emulation; especially as the circumstance of the nearness of equality is likely to give to the principle a degree of liveliness and energy which it might not otherwise possess. And still more, perhaps, is this the case, whenever imitativeness operates in connexion with some other original principle. When, for instance, a youth sees another nearly of the same age more advanced in knowledge, the natural desire of knowledge appears to be stimulated to greater activity by the principle of imitation. When a person sees another extending his stores of wealth, the natural desire of

possession is aroused to greater energy by the principle under consideration; and, girding himself anew to the pursuit of riches, he goes and does likewise. And we do not hesitate to speak of these (and similar remarks will apply to others like them) as cases of rivalry in the pursuit of knowledge or wealth.—Whether this view of the subject is a correct one, we will not pretend to say with entire confidence; but we believe that it is not more encumbered with difficulties, or less susceptible of proof than any other view which is likely to be presented. At any rate, it relieves us from the task of endeavouring to settle the moral character of emulation; a subject which has exercised the ingenuity, and divided the sentiments of philosophers.

§ 121. Of the natural desire of esteem.

Another important propensity, not resolvable into anything else, but original, and standing on its own basis, is the *desire of esteem.*—In proof of the natural and original existence of this principle in the human mind, we are at liberty to appeal, as in the case of all the other propensities, to what we notice in the beginnings of life and the first developements of the mental nature. Before children are capable of knowing the advantages which result from the good opinion of others, they are evidently mortified at expressions of neglect or contempt, and as evidently pleased with expressions of regard and approbation. As it is impossible satisfactorily to account for this state of things on the ground of its being the result of reasoning, experience, or interest, the only explanation left is, that this desire is a part of the connatural and essential furniture of the mind.

(II.) We may further remark, that the desire of esteem is found to exist very extensively and strongly in the more advanced periods of life. If we look at the history of nations and of individuals, how many men do we find who have been willing to sacrifice their life rather than forfeit the favourable opinion of others! When they have lost all besides, their health, their fortunes, and friends, they cling with fondness to their good name; they point triumphantly to their unsullied reputation, as a

consolation in their present adversities, and the pledge of better things in time to come. This is especially true of those periods in the history o nations when the original sentiments and traits of the people have not been corrupt ed by the introduction of the arts of luxury and refinement.

(III.) There is this consideration also which has a bearing upon this topic.—We are sometimes in such a situation that the favourable or unfavourable opinion of others can have no possible bearing, so far as we can judge, on our own personal interests. And further than this, the unfavourable sentiment which we suppose to exist is not responded to in a single instance out of the par ticular circle of those who indulge it. It exists there, and there alone, without the possibility of affecting injuriously either our property or our general reputation. And yet it is difficult for us not to be affected unpleasantly; we feel as if the intentions of nature had been violated; as if some real wrong had been done us; as if we had been deprived of that which is obviously a right.—If this view of the subject is correctly stated, as we have reason to think it is, it goes strongly against the doctrine that the desire of esteem is based upon personal and interested considerations, and not upon the intrinsic nature of the mind.

(IV.) It is an additional proof in favour of the natural origin of this propensity, that it operates strongly in reference to the future. We not only wish to secure the good opinion of others at the present time and in reference to present objects, but are desirous that it should be permanent, whether we shall be in a situation directly to experience any good effects from it or not. Even after we are dead, although we shall be utterly separated both from the applauses and the reprobations of men, still we wish to be held in respectful and honourable remembrance. Fully convinced as we are that no human voice shall ever penetrate and disturb the silence of our tombs, the thought would be exceedingly distressing to us if we anticipated that our memories would be calumniated. We may attempt to reason on the folly of such feelings, but we find it impossible to annul the principles planted

within us, and to stifle the voice of nature speaking in the breast.

§ 122. Of the desire of esteem as a rule of conduct.

The operation of this principle, when kept within its due and appropriate limits, is favourable to human happiness. It begins to operate at a very early period of life, long before the moral principles have been fully brought out and established; and it essentially promotes a decency and propriety of deportment, and stimulates to exertion. Whenever a young man is seen exhibiting an utter disregard for the esteem and approbation of others, the most unfavourable anticipation may be formed of him; he has annihilated one of the greatest restraints on an evil course which a kind Providence has implanted within us; and exposes himself to the hazard of unspeakable vice and misery. It is narrated of Sylla, the Roman Dictator, that, on a certain occasion, happening to see Julius Cæsar walking immodestly in the streets, he remarked to those around him that he foresaw in that young man many Mariuses; distinctly intimating that a person so destitute of regard for the feelings and opinions of others, would be likely to take a course dictated by his sensuality or ambition, irrespective in a great degree of the admonitions of conscience and of considerations of the public good. A prediction founded in a knowledge of the principles of human nature, and abundantly verified by the result.

But, while we distinctly recognise in the desire of esteem an innocent and highly useful principle, we are carefully to guard, on the other hand, against making the opinion of others the sole and ultimate rule of our conduct. Temporary impulses and peculiar local circumstances may operate to produce a state of public sentiment, to which a good man cannot conscientiously conform. In all cases where moral principles are involved, there is another part of our nature to be consulted. In the dictates of an enlightened Conscience, we find a code to which not only the outward actions, but the appetites, propensities, and affections are amenable, and which infallibly prescribes the limits of their just exercise. To

obey the suggestions of the desire of esteem, in opposition to the requisitions of conscience, would be to subvert the order of the mental constitution, and to transfer the responsibility of the supreme command to a mere sentinel of the outposts.

§ 123. Of acquisitiveness, or the desire of possession.

We are so constituted that we naturally and necessarily have not only a knowledge of objects, but of a multitude of other relations which they sustain. And, among other things, we very early form a notion of the relation of POSSESSION. There are but few suggestions of the intellect with which the mind forms so early an acquaintance as with this. Whenever we see children, as we constantly do, contending with each other for the occupancy of a chair or the control of a rattle, we may be assured that they have distinctly formed the idea of possession. They know perfectly well what it is, although they cannot define it, and may possibly not be able to give a name to it. Although there can, in reality, be no actual possession without involving the existence of a relation, since the fact or actuality of possession implies, on the one hand, an object which is possessed, and, on the other, a possessor; nevertheless, as the notion or idea of possession exists suggestively and abstractly in the mind, it is to be regarded as a single and definite object, distinctly perceptible in the mind's eye, and sustaining the same relation to the sensibilities as any other object or relation, either mental or material, which is susceptible of being intellectually represented. Of possession, as thus explained, existing as it were distinctly projected and imbodied in the light of the mental vision, all men appear to have a natural or implanted desire. The fact of its existence, either actual or possible, is revealed in the intellect; and the heart, with an instinctive impulse, corresponds to the perception of the intellect by yielding its complacency and love.

§ 124. Of the moral character of the possessory principle.

Although the desire of possession (the possessory principle or propension, as it might be conveniently termed) has undoubtedly, like the other propensities, its instinct-

ive action, yet its morality, that is to say, its moral character, depends wholly upon the features of its voluntary action. We are not disposed to speak, as some on a slight examination might be inclined to do, of the possessory principle as being, in a moral sense, an unmixed evil. So far as its action may be regulated, either in the form of restraint or of encouragement, by reason, reflection, and the control, either direct or indirect, of the will, (all of which is implied when we speak of its voluntary action), just so far it is capable of being either right or wrong, reprehensible or meritorious. When acting independently of all comparison and reflection, it assumes the form of an instinct, is often in that form beneficial, and always innocent; when it usurps the authority due to other and higher principles, prompting us to look with an evil eye on the rightful possessions of another, and to grasp with an earnest and unholy seizure what does not belong to us, it becomes vicious; when, on the other hand, its action is the reverse of all this, prompted by upright motives, and adhering strictly to the line of rectitude, it is to be regarded as virtuous.

We apprehend it is impossible even to conceive of a being so far elevated in the scale of perception and feeling as to involve moral accountability, which shall be constituted on the principle of an entire exclusion of the possessory desire. If it desires its own existence and happiness, which we suppose to be a trait essential to every rational and accountable creature, it seems to follow, as a matter of course, that it will desire those attributes and gifts which are conducive to the preservation and perfection of such existence and happiness. What sin can there possibly be in desiring to expand the range of that existence, which in itself is such an invaluable good, provided it be done with a suitable regard to the relations and the claims of all other beings! So far from being a sin, it is, and must be, a duty. If it be not so, what shall be said of those passages of the Apostle Paul, not to mention other parts of Scripture of a similar import, where he directs the Corinthians not only "to covet to prophesy," but, in general terms, "to covet earnestly the best gifts," 1 Cor., xii., 31; xiv., 39.

§ 125. Of perversions of the possessory desire.

Although the propensity in question is susceptible, by possibility at least, of a virtuous exercise, there is too much reason to believe that its ordinary action is a perverted and vicious one. It is a great law of the mind, that the repetition of the exercise of the active principles increases their strength; and as the occasions of the exercise of the possessory principle are very numerous, it is the almost unavoidable result that it becomes inordinately strong. When this is the case, the otherwise innocent desire of possession assumes the form of the sin of Covetousness; a term which is universally understood to express an eagerness and intensity of acquisition, that presses upon the domains of some other active principles, and is at variance with some of the claims of duty. This is undoubtedly one of the great sins which attach to human nature; too prevalent, it is to be feared, in the heart of every individual; and which receives, in all parts of the Scriptures, a decided and solemn rebuke.

When the possessory principle becomes, by further repetition, increased in the intensity of its action, it assumes the still more aggravated and guilty form of Avarice. In this form it not only loses that character of innocence which it originally possessed, but becomes exceedingly loathsome and abhorrent in the unperverted eye of moral purity.

§ 126. Of the desire of power.

Another of the original propensities is the desire of Power.—In regard to POWER, it is hardly necessary to say, that it is not an object directly addressed to, or cognizable by the senses; but is an attribute of mind, and is made known to us by an act of the Internal intellect; that is to say, of the intellect operating independently of a direct connexion with the senses. We do not see Power as we see any extended object; nor do we touch it, nor is it an object of the taste or smell; but it is revealed to the mind by an act of Original Suggestion, on the occasions appropriate to that species of mental action. (See § 190, vol. i.) But, although it is not cognizable by the senses, it is as much a reality, as much an object of emo-

tion and desire, as if that were the case. It stands out as distinctly perceptible to the mind's eye, as an extended and coloured body does to the bodily eye. This being the case, we may with entire propriety of language speak of the desire of power; for, wherever there is an object, that object may, in possibility at least, be desired; but where there is no object before the mind, it is not possible for desire to exist.

These remarks are preparatory to what we have now to say, viz., that the desire of power is natural to the human mind; in other words, that the desire of power is an original principle of the mind.—In support of this view, which may, perhaps, fail at first sight to commend itself to the reception of the reader, the first remark we have to make is, that power, in its own nature, is a thing desirable. It cannot be doubted that power is in fact, and is to be regarded, as an essential attribute of all mental being.—Accordingly, if an intellectual and sentient existence is desirable, then power is desirable also, as being necessarily involved in such existence. The desire of existence, by common acknowledgment, is natural to us; the desire of happiness is natural also; and since there can be neither the one nor the other without power it seems reasonable to think that the desire of power, is essential to and is implanted in our nature.—There are various circumstances, obvious to every one's notice, which go to confirm this view of the subject, as will be seen in the following extract from the writings of Mr. Stewart.

§ 127. Facts in proof of the natural desire of power.

"The infant, while still on the breast, delights in exerting its little strength on every object it meets with, and is mortified when any accident convinces it of its own imbecility. The pastimes of the boy are, almost without exception, such as suggest to him the idea of his *power*. When he throws a stone or shoots an arrow, he is pleased with being able to produce an effect at a distance from himself; and, while he measures with his eye the amplitude or range of his missile weapon, contemplates with satisfaction the extent to which his power has reached.

It is on a similar principle that he loves to bring his strength into comparison with that of his fellows, and to enjoy the consciousness of superior prowess. Nor need we search in the *malevolent* dispositions of our nature for any other motive to the apparent acts of cruelty which he sometimes exercises over the inferior animals; the sufferings of the animal in such cases either entirely escaping his notice, or being overlooked in that state of pleasurable triumph, which the wanton abuse of *power* communicates to a weak and unreflecting judgment. The active sports of the youth captivate his fancy by suggesting similar ideas, of strength of body, of force of mind, of contempt of hardship and of danger. And, accordingly, such are the occupations in which Virgil, with a characteristical propriety, employs his young Ascanius

> 'At puer Ascanius mediis in vallibus acri
> Gaudet equo; jamque hos cursu, jam præterit illos;
> Spumantemque dari pecora inter inertia votis
> Optat aprum, aut fulvum descendere monte leonem.'

"As we advance in years, and as our animal powers lose their activity and vigour, we gradually aim at extending our influence over others by the superiority of fortune and station, or by the still more flattering superiority of intellectual endowments, by the force of our understanding, by the extent of our information, by the arts of persuasion, or the accomplishments of address. What but the idea of power pleases the orator in managing the reins of an assembled multitude, when he silences the reasons of others by superior ingenuity, bends to his purposes their desires and passions, and, without the aid of force or the splendour of rank, becomes the arbiter of the fate of nations!"*

§ 128. Of the moral character of the desire of power.

If it be true that the desire of power is connatural to the human mind, it will probably be found, like other analogous principles, to possess a twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. So far as its action is instinctive, we may suppose it to be innocent at least, and probably useful. So far as it is voluntary, the virtue or vice which

* Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, chap. ii., § 4.

attaches to it will depend upon its regulation. If it be kept in subordination to the dictates of an enlightened conscience, and to the feelings and duties we owe to the Supreme Being, its exercise is virtuous. If, on the contrary, it acquires inordinate strength, as it is very likely to do, and is excessive in its operation, pushing us forward to the pursuit of forbidden objects and the invasion of others' rights, it then becomes vicious.

When the desire of power becomes excessive, and exists and operates as a leading and predominant principle, we commonly denominate it Ambition. He who is under the influence of AMBITION desires power; not because it assimilates him to his Maker, not because it affords him the increased means of usefulness, nor for any other reason which commends itself to a strictly virtuous mind, but simply because it administers to the gratification of an unrestrained and insatiable selfishness.

§ 129. Veracity, or the propensity to utter the truth.

It is in the propensive part of our nature that we are to locate the important principle of Veracity; in other words, that disposition and tendency to utter the truth, which characterizes men generally, and which there seems abundant reason to regard as original or connatural to the mind. When we utter the truth, we fulfil the functions of our nature; the action of the mind flows easily in an undisturbed and even channel; there are none of those mental jars and revulsions which generally attend an effort of falsification. To utter a falsehood is against nature; and is as much at variance with the structure of the Pathematic as of the Moral Sensibilities. That is to say, when we deliberately utter a falsehood, we are not only condemned by Conscience, but are obliged to stem the natural current of the Desires.

There are undoubtedly occasional exceptions to this statement; but they may probably be reduced to two classes of persons: first, those in whom the original principle has been perverted by the influence of evil example or some other unfavourable cause; second, those, still fewer in number, who are the subjects of an original mental malformation. In the first class, the tendency to false-

hood is the work of the man rather than of his nature; the second indicates a state of mind more or less approaching the regions of insanity.—In addition to these cases, it may be said further, that sometimes, under the influence, perhaps, of a sudden and powerful temptation, men of acknowledged veracity are betrayed into the utterance of an untruth. But still the general fact, to which these cases must be regarded merely in the light of exceptions, remains good. The utterance of the truth is in conformity with nature; falsehood is against it. And this is so much the fact, that in ordinary cases, the utterance of thousands of truths secures to a man no especial credit, for this is what we naturally expect; while the utterance of a very few falsehoods will be likely to destroy his reputation forever.

§ 130. Of the twofold action of the propensity to truth.

The principle of Veracity, as might be supposed from the circumstance of its being admitted into the class of the propensions, has the twofold action already often mentioned.—In all ordinary cases, the probability is, that its action is INSTINCTIVE. A thousand times a day, in answer to the questions of others, or in giving directions, or on some other occasions, we utter what is true in fact, or what we suppose to be true. And we do this without stopping to reflect whether it is a matter of duty, but apparently and in reality by a natural or instinctive movement, just as the hungry man instinctively seeks to gratify his appetite for food.

In other cases, the action is obviously VOLUNTARY. If, for instance, a man is strongly tempted, by the presentation of some pecuniary inducement, to utter a falsehood, the instinctive action of the principle is interrupted. By an effort of the Will we check it; we stop; we examine the nature and weight of the inducement which is presented; conscience is called in to give its decision in the case; and the action of the principle under such circumstances evidently becomes a voluntary one.—It is, indeed, difficult in some cases to draw the line distinctly between the instinctive and voluntary action; but it is the latter alone which can properly be said to have a moral

character. When, under the influence of a strong temptation, the instinctive tendency is overruled, and we utter the truth in compliance with the mere dictates of conscience, we are the subjects of moral merit. When, on the other hand, we deliberately and voluntarily utter falsehood, we are the subjects of crime. And it may also be added, that the circumstance of the utterance of the truth being in all ordinary cases instinctive, increases the crime of its violation; because falsehood under such circumstances generally implies a high degree of deliberate and voluntary effort.

§ 131. Propensity of self-love, or the desire of happiness.

We proceed to explore this part of our sensitive nature still further, by adding that the desire of enjoyment or happiness appears to be an original or connatural element of the mental constitution. No one will presume to assert that the desire of suffering is natural; that we ordinarily rejoice in the prospect of coming woes, and endure them with gladness of heart. Nor are there satisfactory grounds for the opinion that enjoyment and suffering are indifferent to the human mind, and that there is no choice to be had between them. Such a supposition would be contrary to the common experience and the most obvious facts. On the contrary, our own consciousness and what we witness in others effectually teach us, that the desire of happiness is as natural as that of knowledge or esteem, and even hardly less so than it is to desire food and drink when we experience the uneasy sensations of hunger and thirst.

Under the instigation and guidance of this strong propensity, men not only flee from present evil and cling to present happiness, but, foreseeing the events of the future, they prepare raiment and houses, fill their granaries in anticipation of a day of want, and take other measures for the prolonging of life, health, and comfort. It is kindly provided that they are not left, in taking precautions subservient to their preservation and well-being, to the suggestions and the law of reason alone, but are guided and kept in action by this decisive and permanent principle. And it is proper to add, that this desire oper-

ates not only in reference to outward and bodily comforts, but also in relation to inward consolations, the inspirations and solaces of religion in the present life, and the anticipated possession of that more glorious happiness which religious faith attaches to a future state of existence.

But it should ever be remembered, that the desire of our own happiness, like the other desires which have been mentioned, ought to be subjected to a suitable regulation. An enlightened conscience will explain under what conditions our personal welfare may be pursued, and in what cases, whether it relate to the present or the future, it should be subordinated to considerations of public benefit and of universal benevolence.

§ 132. Of selfishness as distinguished from self-love.

We cannot but suppose, for the reasons that have just been suggested, that the desire of happiness, or propensity of personal good, is an attribute of man's nature. This opinion is not only accordant with the suggestions of the light of nature, but is sanctioned by other and higher authority. The pursuit of our own happiness is obviously recognised in the Scriptures, and is urged upon us as a duty. While we are required to love our neighbour, it is nowhere said that we must perform this duty to the exclusion of a suitable regard for our own felicity. —The desire of happiness thus implanted in our own constitution we denominate by a simple and expressive term, SELF-LOVE. But it cannot be denied that the import of the term is frequently misunderstood, and that the term itself is liable to erroneous applications.

This is owing to the fact that the principle is not always, and perhaps we should say, is not generally regulated and restrained as it ought to be; but frequently degenerates into a perversion, which ought to be carefully distinguished from its innocent exercise. It is not self-love, but the *perversion* of self-love, which is properly called SELFISHNESS; and while self-love is always innocent, and, under proper regulations, is morally commendable, as being the attribute of a rational nature and approved by God himself, SELFISHNESS, on the contrary, is always sinful, as existing in violation of what is due to

others, and at variance with the will of God.—It is due to the cause of morals and religion, as well as of sound philosophy, to make this important distinction. Self love is the principle which a holy God has given; selfishness is the loathsome superstructure which man, in the moments of his rebellion and sin, has erected upon it.

§ 133. Modifications of selfishness; pride, vanity, and arrogance.

Selfishness, it will be kept in mind, is employed as the general name for any excessive or inordinate exercises of self-love whatever. But selfishness is susceptible of various modifications, and exhibits itself to the notice of others in different ways and under different aspects. One of the most marked and important of its modifications is Pride.

Pride not only implies an inordinate estimate and love of our own interests, but appears to be distinguished from the other forms of selfishness in being attended with a desire that others, either for the sake of our own gratification or for the sake of humbling them, should be made sensible of what we suppose to be our superiority.—Accordingly, the feeling of pride is not to be considered as limited, in the occasions of its exercise, to the possession of any one object or quality, or to any single circumstance or combination of circumstances. It will be likely to attach itself to any object whatever which becomes predominant in our affections, and in which we suppose ourselves to have the advantage over others. One is proud of his ancestry, another of his riches, a third of his intellectual ascendancy, and a fourth of the beauty of his dress or person.

We may not only consider pride as one of the modifications of selfishness, but pride itself seems to be susceptible of some subordinate modifications, so distinct as to be known by appropriate names. When, for instance, it is very officious, and makes an ostentatious display of those circumstances in which the subject of it supposes his superiority to consist, it is termed VANITY. When it discovers itself, not so much in the display of the circumstances, or supposed circumstances of superiority, as in a contempt, and in sneering disparagements of the infe-

rior qualities of others, it is termed HAUGHTINESS OR ARROGANCE.

It may be further added, that we are always, if we would be exact in our discrimination of the sources of human action, to make a distinction between pride and a mere desire of esteem, which has already come under our notice. The desire of esteem may exist in all its forms distinct from pride; and, when properly regulated, is not only useful, but is morally commendable. But pride, considered as distinct from the desire of esteem, and as essentially a modification of selfishness, is morally evil. Perhaps no state of mind, if we consider our numerous infirmities and wants, is less suited to our situation, or is more fitted to bring upon us the disapprobation and rebukes of our Maker.

§ 134. Reference to the opinions of philosophical writers.

It would be easy to introduce passages in support of the greater part of the views of this chapter, if it were deemed necessary, from writers whose opinions are received with deference, and are justly entitled to be so. It appears from the recent Work of Dr. Chalmers on the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man, that he regards the desire of possession (the possessory principle, as it may be conveniently designated) as connatural to the human mind. (Vol. i., chap. vi., § 8–13.) Mr. Stewart takes the same view in regard to the principle of self-love, or the desire of happiness. (Active and Moral Powers, bk. ii., chap. i.) On this important subject, which, in some of its aspects, is closely connected with the requisitions and appeals of revealed religion, we find the following explicit statement in Dr. Wardlaw's recently-published treatise, entitled Christian Ethics.

"SELF-LOVE is an essential principle in the constitution of every intelligent creature, meaning by self-love the desire of its own preservation and well-being. By no effort of imagination can we fancy to ourselves such a creature constituted without this. It is an original law in the nature of every sentient existence. In man, it is true, in regard especially to the sources from which it has sought its gratification, it is a principle which, since his

fall, has been miserably perverted and debased, degenerating, in ten thousand instances, into utter selfishness, and in all partaking of this unworthy taint. Between selfishness, however, and legitimate self-love, there is an obvious and wide discrepance. The latter is not at all distinctive of our nature as degenerate, but was inwoven in its very texture, as it came from the Creator's hand. The former is properly the corruption of the latter. It leads the creature who is under its dominant influence to prefer self to fellow-creatures and to God, so as to seek its own real or supposed advantage at the expense of the interests and the honour of both. So far, on the contrary, is self-love from being unwarrantable, that, in that part of God's law which prescribes our feelings and conduct towards our fellow-creatures, it is assumed as the standard measure of the commanded duty, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as THYSELF.' Take away self-love, or suppose it possible that the human heart should be divested of it, and you annihilate the command by rendering it unintelligible.

"There is not, assuredly, any part of the divine word by which we are required, in any circumstances, to divest ourselves of this essential principle in our constitution. That word, on the contrary, is full of appeals to it, under every diversity of form. Such are all its threatenings, all its promises, all its invitations."

CHAPTER V.

PROPENSITIES CONTINUED.—SOCIALITY, OR THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY.

§ 135. The principle of sociality original in the human mind.

IN examining the propensive principles, it is a matter of but little consequence, either philosophically or practically, in what order they present themselves for consideration. The principle of sociality, or desire of society, is deferred to the present chapter, and is made the subject of

a distinct consideration, not because the order of nature required it, but because its importance seemed to entitle it to a more detailed and extended notice than the principles which have preceded.—The doctrine which we propose to maintain is, that men naturally (not moved to it primarily by the influences of education or considerations of interest, but of themselves and *naturally*) have a desire of the company or society of their fellow-men; a tendency of the mind expressed by the single term SOCIALITY or SOCIABILITY.

§ 136. The principle of sociality not selfish.

We are aware that the desire of society, as well as some of the other original propensions, has sometimes been regarded as a mere modification of *selfism*. It is the fact, however, that, in its first operation, the desire of society acts instinctively, being directed to its object as an *ultimate* end, wholly irrespective of any pleasure which may subsequently be found attached to its attainment. It is one of the characteristics of Desire, as we have already seen, that the attainment of its object is attended with more or less pleasure. And this is as true of the successful issue of the principle of Sociality as of any other principle, involving, as a part of its nature, the desiring element. Accordingly, after the experience of pleasure attendant upon its successful exercise, even in a single instance, it is possible that its subsequent action may be prompted rather by a regard to the concomitant enjoyment than to the object which originally called it forth. Such an exercise of the principle under consideration may, with some appearance of propriety, be termed a *selfish* one; but this is rather a secondary than an original exercise; and does not so much indicate what the principle is by nature as what it may become by subordinate or by perverting influences. In itself considered, it is innocent and highly useful; it may indeed, after its first exercise, be indulged from a regard to personal or self-interested considerations; that is to say, from a regard to our own happiness or pleasure; but even the exercise of the principle from such considerations is not to be regarded, as some may suppose, as morally wrong,

provided it is so regulated as not to conflict with the proper operation of other principles and with the claims of duty.

§ 137. Reference to the doctrine of Hobbes on this subject.

We shall enter a little more minutely into the consideration of this principle than of those which have preceded; for this reason, among others, that the doctrine which we propose to maintain has not been universally received. We have reference in this remark to the opinions of those persons who, in concurrence with the doctrine of Mr. Hobbes, the author of the political treatise of the Leviathan and of some philosophical writings, maintain that men do not naturally seek, but rather avoid each other's society, being inspired with sentiments of aversion, and regarding their fellow-men as enemies and not as friends. If the great fact, which meets them at the first step in the inquiry, that men actually live in society, be objected to them, they answer, not by denying the fact, but by saying that this is a matter of necessity; in other words, that men live in society, not because they love it, but because, in all the circumstances of the case, they had rather do this, painful as it is, than suffer other evils still greater. The weak, they say, found themselves in danger of being overrun and destroyed by the more powerful; and, in order to protect themselves, were willing to enter into a companionship and union with their fellow-men, which they would otherwise have gladly avoided. And, in proof of the correctness of their opinions, they refer to those precautions against the injurious attacks of others which are generally considered necessary, such as locks, keys, bars, bolts, prisons, civil officers of justice, and a military force.

§ 138. Remarks on the statements of the preceding section.

In order that the subsequent part of the discussion may be less embarrassed, it will be proper to delay a moment in the consideration of these statements. As to the fact that such precautions as have been specified are generally taken, and that there is a reason for them, we do not suppose that it is at all a matter of question. But it will

be recollected, if there were only one unprincipled and violent man in a community of some hundreds or thousands, who felt disposed, in secrecy and darkness, or at any other time, to exert his power to the injury of his neighbours, these precautions would be rendered necessary. The view, therefore, which we may properly take is, that the facts referred to, although they may be admitted to exist, do not necessarily prove the absence of the principle of sociality, considered as a general element of human nature, but merely prove the presence and influence of other principles, which have the effect, in some instances, to restrict and overrule the social element.—The general rule, resting, as we shall endeavour to show, on satisfactory evidence, is, that man is a social being, seeking and delighting in the society of his fellow-men; and the facts just referred to merely show, and so far they may be admitted to be conclusive, that the general rule is liable to occasional exceptions.

§ 139. The doctrine of an original principle of sociality supported by the view that it is necessary to man in his actual situation.

In proceeding to bring forward some considerations in support of the doctrine that the desire of society is a connatural element of our mental nature, it may be remarked, as introductory to other considerations of a more decisive character, that the various relations which man sustains seem to require it. In other words, his situation is such, being unable, in point of fact, to exist independently of society, as to demand just such a principle as this. If he be destitute of this principle, it may be said, with no small degree of plausibility, that he is not fitted with entire wisdom to those circumstances in which he is actually placed. But this state of things would obviously be at variance with the analogy of nature in other cases; and would seem to imply not only a deficiency of wisdom, but a want of goodness also in the Supreme Being. In other cases He has fitted, with an admirable adjustment, the objects of his creation and care to the situations in which he has designed them to live and act. The wing of the bird is precisely adapted to the air; the fin of the fish is adapted to the element where it is placed;

the organ of respiration is conformed to the properties of the atmosphere; the eye exhibits a wonderful adaptation to the light; the organ of touch is skilfully adapted to the nature of the external bodies with which it is conversant; and the same of instances innumerable. As man, therefore, is found existing as a member and part of society, and, by general concession, cannot live happily and effectively, if he can live at all, out of society, we should be naturally led to expect that the principles of his internal constitution would be such as to correspond to the facts and incidents of his external condition. Society is necessary to him; and the principle of SOCIALITY corresponds to this necessity, by furnishing a firm and broad basis for the existence of society. And this correspondence indicates wisdom. But what shall we say of that wisdom or that goodness which, in connexion with the undeniable necessity of the social constitution of things, implants in the human mind a principle of repulsion, which tends to arm every man against his neighbour, and to scatter society in a thousand directions!

§ 140. Of this principle as it exists in the lower animals.

Before we advance to the direct proofs on this subject, there is one other consideration which, although of subordinate importance, may still be thought worthy of some notice. It is, that the principle of sociality exists, with but few exceptions, in the various classes of the lower animals. Those of the same class are found constantly herding together; and no small part of the pleasure which they experience appears to result from the fact of a participation in each other's company. Whenever they are compelled to separate from each other for any length of time, particularly the young animals, they almost invariably exhibit a high degree of uneasiness and unhappiness. So strong is their desire of society, that animals who happen to be separated from those of their own kind will not unfrequently form a friendship with other animals, whose companionship, under other circumstances, would be far from being sought after.—If this principle is necessary in the lower animals, and contributes to their happiness, as it obviously does, why should

not man, who stands equally in need of it, be put in possession of the benefits of the same principle? We certainly should expect to find it to be so.

§ 141. The existence of the principle shown from the conduct of children and youth.

We now proceed to remark, that the existence of the propensity under consideration is shown, in the first place, like that of some of the propensive principles of the last chapter, by what we notice in the early periods of life. No one is ignorant that infants and very young children exhibit a strong attachment to their parents and others who tend upon them, and a desire for their company, and uneasiness at their absence. When left alone, even for a very short time, they discover a great degree of unhappiness, which may sometimes be ascribed to fear, but more often to the mere sense of loneliness and the desire for society.

When other infants and children are brought into their company, whom they have never seen before, this propensity is at once shown in their smiles, their animated gestures, and sparkling eyes. And when they are old enough to go out and play in the streets, we find them almost always in groups. Their sports, their wanderings in fields and forests, their excursions in fishing and hunting, are all made in companies; and the privilege of amusing themselves in these ways, on the condition of not being allowed the attendance of others, would be deemed scarcely better than a punishment.

In corroboration of what has just been said, we may properly recur a moment to those strong attachments which are formed in early life. Wherever we go, and whatever vicissitudes of fortune may attend us, our thoughts and affections revert with eagerness to the associates of our early days. The basis of this strong attachment, it can hardly be doubted, is to be sought for in the operations of the principle of sociality. It was under the influences of this principle that we so frequently sought them out; that we flew eagerly to their arms in the first moments of relaxation from duty; that we visited with them the banks of the river and the recesses of the

forest; and grew up in the reciprocation of those charities and acts of kindness, which render that period of life so hallowed in the recollection. If this principle, so powerful in its operation, had not been implanted in the human bosom, we should have looked in vain for these marked results.

§ 142. The same shown from the facts of later life.

In the second place, this propensity, which shows itself with so much strength in children, continues to exist, and to give interesting and decisive proofs of its existence, in manhood and age. It is true that those who are further advanced in years, from the circumstance of their finding greater resources in themselves, are in general more capable of supporting retirement and solitude than children. But it is very evident, in the maturity as well as in the earlier periods of life, that man's proper element (that in which alone he can secure the developement of his powers and be happy) is society, in some shape and in some degree. Hence the frequency of family meetings, of social and convivial parties, of commemorative celebrations, of religious, literary, and political assemblies, which constantly occur in all communities throughout the world; and which seem to be almost as necessary as the air they breathe, or their daily food.

It is true that some persons appear disposed to speak of these things as resulting from, or at least as very closely connected with, the comforts and conveniences of civilized life. In other words, they suppose that men seek society, not from any natural impulse of the mind, but merely from the anticipation of the benefits which society, considered as the source and centre of civilization and the arts, will be likely to confer. That the desire of society is increased by this consideration, it is perhaps not necessary either to affirm or deny; but that it is originated or created by such views, which is the statement that we object to, is a position which does not appear at all warranted by the facts that are presented to our notice. Look, for instance, at those portions of the human race that are confessedly in a state of barbarism, and consider the results which are there presented. Where do we

find the social principle showing itself more strongly than among groups of wandering Gipsies, than in the tents of stern and restless Arabs, in the wigwams and hunting-parties of American savages, or the cheerless abodes of the poor and desolate Esquimaux? Unpolished in manners, and rough in temper, and wanting even the necessaries of life, it must be something more than the mere refinements and pleasures of civilization which brings them together, day after day and night after night, and makes the walls of their miserable habitations tremble with their tumultuous companionship.—It is one of the excellences of this great principle, that it is the friend of the ignorant and the wretched. Bereft of those comforts which are generally understood to attend the condition of refinement and opulence, they are prompted by the operations of the social principle to throw themselves into the arms of their fellow-men; and, as the ordinary result, they find, in the mere naked fact of social intercourse, a degree of substantial consolation.

§ 143. The social principle exists in the enemies of society.

It may be remarked, in reply to what has been said, that there are individuals, and even masses or bodies of men, who are in a state of contention and war with society, and in whom, of course, the social principle has no place. The fact which is stated we do not deny; but the conclusion which is drawn from it does not follow, and is not true. On the contrary, it is a striking fact, that the social principle, although restricted in its range, is found to exist, with undiminished strength, in those who are generally regarded as the outcasts and enemies of society. These men would be more desolate and wretched than they are if there were not some with whom they could associate; some whom they could call their friends, and with whom they could participate in their good or evil fortune. The influence of the desire of esteem may be overruled and annulled; the sentiments of filial and parental affection may be extinguished; the light of conscience may be put out; and yet they may find themselves unable (and, in point of fact, this is almost invariably the case) to sunder entirely the tie which binds them to their

fellow-men. They can bear the pain, so insupportable to an unperverted and ingenuous mind, of having their names cast out as evil; but they are unable to endure the wretchedness of an entire and absolute seclusion from society.

§ 144. Proofs of the natural desire of society from the confessions and conduct of those who have been deprived of it.

Let us now attend a moment, in the third place, to the condition of those who are so unfortunate as to be separated from society, particularly from their friends. We presume to say that it will require no further proof than is involved in the mere statement itself, when we assert that the grief they suffer is in all ordinary cases sincere and deep; and that, not unfrequently, it is extreme. If the record of human misery could at once be unfolded to our view, it would abundantly appear in respect to multitudes who have perished in prison and in exile, that it was the deprivation of human society, particularly the society of their friends, which infused the deadliest ingredient into their cup of suffering. If the social propensity be not natural to us, it is not easy to explain why an exclusion from intercourse with our fellow-men should be attended with such unspeakable wretchedness. Even the stern and inflexible Coriolanus, for whom all the forms of danger and even death seem to have had no terrors, could not endure his protracted banishment from Rome without bitter complaint, "*Multo miserius seni exilium esse.*"

If we felt at liberty thus to take up the time of the reader, we might, without doubt, illustrate the subject by some affecting statements. It will answer our purpose, however, briefly to recur to a single incident in the history of the Republic of Venice. In the year 1450, a young man by the name of Foscari, the only surviving son of the Doge of the same name, was banished from the Republic on a charge of which it was subsequently ascertained that he was innocent. Having suffered the wretchedness of banishment for five long years, he at last wrote to the Duke of Milan, imploring his assistance; but the letter was put into the hands of the Venetian Coun-

cil of Ten. As the laws of the Republic forbade any application to foreign princes in anything which related to the Government of Venice, the Council considered the circumstance such as to require that he should be sent for, and tried upon this new crime. Being brought before them, he made this remarkable statement to the Council: That he wrote the letter in the full persuasion that the merchant, whose character he knew, would betray him, and deliver it to them; the consequence of which, he foresaw, would be his being ordered back to Venice, the only means he had in his power of seeing his parents and friends; a pleasure for which he had languished with insurmountable desire for some time, and which he was willing to purchase at the expense of any danger or pain.—The event showed that he was sincere in what he said, for, on being ordered back to the place of his banishment, he died in a short time of pure anguish of heart.

§ 145. Further proofs and illustrations of the natural origin of the principle of sociality.

The considerations which have hitherto been advanced are plain, obvious, and incontrovertible; showing undeniably that society is man's natural element, and that his permanent removal from it is attended with immeasurable pain. Such instances as those last referred to, which, unfortunately, are found thickly scattered in history, indicate how much of truth and nature there is in the following passage of Thomson's Agamemnon:

> "Cast on the wildest of the Cyclad isles,
> Where never human foot had marked the shore,
> These ruffians left me. Yet believe me, Arcas,
> I never heard a sound so dismal as their parting oars."

But we proceed, in the fourth place, to remark, that there is another class of facts, of a very interesting character, which not only show the existence of this propensity, but illustrate its strength in a most striking manner. Facts can be brought to show that the desire of society is so inseparable from man's nature and so strong, that, if men are entirely excluded from the company of their fellow-men, they will establish an acquaintance and companionship with sheep, dogs, horses, goats, mice, spiders, anything whatever, which has life and motion.

"As the old man crept out of his little hut," says Walter Scott, "his two she-goats came to meet him, and licked his hands in gratitude for the vegetables with which he supplied them from his garden."* The Black Dwarf acknowledged the gratitude of these animals, and asserted that, outcast and deformed as he was, the finest shape that ever statuary moulded would be an object of indifference or of alarm, should it present itself instead of the mutilated trunk, to whose services they were accustomed.

Although the fictitious delineations of this celebrated writer are hardly less valuable in relation to the human mind than if they were given as the authentic details of history, we find, in his Life of Napoleon, an incident parallel to the above, and which throws light on the subject before us. Speaking of the banishments and other forms of suffering connected with the French Revolution, he remarks, that "strangers are forcibly affected by the trifling incidents which sometimes recall the memory of those fearful times. A venerable French ecclesiastic being on a visit at a gentleman's house in North Britain, it was remarked by the family that a favourite cat, rather wild and capricious in his habits, paid particular attention to their guest. It was explained by the priest giving an account of his lurking in the waste garret, or lumber-room, of an artisan's house for several weeks. In this condition he had no better amusement than to study the manners and habits of the cats which frequented his place of retreat, and acquire the mode of conciliating their favour. The difficulty of supplying him with food, without attracting suspicion, was extreme, and it could only be placed near his place of concealment in small quantities and at uncertain times. Men, women, and children knew of his being in that place; there were rewards to be gained by discovery, life to be lost by persevering in concealing him; yet he was faithfully preserved, to try upon a Scottish cat, after the restoration of the Monarchy, the arts which he had learned in his miserable place of shelter during the reign of Terror. The history of the time abounds with similar instances."†

* The Black Dwarf, chap. vii.

† Scott's Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, chap. xvi.

§ 146. Other illustrations of a similar kind.

The instances of the preceding section are introduced to show that men, if deprived of human society, will endeavour to satisfy the natural demands of their propensities by forming a species of intimacy with the lower animals; a circumstance which seems to us decisively to evince not only the innate existence, but the great strength of the social tendency. There are multitudes of other facts of the same kind, and still more striking than those which have already been noticed. Baron Trenck, for instance, in order to alleviate the wretchedness of his long and dreadful imprisonment, made the attempt, and was successful in it, to tame a mouse. The mouse, according to his account of him, would not only play around him and eat from his hand, but discovered extraordinary marks of sagacity as well as of attachment.

"This intelligent mouse," he remarks, "had nearly been my ruin. I had diverted myself with it during the night; it had been nibbling at my door, and capering on a trencher. The sentinels happened to hear our amusement, and called the officers; they heard also, and added, all was not right in my dungeon. At daybreak my doors resounded; the town-major, a smith, and mason entered. Strict search was begun; flooring, walls, chains, and my own person were all scrutinized, but in vain. They asked what was the noise they had heard. I mentioned the mouse, whistled, and it came and jumped upon my shoulder. Orders were given that I should be deprived of its society; I earnestly entreated that they would at least spare its life. The officer on guard gave me his word of honour he would present it to a lady, who would treat it with the utmost tenderness.

"He took it away, turned it loose in the guardroom, but it was tame to me alone, and sought a hiding-place. It had fled to my prison door, and, at the hour of visitation, ran into my dungeon, immediately testifying its joy by its antic leaping between my legs. It is worthy of remark that it had been taken away blindfold, that is to say, wrapped in a handkerchief. The guardroom was a hundred paces from my dungeon. How, then, did it find its master? Did it know or did it wait for the hour

of visitation? Had it remarked the doors were daily opened?

"All were desirous of obtaining this mouse, but the major carried it off for his lady; she put it into a cage, where it pined, refused all sustenance, and in a few days was found dead.—The loss of this little companion made me for some time quite melancholy."

§ 147. Other instances in illustration of the same subject

Mr. Stewart, in illustrating this very subject, makes the following statement.—"The Count de Lauzun was confined by Louis XIV. for nine years in the Castle of Pignerol, in a small room where no light could enter but from a chink in the roof. In this solitude he attached himself to a spider, and contrived for some time to amuse himself in attempting to tame it, with catching flies for its support, and with superintending the progress of its web. The jailer discovered his amusement and killed the spider; and the Count used afterward to declare, that the pang he felt on the occasion could be compared only to that of a mother for the loss of a child."

More recently we find statements of a similar purport in the interesting little work of Silvio Pellico, which gives an account of his Ten Years' Imprisonment.—"Being almost deprived of human society," he remarks, "I one day made acquaintance with some ants upon my window; I fed them; they went away, and, ere long, the place was thronged with these little insects, as if come by invitation. A spider, too, had weaved a noble edifice upon my walls, and I often gave him a feast of gnats or flies, which were extremely annoying to me, and which he liked much better than I did. I got quite accustomed to the sight of him; he would run over my bed, and come and take the precious morsels out of my hand."

On a certain occasion, being detected in conversation with his fellow-prisoner, Count Orobini, Pellico was not only reprimanded, but strictly ordered never afterward to converse from his window. He resolutely refused, in language that clearly indicates the workings and longings of the human heart. "I shall do no such thing. I shall speak as long as I have breath, and invite my neighbour

to talk to me. If he refuse, I will talk to my window bars, I will talk to the hills before me, I will talk to the birds as they fly about. I *will* talk."—On another occasion, after having been visited by some one who took a more than usual interest in his situation, he exclaims, "How strange, how irresistible is the desire of the solitary prisoner to behold some one of his own species! It amounts to almost a sort of *instinct*, as if to prevent insanity, and its usual consequence, the tendency to self-destruction. The Christian religion, so abounding in views of humanity, forgets not to enumerate among its works of mercy the visiting of the prisoner. The mere aspect of man, his look of commiseration, his willingness, as it were, to share with you, and bear a part of your heavy burden, even when you know he cannot relieve you, has something that sweetens your bitter cup."

We hold it to be quite certain, that such considerations and facts as have been brought forward cannot be satisfactorily explained except on the ground that the love of society is originally implanted in the human mind. We might, therefore, be safe in leaving the subject here; but there are some other facts, similar to those which have been mentioned, that seem to possess no small degree of interest. We refer not so much to the case of distinguished individuals who have been subjected to long and severe imprisonment, as to some of the more general results that may be gathered from the history of prison discipline.

§ 148. The subject illustrated from experiments in prison discipline.

In the year 1821, the Legislature of New-York directed the Superintendent of the Auburn State Prison to select a number of the most hardened criminals, and to lock them up in solitary cells, to be kept there day and night, without any interruption of their solitude, and without labour. This order, which was regarded, and was designed to be regarded, in the light of an experiment, was carried into effect in September of that year, by confining eighty criminals in the manner prescribed. On this experiment Messrs. Beaumont and Tocqueville, who were recently commissioned by the French govern-

ment to examine and to report on the American system of Prison Discipline, make the following remarks: "This trial, from which so happy a result had been anticipated, was fatal to the greater part of the convicts; in order to reform them, they had been subjected to complete isolation; but this absolute solitude, if nothing interrupt it, is beyond the strength of man; it destroys the criminal without intermission and without pity; it does not reform, it kills.—The unfortunates on whom this experiment was made, fell into a state of depression so manifest that their keepers were struck with it; their lives seemed in danger if they remained longer in this situation; five of them had already succumbed during a single year; their moral state was no less alarming; one of them had become insane; another, in a fit of despair, had embraced the opportunity, when the keeper brought him something, to precipitate himself from his cell, running the almost certain chance of a mortal fall.—Upon these and similar effects the system was finally judged. The governor of the State of New-York pardoned twenty-six of those in solitary confinement. The others, to whom this favour was not extended, were allowed to leave the cells during the day, and to work in the common workshops of the prison."

The Philadelphia Penitentiary appears to be constituted on what may be considered a mixed principle of punishment, viz., solitary confinement combined with labour, and alleviated by opportunities of reading and by frequent visits from official persons, such as the inspectors, wardens, and chaplain. When Messrs. Beaumont and Tocqueville visited this Penitentiary, one of the prisoners said to them, in language which feelingly intimates how repugnant entire solitude is to the natural sentiments of the human heart, "It is with joy that I perceive the figure of the keepers who visit my cell. This summer a cricket came into my yard; it looked like a companion. When a butterfly or any other animal happens to enter my cell, I never do it any harm."

It may be added here, on the authority of the Translator of the Work from which the foregoing extracts have been made, that "the fatal effects of solitary confinement

without labour, both to the body and the mind of the prisoners, has not been limited to the Auburn Prison. The Penitentiaries of Maryland, Maine, Virginia, and New-Jersey, in their experiments of this kind, have not exhibited happier results. In the latter prison, ten persons are mentioned as having been killed by solitary confinement."*

§ 149. Relation of the social principle to civil society.

It is on such considerations that we maintain the principle which has now been the subject of examination, to be connatural to the human mind. If men are frequently found in a state of contention, jealous of each other's advancement, and seeking each other's injury, we are not to regard this as their natural position, but rather as the result, in many cases at least, of misapprehension. If they understood, in every case, the relative position of those with whom they contend, and especially if they were free from all unfavourable influences from those who happen to be placed in positions of authority, the great mass of mankind would find the principle of sociality successfully asserting its claims against those causes of repulsion and strife which, for various reasons, too often exist.

In concluding this subject, we may properly revert a moment to the strange notion of Hobbes, and those who think with him, that man is kept in society only by the fear of what he significantly calls the Leviathan; that is to say, of Civil Society in the exercise of force. These writers give us to understand that it is the chain, the sword, and the fagot which sustain the uniformity of the social position. We have no doubt that civil Government, in its proper administration, has a favourable effect, even in the exercise of force. But, at the same time, it is a great and important fact, that Civil Society has a different, and, in all respects, a better foundation than this. It is based on the constitution of the mind itself, on the unfailing operations of the social principle. It is true that the tendencies of this principle are sometimes temporarily annulled by counteracting and adverse influen-

* Lieber's Translation of Beaumont and Tocqueville's Penitentiary System of the United States, p. 5, 51, 151, 188.

ces; but the principle itself is never, in a sound mind, perfectly extinguished. There is philosophical truth, as well as poetical beauty, in the well-known expressions of Cowper.

> "Man in society is like a flower
> Blown in his native bed; 'tis there alone
> His faculties, expanded in full bloom,
> Shine out; there only reach their proper use."

§ 150. Of the form of desire denominated hope.

Before leaving the Propensities, and ascending, in the gradation of the Desiring or Desirous Sensibilities, to the still higher class of the Affections, we may delay a moment upon a state of mind which, although we may not have authority to give it a distinct place, has a name in every language, and perhaps we may add with strict truth, a residence in every breast. We refer to the state of mind denominated Hope, which does not appear to be a distinct form of desire separate from every other, but rather a modification of all its forms. When the desire, whether it appear in the form of a propensity, or an affection, or in any other possible shape, is attended with a belief of the attainment of the object towards which it is directed, it is generally accompanied, in consequence of this belief, with a pleasant emotion. The effect of this collateral or accessory emotion is to stimulate the action of the desire, whose success it anticipates, and to diffuse over it a portion of its own glow of happiness. Of course, this pleasurable emotion will be greater or less, according as there is a greater or less probability of the object being attained. When the probability is small, the emotion of pleasure is weak; when it is great, the pleasure becomes strong. It is in the latter case that we often speak of "gay" hope, of "cheering" or "bright" hope, and regard it as spreading a sort of rapturous light over the distant objects which it contemplates.

> "With thee, sweet Hope! resides the heavenly light,
> That pours remotest rapture on the sight."

The influence of that peculiar modification of pleased and vivid desire which, in order to distinguish it from other forms of desire, we denominate Hope, is undoubtedly

very great; and, in most cases, it is to be presumed that its tendency is beneficial. Scarcely a duty or a situation of life can be named in which its influence is not felt more or less. The schoolboy is encouraged in his tasks by some hope of reward; and, when grown up to manhood, he cheers himself, after a thousand disappointments, with some good in prospect. The poor peasant, who laboriously cultivates his few steril acres, sees them, in his anticipation, rich, and blooming, and prodigal of wealth. It proffers its aid in the chambers of the sick and suffering; and the victim of oppressive tyranny, the captive in the dungeon, is encouraged to summon up the fortitude necessary to prolong his existence, by the hope, however poorly founded, of future deliverance.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MALEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

§ 151. Of the comparative rank of the affections.

It will be recollected, after some general remarks on the Nature of desire, we proposed to prosecute the examination of what may be called, in distinction from the emotive, the *desirous* portion of the Pathematic sensibilities, under the subordinate heads of the Instincts, the Appetites, the Propensities, and the Affections. Having examined, so far as seemed to be necessary for our purpose, the first three divisions, we are now prepared to proceed to the last.

The Affections are distinguished from the other forms of the desirous or propensive nature, besides other subordinate marks or characteristics, which will naturally present themselves to our notice as they come separately under examination, in being, in the first place, more complex, and also by the circumstance of their sustaining a higher place in the graduation of our esteem and honour.—It may be difficult to explain how it happens, but it is unquestionably the fact, that there is a difference in

the sentiments of esteem with which we contemplate different parts of our nature; some being regarded with higher, and some with less honour. In the graduation of our regard, it appears to be the fact, that we generally estimate the appetites as in some degree higher than the instincts, and the propensities as higher than either. To the Affections, especially the Benevolent affections, which occupy in our estimation a still more elevated position, we look with increased feelings of interest. They obviously stand at the head of the list; and when we shall have completed their examination, nothing more will remain to be said on the regular or ordinary action of the Natural Sensibilities.—We shall then be at liberty to proceed to another and still more important class of subjects.

§ 152. Of the complex nature of the affections.

The Affections, unlike the Appetites and Propensities, as they exist in their primitive or original developement, are not simple states of mind, but complex. Accordingly, the term AFFECTION denotes a state of mind, of which it is indeed true that some simple emotion is always a part, but which differs from any single simple emotion in being combined with some form of that state of mind called DESIRE. "As to every sort of passion," says Kaimes, "we find no more in the composition but an emotion, pleasant or painful, accompanied with desire."

The affections are susceptible of being divided, although it may not be in all respects easy to carry the arrangement into effect in its details, into the two classes of Benevolent and Malevolent. The malevolent affections, as a general thing, include a painful emotion, accompanied with a desire of evil to the unpleasant object. The benevolent affections, on the contrary, include, for the most part, a pleasant emotion, accompanied with the desire of good to the pleasing object. But what distinguishes and characterizes the two classes is probably not so much the nature of the emotion, as the desire of good or evil which attends it.—It is on the basis of this division that we propose to proceed in the examination of this subject.

It is proper to remark here, that the term PASSIONS, in

conformity with the authorized usage of language, is susceptible of being employed as entirely synonymous with AFFECTIONS. In this sense we shall sometimes have occasion to use it, although it is frequently the case that it is employed also as expressive not merely of the existence of the affections, but as implying their existence in a raised or eminent degree.

§ 153. Of resentment or anger.

The first of the MALEVOLENT affections which we propose to consider (that which may be termed the foundation or basis of all the others) is Resentment or Anger. This affection, like all others, is of a complex nature, involving an unpleasant or painful emotion, accompanied with the desire of inflicting unpleasantness or pain on the object towards which it is directed. In its original or natural state, the desire appears to be, to some extent, the counterpart of the emotion; that is to say, having experienced an unpleasant or painful emotion, in consequence of the actual or supposed ill-conduct of others, we naturally desire, in the exercise of the Resentment arising under such circumstances, a corresponding retribution of pain on the offending agent. But in saying that they are reciprocally counterparts, we do not feel at liberty to assert, although there seems to be grounds for such a suggestion, that they possess to each other a precise and *exact* correspondence.

There are various modifications of Resentment, so distinct from each other as easily to admit of a separate notice, and to be entitled to a distinct name, such as Peevishness, Jealousy, and Revenge. These will be considered, although in as brief a manner as possible, in their proper place. It is necessary to remark a little more at length upon the passion now before us, which may be regarded as in some important sense the foundation and the place of origin to all the others.

§ 154. Illustrations of instinctive resentment.

The AFFECTIONS, agreeing in this respect with what has been said of the Appetites and Propensities, have a twofold action, instinctive and voluntary; operating, in the

one case, suddenly and without thought; in the other, operating on reflection and with deliberate purpose of mind.—Accordingly, we proceed to remark, in the first place, on the instinctive form of resentment. The occasions on which this form of resentment arises, or is liable to arise, are all cases of harm or suffering, whether such harm or suffering be caused intentionally or not. The harm which we experience is followed by the resentment at once; the rapidity of the retributive movement may be compared to that of a flash of lightning; quick as the operation of thought is universally allowed to be, there is no opportunity for its interposition between the harm which has been experienced and the resentment that follows. Under such circumstances, it is, of course, impossible that the resentment should be regulated by the consideration whether the hurt which we have experienced was intentional or not. It is the harm, in itself considered, which arouses us, exclusive of any reference to the circumstances under which it is inflicted.

We not unfrequently see instances of instinctive resentment corresponding to what has been said. It is under the influence of this form of resentment that the child who has been accidentally hurt by a stone or a billet of wood wreaks a momentary anger upon the inanimate object; that the Savage breaks and fiercely tramples upon the arrow which has wounded him; and that men, in the first moments of their suffering, almost universally discover a sudden and marked displeasure with the cause of it

§ 155. Uses and moral character of instinctive resentment.

The object (or FINAL CAUSE, as it is sometimes termed) for which the principle of instinctive resentment is implanted in man, seems to be to furnish him with a degree of protection in the case of sudden and unforeseen attacks. The reasoning power is comparatively slow in its operation; and if the constitution of our nature were such as to require us always to wait for its results before acting, we might, in some cases, fail of that protection which an instinctive effort would have given. Hence the practical importance of this form of the principle under consideration.

It may be added, that instinctive resentment has no moral character. It is the glory of the moral nature that it lays back, if we may be allowed the expressions, of the intellective nature; and that it does not and cannot act, independently of the antecedent action, to a greater or less extent, of the intellect. In other words, the nature of conscience is such as to require as the basis of its action a knowledge of the thing and its relations upon which it is about to pronounce its opinion, which knowledge can be acquired only by the perceptive and comparing acts of the intellect. But such is the rapidity of instinctive action, that it entirely excludes a suitable knowledge of the event which calls it forth; and as it in this way excludes the cognizance and authority of conscience, it cannot be said to have a moral character, either good or evil.

§ 156. Of voluntary in distinction from instinctive resentment.

The second, and, in a practical and moral point of view, the more important form of this affection, is what may be denominated Voluntary Resentment. By inquiring into the cause of the resentment which we have instinctively experienced, and by suggesting reasons either for its increase or diminution, we are enabled to modify its action, and to impart to it the character of voluntariness and accountability.

The proper occasion of deliberate or Voluntary, in distinction from instinctive Resentment, is INJURY, as it stands distinguished from mere harm or hurt. That is to say, Voluntary resentment, when exercised in accordance with the intentions of nature, takes into view not only the harm or suffering which has been occasioned, but the motive or intention of the agent. The final cause or object of instinctive resentment is immediate protection; nor does it appear to have anything further in view. The final cause of voluntary resentment is not only protection, but justice. In other words, while it aims to secure protection, it does not propose the attainment of that object, except in conformity with what is strictly proper and right. It always, therefore, in its appropriate and legitimate exercise, dispenses its retribution, not simply with a reference to the

harm, loss, or suffering which has been endured, but chiefly with reference to the feelings which at the time existed in the mind of the agent or cause of the suffering.

A moral character, accordingly, attaches only to the voluntary form of resentment. If there is an exact proportion between the resentment and its cause; in other words, if the resentment precisely corresponds to what justice requires, it is right. But if it exceeds this just proportion it is wrong. This statement is made on the supposition, that we are considering the subject by the mere aid of the light of nature, exclusively of the Scriptures. If, under the Christian dispensation, we are required, for high and holy reasons peculiar to that dispensation, to subdue resentful feelings, which otherwise might have been justly exercised, that circumstance evidently places the subject in a different light

§ 157. Tendency of anger to excess, and the natural checks to it.

Few principles are more operative in man, in point of fact, than that of resentment. And although, reasoning on the principles of nature merely, without taking into view the duty of forgiveness inculcated in the Scriptures, we may justify its deliberate and voluntary exercise in many cases, it must be admitted, on the whole, that it is particularly liable to a perverted and excessive action. It is too frequently the fact, that man is found wreaking his anger on those who, on a full and candid examination of all the circumstances of the case, would be found entitled to no such treatment.

One cause of the frequency of excessive and unjustifiable resentment is to be found in the fact, that, in consequence of the suffering or loss we endure, our thoughts are wholly taken up with our own situation, and we find it very difficult to estimate properly either the facts or the motives of our supposed adversary's conduct. If we could turn away our thoughts from ourselves, so far as fully to understand all the circumstances of a proceeding which, in itself considered, we have found so injurious to us, we should frequently be willing to check the vehemence of our anger, if we did not wholly extinguish it.

Nature, however, has herself instituted some checks on

the undue exercise of this passion.—First. The exercise of this passion is, in its very nature, painful. It is in this respect very different from the exercise of the benevolent affections, which is pleasant. So great is the pain attendant upon deliberate and protracted anger, that it is not uncommon to hear persons assert they have themselves endured more suffering in their own minds than the gratification of their passions has caused to their opponents. Nature seems to have attached this penalty to the exercise of this passion, in order to remind men, at the most appropriate moment, of the necessity of keeping it in due subjection.

Second. Whenever our resentment passes the proper bounds, the feelings of the community, which were before in our favour, immediately turn against us. We are so constituted, that we naturally desire the good opinion of others; and, consequently, the loss of their good opinion operates upon us as a punishment, and not unfrequently a severe one. Under the influence of the experience or the anticipation of this incidental retribution, it is not unfrequently the case, that men restrict within proper bounds those angry feelings which, under other circumstances, they would probably have indulged to excess.

Third. The tendency of the indulgence of anger is to lower a man in his own estimation, and still more so in the estimation of others, who will be less ready to admit those mitigating circumstances that partially justify his feelings to himself. The mere outward signs of the angry passions give a shock to our sensibilities, and are hateful to us, while those of an opposite character beam upon the soul with the pleasantness of a tranquil morning's light. The smile of benevolence wins upon our affections; but the scowl of anger, whether it be directed against ourselves or others, fills us with pain and dread. And, moreover, while the indulgence of anger tends, as a general thing, to degrade the subject of it in our view, we look with increased respect and honour on those who successfully resist its approaches, and are calm and forbearing amid insult and injury.

§ 158. Other reasons for checking and subduing the angry passions.

In addition to those checks to the angry passions which

nature herself seems to have furnished, it may be proper to mention a few considerations, drawn from reason and the Scriptures, which, if they have the weight they are entitled to, will tend to the same desirable result.—(1.) We should always keep in recollection, in the first place, that, when the mind is much agitated by passion, it is rendered by that circumstance itself incapable, to a considerable degree, of correct judgment. Actions, considered as the indications of feeling and character, do not at such times appear to us in their true light. They are seen through an unfavourable medium, and represented unnaturally, with distorted and discoloured features. It is said to have been a saying of Socrates to his servant on a certain occasion, that he would beat him if he were not angry; a remark which seems to indicate, that, in the opinion of the author of it, anger is a state of mind unfavourable to a correct judgment of the merit or demerit of the person towards whom it is directed.

(2.) We should consider, in the second place, even if we have no particular reason to distrust our powers of judging, that we may, by possibility at least, have mistaken the motives of the person whom we imagine to have injured us. Perhaps the oversight or crime which we allege against him, instead of being premeditated or intentional, was mere inadvertence. It is even possible that his intentions were favourable to us, instead of being, as we suppose, of a contrary character. And if it were otherwise, if the wrong done us were an intentional wrong, it is still possible that this hostile disposition may have originated from serious misconceptions in regard to our own character and conduct. And obviously the easiest and best way would be to correct these misconceptions, and thus to secure safety for the future, and, in all probability, recompense for the past.

(3.) There is another consideration which ought to prevent the indulgence of this passion, and to allay its effects. It is, that all have offended against the Supreme Being, and stand in need of pardon from Him. If we ourselves were without sin, if we could boast of perfect purity of character, there might seem to be some degree of reasonableness in our exacting from others the full

amount of what is due to perfect and inflexible rectitude. But the actual state of things is far different from this. Every one who knows his own heart must see and feel himself to be a transgressor. How unsuitably, therefore, to the circumstances of his own situation does that man conduct, who talks largely of satisfaction and revenge, when he is every moment dependant on the clemency and forgiveness of a Being whom he has himself so often sinned against.

In the fourth place, there are many passages of Scripture which expressly require us to subdue the malevolent passions, and to forgive the injuries which have called them into action. And this, we may here take occasion to remark, is one of the great and striking characteristics of the Gospel revelation. The doctrine that we are to love and do good to our enemies, obviously distinguishes the Christian Code from every other; and gives to it, as compared with mere human systems, an inexpressible elevation. Its language is: "Ye have heard it hath been said, thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you"

§ 159. Modifications of resentment. Peevishness.

When, in all ordinary cases, the resentful feeling shows itself, we variously denominate it by the terms resentment, hostility, anger, hatred, indignation, and the like; but there are some modifications of the feeling, distinguished either by excess or diminution, or in some other way, which may be regarded as possessing a distinctive character. One of these is PEEVISHNESS or FRETFULNESS; a species of malevolent passion which, probably with more frequency than its decided manifestations, interrupts the peace and happiness of life.

Peevishness differs from ordinary anger in being excited by very trifling circumstances, and in a strange facility of inflicting its effects on everybody and everything within its reach. The peevish man has met with some trifling disappointment (it matters but little what it is), and the serenity of whole days is disturbed; no smiles

are to be seen; everything, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational, is out of place, and falls under the rebuke of this fretful being.—Anger, in its more marked and decided manifestations, may be compared to a thunder shower, that comes dark and heavily, but leaves a clear sky afterward. But peevishness is like an obscure, drizzling fog; it is less violent, and lasts longer. In general, it is more unreasonable and unjust than violent anger, and would certainly be more disagreeable, were it not often, in consequence of being so disproportioned to its cause, so exceedingly ludicrous.

§ 160. Modifications of resentment. Envy.

One of the most frequent forms of resentment is Envy. By this term we are accustomed to express that ill-will or hatred which has its rise from the contemplation of the superiority of another. Considered as a mere state of the mind, Envy is to be regarded as only one of the perversions of resentment; but considered in respect to the occasions of its origin, it must be added, that it is one of the most degrading and hateful perversions. There is no passion which is more tormenting in the experience, as might be expected from its hatefulness; and none which is more decisively condemned by the sentiments of justice.

If we are asked why it is that, on the mere contemplation of the more favourable situation and the greater advancement of another, we experience such an odious perversion of a principle apparently good in itself, we shall probably find a reason in the irregular and inordinate action of the principle of Self-love. Men frequently become so intensely selfish that they cannot admit others to an equal participation of what they enjoy, much less see them advanced to a higher situation, without a greater or less degree of repining and discontent. And it is this state of mind which is appropriately denominated Envy.

§ 161. Modifications of resentment. Jealousy.

There are still other varieties of that Resentment or Hostility, which may be regarded, in some important sense, as the basis of the whole series of the Malevolent passions. Among these is Jealousy, which includes a

painful emotion, caused by some object of *love*, and attended with a desire of evil towards that object.—The circumstance which characterizes this passion and constitutes its peculiar trait is, that all its bitterness and hostility are inflicted on some one whom the jealous person loves. The feeling of suspicious rivalship, which often exists between candidates for fame and power, is sometimes called jealousy, on account of its analogy to this passion.—There are various degrees of jealousy, from the forms of mere distrust and watchful suspicion, to its highest paroxysms. In general, the strength of the passion will be found to be in proportion to the value which is attached to the object of it; and is, perhaps, more frequently found in persons who have a large share of pride than in others. Such, in consequence of the habitual belief of their own superiority, are likely to notice many trifling inadvertencies, and to treasure them up as proofs of intended neglect, which would not have been observed by others, and certainly were exempt from any evil intention.

The person under the influence of this passion is incapable of forming a correct judgment of the conduct of the individual who is the object of it; he observes everything, and gives it the worst interpretation; and circumstances, which in another state of the mind would have been tokens of innocence, are converted into proof of guilt. Although poetry, it is no fiction:

> "Trifles light as air,
> Are to the jealous confirmations strong
> As proofs of holy writ."

Hence it is justly said to be the monster that "makes the meat it feeds on;" for it perseveringly broods over the slightest suggestion, even when made with the most sincere kindness, and rears up a shapeless and frightful form, which in turn nourishes the baleful passion from which is derived its own existence.

It may be remarked of this passion, that it is at times exceedingly violent. At one moment the mind is animated with all the feelings of kindness; the next it is transported with the strongest workings of hatred, and then it is suddenly overwhelmed with contrition. Continually

vacillating between the extremes of love and hatred, it knows no rest; it would gladly bring destruction on the object whom it dreads to lose more than any other, and whom, at times, it loves more than any other.

§ 162. Modifications of resentment. Revenge.

Another of the marked modifications of Resentment is REVENGE. By the spirit of revenge, as we sometimes express it, we generally understand a disposition, not merely to return suffering for suffering, but to inflict a degree of pain on the person who is supposed to have injured us, beyond what strict justice requires. So that revenge seems to differ from resentment rather in degree than in kind; in other words, it is unrestrained or excessive resentment. It is true, however, that it generally implies something more than mere excess. It commonly exhibits the aspect of coolness and deliberateness in its designs; and is as persevering in the execution of its hostile plans as it is deliberate in forming them. If resentment, when properly regulated, may be considered, on the principles of nature, as morally right; revenge, which is the unrestrained or inordinate form of resentment, is always morally wrong. It is a passion which is not only greatly inconsistent with the due exercise of the other powers of the mind, but is equally condemned by enlightened conscience and the Scriptures.

§ 163. Illustrations of the malevolent passions.

It would not be a difficult matter to bring forward some affecting illustrations of the unrestrained and undue indulgence of the malevolent passions which have thus far come under our notice. In the tragedy of Othello, the pen of Shakspeare has successfully employed itself in developing the workings and the results of the fatal passion of Jealousy; and if this great poem be styled a fiction considered in relation to history, it will probably be admitted to be immutable truth considered in relation to nature. Revenge, in its more determined and persevering exhibitions, is a passion at least equally dreadful. Among Savage tribes in particular, as we learn from the frequent testimony of those who have travelled among them, to

take vengeance, deep, unabated, ample, would seem to be the surest passport to an honourable place and name. But it is not among Savage nations alone that revenge is found, even in its more imbittered forms. There is mention made in the writings of Garcilasso of a Spanish gentleman named Aguire, who, having on one occasion offended a governor of some of the cities of South America, was sentenced to be ignominiously scourged in public. The citizens took an interest so far as to interpose and entreat a remission of the punishment; and the person himself implored that death might be substituted instead of it, but without effect.—"Aguire, esteeming himself eternally disgraced, retired from the military service, and patiently awaited the expiry of the governor's appointment, when he followed him incessantly as his shadow. The governor, warned of his danger, armed himself in mail, and hurried from place to place in quest of safety. But no sooner had he hopes of rest, than he found his implacable enemy treading on his footsteps. He fled again; and again Aguire pursued him. Thus did three years elapse, while many hundred miles were traversed by both. At last Aguire ventured to enter the governor's house, and, finding him asleep in an inner chamber, he pierced him with a dagger where unprotected by his armour."

Such are the deplorable evils that are likely to result when the malevolent passions gain an ascendency. And as, in the present fallen state of man, there is a constant proneness to inordinate malevolent action, it becomes the more important to restrain and duly regulate a tendency so unfavourable, by allowing their full weight to the forgiving and benevolent principles of the Gospel.

§ 164. Nature of the passion of fear.

We conclude this review of this portion of the Affections with a single other notice. The passion of Fear, like the other passions or affections that have passed under examination, embraces both a simple emotion of pain, caused by some object which we anticipate will be injurious to us, and also, additional to the painful emotion, the desire of avoiding such object or its injurious effects. The question might suggest itself, with some appearance

of reason, whether Fear, in view of the definition just given, should be included under the general head of the Malevolent passions. And this is one of the cases referred to, in separating the Affections into the twofold division of the Benevolent and Malevolent, when it was remarked, it might not, in all respects, be easy to carry the arrangement into effect in its details. Nevertheless, the fact that we experience pain in viewing the object feared, accompanied with a desire of avoiding it, seems very clearly to involve the idea that it is an object of greater or less aversion. In other words, that we have more or less of ill-will towards it. It is certainly the case, if the object is of such a nature that its presence is painful, that we can hardly be said to love it. So that, at least, it would seem to come more naturally under the head of the malevolent affections than under the other class.

But to return to the nature of the passion itself. The strength or intensity of fear will be in proportion to the apprehended evil. There is a difference of original susceptibility of this passion in different persons, and the amount of apprehended evil will consequently vary with the quickness of such susceptibility. But whatever causes may increase or diminish the opinion of the degree of evil which threatens, there will be a correspondence between the opinion which is formed of it and the fearful passion.

When this passion is extreme, it prevents the due exercise of the moral susceptibility, and interrupts correct judgment of any kind whatever. It is a state of mind of great power, and one which will not bear to be trifled with. It may serve as a profitable hint to remark, that there have been persons thrown into a fright suddenly, and perhaps in mere sport, which has immediately resulted in a most distressing and permanent mental disorganization.—In cases where the anticipated evil is very great, and there is no hope of avoiding it in any way, the mind exists in that state which is called DESPAIR. But the consideration of this deplorable state of mind, so far as it may be necessary to meet the objects of the present Work, will more properly come under the head of Disordered or Alienated Sensibilities.

CHAPTER VII.

THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

§ 165. Of the nature of love, or benevolence in general.

We proceed now to the consideration of the other great division of the Affections. As the original principle of Resentment is the basis of the Malevolent affections, so Love, in its more general form, appears to be at the foundation, as a general thing at least, of those which are termed, by way of distinction, Benevolent. The affection of Love, like the other affections, is a complex state of mind, embracing, FIRST, a pleasant emotion in view of the object, and, SECOND, a desire of good to that object.—Hence there will always be found in that object some quality, either some excellence in the form, or in the relations sustained, or in the intellect, or in the moral traits, or in all combined, which is capable of exciting a pleasurable emotion. This emotion is the basis of the subsequent desire; but it is the strict and indissoluble combination of the two that constitutes the Affection properly so called.

It is proper to remark here, that there are many modifications or degrees of this affection; such as the unimpassioned preference of friendly regard and esteem, the warmer glow of friendship in the more usual acceptation of the term, and the increased feeling of devoted attachment. There are not only differences in degree, but the affection itself, considered in respect to its nature simply, seems to be modified, and to be invested with a different aspect, according to the circumstances in which it is found to operate. The love which children feel for their parents is different in some respects from that which they feel for their brothers and sisters. The love of parents for their children possesses traits, difficult to be described in language, but recognisable by Consciousness, which distinguish it from their love to mankind generally, or

their love to their country or their friends. Hence we are enabled, in consistency with what is the fact in respect to them, to consider the Affections under different forms or heads, viz., the Parental affection, the Filial affection, the Fraternal affection, Humanity, or the love of the human race, Patriotism, or the love of country, Friendship, Gratitude, and Sympathy, or Pity.

§ 166. Love, in its various forms, characterized by a twofold action.

Love, not only in its more general form, but in all the varieties which, in consequence of our situation and of the relations we sustain, it is made to assume, is characterized, like the opposite principle of resentment, by its twofold action. It is sometimes seen, particularly in parents and children, to operate INSTINCTIVELY; that is to say, without deliberation or forethought. At other times it is subjected to more or less of regulation, being either stimulated or repressed in its exercise by the facts and reflections which are furnished by reasoning; and then it is said to possess a deliberate or VOLUNTARY exercise.—This trait or characteristic, which pervades the whole series of the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, has been so often referred to, that it is unnecessary to delay upon it here

§ 167. Of the parental affection.

The principle of benevolence, love, or good-will, which in its general form has thus been made the subject of a brief notice, is susceptible, like the malevolent affection of Resentment, of various modifications. One of the most interesting and important of these modifications is the Parental Affection.—The view which we propose to take of this modification of benevolence or love is, that it is an original or implanted principle. In support of this view a number of things may be said.

(I.) It is supported, in the first place, by the consideration that the relation between the parent and child is much more intimate and indissoluble than any other. The child, in the view of the parent, is not so much a distinct and independent being, as a reproduction and continuance of himself. He sees not only the reflection of his person and dispositions in his offspring, but of his

hopes, joys, and prospects; in a word, of his whole being. Under such circumstances, it is almost impossible that the parental affection should be less deeply seated, less near to the root and bottom of the soul, than any other which can be named.

(II.) Such an affection seems, in the second place, to be required in order to enable parents to discharge effectually the duties which are incumbent upon them. The cares and troubles necessarily incidental to the parental relation, the daily anxieties, the nights of wakeful solicitude, the misgivings, the fears, and the sorrows without number, it would be impossible for human nature to support without the aid of an implanted principle.—And hence it is that, in the ordering and constitution of nature, this principle rises in such inexpressible beauty upon the parental heart. It diffuses its light upon it like a star upon a tempestuous ocean, and guides it forward in comparative safety.

(III.) In the third place, the acknowledged fact that this affection has an instinctive as well as a voluntary action, is a strong circumstance in favour of its being regarded as implanted. A purely voluntary affection cannot, from the nature of the case, be implanted, because it depends upon the Will; and will either exist or not exist, in accordance with the mere volitive determination. An instinctive affection cannot be otherwise than implanted; because, as it does not depend upon the will, it has no other support than in nature. Now, although this affection has a voluntary action based upon inquiry and reason, it has also, at its foundation, an instinctive action, which is to be regarded as the work of the Author of the mind himself. So that, although it is proper to accompany the statement with the remark that it has a twofold action, the affection, regarded as a whole, may justly be looked upon as an original or implanted one.

(IV.) In the fourth place, its universality is a circumstance in favour of the view which has been taken. We should naturally expect, in regard to any affection not implanted, and which depends exclusively upon the decisions of the reason and the will, that there would be frequent failures in its exercise. We may even be confident

that this would be the result. But the parental affection, in a mind not actually disordered, never fails. In all climes and countries, and among all classes of men, however debased by ignorance or perverted by the prevalence of vice, we may find the traces, and, with scarcely an exception, the marked and distinct traces of this ennobling principle. There is no portion of the human race so degraded that it would not turn with abhorrence from the man that did not love his offspring.

§ 168. Illustrations of the strength of the parental affection.

(V.) Another circumstance in favour of regarding the principle as an implanted one is its great strength. Secondary affections, or those which, by a process of association, are built upon others, are sometimes, it is true, exceedingly strong; but this is found to be the case only in particular instances, and not as a general trait. In respect to the affection before us, it is not found to be strong in one mind and weak in another; but is strong, exceedingly strong, as a general statement, in all minds alike. It might be interesting to give some illustrations of this statement, as, in truth, scarcely any of the facts illustrative of the mind's action in its various departments are wholly destitute of interest. But on this subject, such is the universal intensity of this affection, that they multiply on every side. He who has not noticed them has voluntarily shut his eyes to some of the most interesting exhibitions of human nature. So that a single incident of this kind, which will not fail to find a corroborative testimony in every mother's heart, will suffice.

"When the Ajax man-of-war took fire in the Straits of Bosphorus in the year 1807, an awful scene of distraction ensued. The ship was of great size, full of people, and under the attack of an enemy at the time—the mouths of destruction seemed to wage in contention for their prey. Many of those on board could entertain no hopes of deliverance: striving to shun one devouring element, they were the victims of another. While the conflagration was raging furiously, and shrieks of terror rent the air, an unfortunate mother, regardless of herself, seemed solicitous only for the safety of her infant child.

She never attempted to escape; but she committed it to the charge of an officer, who, at her earnest request, endeavoured to secure it in his coat; and, following the tender deposite with her eyes as he retired, she calmly awaited that catastrophe in which the rest were about to be involved. Amid the exertions of the officer in such an emergency, the infant dropped into the sea, which was no sooner discovered by the unhappy parent, than, frantic, she plunged from the vessel's side as if to preserve it; she sunk—and was seen no more."*

§ 169. Of the filial affection.

As a counterpart to the interesting and important affection which has thus been briefly noticed, nature has instituted the filial affection, or that affection which children bear to their parents. The filial affection, although it agrees with the parental in the circumstance of its being implanted or connatural in the human mind, differs from it in some of its traits.—It is understood, among other things, to possess less strength. And it is undoubtedly the fact, that it does not, as a general thing, flow forth towards its object with the same burning, unmitigated intensity. And this is just what we might expect, on the supposition that the human mind comes from an Author who possesses all wisdom. The great practical object for which the parental affection is implanted in the bosoms of parents, is to secure to their offspring that close attention and care which are so indispensable in the incipient stages of life. The responsibility which rests upon them in the discharge of their duties to their children, is, in the variety of its applications and in the aggregate of its amount, obviously greater than that which rests upon children in the discharge of their duty to their parents. Nothing could answer, so far as we are able to judge, the requisitions which are constantly made on the parent to meet the child's condition of weakness, suffering, and want, and to avert its liabilities, both mental and bodily, to error, but the wakeful energy of a principle stronger even than the love of life. But it is different on the part of the children. As a general thing,

* Origin and Progress of the Passions (Anonymous), vol. i., p. 148.

no such calls of constant anxiety and watchfulness in the behalf of another are made upon them, at least in the early part of their life. Hence their love to their parents, although unquestionably strong enough for the intentions of nature, burns with a gentler ray.

§ 170. The filial affection original or implanted.

We took occasion, in the preceding section, to remark incidentally, that the filial affection, as well as the parental, is original or implanted, in distinction from the doctrine of its being of an associated or secondary formation. It is not our purpose, however, to enter minutely into this inquiry; and yet there are one or two trains of thought, having a bearing upon it, which we are unwilling wholly to omit.—Our first remark is, that if the filial affection were wholly voluntary and not implanted; in other words, if it were based wholly upon reason and reflection, there is no question that it would be extinguished much more frequently than it is in point of fact. But that mere reason and reflection are not the entire basis of the affection, seems to be evident from the fact that we continue to love our parents under circumstances when reason, if we consulted that alone, would probably pronounce them unworthy of love. Our parents, as is sometimes the case, may treat us with great and unmerited neglect; they may plunge into the commission of crimes; they may become degraded and despised in the eyes of the community; but they still have a pure and elevated place, which nature has furnished for them in their children's hearts.—This train of thought (which, it is proper to remark in passing, is equally applicable to parental love, and tends to confirm the views brought forward under that head) goes with no small weight to show that the affection before us has an instinctive or natural basis.

Our second remark, which is also equally applicable to the parental affection, is, that men, with scarcely an exception, show, by their judgments and treatment of this affection, that they regard it as constitutional or implanted. It is evident that they expect us to treat our parents with great forbearance and kindness under all circumstances.

If another person should insult and injure us, public sentiment would probably justify us in inflicting some sort of punishment. But it would not justify us, under precisely the same circumstances of provocation, in inflicting punishment upon, or even in showing marked disrespect to a parent, because it would be a violation of nature. Not merely the disapprobation, but the contempt and abhorrence of mankind, inflicted with scarcely the possibility of a failure, is the fearful penalty which nature has attached to a want of filial love, even when the conduct of the parent himself has been reprehensible.—This is evidently the work of nature. Men act in this case as their nature prompts them. But nature is never at variance with herself. If she in this way distinctly intimates that she requires us to love our parents at all times, in adversity and in prosperity, in honour and in degradation, in good and in evil report, it is obvious that she has not left the affection to mere reason and reflection, for it is impossible that love so unchangeable could be sustained in such a manner; but supports it upon an instinctive or constitutional basis.

We merely add, leaving it to the reader himself to make the application of the remark, that nearly all the considerations which were brought forward to show the connatural origin of the parental affection, might be properly adduced to show the same thing in the case of the filial affection.

§ 171. Illustrations of the filial affection.

Interesting instances of the results of the filial affection are to be found wherever there are men. And while it is admitted that there are some unfavourable tendencies in human nature, it is pleasant to contemplate it in an aspect so amiable and honourable. It is the fact, indeed, that children, as a general thing, do not appear to be willing to labour and suffer for parents so much as the parents do for the children. There are more frequent instances of a failure of filial than of parental love. Nevertheless, in all ages of the world, the filial affection has sustained itself in such a way as to bring honour to the Being that implanted it. Children have not only sup

ported and consoled their parents in the ordinary duties and trials of life, but in multitudes of instances have followed them with their presence and their consolations into banishment and to prison.

At the accession of the late Emperor Alexander of Russia, many prisoners, who had been confined for political and other reasons in the preceding reign, were set at liberty.—"I saw," says Kotzebue, who was in Russia at this interesting period, "an old colonel of the Cossacks and his son brought from the fortress to Count de Pahlen's apartments. The story of this generous youth is extremely interesting. His father had been dragged, for I know not what offence, from Tscherkask to Petersburg, and there closely imprisoned. Soon afterward his son arrived, a handsome and brave young man, who had obtained, in the reign of Catharine II., the cross of St. George and that of Wolodimer. For a long time he exerted himself to procure his father's enlargement by solicitations and petitions; but, perceiving no hopes of success, he requested, as a particular favour, to be allowed to share his captivity and misfortunes. This was in part granted him; he was committed a prisoner to the fortress, but was not permitted to see his father; nor was the unfortunate old man ever informed that his son was so near him. On a sudden, the prison bolts were drawn; the doors were opened; his son rushed into his arms; and he not only learned that he was at liberty, but, at the same time, was informed of the noble sacrifice which filial piety had offered. He alone can decide which information gave him most delight."*

It is true, there have been instances of parents who have done more than this; who have not only been ready to suffer banishment or imprisonment, but have willingly and joyfully offered their lives for the welfare of their children. In the time of the French Revolution, General Loizerolles, availing himself of a stratagem in order to effect the object, died upon the scaffold in the place of his son. It might not be easy to bring instances, although some such have probably existed, of children dying for their parents. But history furnishes some af-

* Kotzebue's Exile, p. 254.

fecting cases, where the child has poured back into the parental bosom the fountain of life which had been received.—"The mother of a woman," says the writer referred to, § 168, "in humble life, being condemned at Rome, the jailer, rather than execute the sentence, wished, from humanity, to let her perish of famine. Meantime, no one but her daughter was admitted to the prison, and that after she was strictly searched. But the curiosity of the man being aroused by the unusual duration of her survivance, he watched their interview, and discovered the daughter affectionately nourishing the author of her days with her own milk. The people among whom this incident occurred were not insensible of its virtue, and a temple, dedicated to Piety, was afterward erected on the spot. So was an aged father, under similar circumstances, preserved by similar means: he too was thus nourished by his daughter."

§ 172. Of the nature of the fraternal affection.

There is one other affection, connected with the family or domestic relation, which bears the marks, although, perhaps, somewhat less distinctly than in the cases already mentioned, of a natural or implanted origin. We refer, as will be readily understood, to the Fraternal Affection, or the love of brothers and sisters. The love which we bear to our brothers and sisters, although, in the basis or essentiality of its nature, it is the same with any other love, has something peculiar about it; a trait not easily expressed in words; which, in our internal experience or consciousness of it, distinguishes it from every other affection.

We are aware that some will endeavour to explain the origin of this affection by saying that it is owing to the circumstance of brothers and sisters being brought up together beneath the same roof, and thus participating in an early and long companionship. Nor are we disposed to deny that this circumstance probably has some weight in imparting to it an increased degree of intensity. But there is a single fact, which furnishes an answer to the doctrine, that denies a distinct nature to the Fraternal Affection, and regards it as a mere modification of love

in general, occasioned by the circumstance of early and long-continued intercourse. It is this. When other persons, not members of the same family, are brought up beneath the same roof, although we love them very much, yet we never have that *peculiar* feeling (distinct from every other, and known only by experience) which flows out to a brother or sister. There is something in having the same father and mother, in looking upward to the same source of origin, in being nourished at the same fountain in infancy, in feeling the same life-blood course through our veins, which constitutes, under the creative hand of nature, a sacred tie, unlike any other.

There are other views of the subject, besides that which has just been noticed, which contribute to show the connaturalness and permanency of this affection. A number of the remarks which have been made in support of the implanted or connatural origin of the Parental and Filial affections, will apply here. But we leave the subject to the decision of such reflections as will be likely to suggest themselves to the mind of the reader himself.

§ 173. On the utility of the domestic affections.

In the institution of the affections, which have now passed under a rapid and imperfect review, and which, taken together, may be spoken of under the general denomination of the Domestic affections, we have evidence of that benevolence and wisdom which are seen so frequently in the arrangements of our mental nature. These affections are not only sources of happiness to individuals and families, diffusing an undefinable but powerful charm over the intercourse of life; they also indirectly exert a great influence in the support of society generally.

It was, indeed, a strange notion of some of the ancients, of Plato in particular, that the domestic affections are at variance with the love of country; and that, in order to extinguish these affections, children should be taken from their parents at their birth, and transferred to the state, to be educated at the public expense. But the domestic affections are too deeply planted, particularly that of parents, to be generally destroyed by any process of this kind; and if it were otherwise, the result would

be as injurious to the public as to individual happiness. It is unquestionable, that one of the great supports of society is the family relation. Who is most watchful and diligent in his business? Who is the most constant friend of public order, and is most prompt in rallying to the standard of the law? Who, as a general thing, is the best friend, the best neighbour, and the best citizen? Not he who is set loose from family relationships, and wanders abroad without a home; but he, however poor and unknown to fame, who has a father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters; who sees his own sorrows and happiness multiplied in the sorrows and happiness of those around him; and who is strong in the advocacy and support of the common and public good, not only because it involves his own personal interest, but the interest and happiness of all those who are linked arm in arm with himself by the beauty and sacredness of domestic ties.

§ 174. Of the moral character of the domestic affections, and of the benevolent affections generally.

One of the most interesting inquiries in connexion with the domestic affections, and the benevolent affections generally, and one, too, on which there has been a great diversity of opinion, is, whether these affections possess a moral character, and what that character is. The more common opinion seems to have been, that all affections which are truly benevolent are necessarily, and from the mere fact of their being benevolent, morally good or virtuous. Nor is it, perhaps, surprising that this opinion should be so often entertained. Certainly, as compared with the other active principles, coming under the general head of the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, they hold the highest rank; and we frequently apply epithets to them which indicate our belief of their comparative pre-eminence. We speak of them not only as innocent and useful, but as interesting, amiable, and lovely; and from time to time apply other epithets, which equally show the favourable place which they occupy in our regard. All this we allow; but still they are not necessarily, and in consequence of their own nature simply, morally good.

The correct view on this subject we apprehend to be this (the same that has been taken of other principles, that are analogous in their nature and operation): So far as the benevolent affections are constitutional or instinctive in their action, they are indifferent as to their moral character, being neither morally good nor evil. So far as they have a voluntary action, they will be either the one or the other, according to the circumstances of the case. When, for instance, the mother hears the sudden and unexpected scream of her child in another room, and impetuously rushes to its relief, we allow the action to be *naturally* good, and exceedingly interesting and lovely; but we do not feel at liberty to predicate virtue of it, and to pronounce it *morally* good, because it is obviously constitutional or instinctive. If the act done under such circumstances be necessarily virtuous, then it clearly follows that virtue may be predicated of sheep, cows, and other brute animals, who exhibit, under like circumstances, the same instinctive attachment to their offspring. So far, therefore, as the benevolent affections are instinctive in their operation, they are to be regarded, however interesting and amiable they may appear, as neither morally good nor evil.

§ 175. Of the moral character of the voluntary exercises of the benevolent affections.

But, so far as the benevolent affections are voluntary; in other words, so far as they exist in view of motives voluntarily and deliberately brought before the mind, they may be, according to the nature of the voluntary effort, either virtuous or vicious. Take, as an illustration, another instance of the operations of the maternal affection. The basis of this affection is unquestionably pure instinct. But it has, in addition to this, a voluntary operation; and this accessory operation, it is to be presumed, is in the majority of cases virtuous. Nevertheless, whenever this amiable and ennobling affection becomes inordinately strong; when, under its influence, the mother leaves the child to vicious courses, against the remonstrances of the sentiment of duty, its exercise evidently becomes vicious.—On the other hand, if the mother, perhaps

in consequence of the improper conduct of the child, or a perplexing inability to meet its numerous wants, or for some other reason, finds its affection falling below the standard which is requisite in order to fulfil the intentions of nature, and in this state of things restores and invigorates its exercise by a careful and serious consideration of all the responsibilities involved in the maternal relation, it is equally clear that its exercise at once assumes the opposite character, not merely of amiableness, but of virtue.

It is proper, perhaps, to remind the reader, that sometimes a theological or religious difficulty is presented here. It is said, and we suppose said correctly, not only that the great element of the religious life is LOVE, but that the consciousness of Christians indicates an extraneous origin and continuance of it. That is to say, it is implanted, is the gift of God, rather than a thing of their own voluntary creation. And yet Christian love, although it is the gift of God rather than a purely volitive or voluntary product, is unquestionably a virtuous or holy state of mind. But there is really no difficulty here which is of such a nature as to place itself in opposition to the views which have been presented. The truth is, Christian love will be found so effectually to carry with itself the consent of the understanding and the harmonious concurrence of the Will, that, as it seems to us, there is no impropriety and no philosophical obstacle in the way of ascribing to it the character of virtue, which is asserted to belong to it.

§ 176. Of the connexion between benevolence and rectitude.

We may add to what has now been remarked, that the highest and most ennobling form of benevolence exists in connexion with strict justice. Perfect justice is, by the constitution of things, indissolubly conjoined with the general and the highest good. All forms and degrees of benevolence, which are at variance, whether more or less, with perfect rectitude, although they are aiming at good or happiness, are nevertheless seeking something less than the greatest possible happiness. Even benevolence, therefore, is, and ought to be, subjected to some regulating power. Whenever we distinctly perceive that its pres-

ent indulgence, in any given cases, will tend, whatever may be its immediate bearing, to ultimate unhappiness and misery, we are sacredly bound, by the higher considerations of duty, to repress it. And there is as much virtue in repressing its action at such times, as there would be at other times in stimulating it.

One of the most benevolent men of whom history gives us any account was Bartholomew Las Casas, bishop of Chiapa. In 1502 he accompanied Ovando to Hispaniola, who had been commissioned and sent out as the Spanish governor to that island. He there witnessed, with all the pain of a naturally benevolent heart, the cruel treatment which was there experienced by the native inhabitants; the deprivation of their personal rights, the seizure of their lands, their severe toil, and inexorable punishment. He was deeply affected; and from that time devoted the whole of his subsequent life, a period of more than sixty years, to exertions in their behalf. Under the impulse of a most unquestionable benevolence, this good man recommended to Cardinal Ximenes, who was at that time at the head of Spanish affairs, the introduction of Negro slaves into the West India Islands as one of the best methods of relief to the native inhabitants.

We introduce this statement for the purpose of illustrating our subject. The measures of Las Casas, which tended to introduce enslaved Africans into the Spanish islands, were the results, beyond all question, of a holy and exalted benevolence. But if he could have foreseen the treatment of the Negroes, still more dreadful than that to which the native inhabitants were subjected; if he could have beheld, in anticipation, the desolations which have spread over Africa in consequence of the Slave-trade, it would have been his duty, whatever good might have immediately resulted to the Indians in whose behalf he was so deeply interested, to have checked and controlled his benevolent feelings, and to have endured the present rather than have been accessory to the future evil. The indulgence of his benevolence to the native inhabitants, under such circumstances and in such a form (however amiable and interesting benevolence, *in itself considered*, undoubtedly is in all cases whatever), would have

been a violation of duty, and, consequently, a sin.—So false and pernicious is that system which ascribes to benevolence, in its own nature and independently of its relations to the law of rectitude, the character of virtue. Even God himself, whose very nature is LOVE, was unable to exert his benevolence in the salvation of sinning men without a sacrifice offered on the altar of the Law, without the antecedent propitiation of offended Justice.

§ 177. Of humanity, or the love of the human race.

Another of the implanted affections is HUMANITY, or the love of the human race.—On this subject there are only three suppositions to be made, viz., that man is by nature indifferent to the welfare of his fellow-man, or that he naturally regards him with feelings of hostility, or that he has a degree of interest in his welfare, and loves him. That man is by nature entirely indifferent to the welfare of his fellow-beings, is a proposition which will not be likely to meet with many supporters; still less the proposition, although some have been found to advocate it, that he is by nature, and instinctively, the enemy of man. But, in endeavouring to support the third proposition, that he has naturally a degree of interest in, and a desire for the welfare of the members of the human race generally, expressed by the terms HUMANITY or PHILANTHROPY, we wish it to be understood that we do not, as a general thing, claim for the exercise of this affection any marked intensity. It is too evident that it possesses but little strength compared with what it should; and that it falls far short of the Scriptural requisition, which exacts the same love for our neighbour as for ourselves. The fact undoubtedly is, that the principle is impeded in its action and diminished in its results by the inordinate exercise of the principle of SELF-LOVE, which is constantly recalling our attention within the restricted circle of our personal interests. But the affection of HUMANITY, although thus restricted in its action, and depressed far below the standard which its great Author justly claims for it, has nevertheless an existence.

This is shown, in the first place, from the great interest which is always taken, and by all classes of persons, in

anything which relates to human nature, to man considered as a human being, irrespective in a great degree of his country and of the period of his existence. There are numerous other subjects of inquiry; and we undoubtedly feel a considerable degree of interest in whatever reaches us from different quarters of the earth in respect to their structure, climate, and resources. But it is chiefly when man is mentioned that the heart grows warm. We listen to the story of his situation and fortunes, even for the first time, as of one in whom flows the same fountain of life. When we touch a string here, we find a vibration in every human heart. It was for this reason that a Roman audience, composed of people from different countries and of different names, and brought up under the influence of different associations and customs, expressed their unanimous and enthusiastic admiration on hearing the memorable verse of Terence,

"Homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto."

They felt that the expressions conveyed a great truth of nature, which it was honourable to recognise, and which it was a violation of the sentiments of their own hearts to deny. The mere aspect of man, the mere sound of the human voice, unaided by a multitude of associations which often enhance their effect, awakens emotions of regard and interest. And seldom can we find a person so immersed in his own selfishness as boldly and openly to avow that the pursuit of his personal interests, with whatever good reasons it may in itself seem to be justified, is a valid and honourable excuse for annulling the claims of humanity and sundering the tie of universal brotherhood.

§ 178. Further proofs in support of the doctrine of an innate humanity, or love of the human race.

In the second place, the testimony of individuals, who have been so situated as to put the natural sentiments of mankind in this respect to a fair trial, is favourable to the doctrine of the natural existence of humane or philanthropic feelings. We refer here, in particular, to the statements of travellers, who, either by design or by accident, have been placed for a considerable time among

Savage tribes; without meaning, however, to exclude those who in civilized lands have been favourably situated for ascertaining the tendencies of the human heart. Kotzebue, for instance, who was suddenly seized and sent as an exile into Siberia, where he remained some time, was thrown into the company of various classes of persons under such circumstances that he could hardly fail to form a correct judgment in the matter under consideration. The Narrative of his Exile, which is exceedingly interesting, discovers the human mind, considered as naturally disposed to the misery or happiness of the human race, under a decidedly favourable aspect. In the recollection of the good and the evil he had experienced, and in view of the numerous facts recorded in his book, he exclaims, "How few hard-hearted and insensible beings are to be met with in my Narrative! My misfortunes have confirmed me in the opinion that man may put confidence in his fellow-man."

Almost all the travellers into the interior of Africa, Vaillant, Park, Sparman, Clapperton, Denham, the Landers, and others, although they travelled among tribes in the highest degree ignorant and degraded, constantly speak of the kindness they experienced.—On a certain occasion, Park, for reasons connected with the circumstance of his being an entire stranger in the country, was obliged to remain all day without food. About sunset, as he was turning his horse loose to graze, and had before him the prospect of spending the night in solitude and hunger, a woman happened to pass near him as she was returning from her employment in the fields. Astonished at seeing a white man, she stopped to gaze upon him; and, noticing his looks of dejection and sorrow, kindly inquired from what cause they proceeded. When Park had explained his destitute situation, the woman immediately took up his saddle and bridle, and desired him to follow her to her home. There, after having lighted a lamp, she presented him with some broiled fish, spread a mat for him to lie upon, and gave him permission to remain in her humble dwelling till the morning. Park informs us that, during the chief part of the night, the woman and her female companions were occupied

with spinning, and that they beguiled their labour with a variety of songs, one of which had reference to his own situation. The air was sweet and plaintive, and the words were literally as follows: "The winds roared and the rains fell. The poor white man, faint and weary, came and sat under our tree. He has no mother to bring him milk, no wife to grind him corn. Let us pity the white man; no mother has he to bring him milk, no wife to grind him corn."

This agrees with the testimony of the traveller Ledyard, who expressly says: "I have always remarked that women, in all countries, are civil and obliging, tender and humane.—To a woman, whether civilized or savage, I never addressed myself in the language of decency and friendship without receiving a decent and friendly answer." In man, undoubtedly, there is more hardihood of character, and the benevolent affections are less lively. There are some things in his situation, also, as the defence of the community rests chiefly upon him, which are calculated to draw out and to impart inordinate strength to the resentful feelings. But it is absurd to suppose that there is a radical difference in the benevolent sensibilities of man and woman; and while sentiments of the most friendly and affectionate regard towards the human race are acknowledged to exist in woman's heart, that man is naturally either indifferent or hostile to his fellow-man. The language in both cases, from man as well as from woman, and from black as well as from white, when nature, unperverted by adverse influences, is left to itself, is the same. "The poor white man, faint and weary, came and sat under our tree. Let us pity the white man."

§ 179. Proofs of a humane or philanthropic principle from the existence of benevolent institutions.

It will be noticed, we do not assert that the principle of love to our fellow-men, considered simply as members of the human race, is as strong in the human mind as it should be. All we propose to assert and maintain is, that it actually has an existence there to some extent. And, among other proofs, we might, in the third place,

properly refer to those numerous benevolent institutions such as hospitals, infirmaries, asylums, houses of refuge charity schools, and charitable societies of every descrip tion, which exist in all parts of the world. It is true that institutions of this kind flourish most, and it is a cir cumstance exceedingly honourable to the tendencies of the Christian religion, in Christian countries. But the fact undoubtedly is, that, on suitable inquiry, we may find evidences, in a diminished degree, of benevolent efforts and traces of benevolent institutions, such as have been now referred to, in lands not thus highly favoured. Denham, for instance, after remarking that hospitality was ever habitual to the Arabs, a class of people with whom we are accustomed to associate everything which is most remote from kindness, goes on to remark: "Nor does this feeling of liberality extend to the chiefs alone, or to Arabs of high birth. I have known the poor and wandering Bedouin to practise a degree of charity and hospitality far beyond his means, from a sense of duty alone."* De Lamartine, a distinguished French traveller well known to the literary world, speaks of the Arabs much in the same manner. Among other things, he has translated and published the interesting narrative of another traveller among those wandering tribes, who remarks: "We were universally well received. In one tribe it was a poor widow who showed us hospitality. In order to regale us, she killed her last sheep, and borrowed bread. She informed us that her husband and three sons had been killed in the war against the Wahabees, a formidable tribe in the neighbourhood of Mecca. When we expressed our astonishment that she should rob herself on our account, her reply was, 'He that entereth the house of the living and does not eat, is as though he were visiting the dead.'"†

We repeat, we do not mean to assert that the benevolence of those nations who are not enlightened by Christianity, and are not stimulated to benevolent exertion by considerations drawn from that source, is such as it should be. It is enough for our purpose to show that it is not,

* Denham's Travels, Introductory Chapter.

† De Lamartine's Pilgrimage to the Holy Land, vol. iii., p. 212

as an attribute of human nature, extinct; but has a real, although, compared with what it ought to be, a feeble existence. Nor is the benevolence of Heathen or Pagan nations limited, as some may be led to suppose, to individual instances and solitary acts, such as have been referred to. There are traces among some unchristianized nations (however cruel, owing chiefly to their mistaken systems of religion, their conduct may appear in some things) of permanent institutions of benevolence. In the recently-published life of the missionary Swartz (chap. xi.), we find the following incidental remark, which throws light upon the state of things in India. Speaking of the territory of Tanjore, the writer says, "Its capital, bordering on the Delta of the Coleroon and the Cavery, is wealthy and splendid, adorned with a pagoda, which eclipses in magnificence all other structures in the south of India; and exceeding, in the number of its sacred buildings and *charitable institutions*, all the neighbouring provinces."

Among other facts, kindred with those which have now been alluded to, it is well known that, when any portion of the human race have been subjected, by fire, war, famine, the pestilence, or some convulsion of nature, to great affliction, an interest is felt and efforts are made in their behalf in other countries. As an illustration of what we mean, it will suffice to remark, that when, some years since, the Greek nation, and, still more recently, the inhabitants of the Cape De Verd Islands, were in a state of extreme want, although they were a remote people and scarcely known among us, a number of vessels, in both cases, were sent from this country to their assistance, loaded with provisions at the expense of private individuals. Many facts of this kind might be mentioned, which are obviously inconsistent with the idea that man is indifferent to the welfare of his fellow-man, much more that men are naturally hostile to each other.

§ 180. Other remarks in proof of the same doctrine.

In the fourth place, the principle of HUMANITY is requisite, in order to render human nature at all consistent with itself.—We have, for instance, implanted within us the

desire of Esteem, which is universal in its operation. But why should we be so constituted as naturally to desire the esteem of those, whom, at the same time, we naturally hate or are indifferent to? There is no question that Sociality, or the desire of society, is connatural to the human mind; but is it presumable that men are so created as earnestly to covet the society of others, when, at the same time, those whose company they seek are, by the constitution of nature, the objects of entire indifference or of decided aversion? We have within us, as we shall have occasion to notice hereafter, the distinct principle of Pity or Sympathy, which prompts us both to prevent suffering and to relieve it when it exists; a principle which no one supposes is designed by nature to be limited in its operation to the immediate circle of our relatives and friends, but which has men *as* such for its object, and the wide world for the field of its exercise. But on what grounds of wisdom or consistency is it possible that nature should prompt men to relieve or prevent the sufferings of others, whom she also imperatively requires us to regard with sentiments of hostility, or, at least, with unfeeling coldness? Furthermore, our conscience requires us to treat our fellow-men, in all ordinary cases, with kindness, and we experience an internal condemnation when we do not do it; which would, at least, not be the case if we were the subjects of a natural hostility to them. —It is on such grounds, we assert, that human nature, in order to be consistent with itself, requires a principle of good-will or love to man, considered simply as possessing a kindred origin and nature.

Add to these considerations the fact that the lower animals, as a general thing, evidently discover an affection for those of their own kind. In some cases there are antipathies existing among those of different tribes; but never, it is believed, as a characteristic of those of the same species. And why should a barrier, either by the mere negation of love or the presence of actual hostility, be raised between man and man? A condition of things which, in a very important respect, places him below the brutes.

§ 181. Objection from the contests and wars among mankind.

We are aware that the frequent wars which have existed among mankind may be brought forward as an objection against these views. But, although wars may be considered as in some sense incidental to the operations of human nature in the present state of things, yet it does not follow, and is not true, that war is the natural state of man. The simple fact is, that mankind, owing to a concurrence of unpropitious circumstances, have been placed in a wrong and most unfortunate position in respect to each other, which they at length begin to perceive.

In the first place, nations have frequently been led into wars in consequence of a misapprehension of the actual state of things. They have been made to believe (we do not undertake to say under what influences or in what way) that they are bound to maintain what are called national interests at any expense whatever. In making an estimate of the hazard and injury of these interests, as preparatory to a state of war, they have frequently laboured under great mistakes. In other words, in placing an estimate on their own interests, they have not allowed enough for the peculiar situation, the passions, and the interests of others. Either from being too intensely occupied with their own concerns, or from wanting suitable means of information, or from hasty and inaccurate judgments on the facts that have come to their notice, they have supposed others to be prompted by a deeper hostility towards them than was actually the case. And they have too frequently acted upon this erroneous supposition. If they had been so situated as to understand each other better, the natural sentiments of kindness would have gained the ascendency, and they would not have committed the great error of placing the supposed claims of their country above the claims of mankind. This error they begin in some degree to perceive. But this is not all.

In the second place, nations have frequently been plunged into war, and have shed the blood of other nations, when the great mass of the people have never been consulted in respect to it; or, if they have been consul-

ed, their feelings have been disregarded. Owing to the prevalence of monarchical and despotic forms of government (a state of things which is undergoing a rapid modification), the destiny of nations has often been placed in the hands of individuals, who were too ignorant, prejudiced, or unjust to sustain a responsibility so immense. The result has frequently been, that the most trifling circumstances, operating upon minds of such a structure, have plunged nations into wars, when, at the same time, the great body of the people entertained towards each other entirely friendly sentiments. We will illustrate what we mean by a single instance out of hundreds, perhaps we may say, thousands of others. Frederic of Prussia (Frederic the *Great*, as he is commonly designated in history) entered into a war with Maria Theresa, the queen of Hungary and Bohemia. This king afterward wrote a history of the war. In the manuscript history, as it was originally written, he gave the following concise statement of the motives under the influence of which he engaged in it. "I had troops entirely prepared to act; this, the fulness of my treasury, and the vivacity of my character, were the reasons why I made war on Maria Theresa, queen of Hungary and Bohemia." In a few sentences afterward he added more explicitly some other motives, which are to be united with these. "Ambition, interest, and a desire to make the world speak of me, vanquished all, and war was determined on."* It certainly cannot be pretended that such a war as this is a proof that the Prussians, Bohemians, and Hungarians possess an implanted or connatural enmity to each other. The probability is, that they were as much taken by surprise, and as much astonished, as the whole civilized world were at its occurrence. A war, existing under such circumstances, may prove that the rulers are perverse and cruel, but does not necessarily prove this in respect to the people generally.—It will, of course, be seen, that things of this nature are to be taken into consideration, before we are at liberty to say, in opposition to the arguments which have been brought forward, that man is by nature, and instinctively, the enemy of his fellow-man.

* See the Memoir of Voltaire, appended to Condorcet's Life of Voltaire.

§ 182. The objection, drawn from wars, further considered.

But there is a third view of this objection which remains to be taken. If we could arrive at the truth on the subject before us, it would undoubtedly be seen (and the distinction in respect to all inquiries into the active principles of human nature is frequently an important one) that, in times of national war, men fight together as *corporations* rather than as *individuals;* and while, in battle, they shoot at the man who happens to be opposite to them, they subdue the voice of pity and conscience by the mistaken and illusive consideration, that the wound is aimed, not so much at the poor bleeding individual as at the state or nation. If they could thrust aside this idea, and separate the man from the political corporation to which he belongs, it is beyond doubt that they would reach forth the hand of kindness, bind up the wounds of their victim, and breathe their consolations into his dying bosom.

In consequence of early associations, and what are supposed to be conflicting national interests, it is not an uncommon thing for Englishmen to say that they hate the French nation, while the same persons will frequently admit that they have no hatred to individual Frenchmen; but, on the contrary, have a regard and love for those with whom they happen to be acquainted. We maintain, therefore, that a hatred against nations is not necessarily a hatred against humanity. And men begin to understand this. They make a broader distinction than they were wont to do formerly between the government and the people, between the responsibilities of public policy and the responsibility that attaches to private individuals. And, accordingly, in times of war, if the action of armies in the vicinity of each other is suspended by a truce, nothing is more common than to see both officers and soldiers reciprocating acts of hospitality and friendship. Acting as men, and with the natural feelings of men, they sympathize in each other's personal sufferings, and endeavour to render each other happy. And yet, acting in their national capacity, and as members of their respective political corporations, they will be found, in a few days after, coolly putting each other to death. The fact

is, that it is impossible for us either to love or hate *masses* of beings, considered in the mass. And hence war necessarily involves the pathematic and moral anomaly of destroying those who would be found, when separated from the mass and considered individually, to be entitled to our esteem and affection.

§ 183. Illustration of the statements of the foregoing section.

The doctrine of the foregoing section, that bodies or masses of men may fight with and destroy each other, while, at the same time, each party entertains towards the opposite party, *individually considered*, no other than humane or friendly sentiments, is not a mere assertion. Strange and paradoxical as it may appear, it is proved beyond doubt by history, particularly by that interesting and instructive portion of history which appears in the form of private Memoirs. A single extract, illustrative of this apparently contradictory view of human nature, and in confirmation of what has been said, will be introduced here. In the late bloody war, generally known as the Peninsular War, two detachments of the French and English armies were stationed near each other on the banks of the Tagus, the one at Almeyrim, the other at Santarem. The following statement of the feelings and intercourse that existed between the two parties, when not engaged in battle, is given by a member of the English army in the interesting Work entitled Recollections of the Peninsula; and when we consider that it relates to men who, both before and afterward, were engaged to their utmost ability in destroying each other, it is to be regarded as one among a thousand other proofs that war is a horrible delusion, and is against nature.

"About the middle of February," says this writer, "as I was one day walking by the river side with three or four companions, we observed an unusual crowd on the opposite bank, and several French officers. They saluted us with a 'Bon jour, Messieurs,' and we soon fell into conversation. They were exceedingly courteous. They spoke in the highest terms of Romana, who had lately died, calling him 'Le seul général Espagnol digne de son grade.' They asked after Lord Wellington, saying

he had done wonders with the Portuguese, and praising him greatly for his conduct of the campaign. They next inquired if our king was not dead; and on our replying that he was not, one of them spoke, but inaudibly; another, in a louder voice, repeated 'Le général dit, que tout le monde aime votre Roi George, qu'il a été bon père de famille, et bon pére de son peuple.' We were thus at once let into the rank of one of their party, and not a little delighted at the manner in which they had spoken of our excellent and unfortunate sovereign. A great deal of good-humour prevailed; we quizzed each other freely. They asked us how we liked bacallao and azete instead of English roast beef; and we, what they did at Santarem without the restaurateurs, cafés, and salles de spectacle of their dear Paris. They replied, laughing, that they had a theatre; and asked us to come over and witness the performance of that evening, which would be 'L'Entrée des François das Lisbon.' A friend of mine most readily replied, that he recommended to them 'La répetition d'une nouvelle piéce, La Fuite des François.' They burst into a long, loud, and general laugh: the joke was too good, too home. Their general, however, did not think it wise to remain longer; but he pulled his hat, and wishing us good-day with perfect good-humour, went up the hill, and the group immediately dispersed."

§ 184. Of patriotism, or love of country.

One of the most important modifications of that more general and extensive form of good-will or benevolence, which extends to all mankind, is PATRIOTISM, or love of country. It seems to be the intention of nature, when we consider the diversities of customs and languages that exist, and particularly that in many cases countries are distinctly separated from each other by large rivers, lakes, gulfs, mountains, and seas, that mankind, instead of being under one government, shall exist in separate and distinct communities or nations, each having its own institutions and civil polity. And such, at any rate, is the fact. We are not only members of mankind and citizens of the world (a relation which ought to be more distinct-

ly and fully recognised than it ever has been), but are members, and, as such, have appropriate duties to fulfil, of our own particular community. And it is thus that a foundation is laid for that particular state of mind which we denominate Patriotism.

This affection we regard as secondary rather than original. It is that love which we exercise, and ought to exercise, towards the members of our species, considered as such, heightened by the consideration that those towards whom it is put forth are sprung from the same race, inhabit the same territory, are under the same constitutions of government, speak the same language, and have the same interests. So that the love of our race, as it is modified in the form of love of our country, while it is more restricted, becomes proportionally more intense. And, in point of fact, it is unquestionably one of the predominant and ruling principles which regulate the conduct of men.

Nevertheless, we are not to suppose that there is necessarily any conflict between these two principles. For, in doing good to our country, we are doing good to mankind; and to that particular portion of mankind, which Providence, by placing them more immediately within the scope of our observation and effort, seems to have assigned as the especial field of our beneficence. At the same time, it cannot be denied, that patriotism, in its irregular and unrestrained exercise, does sometimes, and but too frequently, interfere with Philanthropy, or the love of man. The passion of patriotism, as a general thing, has become disproportionate in degree, as compared with the love of the human race. The interests of our country, by being continually brooded over, are exaggerated to our perception, while those of mankind are too much lost sight of. There is too much ground for the feeling lamentation of Cowper:

> "Lands intersected by a narrow frith
> Abhor each other. Mountains interposed
> Make enemies of nations who had else,
> Like kindred drops, been mingled into one."

§ 185. Of the affection of friendship.

Another interesting modification of that feeling of good

will or love, which, as men, we naturally bear to our fellow-men, is denominated Friendship. It is a passion so distinctly marked that it well deserves a separate notice, although there are no good grounds for regarding it, considered as a distinct affection, as connatural. The love which we bear to our species is so diffused, that it cannot be said, as a general thing, to possess a high degree of strength. As it withdraws from the vast circumference of the human race, and contracts its exercise within the narrow circle of our country, it acquires increased energy. Retreating within the still more restricted limits which imbody those with whom we are most accustomed to associate, it assumes a new modification, being not only characterized by greater strength, but a source of greater pleasure. And this, in distinction from Humanity or Philanthropy, which extends to all mankind, as well as in distinction from Patriotism, which merely spreads itself over the extent of our country, we call FRIENDSHIP.

This affection, like the other benevolent affections which have been mentioned, includes in itself an emotion of pleasure, combined with the desire of good to its object. It exists, or may be supposed to exist, in respect to those persons who are not only so situated as to be the subjects of our intimacy, but possess such qualities as to be deserving of our esteem. It is, perhaps, a common remark, in connexion with this particular view of the subject, that a similarity of character is requisite as a basis of this affection. This, to some extent, is true; but the remark is not to be received without some limitation. It is certainly the case, that friendship is consistent with diversities of intellect. Persons who differ much in the quickness and amplitude of intellectual action, may nevertheless entertain for each other a sincere friendship. But it must be admitted, it does not readily appear how such friendship can exist in the case of persons who differ essentially in moral character. The fact that one of the parties is virtuous, the other vicious; that one of them attaches his highest veneration and esteem to that rectitude which the other regards as of no value, can hardly fail to interpose between them, as far as the reciprocation of friendship is concerned, an insuperable barrier.

It seems to be the opinion of Mr. Stewart, although we may entertain feelings of decided regard and good-will to a great number of persons, that Friendship, in the strict and appropriate sense of the term, is necessarily much more limited. It will be understood that we speak now of real Friendship; of an attachment firm and unwavering; and not of that mere aspect or semblance which so often bears the name. It is true, there are some persons, who profess to have a wide circle of friends; and this is undoubtedly sometimes the fact. But, in a majority of cases, we have reason to think, that those whose apparent friendships are very much multiplied, seek the company and cherish the acquaintance of others, not so much because they entertain feelings of true friendship towards them, as for the purpose of gratifying an inordinate and restless desire of society. It is certain that the desire of society, when not properly regulated, frequently operates in this way, and thus furnishes occasion for a semblance of friendship, which has for its support, instead of an emotion of genuine benevolence, nothing higher or better, if the desire of society be of that unregulated and inordinate kind which has been supposed, than a basis of selfishness

§ 186. Of the affection of pity, or sympathy.

It is not unfrequently the case that we find around us objects of suffering; those who, from want, or disease, or some other cause, are justly entitled to the aid of their fellow-men. In order to meet this state of things, Providence has kindly implanted within us the principle of Pity, which prompts us, by an instinctive and powerful impulse, to render the aid which is so frequently needed. This benevolent affection differs from others, in being based upon a painful instead of a pleasant emotion. The occasion of the exercise of the affection of Pity or Sympathy is some case of suffering. On contemplating the scene of suffering, it is the result, in all ordinary cases, that we experience a painful emotion, which is followed by a desire to relieve the suffering object.

This principle is practically a very important one. It is a sentiment of Bishop Butler, expressed in connexion with this very subject, that the misery of men is much

more directly, and to a much greater extent, under the power of others than their happiness. The sources of happiness, both mental and bodily, are to a great extent in ourselves; and although they are susceptible of increase through the instrumentality of the kind offices of others, yet not ordinarily in a very great degree. But it is in the power of any individual, who is thus evilly disposed, to plunge others, not one or two merely, but even whole neighbourhoods, into misery. The principle of Pity, which is called forth not only in the actual, but also in the anticipated prospect of suffering, aids, in connexion with other causes, in keeping under proper restraint any tendency to a wrong exercise of this important power. It not only exercises the important office of preventing suffering, by operating, as it were, in anticipation, but it visits, watches over, and relieves it when it has actually occurred. And in this last point of view particularly, as well as in the other, it commends itself to our notice and admiration, as a practical principle eminently suited to the condition and wants of man.

§ 187. Of the moral character of pity.

It is an opinion sometimes expressed, that an affection so amiable, and generally so useful as that of Pity, cannot be otherwise than virtuous. It is not wonderful, when we take into view the interesting character of the affection, that such an opinion should be entertained; but we cannot regard it as strictly correct. It is well understood, so much so as not to be considered a matter of doubt, that this affection operates in the first instance instinctively. And it is easy to see the intention of nature in instituting this form of its action. In a multitude of cases where we can relieve the sufferings of our fellowmen, our assistance would come too late if we acted on the hesitating and cautious suggestions of reason. An instinctive action, therefore, is necessary. And, so far as the action of the principle is of this kind, it must be obvious that it is neither virtuous nor vicious.

But there is another view of this subject. The principle of sympathy may be checked in its exercise when it is too intense, or increased when deficient, under the

influences of a deliberate and voluntary effort. And, under these circumstances, its action may have a voluntary character, being right or wrong according to the circumstances of the case. It is right when it is subordinated to the requisitions of an enlightened conscience, but otherwise is wrong. And it may be wrong by excess as well as by defect. If, for instance, we happened to see a person severely but justly punished under the authority of law, we might exercise pity in his behalf. But if, under the mere impulse of pity, we should be led to attempt his rescue, in violation of the rights and interests of society, such an exercise of it would be wrong. Again, we can hardly fail to pity the wretchedness of the emaciated beggar who asks for our assistance; but if we are well persuaded that the bestowment of alms will only tend to encourage those vicious habits which have led to this wretchedness, it may become a duty both to check our sympathy and to withhold our aid.—(See § 174–176.)

At the same time, we do not deny that we may very justly draw inferences in favour of the virtuousness of that man's character in whom this interesting passion is predominant. And we say this, because, although sympathy does not necessarily imply virtuousness, yet, in point of fact, it is seldom the case that they are at variance with each other. They generally run in the same track, acting harmoniously together.

§ 188. Of the affection of gratitude.

Another distinct modification of that general state of the mind which is denominated love, is the implanted or connatural affection of GRATITUDE. Although this, like the other benevolent affections, includes an emotion of pleasure or delight, combined with a desire of good or a benevolent feeling towards the object of it, it nevertheless has its characteristics, which clearly distinguish it from them. We never give the name of gratitude, for instance, to this combination of pleasant and benevolent feeling, except it arise in reference to some benefit or benefits conferred. Furthermore, GRATITUDE involves, as the basis or occasion of its origin, not only the mere fact

of a good conferred, but of a *designed* or *intentional* benefit. If the benefit which we have received can be traced to some private or selfish motive on the part of the person from whom it comes, we may be pleased, as we probably shall be, with the good that has accrued to us; but shall cease, from the moment of the discovery of his motive, to entertain any gratitude to the author of it. Gratitude, therefore, can never be excited within us, except in view of what is in fact, or is supposed to be, true, unadulterated benevolence.

Different individuals manifest considerable diversity in the exercise of grateful emotions. There are some persons who exhibit, in the reception of the favours conferred upon them, but slight visible marks of grateful regard; others are incapable of such a passive reception of benefits, and are strongly affected with their bestowal. This difference is probably owing, in part, to original diversities of constitution, and is partly to be ascribed to different views of the characters and duties of men, or to other adventitious circumstances.

The affection of gratitude, under whatever diversities of aspect it may show itself, at different times and in different persons, is undoubtedly to be regarded as, on the whole, one of the interesting and ennobling traits of human nature. It imparts a feature of loveliness, a mingled aspect of amiability and justice to the human character which it might not otherwise possess. It is also practically important, inasmuch as it affords an indirect, but still a decided encouragement to deeds of benevolence And although there are some in whom the principle, if it exists at all, exists in too slight a degree, yet, in general, the man who has received what he knows to be a well-meant kindness will not withhold this tribute of nature. There are some interesting lines of Southey, which Bishop Heber, on the occasion of his leaving England for India, has quoted as descriptive of his own personal experience, that may be appropriately introduced in connexion with this subject.

"I've *heard* of hearts unkind—kind deeds
With scorn or hate returning.
Alas! the *gratitude* of man
Has oftener left me mourning."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.—LOVE TO THE SUPREME BEING.

§ 189. Man created originally with the principle of love to God.

In order to preserve the other principles of human nature in the position which the great Author of that nature has assigned to them, and to render their action just in itself and harmonious in its relations, we have reason to believe that there was originally, in the human constitution, a principle of love to the Supreme Being. This affection, it may well be supposed, was entirely analogous, both in its nature and its operations, to the other Benevolent Affections, possessing, like them, a twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. It differed, however, greatly in the degree or intensity of its action; being rendered to its appropriate object, as might be expected from the unspeakably high and holy nature of that object, with all the energy of which the mind was capable. That man must have been created originally with such a principle of love, overruling and regulating all the subordinate principles, we think must be evident, in the first place, from the considerations furnished by Analogy.

In all the departments of the mind, so far as it has hitherto passed under our examination, we have seen evidences of contrivance and wisdom; everything has its place, adaptations, and uses; and nothing, so far as we can judge, is done imperfectly. If it were necessary in this inquiry to put out of view the Intellect, so wonderful in its adaptation and its resources, we should hardly fail to find, in the distinct departments of the Sensibilities, ample illustrations and proofs of this remark. The Instincts, which naturally arrest our attention first, have obviously their appropriate place and office; and, although they rank lowest in the enumeration of our active principles, are yet indispensable. If man were constituted physically as he is at present, and yet without the Appetites, the next higher class of the principles involving de-

sire, there would obviously be a want of adaptation between his mental and physical arrangements. The Propensities, also, as we advance still upward, have each their sphere of action, their specific nature and uses; and are adapted with wonderful skill to the necessities of man, and to the relations he sustains. The same remark, and perhaps in a still higher sense, will apply to the Affections.—As a father, man has a natural affection for his children, that he may thus be supported in the discharge of the arduous duties he owes to them; as a child, he has naturally an affection for his parents; and as man simply, he is evidently constituted with a degree of love for his fellow-man.

When we consider the relations which men sustain, still more important than those which are the basis of the principles which have been mentioned, are we not justified in saying, on the ground of Analogy, that there must have been originally in the human constitution a principle of love to the Supreme Being? If there was not originally in the mental constitution such a principle as love to God, was not the structure of the mind in that respect obviously at variance with what the Analogy of its nature in other respects requires? If, from the urgent necessities of our situation, there must be strong ties of love binding together parents, and children, and brothers; if these ties must reach and bind, with some degree of strictness, all the members of the human family, on what principle can the doctrine be sustained, that man was originally created without an implanted love to that Being who is infinitely more and better to him than an earthly brother or father?

§ 190. That man was originally created with a principle of love to God, further shown from the Scriptures.

In the second place, we have great reason to believe, from the testimony of the Scriptures, that man was, in the first instance, created with the distinct and operative principle of love to his Creator. At the creation, it is worthy of notice, that everything which came from the hands of the great Architect was pronounced to be GOOD. But if man, raised from nothingness into existence, furnished with high powers of thought and action, and supported

by the daily gifts of the Divine bounty, was created without a principle of love to his Maker (analogous to the other implanted affections, only that it existed in an exceedingly higher degree, corresponding to the greatness of the object), we cannot deny that we are utterly unable to perceive in such a result the basis of so marked a commendation, as far as the parents of the human race were concerned. It would seem, on the contrary, that such a work, framed with such a disregard of the most important relations, could not be pronounced good, even in the estimate of human reason, much less in that of a reason infinitely comprehensive and divine.

But, furthermore, man is expressly said to have been created in the image of his Maker. That is to say, in the great outlines of his mental constitution he was, in the first instance, a copy (on a very limited scale, it is true, but still a copy, in fact) of the Divine Mind. But we must suppose that God, both in his administration of justice and benevolence, is regulated by a wise and full consideration of the relations of things. He always loves, from the very perfection of his nature, what is worthy to be loved; and if he created man in his own image (that is to say, with affections and moral sentiments corresponding to the nature and relations of things), He must have created him with a disposition to love himself. We are not at liberty to suppose that he could by possibility create a being who should either hate or be indifferent towards another being, whom he knew not only to be infinitely wise and good, but to sustain the relation of a Creator, preserver, and benefactor. A being thus created, so utterly wanting in those affections, which are required by the immutable relations of things, could hardly be said, with any degree of truth, to be created in the image of God. We infer, therefore, from the statement of man's being created in the Divine image, that he was created with a principle of love to his Maker. And the same reason leads us to believe that the principle was paramount to every other; corresponding, as far as the limited powers of man would permit, to the infinitely exalted nature of its object. And, in addition to this, the analogy of the other implanted principles points to the conclusion, that, like them, it possessed a twofold action, instinctive and voluntary.

§ 191. Further proofs that man was thus created.

Again: many of those passages of Scripture, which are addressed to man in his present fallen state, appear to contemplate the restoration of this great principle. When the Saviour, on a certain occasion, was asked, in respect to the commandments, which of them was to be regarded as having the first or leading place, his answer was, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment." Matt. xxii., 37, 38. This language implies, to say the least, the possibility of the existence of this principle; and particularly, that in a sinless or perfect state of the human race it is indispensable.—Finally, that renovation of our nature, which is so frequently spoken of in the New Testament under the name of a New Creation or New Birth, and which is represented as being brought about by Divine assistance, unquestionably, in the meaning of the writers of the Scriptures, involves the restoration of this essential element of the mental constitution. To be what he is required to be, man must be essentially what he was before the Fall; and in order to be in this situation, the great requisite is, what has just been mentioned, to love God with all the heart. —We feel authorized, therefore, in asserting, that originally supreme love to God was an essential element of human nature, and that at the present moment it is, or ought to be, in every human bosom, a distinct and operative principle. Its presence, as we shall be led to see in the succeeding section, makes man what he was designed to be; its absence, or, if it be preferred, even its entire prostration, furnishes an easy and philosophical explanation of those evils which, in the present state of things, so frequently press themselves on our notice.

§ 192. Relation of the principle of supreme love to God to the other principles of the pathematic sensibilities.

In giving an account, in their succession and place, of the principles of action which go to constitute the department of the Natural sensibilities, we feel at liberty, from what has been remarked, to place at their head, both as most important in its results and as highest in rank,

the principle of supreme love to God. If it be said, as undoubtedly it may be said with too much truth, that this principle of human action, considered as a distinct and permanent principle, is either really or virtually obliterated, it is nevertheless true, that it is susceptible, with Divine aid, of a restoration. If it be asserted that men are not naturally governed by it, it still remains certain, if the precepts of Scripture may be understood with their obvious import, that they *ought* to be governed by it. The simple fact is, that man, in his present condition, is, in many respects, not the man which a holy God created him; but rather a mutilation of humanity, a darkened and shattered fragment of original workmanship. Geologists assure us, although even in the present condition of things there are abundant evidences of a workmanship equally powerful and wise, that there are marks and proofs of some great physical convulsion, such as is related in the Scriptures to have once taken place; and, in like manner, mental philosophy, as well as Divine Revelation, clearly indicates that there has been at some period a great mental convulsion; that the glory of the human mind, although not absolutely extinct, is greatly obscured; and that man, in respect to his intellectual and moral condition, is truly and aptly described as a depraved and fallen being. And in this deplorable state of moral obliquity and mutilation he will continue to remain, if the views which have been proposed are correct, until the principle of supreme love to God is reinstated. The wisdom which we claim for the structure of human nature cannot be asserted with confidence to exist, except on the supposition that this great pillar of its support originally belonged to it, and may yet, by possibility, belong to it.

Now, supposing this principle to exist in the human mind, either by being originally implanted, as in Adam, or by being restored under the name of a Regeneration or New Creation, we naturally proceed to inquire what relation it holds to the other principles in this department of the mind, and what results are likely to attend upon it. In point of mere rank (that is to say, in the position which it occupies and ought to occupy in our estimation), we cannot hesitate to say that it stands first; not only before

the Appetites and Propensities, but before all the other Affections, the class with which it is itself properly arranged; taking the precedence, by an incalculable remove, not only of the love of country and the love of friends, but of the love of parents and children. "He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me." Matt. x., 37. The beneficial results connected with the exercise of this principle are such as might be expected from the pre-eminent rank it sustains. When it is in its full exercise, rendered to its appropriate object, in the language of Scripture, with all the heart, and mind, and soul, it may be regarded as a matter of course, that all the subordinate principles will be kept in their place. The appetites, the propensities, and the domestic affections still exist; but such is the ascendency of love to the Supreme Being, that every inordinate tendency is rebuked, and they all revolve in the circle which God in the beginning assigned to them.

§ 193. Illustration of the results of the principle of love to God from the character and life of the Saviour.

We have an impressive illustration of these favourable results in the character and life of Jesus Christ, who, we are informed in the Scriptures, is set before us as an example for our imitation. The Saviour, it will be recollected, appeared on earth not only in the fashion of a man, but was constituted also with those various attributes which pertain to man as a human being. He was hungry and thirsty, he ate and drank, he toiled and was susceptible of fatigue, he showed indignation, he loved, and rejoiced, and wept as other men. Not only this, we are expressly assured that he was tempted in all points as we are, *and yet without sin;* and this is just what might be expected when we take into view his feelings towards God. In him the principle of love to God the Father was a supreme principle. It sustained an unshaken dominion. And, under its pervading and paramount influence, the appetites asked for no inordinate indulgence; the propensities fulfilled the intentions of nature without degenerating into unseemly and sinful perversions; and

all the departments of the mind maintained a harmony with each other.

And this will be the result in all other similar instances. The Saviour is set before us as an example, not merely in bodily and outward action, but still more in the propensions and affections of the heart. All that has been said of him may, by possibility, be true of all men in every situation of life. Under the blaze of a burning love to God, the appetites of men, so far as they are inordinate and sinful, will necessarily wither and die. Such is its infinite ascendency, in its perfect and appropriate exercise, that all their desires, whether they relate to themselves or their fellow-men, will be absorbed and hardly perceptible in this great flood of the heart's movement upward to the Source of life and light. We do not mean to say that the appetites and propensities, or any other of the natural or pathematic principles, will actually cease to exist; but the mind will be so intensely occupied with the higher and paramount principle, so long as it operates with a power proportioned to its object, that they will attract but comparatively little notice; and it will be impossible for them to become excessive.

§ 194. The absence of this principle attended with an excessive and sinful action of other principles.

Now take for a moment the opposite view, and let us see if we may not account for what has sometimes been called the Depravity of human nature, without the necessity of supposing the implantation of principles which, in themselves necessarily and under all circumstances, are evil. If the principle of Supreme love to God be removed from the place which both Scripture and reason agree in assigning to it in the original constitution of the mind, one of the most important checks on the undue exercise of the subordinate principles is, of course, taken away. The love which is drawn from the great Source of all good will naturally centre in ourselves, and the principles which have relation to our present enjoyment and interest will become predominant. Hence we see the disorders which all impartial inquirers, even heathen philosophers,* acknowledge to exist in the human race;

* Cicero repeatedly asserts the fact of human depravity, not only in

and which it is the aim of enlightened reason and philosophy, and particularly of religion, in its instructions and its special influences, to rectify. The Appetites, which before had their appropriate place and offices, have now broken over their allotted limits, and are, on every hand, leading their victims into the various forms of excess and debauchery. The Propensities, many of which connect us closely with our fellow-beings, and, in their proper exercise, impart no small degree of strength and enjoyment to human character, have become inordinately intense in their action. Conscience, it is true, continues to repeat its remonstrances; and the Will, under the suggestions of Conscience, makes more or less of resistance; but, as they are not sustained by the love of the Supreme Being, which could not fail, if it existed, to operate in their favour, the contest becomes unequal, and the efforts which they make are found to be unavailing. In this state of things, men who, under other circumstances, would have leaned, and loved to lean, on the great arm of the Almighty for support, now find their chief enjoyment in the pursuit of wealth and power, and in the unrestricted intercourse and the uncertain enjoyments of the world.—It is in such a condition of things as this that we find the true source of the follies and crimes which afflict the human race. The dethronement of God in the heart necessarily involves the predominance of principles which, however innocent and useful in their just exercise, become in their excess evil, "and only evil continually." In the striking language of Ovid (Metam., vii., Fab. 1),

> "Si possem, sanior essem.
> Sed trahit invitum nova vis; aliudque cupido,
> Mens aliud suadet. Video meliora proboque,
> Deteriora sequor."

decided language, but in terms which, in their import, nearly coincide with the views which appear to be communicated in the Holy Scriptures. "*Simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate, et in summa opinionum perversitate, versamur; ut pæne cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur.*"—"*Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declarat quid velit, anquirat, ac desideret; obsurdescimus tamen nescio quomodo; nec ea, quæ ab ea monemur, audimus.*" (*Questiones Tusculanæ*, iii., 1. *De Amicitia*, c. 24.) There are a number of passages in Seneca, particularly in the Treatises *De Ira* and *De Clementia*, of a similar import.

§ 195. Further illustrations of the results of the absence of this principle

The topic of the last section is one of no small importance. The section, it will be noticed, consists chiefly of a statement of facts, without any attempt at explanations. As some persons may not at first readily perceive how it happens that the suspension or obliteration of the principle of love to God is necessarily or naturally attended with the evil results there ascribed to it, we will delay upon the subject a little longer. It is sometimes the case that a mere additional illustration, placing the subject in a new light, will have the effect upon the mind of the inquirer of an argument or proof. If the suspension or obliteration of any other principle will be followed by results analogous to those which have been described as accessory to the extinction of love to God, we shall clearly have in this circumstance an evidence that the results in the last case have been correctly indicated. And, on the other hand, if the extinction or utter inaction of subordinate principles be not attended with irregularity and perversion in other parts of the mind, it will furnish a strong presumption that the extinction or utter inaction of the higher principle will, in its collateral results, be equally harmless. By the aid of these statements we may easily bring the subject, in a considerable degree, to the test of common observation. And what is the fact?

We will make the supposition that, in the case of some individual, the domestic affections have, for some reason, become permanently extinct, either in their nature or in their action. Such instances, though not by any means frequently, may yet sometimes be found. The person in whom this obliteration or utter inaction of the domestic affections takes place, has no attachment for his children or any of his family, such as he used to have. It is a matter of common observation and remark, that a person in such a situation will be much more likely than another to fall under the dominion of the lower appetites; to addict himself, for instance, to licentious practices, or to become a drunkard. While the domestic affections existed, while he looked with deep interest on his parents, his children, and his wife, he was furnished with powerful auxiliary motives to restrain his appetites. He saw dis-

tinctly, if he indulged them, they would not only interfere with his duties to his family, but would plunge them into deep disgrace and sorrow. So great influence had this view of his situation upon his mind, that he was enabled to sustain himself in opposition to the approaches of the evil habits which threatened him. But, as soon as the domestic affections became extinct, as soon as the love of kindred was blasted in his bosom, he fell before them.

Again: if we suppose, in addition to the extinction of the domestic affections, the further obliteration of love to his country and of love to the human race (and, still more, if we add the extinction of the principles of pity and gratitude), the probability of his falling under the dominion of the bodily appetites, and of degrading himself to the condition of a brute, will be obviously increased by this state of things. With the removal of these leading principles of human action, there is, of course, a removal of an important class of motives, which had a favourable tendency. And if it were possible for him to stand against the solicitations of the appetites before, he will be likely to fall now. The Will, whose office it is, under the direction of the Conscience, to regulate and restrain the appetites, received important assistance from the sources which have been alluded to; but with the removal of that assistance, its power is proportionally diminished, and all hope is gone. The cravings of nature must have food of some kind; and if it fails to be furnished with the ennobling aliment which is generated in the love of our families, our country, and mankind, it will inevitably fatten itself on the mire of a debasing sensuality.—This is the common-sense view of the subject; one which will be likely to commend itself to the sober judgment and acceptance of all.

It is clear that these illustrations will apply in their full strength to the principle of love to God. Just so long as this principle is predominant, it is impossible, as has been before stated, for the inferior principles to become excessive and morally evil in their action. We feel, under the influence of this exalting affection, that we cannot so much dishonour our Maker; we cannot estimate so

lightly those claims of gratitude which He has upon us; we cannot so basely contemn our infinite obligations to his wisdom and benevolence, as to indulge for a moment any exercise of the passions which he has forbidden. They stand rebuked and withering in the presence of the object that has the dominion in our hearts. But only obliterate the principle of Love to God, and at once a thousand motives, which enabled us to keep them in their proper place, are lost in the extinction of the principle on which they rested; and other principles, infinitely below it, at once gain the ascendency.

§ 196. Views of President Edwards on the subject of human depravity

In connexion with what has just been said, we take the liberty to introduce some remarks of President Edwards, whose opinions on a subject of this kind, whatever degree of weight they may be entitled to, the reader will probably be willing to know. In the first place, he opposes the doctrine of a connatural or positive depravity, as not being required by the facts in the case, and also as being at variance with the moral character of the Deity. His language is, "In order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total natural depravity of the heart of man, there is not the least need of supposing any evil quality *infused, implanted,* or *wrought* into the nature of man, by any positive cause or influence whatever, either from God or the creature; or of supposing that man is conceived and born with a fountain of evil in his heart, such as is anything properly *positive.*" His doctrine is, that man was created originally with the natural appetites, the principle of self-love, and the other common natural principles; and above them, the superior principle of divine love, which, in his own language, possessed the throne, and maintained an absolute dominion in the heart. "While things continued thus," he goes on to remark, "all things were in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in their proper and perfect state." When man sinned and broke God's covenant, it was very different. The principle of Divine love, which, although it had a voluntary action, and in that respect could be either yielded or withdrawn at will, was sustained in its

instinctive or connatural form, as all other instinctive or connatural principles are, by Divine agency, immediately left him. "Because," says President Edwards, in explanation of the fact of the withdrawal of the Divine favour, and in proceeding to remark on the results of this great change, "it would have been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the covenant and constitution God has established, that God should still maintain communion with man, and continue, by his friendly, gracious, vital influences, to dwell with him and in him after he was become a rebel, and had incurred God's wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principles wholly ceased; so light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn; and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woful corruption, and ruin; nothing but flesh without spirit. The inferior principles of self-love and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone and left to themselves, *of course* became reigning principles; having no superior principles to regulate or control them, they became absolute masters of the heart. The immediate consequence of which was a *fatal catastrophe*, a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man did immediately set up *himself*, and the objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme; and so they took the place of *God*. These inferior principles are like fire in a house, which we say is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but, if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction. Man's love to his own honour, separate interest, and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto love to God, and regard to his authority and glory, now disposes and impels him to pursue those objects without regard to God's honour or law; because there is no true regard to these divine things left in him. In consequence of which, he seeks those objects as much when against God's honour and law as when agreeable to them. And God, still continuing strictly to require supreme regard to himself, and forbidding all gratifications of these inferior passions, but only in perfect subordination to the ends, and agree-

ableness to the rules and limits which his holiness, honour, and law prescribe, hence immediately arises *enmity* in the heart, now wholly under the power of self-love; and nothing but *war* ensues, in a constant course, against God As, when a subject has once renounced his lawful sovereign, and set up a pretender in his stead, a state of enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily ensues. It were easy to show how every lust and depraved disposition of man's heart would naturally arise from this *privative* original, if here were room for it. Thus it is easy to give an account how total corruption of heart should follow on man's eating the forbidden fruit, though that was but one act of sin, *without God's putting* any evil into his heart, or *implanting* any bad principle, or *infusing* any corrupt taint, and so becoming the *author* of depravity. Only God's *withdrawing*, as it was highly proper and necessary that he should, from rebel man, being, as it were, driven away by his abominable wickedness, and men's *natural* principles being *left to themselves*, this is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely corrupt, and bent on sinning against God."*

CHAPTER IX.

HABITS OF THE SENSIBILITIES.

§ 197. General remarks on the nature of habit.

WE propose to bring the subject of this department of the Sensibilities to a conclusion by some slight references to the results of the law of Habit, considered in connexion with this portion of our nature. As we have already had occasion to make some remarks upon the general nature of Habit, and have seen in repeated instances its bearing upon mental action, it will not be necessary to spend much time upon that subject here. The term Habit, in its application to the various mental powers, expresses the simple fact, *That the mental action acquires*

* Edwards's Doctrine of Original Sin, part iv., chap. ii.

facility and strength by repetition or practice. The following remarks, made on a former occasion (vol. i., § 98), may properly enough be repeated in this place.

"The fact that the facility and the increase of strength implied in HABIT is owing to mere repetition, or what is more frequently termed practice, we learn, as we do other facts and principles in relation to the mind, from the observation of men around us, and from our own personal experience. And as it has hitherto been found impracticable to resolve it into any general fact or principle more elementary, it may justly be regarded as something ultimate and essential in our nature.

"The term Habit, by the use of language, indicates the facility and strength acquired in the way which has been mentioned, including both the result and the manner of it. As the law of habit has reference to the whole mind of man, the application of the term which expresses it is, of course, very extensive. We apply it to the dexterity of workmen in the different manual arts, to the rapidity of the accountant, to the coup d'œil or eye-glance of the military engineer, to the tact and fluency of the extemporaneous speaker, and in other like instances.—We apply it, also, in cases where the mere exercise of emotion and desire is concerned; to the avaricious man's love of wealth, the ambitious man's passion for distinction, the wakeful suspicions of the jealous, and the confirmed and substantial benevolence of the philanthropist."

§ 198. Of habits in connexion with the appetites.

In considering the results of Habit in connexion with that portion of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities which involves desire, viz., the Instincts, Appetites, Propensities, and Affections, we shall adhere to the arrangement which has hitherto been followed, with the exception of the Instincts, to which the law of Habit does not apply.—We proceed to remark, therefore, that there may be appetitive habits; in other words, that the Appetites, the class of sensitive principles next in order to the Instincts, acquire strength from repeated indulgence. The appetites, in their first or original operation, act instinctively; but it is incidental to their nature, as it is to all

the modifications of Desire, that their gratification is attended with more or less of pleasure. In connexion with this experience of pleasure, we frequently stimulate them to action a second time, under circumstances when there would be but little, and perhaps no occasion for a purely instinctive exercise. But the desire, as it is thus, by a voluntary effort, or, at least, by a voluntary permission, indulged again and again, rapidly becomes more and more intense, till at last it is found to acquire a complete ascendency. That such is the process appears to be proved by what, unfortunately, we have so frequent occasion to notice in those who are in the practice of taking intoxicating drinks. If they had indulged their appetite only a few times, they would undoubtedly have retained their mastery over it. But, as this indulgence has been repeated often, and continued for a considerable length of time, the appetite, growing stronger with each repetition, has gradually acquired the predominance, till it has brought the whole man, as it were, into captivity.—(See § 100, vol. i., § 108, vol. ii.)

§ 199. Of habits in connexion with the propensities.

The Propensities, as well as the Appetites, are subject to the influence of this law; in other words, there may be propensive as well as appetitive habits. The principle of Sociality, for instance, has an instinctive action; but there is no question that we have the power, as it is undoubtedly our duty, to subject it to suitable regulation. But if, instead of doing this, we indulge it continually for the mere sake of the pleasure we experience, without regard to the other claims existing upon us, we shall find it rapidly acquiring undue strength, and every day will render it more difficult to regulate it properly. And, in point of fact, it is sometimes the case, that we find persons who, in consequence of an unrestricted indulgence of a principle otherwise naturally good, have brought themselves into such a situation, that retirement, which every reasonable man ought sometimes to desire, is always exceedingly irksome to them.

Perhaps not one of the Propensities can be named which may not be greatly strengthened in the same way

It is well known in what countless instances the desire of Possession, growing stronger by continued repetition, becomes an ascendant and controlling principle. We are not to suppose that the intense love which the miser has for his possessions existed in him naturally and originally. We do, indeed, admit that the seed or element of it, the basis on which it rests, existed in him naturally, as it exists in all men. But how does it happen that it shows itself in this exaggerated and intense form? This is the work of the man himself, and for which the man himself is accountable, rather than the original tendencies of his nature. From morning till night, from day to day, and from year to year, the Possessory principle has been voluntarily kept in intense exercise. And the natural and necessary result has been, that it has become the ruling sentiment of the heart.

So of the desire of Power. In itself considered, power may properly be regarded as one of the various forms of natural good. And, accordingly, we are at liberty to take the ground, as was formerly seen in the remarks on that subject, that the desire of power, if duly subordinated, is not reprehensible. But in a multitude of instances, this desire is far from showing itself in the aspect of a subordinate principle. And the reason is, that it has acquired inordinate strength by repetition; a habit of mind has been formed, which has resulted in its becoming predominant. The individual in whom it exists in this intense form is not satisfied with anything short of the prostration of every other person at his own feet. It would hardly be going too far to say, that he looks upon the Supreme Being, when he contemplates his greatness and elevation, in the light of a rival and an enemy.

§ 200. Of habits in connexion with the affections.

Remarks similar to what have been made in respect to the lower active or motive principles, will apply in like manner to the higher class of the Affections. We sometimes see, for instance, decided indications of the result of Habit in the progress of the Malevolent Affections. A man entertains a degree of dislike to his neighbour; it appears, perhaps, at first, in the form of a mere un-

pleasant suspicion; these suspicious and unpleasant feelings are frequently indulged; we see them gradually growing deeper and deeper; assuming, under the influence of Habit, a more fixed and determinate form; and ultimately appearing in the shape of malignant and permanent hatred.

The law of Habit applies in the same manner to the Benevolent affections. The Parental affection is strong and decided in the very beginning of its existence. But the dependant situation of the beloved object on which it fastens, keeps it almost constantly in exercise. And thus, unless there are some improprieties in the conduct of the child, which check and diminish the results naturally following under such circumstances, it rapidly acquires immense strength. And hence it may be explained in part, that when a son or daughter, in the maturity of youth or on the verge of womanhood, is taken away by death, the grief of the parent, always great at such times, is more intense and excessive than when death takes place in infancy. The death of the child at the later period of life not only blasts a greater number of hopes, but as love, by a long-repeated, cumulative process, has been added and incorporated with love, it carries away, if one may be allowed the expression, a greater portion of the heart.

We are informed in Scripture, that when an infant child of David was taken away by death, the king was so far able to control his sorrow as to arise from his prostration on the earth, and wash and anoint himself, and change his apparel, and come into the house of the Lord and worship. But when Absalom died, who was but little worthy of his affection, his language was, "Oh, my son Absalom! my son, my son Absalom! Would God I had died for thee, oh, Absalom, my son, my son!"

We may unquestionably apply these views to all those affections which are properly characterized as Benevolent, to Friendship, Patriotism, Gratitude, and Sympathy. He who is so situated that he is required to think much on the interests and good of his country, and whose love of country is in this way kept constantly in exercise, will be found, other things being equal, to exhibit in the day

of trial a more intense ardour of patriotism than others. He who, by his untiring attentions to the poor, the sick, and the prisoner, has kept his sympathetic affections in action for a long series of years, will find the principle of sympathy more thoroughly consubstantial in his nature and more intensely operative than if it had lain dormant. And we may add, that this doctrine, in all its extent, is applicable to the highest of all the Benevolent affections, that of love to God. This ennobling principle, this pre-eminent trait, which allies us not only to just men made perfect, but to angels, is an improveable one. Under the influence of Habit, we find it, even in the present life, going on from one degree of brightness and strength to another. The more we think of God, the more frequently we connect him with all our ordinary transactions, the more will the broad orb of his glory expand itself to our conceptions, and call forth the homage and love of the heart.

§ 201. Of the origin of secondary active principles.

It is here, in connexion with the views of this Chapter, that we find an explanation of the origin of what are called SECONDARY principles of action. Some individuals, for instance, are seen to possess a decided passion for dress, furniture, and equipage. We are not to suppose that this passion is one which is originally implanted in the human mind, although it may be so permanent and so decided in its action as to have something of that appearance. The probability is, setting aside whatever may be truly interesting or beautiful in the objects, that they are chiefly sought after, not so much for what they are in themselves, as for some form of good, particularly some esteem and honour, to which they are supposed to be introductory and auxiliary. But the desire, existing, in the first instance, in reference to some supposed beneficial end, has been so long exercised, that we at last, in virtue of what may properly be called a Habit, so closely associate the means and the end, that it is exceedingly difficult to separate them. So that, after a time, we apparently have a real love or affection for the means itself (the dress, furniture, equipage, or whatever it is), independ-

ently, in a great degree, of the ultimate object, in connexion with which it first excited an interest in us.

There are some men, to illustrate the subject still further, who appear to have a strong love for money; we do not mean property in the more general sense of the term, but MONEY, the gold and the silver coin in itself considered, the mere naked issue of the mint. This is one of the various forms which the too common vice of Avarice sometimes assumes. But we cannot suppose that the love of money, in this sense of the term, is a passion connatural to the human mind, and that men are born with it. It is loved, in the first instance, simply as a means subordinate to some supposed beneficial end. The person has looked upon it for years as the means of enjoyment, influence, and honour; in this way he has formed a Habit of associating the means and the end; and they have become so closely connected in his thoughts, that, in ordinary cases, he finds himself unable to separate them.

Again: we are not to suppose that men are born with a natural desire for the company of mice and spiders, such as we have reason to think they naturally entertain for that of their fellow-men. But, in the entire exclusion of all human beings, we find the principle of sociality, deprived of its legitimate and customary sources of gratification, fastening itself upon these humble companions. A man, as in the case of Baron Trenck and Count Lauzun, may form an acquaintance with these animals, which, aided by the principle of Habit, will, after a time, exhibit a distinctness and intensity which are commonly characteristic only of the original passions.—In this way there may unquestionably be formed a series of SECONDARY appetites, propensities, and affections almost without number. And we have here opened to us a new and interesting view of human nature, capable of being so applied as to explain many things in the history and conduct of men, which, however, we are not at liberty in this connexion to explore more minutely.

§ 202. Objection to these views in respect to habit.

It is proper to mention here that an objection has been

raised to these views; not to the doctrine of Habit in general, but to the alleged extent of it. While it is admitted that it exists, and produces its results in most cases, it is contended that our passive feelings, as they are sometimes called, are not strengthened in this way. Passive feelings, as the term is used in this objection, are those where we suffer or endure. This seems to have been the original meaning of the epithet, which is derived from the participle of the Latin PATIOR, to suffer. So that the objection, stated in more obvious phraseology, has reference in particular to painful or unpleasant feelings. The statement, which is made in respect to feelings of this description, is that, instead of growing stronger by repetition, they diminish in power.

The opinions involved in this objection are brought forward in the philosophical works of Bishop Butler. We learn from him, in express terms, that frequent exposure to danger lessens fear and begets intrepidity; and that a frequent acquaintance with scenes of distress lessens the passion of pity. "Let a man," he says, "set himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of life with which he must become acquainted."*

Some further illustrations will help to show what is meant, although the objection has always appeared in a somewhat perplexed and indefinite form.—Among other instances referred to in connexion with this subject, it is said of the physician, which perhaps was the very instance had in view by Bishop Butler in the remark just quoted, that at first he is affected as much as another man at the sight of suffering; but the repetition of such scenes, to which he is constantly called, blunts and does away the painful feeling, instead of increasing its strength.—Again, it is said of the sailor, when exposed for the first time to a storm on the ocean, that he is filled with the painful emotion of fear; but the feeling grows weaker at

* Butler's Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion, pt. i., ch. v. The passage at the place here referred to in Butler is avowedly the basis of a number of remarks and illustrations in Mr. Stewart's Elements (vol. i., ch. vii., § 5), in which similar sentiments are maintained

every repetition of danger. The soldier, in particular, felt a degree of pity for his writhing and groaning comrades in his first fields of battle; he wept as well as others; but, after a few campaigns, the feelings of sympathy grew weaker and weaker, and he no longer had tears to shed.

It is not necessary to multiply instances; the difficulty will probably now be understood; the facts are in appearance precisely, or very nearly such as have been stated; nevertheless, they are susceptible of being satisfactorily accounted for, consistently with the great law which has been laid down.

§ 203. Explanation of the above-mentioned cases.

In explanation of the instances mentioned in the preceding section, we would remark, in the first place, that the law of Habit is not so strong as not to be overcome by others; it may be weakened, subdued, apparently annulled, when coming in contact with other strong principles; and that is the fact in these cases. When the sailor was first exposed to the storm, it was but natural that the idea of danger should be prominent in his mind, and that his fears should be strong. After the repetition of similar situations, he finds that the danger is less than he at first imagined; and not only this, he finds that, in order to escape the danger, whatever it is, he must discharge his duty; he must make every effort; he must put forth a cool judgment, which is inconsistent with the agitations of fear; he must call into exercise other feelings. Every strong and energetic principle of the soul, ambition, courage, and hope, are summoned forward, to counteract and destroy the action of the law in question, and the effort is successful. This is the explanation.

And so in the case of the physician. He finds it absolutely necessary that his sympathy or pity for the objects suffering before him should be overruled and subdued. It is more necessary for them than for himself. He must subdue pity in order to show pity; his mind must be perfectly calm and collected, which would be inconsistent with his dwelling much on the actual distress of the patient; he must be able to observe and collate the

symptoms of the disease, and to prepare the remedy. His heart has not become truly and intrinsically harder than other men's; his judgment has gained an ascendency over his heart, and checked its emotions; he has made it hard for particular occasions and for sufficient reasons; but place him in other situations, where this necessity is not laid upon him; smite this seeming rock at other times, and the waters of sorrow will freely gush out.

§ 204. Further illustrations of the foregoing instances.

In the cases which have been mentioned, and others like them, the persons concerned have formed, in some sense, an opposite habit; they have called into exercise, repeated, and strengthened, emotions and desires of a different kind; they have banked up, as it were, their fears and their sympathies, lest they should overflow.

An explanation, similar to what has been already given, will apply universally; and, among other cases, to that of the soldier. How often did Napoleon look on the heaps of slain, on the lifeless piles of young men, the hope of their parents; of the men of middle age, the support of their families; of veterans and renowned officers, without discovering a single emotion! The lamentation of millions arose around him; but he heeded them not, felt not, wept not. But no one undertakes to assert that the heart of the French Emperor was naturally without kindly feeling. There is much reason to believe it was far otherwise; it was the supposed necessity of his situation, and his philosophy, which made it so. He had placed before him his own chosen object, and he had long and laboriously taught himself to care for nothing else. His hardness of heart was a matter of calculation and discipline; and possibly we may find a proof of it in what some will consider a trifling incident.

It is said that he once rode along one of his fields of battle, and, amid the fearful desolation around him, happened to fix his eye on a dog that remained to watch and to mourn over his lifeless master's body; and he was affected, even agitated with emotion. And how did this happen? The explanation seems to be, that he had hardened his heart against sympathy with human beings, and

had not counted on a contest with his sympathy for dogs. Here he was unprepared. He had left an opening, of which he was not aware, in the Chinese wall which he had built around his natural feelings of commiseration. He could meet the grief of mothers, and the lamentations of orphans, and the despair of widows, as the rock meets the dashing of the ocean, and remain unmoved; but with all this premeditated and immoveable induration of heart, the fact still remains, explainable only in the way which has been intimated, that his firmness was shaken and his spirit troubled by the humble sorrows of a mourning brute animal.

§ 205. The objection to the extent of the law of habit further considered.

In forming a conclusion on this subject, we are to consider, furthermore, the results which would follow on the adoption of those views which we have thus seen reason to object to. In the case of physicians, for instance, it would seem to follow universally, that they must, as they advance in life, become an unfeeling and hard-hearted race of men. But the facts, as we have already had occasion to intimate, are far from warranting us in making any such assertion. Men who are naturally of decidedly kind and smypathetic feelings, and who, under the impulse of such feelings, are in the habit of visiting the chambers of the sick and the dungeon of the prisoner, and in whom, of course, painful feelings must almost constantly be in exercise, would be subject, on this doctrine, to a sure and rapid process of sensitive induration. Howard himself, who spent his life amid scenes of suffering, must, on a strict and philosophical application of this system, have become, at last, one of the most hard-hearted of men. But this does not seem to have been the fact. On the contrary, his desire to relieve suffering appears to have grown stronger and stronger till the last moments of life.

There are a considerable number of men at the present day, who, with no small portion of Howard's spirit, have left their native country, and the endearments and charities of home, that they may relieve the physical sufferings, and enlighten the mental darkness of their fellowmen. The hearts of these men, according to their own

accounts, are continually pained with the view of vices and sufferings that are constantly presented to their notice. No other emotion than a painful one can possibly arise in the view of these vices and sufferings, in themselves considered. But on the system, some of the results of which we are endeavouring to indicate, these painful emotions will necessarily, after a time, cease to exist. And as the affection of Pity or Sympathy, as we have already had occasion to see, is based upon painful emotions, it will also become extinct with the extinction of these emotions. The heart will become sealed up, and its fountains of sorrow for the ruin which is witnessed, and of pity for the subjects of it, will be effectually closed.—These are the results in theory; but we do not hesitate to say, that, as a general thing, they are far from being the results in fact. These devoted men, to whose philanthropic toils we have alluded, still labour on, month after month and year after year, without either any diminution of their grief at witnessing the wide-spread sin and misery around them, or any decrease of that benevolence which prompts them to labour for its removal. On the contrary, as their life wears away, they appear to experience stronger emotions, and to put forth still more strenuous efforts.

§ 206. The objection noticed in connexion with the malevolent affections.

A single remark more remains to be made. The exercise of the Malevolent affections is always painful. These affections are not only attended with pain, but, as was seen when they came under examination, they are in their nature based upon a painful emotion. And it is universally admitted that a resentful and malevolent state of mind is an exceedingly unhappy one. Now if we apply to this statement the doctrine which we are controverting, it will seem to follow, that the way to terminate and extinguish the Malevolent affections, inasmuch as they are painful, is to keep them in exercise. The more freely we let our disorderly tempers run on, the more prodigally we indulge in resentful and angry passions, the sooner will the atmosphere of the mind be cleared up; and, instead of clouds and darkness, shine forth in

the aspect of purity and peace.—But the idea that such a result can be secured by such a process is equally inconsistent, so far as we are able to judge, with philosophy, the Scriptures, and fact.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

PART SECOND.

THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES, OR CONSCIENCE.

MORAL OR CONSCIENTIOUS SENTIMENTS.

CLASS FIRST.

EMOTIONS OF APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL.

CHAPTER I.

PROOFS OF A MORAL NATURE

§ 207. Reference to the general division.

In entering upon the examination of the interesting and important department of the mental nature which now presents itself to our notice, it is proper to revert a moment to that general division of the mind which we have endeavoured throughout to adhere to as the basis of our inquiries. The general classification, it will be recollected, was into the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. In passing from the purely intellectual region to that of the Sensibilities, we first find ourselves in the subordinate department of the Emotions. And leaving the emotions, we may advance onward, and come in contact with the still more interior and remote department of the Will, either by passing through the region of the Desires on the one hand, or through the space occupied, if we may be allowed to use such expressions in connexion with the mind, by the feelings of Moral Obligation on the other. In accordance with this plan, we made it our first object to examine some of the leading emotions which come under the head of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities. And then, taking the direction of the Desires, endeavoured, in a variety of remarks on the Instincts, Appetites, Propensities, and Affections, to explain what may properly be included under that head.

Having completed, in such manner as we were able, that part of the subject, we propose to return again to the region of the Emotions, a part of which are included under the general head of the Moral Sensibilities, and to approach the Will in the opposite direction. But, in carrying this plan into effect, and in giving a philosophical account of the Moral, in distinction from the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities, we shall attempt, in the first place, to consider the general question, whether, in point

of fact, man possesses such Moral Sensibilities or not. After having satisfied ourselves as to the general fact of the existence of a conscientious or moral nature, we shall be prepared to enter with more satisfaction into the consideration of the subordinate elements and the characteristics of that nature.

§ 208. Proof of a moral nature from consciousness.

(I.) In proceeding, in the present chapter, to bring forward some considerations in proof that man has a moral nature, the first remark we have to offer is, that we have evidence of this in the intimations of our own Consciousness. In other words, we shall find evidence of the fact under consideration by consulting our own internal experience, and carefully noticing what takes place there.

If it be a fact that we have a moral nature, it may, of course, be expected to follow, that this nature will manifest itself on suitable occasions in the exercise of its appropriate acts. Accordingly, it is generally the case, that in those instances of actual right and wrong in which we ourselves are the agents, we possess unquestionable evidence of such inward manifestations. In other words, we find ourselves conscious or cognizant, according as we act right or wrong, of an internal sanctioning or condemnation, approval or disapproval. The results of our moral nature, when we are not in action ourselves, but are simply noticing the conduct of others, are the same; at some times we approve, at others condemn.

It merely remains to be added here, that the emotions we have at such times, and which we commonly designate as emotions of approval and disapproval, are SUI GENERIS; that is to say, they have a distinct and specific nature. It is true we are not able to define them, for the reason that they are elementary and simple. But it is certain, as they are manifested in our Consciousness, we never find any difficulty in distinguishing them from other emotions, those of beauty or sublimity, for instance.

§ 209. Evidence of a moral nature discoverable in what we notice in children.

(II.) Again, we may unquestionably discover the evi-

dences of a moral nature in the operations of the mind, as they develope themselves in early life. It can hardly have escaped the notice of any one, that if some affecting story of cruelty and crime on the one hand, or of benevolence and virtue on the other, be rehearsed in the presence of children, they will generally discover decided feelings, not only of mere joy or sorrow, but of approval or condemnation, corresponding to the facts in the case. Beattie, in his poem of the Minstrel, describes Edwin, the progress of whose thoughts and feelings it is his principal object to unfold, as being made acquainted at an early period with the affecting old Ballad called the Children in the Wood.

> "Behold, with berries smear'd, with brambles torn,
> The babes, now famish'd, lay them down to die;
> Mid the wild howl of darksome woods forlorn,
> Folded in one another's arms they lie,
> Nor friend nor stranger hears their dying cry."

But when, in the conclusion of the Ballad, it appears that the awakened anger of Heaven, in the most terrible forms of want and death, overtook the uncle, who for private ends had been guilty of this horrible cruelty, the poet adds, with entire truth to nature,

> "A stifled smile of stern, vindictive joy
> Brighten'd one moment Edwin's starting tear."

But it is unnecessary to appeal, in support of what is a matter of every day's observation, to testimonies of this kind, however frequently they may be found, particularly in the earlier and simpler forms of Literature. It is not easy to witness the sports of children, even for a few moments, without having evidence, loud and eloquent evidence, of their disposition to appeal to the right and wrong of actions. The often-repeated declaration that wrong play will never prosper, expresses the secretly lurking conviction, not only that there is such a thing as justice, but that justice will be found capable, in some way or other, of vindicating its own rights.

While, however, we may properly appeal, in support of our general proposition, to those exhibitions of moral sentiments which we often notice in early life, we are aware that some exceptions are to be made, and some

explanations to be offered, in order to present this view of the subject in a proper light.—We do not mean to say, nor is it true, that children will give a correct moral decision on all possible moral subjects. There are many subjects involving high moral principles, which, in whatever aspect they may appear to mature minds, will probably fail of eliciting from children and youth either approbation or disapprobation. And the simple reason is, because they have not capacity enough to understand them. It is one of the leading characteristics of the moral nature, as we shall have occasion to see more fully hereafter, that its operation depends upon the antecedent operation of the intellect; in other words, that it cannot act otherwise than in view of knowledge. When, therefore, we maintain that there are decided evidences of a moral nature in children, it is proper to add, that this is the case so far, and so far only, as they are capable of understanding the subjects brought before them. When the matter proposed to them is one level to their comprehension, if it involve anything of a moral nature, they seldom fail to show, and that, too, promptly and decisively, that they have a knowledge of it in that respect.

§ 210. Proofs of a moral nature from the manner of our intercourse with our fellow-men.

(III.) In the third place, the existence of conscience is taken for granted in our intercourse with our fellow-men. We make our agreements and bargains with them (we do not say always, but, at least, as a general thing) as if they had a conscience; we converse with them, and consult with them, and rejoice with them, and weep with them, as if they had a conscience; and in our more formal addresses and exhortations, we always take the same thing for granted. How many customers would a tradesman have, how long would any person be admitted into good company, how many public and responsible duties would any citizen whatever be called to fulfil, if it were known or suspected that they had no conscience!

We shall feel more fully the force of the facts we have now in view, if we consider the mode of address which is usually employed when a person wishes to persuade

men to pursue a certain course. He appeals at first, we will suppose, to their INTEREST; he tells them of the various advantages which would attend the course he proposes; but he reserves, as his last and most efficacious argument, an appeal to their sense of DUTY. If every other consideration is found to fail, the orator assures them of his perfect persuasion that they will not so disgrace themselves in the eyes of the whole world as to refuse obedience to the calls of conscience. He calls upon conscience to speak out on this important occasion, and he knows full well, if that voice of God and nature, implanted in the human bosom, can be made to utter itself, there will no longer be occasion for his own humble efforts.

§ 211. Proofs of a moral nature from the terms used in different languages.

(IV.) Another proof of the existence of a moral nature is to be found in the fact, that there are terms in all languages, probably we may say without a single exception, expressive of such a nature and its operations. If it be true that there is no such thing as a moral nature and no such thing as original moral sentiments in men, the fact is obviously unprecedented and unaccountable, that terms expressive of a moral power, and of moral distinctions and sentiments, are to be found so generally.

The ancients, it is well-known, were accustomed to speak of the SENSUS RECTI ET HONESTI; by which there can be no question they intended to intimate what at the present time we commonly express by the term Conscience. They also, in particular, made a distinction between the HONESTUM or honourable, and the UTILE or beneficial, considered as principles of action; and it certainly would be easy to show that like distinctions are to be found in all modern tongues. In English, for instance, we not only constantly speak of a man's acting from interest and also acting from the sense of duty, but always regard these two modes of action as involving, in our apprehension, two distinct active or motive principles. We repeat, therefore, that, on the doctrine of the negation or absence of a moral nature, the use of such terms and the making of such distinctions is inexplicable. With-

out the existence of a moral nature as their basis, there would seem to be no import and no propriety in them. On the contrary, the use of such terms and the making of such distinctions is what would naturally be expected on the supposition that the foundation of moral emotions and of feelings of moral obligation is actually laid in the human constitution. We may, therefore, properly infer from them, among many other sources of proof, the existence of such a moral constitution.

§ 212. Proofs from the operation of the passions of anger and gratitude.

(V.) It may be remarked, in the fifth place, that the manner in which the passions of anger and gratitude are often found to operate, implies the existence of a power of moral perception.—The facts to which we refer are these. If we suffer what we suppose to be an injury, we are angry; and this, too, not merely with an instinctive, but a voluntary and deliberate anger. On the other hand, if we receive what we suppose to be a benefit (not merely a good, but a designed or *well-meant* good), we are grateful. Now we will suppose, that soon after we discover, on the one hand, that the injury was wholly accidental, and, on the other, that our supposed benefactor was governed by selfish motives, seeking his own good instead of ours. We shall generally find, under these altered circumstances, that both our anger and our gratitude will immediately disappear.

But it does not appear why this marked and sudden change should take place, if we have not the power of making moral distinctions. The actual benefit on the one hand, and harm or suffering on the other, remain the same as they were at first. So far as the mere effects to ourselves are concerned, there is obviously no reason for a change in our feelings. The basis of the change which we experience is not a perception of any difference in the beneficial or hurtful results, but simply in the motives which led to them. It is the knowledge of the real nature of the motives which causes this sudden alteration. The moral sense (and, so far as we can judge, nothing short of or other than the moral sense) requires and exacts from us, as soon as their motives are discovered, that

we shall place a new and far different estimation on the persons concerned.

§ 213. Proofs of a moral nature from feelings of remorse.

(VI.) Another proof of the existence of a moral nature (it will be recollected that we are considering the subject now in the most unrestricted point of view, and directing our attention simply to the general fact of a moral department) is to be found in the important circumstance, that men are evidently constituted with a susceptibility of feelings of REMORSE.

It is unquestionably a matter of common consciousness, that the feelings of remorse are distinct and peculiar in their kind; in other words, that they have a separate and specific nature. Considered in reference to the classifications which have been made, they obviously belong, although no distinct notice was taken of them under that head, to the class of Emotions; and are clearly distinguishable, not only from all other feelings of the class to which they pertain, but from all other states of mind whatever. They are unpleasant or painful feelings, it is true, and in this respect agree with many others; but the suffering which is involved in them is of a peculiar character, altogether different from the mere sadness or grief which we often experience on other occasions.

Now what we wish to remark here is, that the existence of these feelings always and necessarily involves, as the basis of their existence, the fact of a moral nature. When we meet with disappointment, when we become the subjects of injuries and misfortunes, which are not to be attributed in their origin to any misconduct of our own, we may experience feelings of sadness or grief, but never feelings of remorse. It is impossible that we should. Feelings of remorse always imply some responsibility and some action of our own. Nor is it every kind of action which is the occasion of their being called into existence. They imply a course of action which is morally reprehensible; that we have not merely been the occasion of harm, but have committed a wrong; that we stand arraigned, disapproved, and culpable in the decisions of our own conscience.

§ 214. Evidence of a moral nature from the ideas of merit and demerit, reward and punishment.

(VII.) Among other sources of proof on this subject, we may add the fact that we are capable, as will no doubt generally be admitted, of framing the abstract conceptions of moral merit and demerit. We had occasion, in explaining the origin of these ideas, to remark expressly (vol. i., § 193), that it would be impossible for us to frame them without possessing the antecedent notions of right and wrong. For what merit, it was inquired, can we possibly attach to him in whom we discover no rectitude; or what demerit in him in whom we discover no want of it! But the perception of right and wrong, of virtue and of the opposite of virtue, implies the existence of a moral nature.

Our ideas also of rewards and punishments are obviously based upon the fact of moral distinctions. We always make a distinction between punishment and mere suffering. The former, although in the mere amount of pain there may be no difference between the two, involves the additional idea of some real or supposed ill-desert. There is the same distinction between good and reward. Reward implies not only a good or benefit conferred, but the additional notion of its being deserved. There can be no question that both reward and punishment, in the common acceptation of the terms, are understood to imply good and ill desert, or merit and demerit; and, consequently, as the ideas of merit and demerit involve the fact of a moral nature, the ideas of reward and punishment cannot be supposed to involve less.

§ 215. The existence of a moral nature involved in systems of moral philosophy, and in other writings and treatises of a moral nature.

(VIII.) The doctrine of a moral nature is necessarily involved, in the eighth place, in all treatises of Moral Philosophy, and in all works of whatever nature, the object of which is to correct the conduct of men and to make it better, not merely in the matter of pecuniary interest and supposed personal good, but *in a moral point of view*. Works of this kind are numerous; and they are obviously prepared upon the principle that there is

such a thing as right and wrong, moral good and evil, and that men are so formed as to be capable of distinguishing the one from the other. In the opinion of these writers, at least, and in the opinion of those who receive them as correct expositors of the actual and prospective state of things, there must be in man the elements of a moral nature; the susceptibility of moral emotions, and of moral obligation. Otherwise it is obvious that their statements and reasonings must be essentially destitute of meaning and of application.

These remarks will apply not only to Systems of Moral Philosophy, and to formal Treatises and Essays on Morals, but to all those lighter forms and varieties of literature (some of the Essays of Johnson and Addison, for instance), the object of which is not merely to amuse the reader, not merely to aid him in the correction of the slighter improprieties of conduct, but to impress moral truths, and to secure, in the case of those who had given themselves up to vice, a moral renovation. The remarks will apply, among other varieties of literature, to Satires, the professed object of which is to point out and to correct the prevailing vices. The Satires of Juvenal not only recognise throughout the abstract distinctions of Right and Wrong, but distinctly announce that there are original elements of moral judgment, and sources of reward and punishment in the human breast. It would be difficult to refer, in any uninspired writer, to more decisive indications of a natural conscience, and to more energetic and fearful descriptions of the miseries attending its violation, than are to be found in his Thirteenth Satire. The very first lines of this celebrated production are worthy of notice in this respect. And near the conclusion he expresses himself, in respect to those who have been guilty of violations of right, in the following significant terms.

"Cur tamen hos tu
Evasisse putes, quos diri conscia facti
Mens habet attonitos, et surdo verbere cædit,
Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum?"

§ 216. Proofs from the uniformity of law.

(IX.) Another circumstance, which is entitled to no

small weight in the decision of this inquiry, is, that systems of law or jurisprudence, as well as of morals, have been the same, in their leading principles, in all ages of the world, and are essentially the same at the present time. It is true, there are peculiarities, founded in some cases on the physical or political condition of the country, and in others on long-established associations, which distinguish one code from another; but the great rights of persons and property are recognised in all. "Lawgivers and statesmen," says Sir James Mackintosh, "but, above all, moralists and political philosophers, may plainly discover in all the useful and beautiful variety of governments and institutions, and under all the fantastic multitude of usages and rites which have prevailed among men, the same fundamental, comprehensive truths, the sacred master principles which are the guardians of human society, recognised and revered, with few and slight exceptions, by every nation upon earth."* This passage is taken from his published Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations. In another unpublished discourse on that great and interesting subject, from which an Extract is given in his recently-published Memoirs, he illustrates his general observation by going more into particulars. "I have said, in my printed Discourse," he remarks, in the Extract just referred to, "that morality admits no discoveries; and I shall now give you some reasons for a position, which may perhaps have startled some, in an age when ancient opinions seem in danger of being so exploded, that when they are produced again they may appear novelties, and be even suspected of paradox. I do not speak of the theory of morals, but of the rule of life. First examine the fact, and see whether, from the earliest times, any improvement, or even any change, has been made in the practical rules of human conduct. Look at the Code of Moses. I speak of it now as a mere human composition, without considering its sacred origin. Considering it merely in that light, it is the most ancient and the most curious memorial of the early history of mankind. More than three thousand years have elapsed since the composition of the Pentateuch; and let any

* Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations, Lond. ed., p. 35.

man, if he is able, tell me in what important respects the rule of life has varied since that distant period. Let the Institutes of Menu be explored with the same view; we shall arrive at the same conclusion. Let the books of false religion be opened; it will be found that their moral system is, in all its grand features, the same. The impostors who composed them were compelled to pay this homage to the uniform moral sentiments of the world. Examine the codes of nations, those authentic depositories of the moral judgments of men; you everywhere find the same rules prescribed, the same duties imposed: even the boldest of those ingenious skeptics, who have attacked every other opinion, has spared the sacred and immutable simplicity of the rules of life. In our common duties, Bayle and Hume agree with Bossuet and Barrow. Such as the rule was at the first dawn of history, such it continues till the present day. Ages roll over mankind; mighty nations pass away like a shadow; virtue alone remains the same, immortal and unchangeable."*

Perhaps the best illustration of the idea which we wish to impress in this section, unless some should see reason to make an exception in favour of the Spirit of Laws of Montesquieu, is to be found in the great work of Grotius on the Law of Nations. It is rather a remarkable feature in respect to the principles which this great writer lays down, that they are supported throughout by a variety of quotations from the poets, historians, orators, and philosophers of different ages and countries. In doing this, it is to be presumed he had a more important and ennobling object than the mere display of the variety and extent of his learning. He wished to show, as he himself gives us to understand, by the conspiring testimonies of such various authorities, that the whole human race, with no exceptions whatever that are not explainable in consistency with the general statement, have one opinion, one feeling, and one voice in respect to the leading principles of political justice.

We infer from the unanimity of mankind in respect to the great principles of right and wrong, as they develope themselves in their systems of Law, both internal and in-

* Memoirs of the Life of Sir James Mackintosh, 2d Lond. ed., p. 120.

ternational, that there is, and must of necessity be, as the basis of this unanimity, a conscience, a moral element of some kind, existing as an essential attribute in the universal mind of man.

§ 217. Evidences of a moral nature even among Savage nations.

(X.) The leading principles of morals and justice, both as seen in the conventional rules which regulate the intercourse of life, and also in the few and simple laws which support the civil and political fabric of their little communities, are known and distinctly recognised, as a general statement, among barbarous and Savage tribes. We do not doubt that there have been, and that there are, among Savage tribes, great perversions of the moral nature; but we speak now of the general fact simply, and not of the exceptions.—Mr. Stewart, in his Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers (bk. ii., chap. iv.), speaks expressly of the gratification which a liberal mind experiences in recognising under the ignorance, superstition, and sensualities of Savage life, the kindred features of humanity, and the indelible vestiges of that Divine image after which man was originally formed. In illustration of his remark, he introduces, with no small degree of satisfaction, a short statement from Sparman's Travels through the Southern Parts of Africa, in relation to a portion of the human race who have generally been regarded as ranking among the lowest in the scale of civilization.—"A Hottentot," says this traveller, "is rich in proportion to the number of his cattle; but the richest is clothed, fed, and attended no better than the poor." After some other remarks in illustration of what he had just said, he adds, "That which constitutes the distinction of rank in this simple race of men, is the divine pleasure of doing good to their fellow-creatures." The testimony of Vaillant in respect to the same ignorant and degraded people is much to the same effect. "To convey some idea of the character of the savage Hottentots," he observes (Travels in Africa, p. 179), "and of what I had to expect from them, it will be sufficient to offer one remark, which is a truth confirmed by experience. In all countries, wherever the Savages are

absolutely separated from civilized nations, and live sequestered, their manners are mild; but they change and become corrupted the nearer they approach to them."— "When on the northward of the Cape, I found myself under the Tropic among remote nations; when I saw whole hordes surround me with signs of surprise and of the most childish curiosity, and, approaching me with confidence, stroke my beard, my hair, and my face with their hands, I said to myself, I have nothing to fear from these people; this is the first time they ever saw a white man." A portion of Dillon's Narrative of a Voyage in the South Seas is occupied with giving some account of the religion, morals, and customs of the inhabitants of the islands in those seas, called the Friendly Islands. "There is implanted," says the writer, speaking, in particular, of the people of Tonga (vol. ii., p. 27), "a knowledge or sentiment, which enables us sometimes, if not always, to distinguish between the beauty of disinterestedness and the foul ugliness of what is low, sordid, and selfish: and the effect of this sentiment is one of the strongest marks of character in the natives of these islands. Many of the chiefs, on being asked by Mr. Mariner what motives they had for conducting themselves with propriety besides the fear of misfortune in this life, replied, 'the agreeable and happy feelings which a man experiences within himself when he does any good action, or conducts himself nobly and generously, as a man ought to do:' and this question they answered as if they wondered that such a question should be asked. After this, we cannot but suppose (unless we are led by prejudice) that the seeds of very great virtues are implanted in their breasts."

§ 218. Further remarks on the morality of Savage tribes.

We have not the least doubt (and we make the remark, not as a matter of conjecture, but from an examination prosecuted to no small extent, in reference to this very subject) that the testimony of travellers among Savage tribes will show conclusively that there is no tribe of men so ignorant and degraded as not to give some evidences of a natural regard for kindness, truth, and justice. At

the same time, it is due to the truth to admit, that we find among some of these tribes instances of cruelty and violations of right which are abhorrent to the nature and moral sensibilities of a Christian people. We shall endeavour to show, however, in its proper place, that these deviations from the more common and predominant features of humanity may be explained in consistency with the general statement.

As we do not feel at liberty to multiply quotations, especially as we do not suppose that those who read these remarks will generally consider it necessary, we leave the subject of this section, with merely opening a train of thought in connexion with it, which has very seldom been alluded to. We refer to the fact, that all savage tribes, so far as we have been able to learn, not only have some form of religion, but, as a general thing, recognise the duty, on certain occasions of a private or public nature, or both, of performing expiatory ceremonies and offering expiatory sacrifices. They seem to feel that something must be done, either by enduring suffering in their own persons, or by inflicting suffering somewhere else, to prevent those evils, either to themselves personally or their country, which they believe will be the result of their transgressions. What we have to add is, that expiatory ceremonies and expiatory sacrifices, wherever they are found to prevail, clearly imply as their basis the existence of certain sentiments of ill-desert or wrong, and, of course, involve the existence of the elements of a moral nature.

§ 219. The existence of civil or political society implies a moral nature.

(XI.) We may add to the other considerations which have been brought forward, the circumstance that society, in its *civil* or *political* form, is supported, in a very considerable degree, by the sentiment of moral obligation. If we are asked, why obedience is rendered to the civil laws, the answer is, because they are enacted by the society or social body. If we are asked why we render so much deference to the will of the society or social body, the answer is, because we have agreed to. In other words, we have promised, have pledged ourselves, either expressly or by implication, to conform to it. If we are

asked why we so strictly fulfil our promise, why we so scrupulously conform to our word, all the answer we can give is, that we feel under a moral obligation to do it. In other words, in order to give anything like a satisfactory answer to this question, we are obviously thrown back upon our moral constitution.

There is no doubt that the natural desire of society, especially when stimulated, as it sometimes is, by a knowledge of the benefits which flow from social intercourse, tends powerfully to keep men together in masses or bodies. But, after all, whatever suggestions may sometimes be made to the contrary, the principal secret of the stability of the social position, when it exists in the form of civil and political society, that which, more than anything else, keeps it from disastrous fluctuations, and gives it a degree of permanency and uniformity sufficient to enable it to sustain the vast fabric of government and laws, is to be found in the strong and broad column of the Moral Sensibilities.

§ 220. A moral nature implied in the motives of human conduct which are recognised in historical works.

(XII.) We find an additional proof of the existence of the department of the Moral Sensibilities in those principles, in relation to the estimate of the conduct and characters of men, which pervade historical composition. History, in distinction from the mere registers and annals of events, professes to give us not only the acts, which, as subjects of history, are proper to be recorded, but, so far as they are ascertainable, the motives and characters of the agents. Accordingly, the historians of all ages and countries, while they have condemned some actions, have been equally warm in their commendations of others. In a multitude of cases, the highest possible commendations have been bestowed, and for no other reason, in connexion with the perception or supposed perception of high moral traits in the actors. If it could be ascertained in any way that Leonidas and his companions bled at the pass of Thermopylæ from views of a pecuniary nature or from a selfish desire of fame, and not from a sense of the duty which they owed to their country, the glory of that celebrated action would be blasted at once.

In order to illustrate the subject more fully, let us consider a moment an instance in Roman history still more directly to our present purpose. The Roman Regulus was a prisoner at Carthage. The Carthaginians sent him to Rome in order to procure a peace; but with the expectation, and on the condition, if peace were not procured, of his returning. He no sooner arrived at his native city, than, contrary to the hopes and expectations of the Carthaginians, he advised and urged the Romans to continue the war. Some persons, when he had seen fit to take this course, proposed to him not to return, as the most distressing results would be likely to follow. Regulus replied, "Though I am well acquainted with the tortures which await me at Carthage, I prefer them to an act which would cover me with infamy in my tomb. It is my duty to return, and for all else let the gods provide." He accordingly went back, and was put to death with unheard-of sufferings.—This high-minded act of the noble Roman has been applauded, not only by the historians who record it, but by the whole human race, although nothing could be more unwise under the existing circumstances, if there was no such thing as a moral nature, no such thing as conscience and conscientious or moral obligations.

§ 221. Evidence of a moral nature from Scripture.

We close this examination of the reasons which may be brought forward in support of the general doctrine of a moral nature, by remarking further, that the doctrine is fully recognised in the Scriptures. All those passages in which men are called upon to do what is just and right, in distinction from pursuing their own selfish and private ends, imply not only that there is a right and wrong, but that men are capable of understanding what is right, and that they are under obligation to do what is right. The term CONSCIENCE, in particular, as expressive of the fact of man's moral nature, is frequently used in the Scriptures. Men are directed to have a good conscience; the testimony of conscience is spoken of as a matter of rejoicing; the Apostle and his associates are said to commend themselves to every man's conscience; passages which, together with others like them, can hardly be said to have

any meaning, if there be not in man some moral element which is capable of taking cognizance of the right and wrong of things, in distinction from the merely prudential view, the mere apparent expediency or profitableness of things.

And not only this, God himself, in various passages, calls upon men to sit in judgment upon the course, whatever it may be, which He has thought fit to pursue. He does not simply appeal to them for a decision, whether his providential administration is an advantageous one or not, but whether it is *right.* All passages of this kind appear to take it for granted, that man has a power of moral judgment.—But the passage of Scripture which, standing by itself, is most decisive on this subject, is to be found in Romans, ii., 14, 15. The passage, which we commit without comment to the reader, is as follows. "*For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another.*"

§ 222. Concluding remarks on the general fact of a moral nature.

In view of the various considerations which have been brought forward, we may certainly feel authorized to speak with entire confidence of the existence of the Moral Sensibilities as a portion of man's nature essentially distinct from the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities. When we give to these considerations the weight to which they are obviously entitled, the only matter of wonder is, that the subject should have hitherto been involved in so much obscurity and doubt; and that men of no small learning and of no dishonourable reputation should have lent the countenance of their authority to doctrines the opposite of those we have endeavoured to support. In making this remark, we have not reference so much to such writers as Hobbes, and Mandeville, and others of that class, who have never had great weight with the popular mind, as to the distinguished and highly-influential names of Locke and Paley. The circum-

stance that such men have had doubts as to the fact of an original and distinct moral department in the mind, is one reason, aside from the intrinsic interest and value of the subject, why we have been led in this Chapter, and shall be led hereafter, to pursue the investigation with a degree of minuteness, and with a regard to such objections as may be likely to be suggested, which might not otherwise have been supposed to be necessary.

CHAPTER II.

EMOTIONS OF MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL

§ 223. Classification of the moral sensibilities.

THE remarks of the preceding chapter, it will be noticed, have had a relation exclusively to the general subject. If we are satisfied on the general question whether man has a moral nature, we are ready to commence a consideration of what that nature is.

We proceed, accordingly, to make the general remark, that the Moral nature is less complicated than the Pathematic, although the general division of the Moral Sensibilities corresponds precisely to the general division of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities. As the Natural Sensibilities resolved themselves, in the first instance, into the subordinate classification of the Emotions and Desires, so the Moral Sensibilities, in a manner precisely corresponding, resolve themselves into the subordinate classification of moral Emotions and feelings of Moral Obligation. But both divisions of the Natural Sensibilities, it will be recollected, viz., the Emotive and the Desirous, were found to be susceptible of numerous minor divisions. It is not so in the moral department. The class of moral emotions, and the obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation, which are based upon them, will be found, exclusive of any subordinate divisions, to comprehend the whole subject.

It might be supposed, therefore, that this subject would

be despatched in a few words. And so it would if the discussion could properly be limited to the mere examination of these feelings. But the moral sentiments, both the emotive and the obligatory, sustain such important relations, and involve so many important consequences, that it seems to be proper not only to examine them in their own nature, but also to consider them, to some extent, in their multiplied connexions.

§ 224. Nature of the moral emotions of approval and disapproval.

In accordance with what has been said in the foregoing section, we repeat, that there are but two classes of mental states which belong, in strictness of speech, to the Moral sensibilities, considered as being by nature an essential portion of the human mind; although it is very true that there are a number of things in the mind, such as the abstract conceptions of right and wrong, and the feelings of remorse, which have both theoretically and practically an important connexion with morals. The Moral Nature, properly so called, putting out of view the incidental relations it sustains, exists and developes itself, FIRST, in the moral Emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval; and, SECOND, in the feelings of moral Obligation.

While there are many kinds of the Natural or Pathematic emotions, such as the emotions of beauty, of sublimity, of the ludicrous, of cheerfulness, of surprise, of reverence, of shame, and the like, there is but one kind or class of Moral emotions. And these are known, considered as distinct states of mind, by the names by which they have just been described, viz., as feelings of APPROVAL and DISAPPROVAL. Of these states of mind we now proceed to give some account.—And our first remark is, that they are original feelings; which implies, that in the appropriate circumstances of their existence, they are called forth by the original or constitutional tendencies of the mind, and also that they are elementary or simple. Of course they are not susceptible of definition, since defining, except that sort of apparent defining which consists in the mere use of synonymous terms, is predicable only of what is complex. Hence, in their distinctive or appropriate nature, in that which constitutes them what

they are, considered as separate from anything and everything else, they cannot be known by description, but by consciousness only. Nevertheless, we are not at liberty to suppose that their nature is either absolutely unknown, or, as a general thing, even misunderstood, inasmuch as the consciousness of such feelings is universal, and as no form of knowledge, it is generally admitted, is more distinct to our apprehension than that which has consciousness for its basis. Whoever, therefore, has had placed before him any case of right and wrong, of such a nature that he could have, and did in fact have, a clear apprehension of it, in itself and in its relations, must, we suppose, have a knowledge (and if he has not, it is impossible he ever should have) of emotions of approval and disapproval.

§ 225. Of the place or position, mentally considered, of the emotions of approval and disapproval.

Moral emotions, or emotions of moral approval and disapproval, occupy a place, considered in reference to other departments of the mind, immediately successive to intellections, or acts of the intellect.—In this respect they agree with the natural or pathematic emotions, which occupy the same position. It is, for instance, impossible for us to feel the beauty of an object, which is an act of the Natural sensibilities, without first having a perception or knowledge of the object itself. In like manner, it is impossible for us to approve or disapprove a thing, in the moral sense of the terms, without first having some perception, some knowledge of the thing approved or disapproved.

And as the natural emotions are immediately followed by Desires, so the moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval (for these are all the states of mind that are properly comprehended under that phrase), are followed, in like manner, by Obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation. The position, therefore, of moral emotions, and they are found nowhere else, is between perceptions or intellective acts on the one hand, and Obligatory sentiments on the other. And as there can be no moral emotions without antecedent perceptions, so there can be

no feelings of moral obligation without antecedent emotions of approval and disapproval. Accordingly, if we are said in any given case to be under obligation either to do a thing or to abstain from doing it, we may always find a reason for our thus being under obligation in the antecedent action of the mind, viz., in our approval or disapproval, as the case may be, of the thing to which the obligation relates. (See § 14.)

§ 226. Changes in the moral emotions take place in accordance with changes in the antecedent perceptions.

If the emotions of approval and disapproval, which are the basis of the subsequent feelings of moral obligation, are naturally founded upon antecedent perceptions, we may expect, and such is the fact, that they will change in their character in accordance with changes in those perceptions. If, for instance, a statement of facts is made to us, clearly establishing in our view a case of great crime, our emotions of disapproval are prompt and decided. But if it should happen that afterward some new facts are mingled in the statement, throwing a degree of doubt and perplexity upon what was believed to have taken place, the feelings of disapproval would at once become perplexed and undecided, in a degree precisely corresponding to the perplexity and indecision that, under the new circumstances, pervade the intellectual perception in the case. If, still subsequently, the introduction of other facts should show that what was supposed to be a crime was directly the reverse, our moral emotions would undergo a new change, and, instead of condemning the transaction either more or less decidedly, would approve.

Nor is this changeableness in the character and the degree of the moral emotions to be regarded as implying any defect in the moral nature. On the contrary, it is unquestionably one of the most decisive indications of its value. If the moral nature were so constituted as not only to pronounce a thing right or wrong under certain given circumstances, but necessarily to adhere to that decision under essential changes in the circumstances, it certainly could not be regarded as a safe rule for men's guidance. A man kills another by means of the infliction of a heavy

blow, and, as we suppose, with evil intention or malice prepense, and the action is at once disapproved and condemned by conscience. But it subsequently appears that the blow, which had the appearance, at first, of being intentional, was entirely a matter of accident; and the conscience or moral nature immediately conforms its decision to the new aspect of the transaction, and annuls the disapproving and condemnatory sentence which it had before pronounced. If it were otherwise, if it did not promptly and fully conform itself, by changes in its own action, to antecedent changes in the percipient or cognitive action, it would confound vice and virtue, guilt and innocence; and, as a rule of moral conduct, would not only be without value, but absolutely and exceedingly injurious.

§ 227. Of objects of moral approval and disapproval.

We are not to suppose that the sphere of that moral adjudication, which is involved in the existence of emotions of moral approval and disapproval, extends to all objects indiscriminately. It is a proper inquiry, therefore, and in some respects an important inquiry, what are the appropriate objects of approving and disapproving emotions.—In answer to this question, we remark, in the first place, that such objects are voluntary agents. The feelings in question, in their announcements of the right and the wrong of any case that comes before them, have nothing to do with things without life. And more than this, they require, as the objects of their exercise, something more than mere vegetable and animal life, viz., intellective, sensitive, and volitive life. In other words, they require, in the appropriate objects of their adjudication, those attributes of perceiving, feeling, and willing, which are necessarily implied in voluntary agency.

(II.) In the second place, the legitimate objects of approval and disapproval are not only voluntary agents, but MORAL agents. No being is the object of moral emotions (that is to say, no being can by possibility be approved or disapproved in the moral sense of the terms) except such as have a conscience or moral nature. It is impossible that any others should have a knowledge of

right and wrong; and, of course, impossible that they should conform themselves to the rule of right. Hence no one regards brute animals as the proper objects of these emotions.

(III.) Again, moral agents (this expression, of course, implies that they are voluntary agents) are morally accountable; in other words, are the proper objects of moral approval and disapproval, in respect to those things only which are truly in their power. This remark, which limits the sphere of moral approval and disapproval not only to moral agents, but to what is actually in the *power* of moral agents, is practically an important one. So far as we can regulate our outward actions, we are accountable; that is to say, we are the proper objects of the emotions of moral approval and disapproval. So far as we can regulate the action of the intellect, the sensibilities, and the will, we are accountable also. So far as the action, whether physical or mental, is either involuntary or instinctive, it is not an appropriate object of the notice and adjudication of conscience; for all such action, although it belongs to and is not separable from the agent, is nevertheless not under his control.—Accordingly, when the moral agent, in the exercise of all his various powers, does what he ought to do, he stands approved. When, in the exercise of the same powers, he fails to do what he ought to do, he stands condemned. The extent of his capability is the basis of his duty, and the law of conscience is the measure of its fulfilment. And this simple statement intimates both the rule by which he is judged, and the vast amount of his responsibility.

§ 228. Of the original ground or basis of moral approbation and disapprobation.

If what has been said in the course of this chapter be true, we are so constituted that, in all cases of actual right and wrong which we are capable of understanding, we have the feelings, whenever such cases come to our knowledge, of approval and disapproval, corresponding both in kind and degree to the occasion which excites them. But there remains another interesting inquiry.—It has ever been, in the speculative and theoretical aspect of moral

subjects, a much agitated question, what trait or quality it is in the thing approved or disapproved which excites the corresponding emotion. To this question different individuals are found to give different answers. We approve of an action, says one, because it is useful; because, says another, it is commanded by a higher power; because, says a third, it is agreeable to the fitness of things; because, says a fourth, it is in conformity to the will of God. But an answer of this kind does not appear to be satisfactory, because the question may always return with undiminished propriety and force, why utility, or the command of a superior, or the fitness of things, or conformity to the will of God, should, in themselves considered, excite within us feelings of moral approbation more than anything else.

The fact is, that this question, viz., what is the foundation or basis in the thing approved of the emotion of approval which we exercise towards it, lies, in all probability, upon the extreme boundaries of human knowledge. Whenever we touch that boundary, we must either rest satisfied, or return in the track of our own footsteps. Whatever efforts we may make to resolve and explain a question which, by the nature of things, is placed in the outskirts and limits of human perception, we always find the train of thought moving, as it were, in a circle; and answering itself in a change of terms, and not in a change of position. If, for instance, we are asked why we approve the will of God, it may be answered with entire propriety, because it is morally right or virtuous. If we are asked why we regard his will as morally right or virtuous, the answer is, because, considered in all its circumstances, it is *approved* by an enlightened moral sense. If we are asked why it is that we thus put forth emotions of moral approval in relation to his will, then, instead of being able to take a new position and to give a new and distinct reason, we necessarily move round to a former one, and say, because his will is morally virtuous or right. —And the same in other similar cases. On being asked why we approve of a particular action, we may give a different answer, and say, with a degree of propriety, because it is beneficial or useful. On being further asked

why we approve of a useful or beneficial action, we may answer again, because such an action is morally right or virtuous. If we are still further asked why an act of kindness or benevolence is to be regarded as morally right or virtuous, we answer, because in its own nature it commends itself to our conscience; in other words, excites within us emotions of moral approval. Which is the same as to say, in the assignment of reasons, that we approve, because we have emotions of approval. An instance, as well as the former one, of that sort of Paralogism or false reasoning which is called reasoning in a circle.

§ 229. Emotions of moral approval are called forth in connexion with the existence of right or rectitude in the things approved of.

It is unquestionable, however, when we take into view the necessarily limited nature of the human mind, that there is a suitable and satisfactory stopping-place in this successive announcement of reasons. The proper answer in all these cases, when we are asked why we approve of a thing, is, *because it is right.* With the assignment of this reason, if the circumstances of the case obviously warrant us in assigning it, we may rest satisfied.

But then comes the question, what is RIGHT? We approve of a thing because there is in that thing the trait or quality of RIGHT. What is Right? The examination of this significant inquiry will more properly come up in another place. Nevertheless, a word or two may be said here.—We admit that Right or Rectitude, like many other things that are elementary and are intellectually revealed to us, cannot be defined. But can we define what existence is; what identity is? Can we define intelligence, or power, or succession, or space, or time? From the nature of the case, there must be some things elementary and ultimate. We are too apt to forget that there are, and of necessity must be, limits which the human mind cannot pass; and that there are ultimate moral suggestions as well as intellectual. When we say an action is approved because it is right, the expression not only has meaning, but proclaims a truth which has nature for its basis. That is to say, the expression imbodies in

language a conviction, which in some way or other is necessarily attendant on the action, considered as the occasion of its origin, of the Moral Sensibilities, viz., that there is, in fact, such a thing as Right or Rectitude. At the same time, we do not hesitate to admit, as has already been intimated, our inability to explain what Right is. While we claim that it is perceptible in the mind, we do not deny that it is unexplainable, in the sense of being defined, in language. Nevertheless, we have no hesitation on this account, either in asserting its existence, or in assigning it as a reason for whatever naturally depends upon it.—(See vol. i., § 192, 193, and the subsequent chapter on the Immutability of Moral Distinctions.)

CHAPTER III.

RELATION OF REASONING TO THE MORAL NATURE.

§ 230. Of the doctrine which confounds reasoning and conscience.

We are now prepared, in view of what has been said in the last Chapter, particularly in connexion with the subject of the grounds or principles on which changes take place in moral emotions, to proceed to another subject not more interesting than it is practically important. —The opinion has sometimes been advanced, that those moral decisions or judgments, which, as moral beings, we are capable of forming, are the direct results of REASONING. The advocates of this doctrine, rejecting the idea of a distinct moral principle or conscience, appear to regard the reasoning power as entirely adequate to the causation of all those results in the mind which have a moral aspect. In a word, they may be regarded, either as denying entirely the existence of conscience, or, what is philosophically, if not practically, the same thing, as identifying it with mere ratiocination.

It is not surprising, on the whole, that this mistake, which is certainly a very serious and prejudicial one, should have been committed, when we consider how

close the relation is which reason sustains to conscience. It will be noticed, that we speak without any hesitation of the doctrine referred to as a mistaken one. We do not suppose it to be necessary, after what has already been said, to attempt to show that reasoning and conscience are not identical, and that the moral nature has a distinct and substantive existence. Nevertheless, we freely admit the intimate and important relation which they sustain to each other. A relation so important in a practical, as well as in a philosophical point of view, that we shall delay here for the purpose of entering into some explanations of it.

§ 231. Of the close connexion between conscience and reasoning.

Reasoning, it will be recollected, is purely an intellectual process; consisting of successive propositions arranged together, and a succession of relative suggestions or perceptions, but, in itself considered, involving nothing which is properly called an emotion or desire. This single circumstance separates the reasoning power entirely from the moral nature, which, in its appropriate action, never originates, like the reasoning power, perceptions or new intellectual views, but merely moral emotions and feelings of moral obligation. Probably every one can say with confidence, that he is conscious of a difference in the moral emotions of approval and disapproval, and the mere intellectual perceptions of agreement and disagreement which are characteristic of reasoning. In the view of consciousness, there can be no doubt that they are regarded as entirely diverse in their nature, and as utterly incapable of being interchanged or identified with each other. The moral feeling is one thing; and the intellectual perception or suggestion, involved both in the process and the result of reasoning, is another.

Although the reasoning power and the conscience or moral being are thus distinct from each other in their nature, they are closely connected in their relations, as has been intimated already; inasmuch as the intellect, particularly the ratiocinative or deductive part of it, is the foundation or basis of moral action. We must first know a thing; it must first be an object of perception, before

we can take any moral congnizance of it. And this is not all. The moral cognizance, as we have already had occasion to explain, will conform itself with great precision to the intellectual cognizance. That is to say, it will take new ground in its decisions, in conformity with new facts perceived. Consequently, we cannot rely perfectly on a moral decision which is founded upon a premature or imperfect knowledge. The more carefully and judiciously we reason upon a subject, the more thoroughly we understand it in itself and its relations, the more confidently may we receive the estimate which the voice of conscience makes of its moral character.

§ 232. Illustration of the preceding section.

The views of the preceding section may be easily illustrated. When, for instance, one man is alleged to have stolen the property of another, we find the conscience, as a general thing, ready to discharge the duty which the Author of our nature has assigned to it; but it is sometimes the case, that its decisions are arrested and postponed, in order to give time for the inquiries and conclusions of the reasoning power. Such inquiries inform us, perhaps, that the theft was long and coolly premeditated; and was committed, not only without any special temptation to it, but with a full knowledge of the aggravation of the crime. In view of this state of things, conscience immediately passes its decision. Perhaps our inquiries inform us that the theft was committed at a time of extreme want and consequent great temptation; and, furthermore, was committed upon a species of property, in respect to which the right of individual possession is regarded by common consent as less strict and exclusive than in other cases. The conscience here, as in the former instance, condemns the criminal, but probably with a mitigated sentence. On further inquiry, we learn that, although the property was taken, and that, too, much to the damage of the owner, it was taken wholly by mistake; it was a thing entirely accidental. In this case, conscience, adapting itself to the newly-discovered circumstances, pronounces the supposed thief altogether guiltless.

The conscience, therefore, however distinct the two may be in themselves, is aided and supported by the various powers of perception and comparison, particularly by the reason. The reasoning power, however high the rank which we justly ascribe to it, sustains, in this case at least, a subordinate position; and is to be regarded as the servitor and handmaid of the moral power. And, moreover, the latter will vary in exact accordance, if there are no collateral disturbing influences, with the new facts and the new relations which are from time to time presented by the former.—It is in consequence of this close connexion, and the important assistance rendered to conscience by reason, that they have sometimes been confounded together. But it is very essential to right views of the mind that this erroneous notion should be corrected, and that the precise relation existing between these two distinct parts of our mental nature should be fully understood.

§ 233. Further illustrations of the same subject.

We may, perhaps, further illustrate the subject of the connexion existing between the perceptive nature, particularly the reasoning power, and the moral nature, by the interesting case of Caius Toranius, which Dr. Paley, in a translation from Valerius Maximus, has introduced in his Moral Philosophy in nearly the following terms.—The father of Caius Toranius had been proscribed by the Roman Triumvirate. Caius Toranius, coming over to the interests of that party, discovered to the officers the place where his father had concealed himself, and gave them, withal, a description by which they might distinguish his person when they found him. The old man, more anxious for the fortunes and safety of his son than about the little that might remain of his own life, began immediately to inquire of the officers who seized him whether his son was well; whether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of his generals. "That son," replied one of the officers, "so dear to thy affections, betrayed thee to us; by his information thou art apprehended and diest." The officer, with this, struck a poniard to his heart, and the unhappy parent fell, not so much affected by his own fate, as by the means to which he owed it.

"Now the question is," says Dr. Paley, "whether, if this story were related to the wild boy caught some years ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without experience and without instruction, cut off in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and, consequently, under no possible influence of example, authority, education, sympathy, or habit, whether, I say, such a one would feel, upon the relation, any degree of *that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius's conduct* which we feel, or not?

"They who maintain the existence of a moral sense, of innate maxims, of a natural conscience, that the love of virtue and the hatred of vice are instinctive, or the perception of right and wrong intuitive (all which are only different ways of expressing the same thing), affirm that he would.—They who deny the existence of a moral sense, &c., affirm that he would not. And, upon this, issue is joined."

§ 234. Remarks upon the case stated in the foregoing section.

Upon the case as thus stated, and upon the diverse opinions which are said to be entertained in connexion with it, one or two remarks are to be made, which are naturally suggested by the train of thought in this chapter. First, the supposition that a savage, who is *entirely* ignorant (which we understand to be the condition of his mind in the statement given), is able, in any case whatever, to pronounce a moral judgment, is an impossibility. It is arranged in great wisdom, that the Moral Sensibilities, as well as the Natural, are placed *behind* the Intellect; that is to say, they are subsequent in action, and are conditioned upon the antecedent existence of intellective acts. It is in view of this state of things in particular, we make the assertion, that a negation of all knowledge, an intellect which, like a fragment of perfectly white paper, is entirely free from any delineations of thought, necessarily involves the impracticability of any moral judgment. It is impossible, therefore, that the wild boy of Hanover, or any other Savage, cut off in infancy from all intercourse with his species, without sympathy, experience, or instruction of any kind, should pro-

nounce a moral judgment upon the case of Caius Toranius, or upon any other case of morals. And the reason is what has just been referred to, that the antecedent condition is wanting, viz., *knowledge.*

We remark further, however, that it is not meant to be implied, in what has been said, that the wild boy or Savage must necessarily possess a wide extent of knowledge. We may suppose it possible that he is absolutely ignorant of everything else; yet, if he has a full knowledge of the facts and relations of the thing under consideration, there is a foundation laid in his mind for a moral movement. In the case of Caius Toranius, if the Savage, however ignorant he might be on other subjects, were made fully acquainted with the relation existing between the father and the son, with the nature and degree of the acts of kindness which are always implied in the history of those who sustain the parental relation, he would be in a situation to pronounce a moral decision on the son's conduct: otherwise he would not. And on the supposition that he possessed such knowledge, it is difficult to suppose that he would be indifferent to the son's conduct, much less approve it, or that he could look upon it otherwise than with feelings of decided disapprobation. —(See, in connexion with this subject, § 226 in the preceding chapter.)

§ 235. Of the training or education of the conscience.

We infer, from what has been said in this chapter, that there is such a thing, philosophically considered, as a training or education of the conscience. We propose to remark more fully on the subject of moral education in another place; but we may properly refer to it a moment here, in connexion with the views which have now been taken. No man is at liberty to say, in regard to any given case, that I am willing to refer this case to conscience, and to abide by the decisions of conscience, without first taking the pains to lay the case fully and fairly before the power that is to sit in judgment upon it. We might as well expect the judge in a court of civil justice to give an upright decision, without facts, without evidence, and without law, as to expect a correct decision

from the spiritual judge, that exercises authority in the judgment-seat of the Sensibilities, without a full and fair presentment of the facts by the Intellect. And when we say it is necessary to make a full statement of the facts, we may add further, that they are to be stated not only in themselves, but also in their relations and bearings upon each other.—This is one form of moral training or moral education. In other words, in order to have a right conscience in respect to the vast multitude of things which are the proper subjects of moral adjudication, it is necessary to extend the field of our knowledge; to know much, to think much, to compare much.

§ 236. Of guilt when a person acts conscientiously.

The question has sometimes been started, whether a person is in any case to be considered as guilty, and to be punished for actions done *conscientiously;* for instance, when certain ignorant Savages are supposed to act conscientiously in leaving their aged and infirm parents to perish. In view of what has been said in this Chapter, we seem to be prepared to answer this question in the affirmative.

We have seen that the moral nature, in consequence of its intimate connexion with the powers of perception and reasoning, is in some measure under our own control. On the one hand, it may be enlightened and guided; on the other, darkened and led astray, and, in some cases, be made to approve of actions of the most unworthy and sinful kind. Men, therefore, are to have a right conscience; this great and exalting principle is to receive and ought to receive the very first attention; and they are accountable whenever it is neglected. Otherwise we furnish a very easy and convenient excuse for all the cruelties of the Inquisition, for all the persecutions of the Protestants by the Catholics, for all the persecutions of the Protestants by each other, for all the acts of unkindness and tyranny which have ever been exercised upon individuals and communities.

And the position that men are accountable and guilty for having a wrong conscience, in proportion to their means of knowledge and their ability of rectifying the

conscience, holds good in respect to the most ignorant and degraded Savage tribes, as well as in respect to civilized nations. It is true, no individual ought to assume the province of judging in all cases what that degree of guilt is, for no one is competent to it. All that is meant to be asserted is, that when persons feel an emotion of approval in doing wrong (that is, in doing what is condemned by the general moral sentiments of mankind, and by the will and law of God), and yet have within their reach neglected sources of knowledge, which, on being laid open to the mind, would have caused different feelings, they are criminal for such neglect of the information before them, and, consequently, cannot, under such circumstances, be rendered otherwise than criminal by any internal approbation.

§ 237. Illustration of the statements of the preceding section from the case of the Apostle Paul.

The Apostle Paul was at one time a great persecutor He shut up the early Christians in prison; "and when they were put to death, he gave his voice against them." Nevertheless, he expressly says, in reference to these very transactions: "I verily thought with myself that I *ought* to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." He evidently, from his own statement, supposed he was doing right; in other words, he was *conscientious* in his conduct. Here is a case in point, to which the principles of the preceding section may be made to apply.

That Paul, as he by implication asserts himself to have been, was conscientious in his persecutions of the early Christians, there can be no doubt. That he was, at the same time, exceedingly guilty, seems to be equally certain. He had not made himself acquainted with all the facts in the case; he was too bigoted to his own sect, too passionate, and too cruel to make a full and impartial investigation of the merits and demerits of those whom he had determined to destroy. He acknowledges that, at the very time when he supposed he was acting conscientiously, he was "exceedingly mad against them." But every one knows that an exceedingly excited state of the

passions is very unfavourable to a minute and impartial inquiry. The presumption is, whatever the reason of it may have been, that he had no correct knowledge of the life, miracles, and doctrines of Jesus Christ, or the belief, practices, and character of Christians. His conscience, accordingly, as is its nature, acted in view of what he actually knew, and not in view of what he *might* have known. His conscience, in the circumstances of the case, could not do otherwise than it did, viz., approve its conduct. Nor, in strictness of speech, are we to say that he was to blame for acting according to his conscience, but to blame, exceedingly to blame, for not having, as on proper inquiry he might have had and would have had, a right conscience.

CHAPTER IV.

NATURE OF MORAL BEAUTY.

§ 238. Of the origin of emotions of moral beauty.

It seems to be a proper place here, as incidental to the main subject, to remark upon the nature of Moral Beauty. We have already had occasion to refer to this subject, in connexion with some remarks on natural beauty (§ 38); but it seems to be deserving of a more particular notice.—Our first remark in the explanation of this topic is, that there is a close analogy between natural and moral beauty; and that, consequently, the nature of the latter may be easily understood by a reference to the former. The beauty of outward objects, whatever may be its inherent or intrinsic nature (a subject which, like that of the inherent or intrinsic nature of rectitude, is probably beyond the limits of the powers of the human mind), is revealed to, and is cognizable by us, in consequence of the structure of the natural sensibilities. In other words, we are so constituted that the perception of certain objects is naturally and necessarily followed, in our Sensitive nature, by the existence of emotions of beauty. It

is the existence of these emotions, which, it is proper to remark, do not depend upon our volition, but are the work of nature alone, that reveals to us the beautiful object, as having the character of beauty. Without this we should know, it is true, the mere existence of the object; but the additional and distinctive fact of its beauty would not be known. These are not only the facts in the case, but they are *ultimate* facts, and contain, in the outlines at least, a statement of nearly all that is to be said.

This statement will apply, with but slight alteration, to moral as well as natural beauty. A moral object (we speak now of one which is morally good), in distinction from a mere natural object, becomes such to us (that is to say, we know it to be such) in consequence of its being stamped with moral approbation. When clothed, as it were, with this new garment, it assumes, even in the view of the intellectual apprehension, a character unknown before. Intellectually considered, it stands forth distinctly as a new object. And as it thus imbodies itself in the intellectual apprehension, or, as we more commonly express it, as it thus appears in the view of the intellect, it is followed in the sensibilities, the same as any physically beautiful object is, by emotions of beauty. The soul is delighted with the contemplation. And the same as in any instance of natural beauty, it diffuses here also, by means of the principle of association, the splendour of the inward emotion over the outward cause. And thus moral objects, as well as physical, and even in a still higher degree, are made to shine forth with an attractive lustre.

The phrase Moral Beauty appears to be based upon the experience which has just been described. It merely designates the abstract conception, which, in connexion with that experience, we are enabled to form of beauty of a moral kind.

§ 239. Of the origin and import of the phrase, moral deformity.

We sometimes speak of MORAL DEFORMITY as well as of moral beauty; nor are we to suppose that the phrase, which is a very common one, is without meaning. It originates in precisely the same way, as far as the mental action is concerned, as its opposite. When an object

which is morally wrong is before the mind, it excites an emotion directly the reverse of an emotion of beauty. In other words, it is impossible for us to contemplate a case of moral wrong, without having, in addition to those feelings of disapproval by means of which its immorality is revealed in the mind, other emotions more or less painful. We not only condemn it as a violation of rectitude, but it is at once clothed, in our view of it, in features that are unlovely and hateful.

The phrase Moral Deformity, like the opposite one of Moral Beauty under the reverse of circumstances, has its origin in the internal experience which has just been described. It is used to designate the abstract conception, which, in connexion with that experience, we are enabled to form of Deformity of a moral kind.

§ 240. Of the correspondence between the degrees of moral beauty, and the quickness or liveliness of the moral sensibilities.

The ability to contemplate moral worth, wherever it exists, in the aspect of the beautiful, and to throw around it a lustre, which has its origin in the fountains of the heart, is unquestionably an important fact in the history of the mind. We have thus a source of pleasure opened to us, which is not only abundant, but flows forth without any corrupting ingredient. But it is proper to add, that moral beauty does not shine equally upon all minds; while to some it walks in brightness like the clear sun in the heavens, to others it appears dimly, in clouds and vapours. There are a number of causes which have more or less influence in accounting for this difference.

The first is original or constitutional difference in the moral sensibilities. It appears to be regarded as an admitted fact, that there are original differences of moral as well as of intellectual character; and as there are some who are naturally dull in the comprehension of the truths of science, so there are some also who are naturally sluggish and obtuse in the matter of moral perspicacity. The latter, for this reason, take less pleasure than they otherwise would in the contemplation of moral objects; and the objects themselves, which in the eyes of persons of livelier moral sensibilities possess the highest attractions, are almost wholly destitute of beauty.

Another reason why, in the minds of some persons, moral beauty is comparatively so lustreless and unattractive, is because they voluntarily yield too great an ascendency to the lower principles of our nature. He who does not keep those lower appetites and propensities, which we have in common with the brutes, under suitable regulation, must not only undergo the penalty of bodily suffering, but will inevitably find a thick mist of impurity spreading itself over the mind, which will not only obscure the inward eye of moral perception, but will of course extinguish, in a corresponding degree, the glow of outward moral excellence.

> "He that hath light within his own clear breast,
> May sit in th' centre, and enjoy bright day;
> But he that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts,
> Benighted walks under the midday sun."

§ 241. Of the perception of moral beauty considered as a source of happiness.

But, while this source of happiness is closed, in a considerable degree, to the vicious, it remains fresh and undiminished in the heart that is animated by pure and upright sentiments. There are other sources of happiness, which, in a true estimate of our condition, are not to be lost sight of; but there is none so pure and exalting, excepting that which is connected with the possession of virtue in our own bosoms, as the pleasure which results from the contemplation of virtue in others.

It was the case with some of the old English theologians, that they divided the affection or passion of Love into two kinds, viz., the love of BENEVOLENCE and the love of COMPLACENCY. By the love of benevolence they seem to have intended to express a desire for the good of others, irrespective of their character. There are probably some persons in whose characters it is impossible for us to take delight, but for whose good we may nevertheless have an ardent desire. This is the love of BENEVOLENCE; and is such as we may suppose the Supreme Being to exercise towards the human race in their state of rebellion and opposition to himself.

By the love of COMPLACENCY, in distinction from the other form of love, the theological writers referred to appear

to have intended to express that pleased or joyful emotion of the soul, which arises in view of any form of existence that is intrinsically excellent, particularly in view of moral excellence. Although the terms which were formerly employed to intimate this kind of benevolence are in some degree gone out of use, it is unquestionable that they express an important fact in the philosophy of the mind. The mind is so constituted that it is not only capable of perceiving, as has already been explained in its proper place, physical, or, rather, material beauty, but also intellectual and pathematic, and particularly moral beauty. It is the last which is the highest kind or perfection of beauty.

The emotions which are involved in the revelation of any form of moral beauty to the mind (for it is by means of emotions that beauty in any case whatever is disclosed to us) are impregnated with happiness. They flow out on every side with emanations of pure, unmixed beatitude. Of course, the degree of the happiness will be in proportion to the vividness or energy of the emotion; but, so far as it exists at all, whether more or less, it is not only unalloyed, but is pure to the degree of celestial brightness. Here is a fountain of enjoyment, too often unvisited, which those that taste of shall live. Here is a river of pleasure, which, amid all the disappointments and sorrows of life, can never fail.

§ 242. Of the moral beauty of the character of the Supreme Being.

These views are susceptible of a religious application. Theologians appear to agree in asserting that one great source of happiness, both in this and in a future life, consists in the contemplation of the character of the Supreme Being. The character of God is revealed to us internally rather than outwardly; to the intellectual rather than to the bodily vision. We are given to understand by theological writers, and by writers on practical religion generally, that this great idea, as it exists in the intellect or understanding, is susceptible of being invested with a radiance and intensity of beauty, which beams forth from the natural sensibilities or heart. Without assuming to give an opinion on the theological or scriptural correct-

ness of this view, it is beyond question that it is, and must be, *philosophically* true. From the nature of the case, whatever is beautiful, and is *perceived* to be beautiful, must "walk in brightness." And the idea of the Supreme Being, when revealed in its due and full proportions, whether the revelation be made to angels or to men, cannot be otherwise than infinitely glorious. "Thy sun shall no more go down; neither shall thy moon withdraw itself; for the Lord shall be thine everlasting light." And as there never can be a perception of beauty without involving more or less of happiness, we can in some degree understand how it is, when the idea or image of the Supreme Being takes possession of a purified and holy mind, that it becomes a fountain of blessedness, perpetual and unutterable.

But in regard to beauty, material as well as moral, it is to be recollected that all beauty is practically nothing, and is the same as if it had no existence, unless it is perceived. And the light of moral beauty is not perceptible, and, from the nature of the case, cannot be perceptible to the mind which is itself involved in moral obscuration. Accordingly it is said in Scripture, "blessed are the PURE IN HEART, for they shall see God." These expressions imply that the moral excellence of the Deity cannot be fully perceived, and the blessedness attendant on its perception cannot be fully realized, except by hearts that are themselves morally pure. This is a great truth; and is as strongly founded in philosophy as it is express and unquestionable in religion. Accordingly, as the heart becomes pure, the upward glory is let in. At first dimly, like the glimmerings of the new moon, and afterward in full-orbed magnificence. And hence it frequently happens, that those who have laboured, through a large portion of life, to correct their moral deformities, and begin at last, through Divine assistance, to bring their souls into a morally right position in reference to the Supreme Being, speak of the enlargement of the Divine manifestation, of glory accumulated to glory, and of happiness poured upon happiness.—"The Sun of Righteousness," we quote the language of one who thus describes his own personal experience, "has been gradually draw-

ing nearer and nearer, appearing larger and brighter as he approached, and now he fills the whole hemisphere; pouring forth a flood of glory, in which I seem to float like an insect in the beams of the sun; exulting, yet almost trembling, while I gaze on this excessive brightness, and wondering, with unutterable wonder, why God should deign thus to shine upon a sinful worm."

CHAPTER V.

NATURE OF MORAL SUBLIMITY.

§ 243. Remarks in explanation of the moral sublime.

We proceed now to remark further, as incidental to the main subject of the Moral Sensibilities, that there is a Moral Sublimity as well as a Moral Beauty. Such is the constitution of our mental being, that we naturally regard those actions of men as Morally Sublime which, in the first place, are morally good in their character, but which are characterized by being put forth under such circumstances as strongly to affect our feelings. Moral sublimity, accordingly, does not appear to differ from Moral Beauty so much in kind or nature as in degree. There appears to be a progression from the morally Beautiful to the morally Sublime, which is precisely analogous to what we have already seen to exist in respect to the Beautiful and Sublime in the natural world. All, therefore, that seems to be necessary to an understanding of Moral Sublimity, in distinction from Moral Beauty, is to contemplate some of those traits which are morally beautiful, under such circumstances as will present them to view in an increased and intense aspect. It is chiefly the intensity of the morally beautiful action which enhances it to the character of moral sublimity; because an energetic or intense action, when it comes under our notice, necessarily produces in us a corresponding vividness or intensity of emotion; and it seems to be conceded, that the inward emotion may justly be regarded as the true measure both of beauty and sublimity.

Whenever, for instance, we look abroad upon men, and witness the trait of unconquerable fortitude; whenever we behold great self-possession in sudden and fearful emergencies, or see a readiness to share voluntarily in another's sufferings, or become acquainted with other moral excellences of a like kind, we cannot but experience a strong emotion. It is not easy, by a mere form of words, to communicate an exact notion of this feeling, except, perhaps, in the circumstance of its great strength. It is evident, however, that it is analogous to that agitation, and heaving, and expansion of the soul, which exists when we contemplate what is vast, and terrible, and mighty in nature.

§ 244. Instances and illustrations of the moral sublime.

At the celebrated pass of Thermopylæ, three hundred Spartans met, and fought with the Persian army of a million. The remark was made by some one of the Spartans at the commencement of the battle, that the Persian arrows would fly so thick as to obscure and shut out the light of the sun; the reply of Dieneces was, "so much the better, for we shall then fight in the *shade*;" and this has justly been set down as an instance of moral sublime. That short reply, made almost with a degree of levity, disclosed a mind which, in the defence of its country and its country's rights, was prepared to meet every hazard, and to make the best of every form of adversity.

Such instances of striking calmness and self-possession amid great dangers are not unfrequent, and seldom fail to enlist a strong feeling in their favour. On some urgent occasion Julius Cæsar put to sea in an open boat; a violent storm arose, and the pilot discovered great terror. "*Quid times*," said the Roman, "*Cæsarem vehis*."—We see in this incident, as in that of Dieneces, a marked degree of firmness; an indication of spiritual hardihood, which could stand unshaken both against the opposition of men, and the frowns and persecutions of the elements of nature.

The reply of the wounded and dying Warwick, in the Henry VI. of Shakspeare, is full of a moral nobleness.

"*Somerset.* Ah! Warwick, Warwick, wert thou as we are,
We might recover all the loss again.
The queen from France has brought a puissant power,
E'en now we heard the news. Ah! couldst thou fly!
Warwick. Why then I *would not fly.*"

§ 245. The moral sublime involves the morally beautiful.

In the remarks which were made in a former part of the Work, in the Chapter on the Natural Sublime, the principle was laid down that sublime natural objects usually have a degree of beauty, and that a progression may be traced from the beauty to the sublimity. And the same principle, as we have already had occasion to notice, will hold good in respect to the Moral Sublime.—The idea which we wish to convey by this statement may be illustrated thus. The benevolent man is a pleasing or beautiful object; but when, in the pains and agonies of death, he requests with his dying breath that the poor may continue to be fed from his substance, the exercise of benevolence under such circumstances strongly excites our feelings; and ascending, as it were, from the region of mere Beauty, becomes an instance of the Moral Sublime.

Again, whenever we see an individual undisturbed, composed, and even cheerful in ordinary difficulties and pressures, such an individual is undoubtedly an object of moral beauty. The trait of character which particularly interests us is firmness or strength of purpose. But let these misfortunes be increased, let him be driven from home and country, let the world, as it were, be combined against him, and the man who, in such circumstances, betrays no diminution of fortitude, but holds up an unshaken stability of soul amid the blackness of the desolations around him, is a sublime object.*

* NOTE.—Emotions of sublimity, as has been repeatedly intimated, connect themselves with MIND and with mental objects as well as with MATTER and material objects. Furthermore, there seems to be ground for saying that there is a Natural as well as Moral sublimity, even when both forms of it are equally based upon mental manifestations. The emotions, for instance, which exist in view of great and wonderful manifestations of Wisdom and Power, independently of any moral connexions, are the results of what may be called the Natural sublimity of the mental objects before us. But exhibitions of endurance under suffering, of self-possession in danger when duty evidently requires such self-possession, of benevolence, of unshaken truth, of honour, forgiveness, and the like, may properly be regarded, in distinction from the sublimity of mere Wisdom and Power, as instances of Moral Sublimity.

§ 246. A degree of moral sublime in acts of strict and undeviating integrity or justice.

Instances of decided and unwavering integrity, not, perhaps, in ordinary circumstances, but when the sense of justice is strongly opposed by considerations of interest or of natural affection, have a degree of moral sublimity. Sometimes, however, instances, which are not remarkable in themselves, acquire a degree of sublimity by combination. One of the distinguished citizens of Athens may be adduced as illustrating this remark. Such was the undeviating rectitude of his life, that Aristides, by the unanimous consent of the Athenians, was surnamed the Just. Whether followed by the acclamations of the multitude, or driven into ignominious banishment, he always retained his truth and integrity; and many acts are related of him which are deserving of lasting remembrance.

Being once called to act as a judge between two private persons, one of them declared that his adversary had greatly injured Aristides. "Relate rather, good friend," said he, interrupting him, "what wrong he hath done yourself; for it is *your* cause, and not *my own*, which I am now required to judge of."—We are aware that there is nothing particularly remarkable in this incident; but it illustrates the prevalent temper of the man, and shows how lively were his sentiments of justice, even on ordinary occasions.

The people of America take a great satisfaction in acknowledging that a strict, inflexible integrity was one of the remarkable traits in the character of Washington. During a long life of the most trying public services, it is impossible to point out a single act where there is any reason to believe that he subjected his principles to his interest. Accordingly, in the view of his countrymen, there is a sort of sublimity throwing its unextinguishable light around that illustrious name, arising not so much from particular acts of integrity as from their multiplication. The separate rays of virtue imbody themselves in the complex conception of his character, the stars that shine apart congregate into one centre; and, as in the case of Aristides, present, by their mingled and united influence, an object of contemplation truly sublime.

§ 247. Other instances of the sublimity of justice.

There are other instances of justice or integrity, where a high degree of moral sublimity will be found to attach even to a single transaction. We have already had occasion to mention the conduct of Regulus. From a mere regard to the obligation involved in the promise which he had given to the Carthaginians, he returned to Carthage and suffered a cruel death; willingly encountering suffering for the sake of his good name, and holding his honour far above his life.

But perhaps the most strikingly triumphant and sublime instance of rectitude is to be found in the history of the first Roman Consul. It was the memorable and unhappy lot of Lucius Junius Brutus to be placed in circumstances where his duty to his country and its laws required him, according to the view which he took of his situation and responsibilities, to pronounce the sentence, and see the punishment of death executed, at the same time, upon two of his own children. Nothing could be more terrible than such an exigency. Not only the measureless weight of a father's affection, but even the desires of the surrounding multitude, that were melted into compassion at an event so melancholy, conspired to weaken and dethrone the stern sense of justice that had hitherto reigned in the heart of the illustrious liberator of his country. But he did not sully his high fame; he would not condescend to ask or accept for his own children what he felt himself bound to deny to those of others. Though borne down with inexpressible misery, he caused them to be executed as traitors to their country, and was present at their death; thus showing, under circumstances fearfully calculated to make him falter in the expression of such exalted sentiments, that the duty we owe to God and the authority of the laws is higher than that which we owe to our dearest friends and kindred.

§ 248. Instances of friendship and the parental affection illustrative of the subject.

Sincere friendship is an interesting and exceedingly pleasing trait in the human character; and it may exist in such a degree of intensity as to partake of the Moral

Sublime. The same may be said of the filial and parental affections. In the history of these affections we may read many lessons, in the highest degree creditable to human nature, and entitled to a lasting admiration.

And here we cannot forbear remarking, that there may be kindness and nobleness of mind even in the rude Savage; and that, too, in such a degree as to call forth the blush on those who claim for themselves the exclusive honour of civilization and refinement. The patience and fortitude of the Aborigines of America under the most excruciating sufferings have often been eulogized, but it has not been so generally acknowledged that they were capable of other virtues. The benevolent affections of the Savage, as well as those of an opposite kind, are often found to exist in the highest possible degree, as may be seen in the following instances.

It is related in Mr. Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, that Colonel Byrd, of that state, was sent at a certain time to the Cherokee nation to transact some business with them. "It happened," says this writer, "that some of our disorderly people had just killed one or two of that nation. It was therefore proposed, in the council of the Cherokees, that Colonel Byrd should be put to death, in revenge for the loss of their countrymen. Among them was a chief called Silòuee, who, on some former occasion, had contracted an acquaintance and friendship with Colonel Byrd. He came to him every night in his tent, and told him not to be afraid, they should not kill him. After many days' deliberation, however, the determination was, contrary to Silòuee's expectation, that Byrd should be put to death, and some warriors were despatched as executioners. Silòuee attended them, and, when they entered the tent, he threw himself between them and Byrd, and said to the warriors, 'This man is my friend; before you get at him, you must kill me.' On which they returned, and the council respected the principle so much as to recede from their determination."

Some years since, an Indian of the Collapissas nation, near the Mississippi, slew a Choctaw in a moment of excited passion. The circumstances were such as to render it necessary that the guilty person, whose name was Ty-

chou Mingo, should die. At the time appointed for the execution, the aged father of Mingo came forward, and expressed an earnest desire to be put to death in his son's stead. He urged his request by saying that he was an old man, and no longer good for anything; that his son was young and vigorous, and his life was necessary for the support of a mother, wife, and four infant children. The surrounding multitude (among whom were many French soldiers present) were affected to tears; the Choctaws accepted the offer of the heroic old man, and with a hatchet severed his head from his body.

§ 249. Of the moral sublimity of great benevolent undertakings.

Brief as the remarks are which have been made, we indulge the hope that a train of thought has been opened which may lead to a correct understanding of this interesting subject. The inquiry, however, is too extensive to be pursued here at great length; being not less wide than the limits of whatever is morally good and beautiful in human nature, which is susceptible of being increased to an intensity of action. There may be a sublimity in courage, a sublimity in piety, a sublimity in benevolence, a sublimity in mere consistency and perseverance. Every trait in human character may become sublime, which is of such a nature as to secure to itself the approval of our moral sentiments, and can, at the same time, strongly interest and excite us. But we are under the necessity of leaving the subject, with merely adding a few remarks on the sublimity of benevolent enterprises and of the spirit of forgiveness.

Ordinary acts of benevolence are merely pleasing. Almost every person performs such acts from time to time, but the knowledge of them is not expected to excite any very strong feeling. But it is different when the object is one of great difficulty in the attainment, and requires to be pursued with great perseverance and sacrifices even for successive years. The enterprise then acquires a high degree of moral sublimity.

The abolition of the Slave-trade was a distinct object; one of incalculable importance in the estimation of every real friend of man, and surrounded with a multitude of

difficulties. A few persons (among whom the distinguished names of Clarkson and Wilberforce stood pre-eminent) engaged in this great contest with no object but that of securing the rights of humanity, and with no arms but a strong faith, determined perseverance, and the approbation of God. The public mind was to be enlightened; the moral apathy which existed on this momentous subject was to be dispelled; the influence of a powerful party, who were directly interested in the traffic in slaves, was to be overcome; jealousies and hostile passions, arising from other causes, were to be met, resisted, and subdued.

The prominent individuals in this noble enterprise, though few in number, and almost wholly unsustained except by the exaltation and purity of their object, laboured unceasingly for twenty years, amid every form of opposition, rebuke, and discouragement. They determined, while the press of England remained free or God gave them the power of speech, to vindicate, in print, and in conversation, and on the floor of Parliament, the cause of a greatly-injured people. There was no swerving from their purpose; no disposition to take up with half-way measures, and make a compromise with this fearful abomination; no relaxation of effort, because their undertaking brought them into conflict with men high in power and office. And thus, after long years of unwearied and unchangeable effort, they succeeded in causing it to be solemnly acknowledged in their National Senate, and to be written on the statute-books of their country, that differences of complexion cannot annul the claims of nature, and that minds are never to be sold.

It was then that the light first dawned upon benighted and suffering Africa; and, in view of the struggles that preceded the rising of that light, we may assert with confidence, that even the gentle feeling of benevolence may become so quickened and so prolonged, and so active and irresistible, as to be truly overwhelming in the contemplation of it.

§ 250. The spirit of forgiveness in some cases sublime.

There may be sublimity also in forgiveness. It will

generally be conceded, that forgiveness, even when the injury is a small one, is a pleasing and somewhat striking trait; the more so, because men in general are much less apt to forgive than to return injury for injury. But when the injury has been a great one, the forgiveness which is exercised calls forth an increased degree of admiration.

It is related of Demetrius (surnamed the *conqueror of cities*), that, having received a marked and undoubted provocation, he laid siege to the city of Athens. The inhabitants made a desperate resistance, but were at last obliged to surrender in consequence of a great scarcity of provisions. Demetrius then ordered them, with the exception of the women and children, to be assembled together in one place, and to be surrounded with armed soldiers. Every one was in the greatest fear, conscious how much they had injured him, and expecting every moment to be put to death. It is not surprising, therefore, that they were overwhelmed with joy and admiration when they heard him, with a magnanimity honourable to human nature, thus address them.—"I wish to convince you, oh Athenians, how ungenerously you have treated me; for it was not to an enemy that your assistance was refused, but to a prince who loved you, who still loves you, and who wishes to revenge himself only by granting your pardon, and being still your friend. Return to your own homes; while you have been here, my soldiers have been filling your houses with provisions."

It may with propriety be added here, that the duty of a sincere and unlimited forgiveness, even under the most trying circumstances, is clearly recognised and enjoined in the Christian system. And one of the earliest professors of that system gave a practical exhibition of the obligation attending it. When the martyr Stephen was stoned to death by a cruel and infuriated multitude, as he cast his dying eyes upward to the heavens and the visible throne of the Almighty, his prayer was not, in the language of an old Roman, "Be ready, gods, with all your thunderbolts, and dash them to pieces;" but, in a far more generous and sublime temper of soul, he cried, with a last and loud voice, "*Lord Jesus, receive my spirit. Lord, lay not this sin to their charge.*"

THE SENSIBILITIES.

PART SECOND.

THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES, OR CONSCIENCE.

MORAL OR CONSCIENTIOUS SENTIMENTS.

CLASS SECOND.

FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

CHAPTER I.

EXISTENCE OF OBLIGATORY OR OBLIGATIVE FEELINGS.

§ 251. Feelings of moral obligation distinct from feelings of moral approval and disapproval.

It was remarked in a former chapter that the Moral Sensibilities or Conscience would be found, on an examination of its elements, to resolve itself into two classes of feelings; viz., Moral Emotions, and Obligatory feelings or feelings of Moral Obligation. Having remarked, so far as seemed to be necessary, upon Moral Emotions, viz., the feelings of moral approval and disapproval, which are all the states of mind which properly come under that head, and also upon some of those collateral subjects which seemed to be particularly connected with them, we are now prepared to proceed to the consideration of the second class, viz., Obligatory feelings.

It is proper to remark here, that this class of mental states, considered as a separate and distinct class, has received but little notice in philosophical systems; having generally been confounded, under the familiar designations of conscience and the moral sense, with the moral emotions which have already been considered. On this account, therefore, and also for the reason that they have an important connexion with the actual operations and with the philosophy of the Will, it will be necessary to examine them with some degree of care.

§ 252. Proof of the existence of obligatory feelings from consciousness.

Our first inquiry relates to the actual and distinct existence of the states of mind which now come under consideration. The existence of feelings of this description is evinced, in the first place, by our own CONSCIOUSNESS. We might safely appeal to the internal conviction and the recollections of any man whatever, and ask whether there have not been periods in the course of his life in which he has experienced a new and authoritative state

of mind; a peculiar but undefinable species of mental enforcement, which required him to perform some particular act, and to avoid doing some other act, even when his interests and his desires seemed to be averse to the requisition thus made upon him. And, if so, we have here an instance of moral obligation, a feeling or sentiment of duty, the precise thing which is meant when we say we *ought* to do or *ought not* to do.

Take a common and simple illustration. A person, in passing along the streets, saw an old man sitting by the wayside, who bore about him the most convincing marks of want, wretchedness, and sincerity in his applications for relief; he gave him bread, clothing, and money, conscious that it was done, not in view of any personal interest or gratification, or of any selfish object whatever, but under the impulse and guidance of a peculiar enforcement within, such as we commonly have when we speak of doing our duty; and, if so, he then and there had a distinct knowledge of the moral sentiment or feeling under consideration. And this knowledge was from Consciousness.

§ 253. Further proof from the conduct of men.

The existence of feelings of obligation is further shown by the general conduct of men.—It cannot be denied that other motives, distinct from convictions of duty, often operate upon them. Their desires, hopes, fears, sympathies, their present and future interests, all have an effect. But it would certainly argue an evil opinion of human nature altogether unwarranted, to maintain that they are never governed by motives of a more exalted kind. In a multitude of cases they are found to perform what is incumbent upon them in opposition to their fears, in opposition to their sympathies, and their apparent interests. Different persons will undoubtedly estimate the amount of interested and selfish motives as greater or less, according as a greater or less portion of the good or evil of human nature has come within their own cognizance; but it is impossible, after a cautious and candid review of the principles of human action, to exclude entirely the elements of uprightness and honour

If there is any truth in history, there have always been found, even in the most corrupt periods of society, upright and honourable men. And if we are at liberty to infer men's character from their actions, as assuredly we are, we may assert with confidence that there are such at the present time. But a man of true uprightness and honour is one who acts from the sentiment of duty, the feeling of moral obligation, in distinction from motives of an inferior kind.

§ 254. Further proof from language and literature.

The existence of obligatory feelings is further proved not only by each one's consciousness, and by the conduct of men generally, but by language and literature. In most languages, and probably in all, there are terms expressive of obligation, or a sentiment of duty. No account could be given of the progress of society, and of the situation and conduct of individuals, without making use of such terms. If the words rectitude, crime, uprightness, virtue, merit, vice, demerit, right, wrong, ought, obligation, duty, and others of like import, were struck out from the English tongue (and the same might be said of other languages), it would at once be found unequal to the expression of the phenomena which are constantly occurring in the affairs of men. Now, as these terms occur, it is rational to suppose that they intimate something, that they have a meaning, that they express a reality. But it does not appear how this can be said of them, unless we admit the actual existence of obligatory feelings.

Turning our attention from single words and phrases, if we enter into an examination of the literature of a language, we shall come to the same result.—A great portion of every nation's literature is employed in giving expression and emphasis to moral principles and sentiments They find a conspicuous place in the most valuable speculations, not of professed moralists merely, but of historians, poets, orators, and legislators. But their frequent introduction would seem to be altogether misplaced, unsuitable, and unmeaning, if there were no real and permanent distinction between virtue and vice, between the so-

cred requisitions of duty and those of mere personal interest. One of the Roman historians* very happily remarks of the elder Cato, that he never performed an upright action in order that he might have the appearance of being an upright person in the view of men, but because *he could not do otherwise* (QUI NUNQUAM RECTE FECIT, UT FACERE VIDERETUR, SED QUIA ALITER FACERE NON POTERAT).

Every one who is familiar with the characteristic traits of Cato will assent to the justness of the remark; but still it would be nugatory and unmeaning without the existence of original principles, involving an internal and moral obligation. If any one will take the pains to peruse the writings of Tacitus in particular, he will fully see the bearing of these observations. That celebrated historian sketches, in colours dark and terrible, the pictures of cruelty and selfishness, treachery and deceit, but at the same time he diffuses over the nether horrors of flame and smoke the sunlike radiance of benevolence and patriotism, of honour and truth. Now, if you strike out from the human breast the emotions of approval and disapproval, and those feelings of obligation which are subsequently built upon them, you necessarily strike out, not only from Tacitus, but from almost all historians of acknowledged merit, the most eloquent and ennobling passages; everything, in fact, which places truth in opposition to falsehood, and contrasts meanness and selfism with justice, rectitude, and honour.

§ 255. Further proof from the necessity of these feelings.

And, in connexion with the observations which have been brought forward, we may further ask, what would men be, or what would society be, without the basis of moral obligation? There must be somewhere a foundation of duty. It does not appear how the bond which unites neighbourhoods and states can be maintained with any requisite degree of permanency and strength without something of this kind. Annihilate this part of our constitution, and would not society be dissolved? Would not violence, and wrath, and utter confusion immediately

* Paterculus.

succeed? The natural desire of society, the sympathies, and the selfish interests of our nature, might do something by way of diminishing these evil results, but could not wholly prevent them. With the dislocation of the great controlling principles which regulate the action of the moral world, there would soon be an utter confusion in the movements of society, and all the unspeakable evils attendant on such a state of things.

We are aware it can be said that we have the feelings of approval and disapproval, which are of a moral nature. This is true. By means of these feelings we are enabled to pronounce a decision on the merit or demerit of the conduct of others; and they thus discharge an important office. It is undeniably necessary, when we consider the various relations we sustain to other accountable beings, that we should be able to pass a judgment on them. It is necessary also, when we consider our own nature and destinies, that there should be within ourselves some power of decision on our own conduct. Accordingly, the Moral Sensibility, in the exercise of emotions of approval and disapproval, effects this great object. But this is not enough. It is not only necessary to be able to distinguish between right and wrong, but to pursue the one and avoid the other. We need within us not only a monitor which shall assure us what right is, but something also which shall speak, as it were, with a voice of authority, and strongly urge us to do what is right. And this object is designed to be effected through the medium and agency of feelings of obligation.

Undoubtedly the two classes of feeling are closely connected; emotions of approval and disapproval are antecedent to, and are the foundation of, feelings of obligation; but the fact of their close connexion does not prove their identity. Both exist, and both are necessary. The absence of either, particularly of feelings of obligation, would have a disastrous bearing on the conduct of men, and on the various interests of society.

CHAPTER II.

NATURE OF OBLIGATORY FEELINGS.

§ 256. Feelings of obligation simple and not susceptible of definition.

In view of what has been said, we assert with confidence that feelings of moral obligation, or obligatory feelings, in distinction from the antecedent acts of the Moral Sensibility, which consist in mere approval and disapproval, actually have an existence. In looking into their nature, in distinction from the mere fact of their existence, although we do not flatter ourselves with being able, by a mere verbal statement, to give a satisfactory notion of them, we would direct the attention to some characteristic marks. And the first observation to be made is, that these states of mind are simple. We cannot resolve them into parts, as we can any complex state of mind. And, as a necessary consequence of this, they are not susceptible of definition. Still we cannot admit that this simplicity, and the consequent inability to define them, renders men ignorant of their nature. It is true, that the man who has never experienced the sentiment of obligation in his own bosom can have no better means of knowing it from the descriptions of others than the blind man can have for understanding the nature of the colours of the rainbow. But such a case is hardly a supposable one; among all the tribes of men and amid all the varieties of human degradation, it will probably not be found to exist; and we may therefore say with confidence that every man knows what the feeling of obligation is, not less than he knows what the feeling of joy, of sorrow, or of approval is. In other words, men have as ready and clear an idea of it as of any other simple notion or feeling.

§ 257. They are susceptible of different degrees.

In obtaining this knowledge, however, which evidently cannot be secured to us by any mere process of defi-

ning, we must consult our consciousness. We are required to turn the mind inward on itself, and to scrutinize the process of interior operation, on the various occasions of endurance, trial, and action, which so often intersect the paths of life. The same consciousness which gives us a knowledge of the existence of the feeling and of its general nature, assures us, furthermore, that it exists in various degrees. This fact may be illustrated by remarks formerly made in reference to another state of mind. The word *belief* is the name of a simple mental state; but no one doubts that belief exists in different degrees, which we express by a number of terms, such as presumption, probability, high probability, and certainty. In like manner, the feeling of obligation may evidently exist in various degrees, and we often express this variety of degrees by different terms and phrases, such as moral inducement, slight or strong inducement, imperfect obligation, perfect obligation, &c.

§ 258. Of their authoritative and enforcing nature.

It may be remarked further in respect to obligatory feelings, that they always imply action, something to be done. And again, they never exist except in those cases where not only action, but *effective* action, is possible, or is supposed to be so. We never feel under moral obligation to do anything which we are convinced at the same time is beyond our power. It is within these limits the feeling arises; and, while we cannot define it, we are able to intimate, though somewhat imperfectly, another characteristic. What we mean will be understood by a reference to the words enforcement, constraint, or compulsion. Every one is conscious that there is something in the nature of feelings of moral obligation approaching to the character of enforcement or compulsion; yet not by any means in the material sense of those terms. There is no enforcement analogous to that which may be applied to the body, and which may be made irresistible.

The Apostle Paul says, "the love of Christ *constraineth* us." What is the meaning of this? Merely that the mercy of Christ, exhibited in the salvation of men, excited such a sentiment of obligation, that they found in

themselves a great unwillingness to resist its suggestions, and were determined to go forth proclaiming that mercy, and urging all men to accept it. And it is in reference to this state of things we so frequently assert, that we are bound, that we are obliged, or even that we are compelled to pursue a particular course in preference to another course; expressions which, in their original import, intimate the existence of a feeling which is fitted by its very nature strongly to control our volition. But, although these expressions point to this trait of the feeling, they do it but imperfectly and indistinctly, and consciousness alone can give a full understanding of it.

§ 259. Feelings of obligation differ from those of mere approval and disapproval.

It is possible that the question may be started why we do not class these feelings with Emotions, particularly those of a moral kind. And, recognising the propriety of avoiding an increase of classes where it is not obviously called for, we shall endeavour to say something, in addition to what has already been intimated in the preceding chapter, in answer to this question.—We have not classed the mental states under examination with Emotions, in the first place, because they do not appear to be of that transitory nature which seems to be characteristic of all emotions. Ordinarily they do not dart into the soul with the same rapidity, shining up, and then disappearing like the sudden lightning in the clouds; but, taking their position more slowly and gradually, they remain like the sun, bright and permanent. In the course of an hour, a person may experience hundreds and even thousands of emotions of joy or grief, of beauty or sublimity, and various other kinds. They come and go, return and depart again, in constant succession and with very frequent changes; but it will probably not be pretended that the feelings of duty, which are destined to govern man's conduct, and which constitute his most important principles of action, are of such a rapid, variant, and evanescent nature. A man feels the sentiment of duty now, and it is reasonable to anticipate, unless the facts presented to his mind shall essentially alter, that he

will feel the same to-morrow, next week, next month, and next year. He may as well think of altering and alienating the nature of the soul itself, as of eradicating these feelings when they have once taken root, so long as the objects to which they relate remain the same in the mind's view.

§ 260. Feelings of obligation have particular reference to the future.

A second reason for not classing feelings of obligation with emotions, particularly moral ones, is the fact that obligatory sentiments have special reference to the future. Moral emotions are of a peculiar kind; they have a character of their own, which is ascertained by consciousness; but they merely pronounce upon the character of objects and actions that are either past or present; upon the right or wrong of what has actually taken place in time past, or is taking place at the present moment; with the single exception of hypothetical cases, which are brought before the mind for a moral judgment to be passed upon them. But even in these cases, as far as the action of the moral sense is concerned, the objects of contemplation are in effect present. The conscience passes its judgment upon the objects in themselves considered, and that is all. It goes no further.

But it clearly seems to be different with the feelings under consideration. The states of mind involving obligation and duty have reference to the future; to something which is either to be performed, or the performance of which is to be avoided. They bind us to what is to come. They can have no possible existence, except in connexion with what is to be done, either in the inward feeling or the outward effort. The past is merged in eternity, and no longer furnishes a place for action. Obligation and duty cannot reach it, and it is given over to retribution.

§ 261. Feelings of obligation subsequent in time to the moral emotions of approval and disapproval.

Another and third important circumstance to be taken into view, in making out the distinction under our notice, is, that the sentiments or feelings of obligation are always subsequent in point of time to moral emotions, and can-

not possibly exist unless preceded by them. The statement is susceptible of illustration in this way. Some complicated state of things, involving moral considerations, is presented before us; we inquire and examine into it; emotions of approval or disapproval then arise. And this is all that takes place, if we ourselves have, in no way whatever, any direct and active concern, either present or future. But if it be otherwise, the moral emotions are immediately succeeded by a distinct and imperative feeling, the sentiment of obligation, which binds us, as if t were the voice of God speaking in the soul, to act or not to act, to do or not to do, to favour or to oppose.

How common a thing it is for a person to say that he feels no moral obligation to do a thing, because he does not approve it; or, on the contrary, that, approving any proposed course, he feels under obligation to pursue it; language, which undoubtedly means something, and which implies a distinction between the mere moral emotion and the feeling of obligation; and which tends to prove the prevalence of the common belief, that obligation is subsequent to, and dependant on approval or disapproval On looking at the subject in these points of view, we cannot come to the conclusion to rank feelings of obligation with moral emotions, or with any other emotions, but are induced to assign them a distinct place. But it is not surprising, on the whole, that moral emotions are often confounded with them, when we consider the invariable connexion between the two just spoken of, and when also we consider the imperfection of language, which not unfrequently applies the same terms to both classes of mental states.

§ 262. Feelings of obligation differ from desires.

For the reasons which have now been stated, feelings of obligation are not classed with Emotions. We are next asked, perhaps, why they are not classed under the general head of Desires. And, in answering this question, we say, in the FIRST place, that consciousness clearly points out a difference. It is believed that few matters come within the reach and cognizance of consciousness, which can be more readily decided upon than the difference be-

tween our desires and our feelings of obligation. We admit that, in the particular of their fixedness or permanency, and also of their relation to the future, the latter closely approach to the characteristics of the former; and yet a little internal examination will detect a distinction between them which is marked and lasting.

(2.) We may not only consult our own consciousness in this matter, but may derive information from a notice of the outward conduct of men. In speaking of men's conduct, we not unfrequently make a distinction; and we attribute it sometimes to the mere influence of their desires or wishes, and at other times to the predominance of a sense of duty, which is only another name for a sentiment or impulse within, which is morally obligatory. But there would evidently be no propriety in this distinction, if desire and feelings of duty were the same thing; and it would certainly be premature and unjust to charge men with universally making such a distinction when there are no grounds for it.

§ 263. Further considerations on this subject.

If there is not a fixed, permanent, and radical distinction between desires and feelings of obligation, then there is an utter failure of any basis of morality, either in fact or in theory. It will readily be conceded that morality implies a will, a power of choice and determination. But the mere moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval, do not of themselves reach the Will. They operate on the Will through the feelings of obligation; that is to say, they are always succeeded by the latter feelings before men are led to action. All other emotions operate through the Desires. So that the will, in making up its determinations, takes immediate cognizance of only two classes of mental states, viz., Desires and Feelings of obligation. But brute animals, as a general statement, have all the desires that men have; we mean all those modifications of feeling which have been classed under that general head, viz., instincts, appetites, propensities, the various forms of affection, as resentment, love, the parental affection, &c. But still, being evidently destitute of all feelings of obligation, we never speak or think of them

as possessing a moral character. We never applaud them for doing their duty, nor punish them for neglecting its performance. Our treatment of them proceeds on altogether different principles. And it would be the same with men if they were wholly destitute of feelings of moral obligation, and had no motives of action but the various forms of desire. They could never, in that case, be considered morally accountable. They would be without reward when they went right, and without rebuke when they went wrong.

CHAPTER III.

UNIFORMITY OF ACTION IN THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

§ 264. Of uniformity in the decisions of the moral nature and the principle on which it is regulated.

THE two classes of feeling which have been considered, viz., moral emotions, by means of which we approve and disapprove of actions, and the subsequent feelings of moral obligation, embrace all the states of mind which are properly and strictly included under the head of the Moral Sensibilities; although there are a number of collateral or incidental inquiries, some of which have been attended to, which are worthy of notice. One of the most interesting of these inquiries relates to the Uniformity of moral decisions.—In entering upon the subject of the Uniformity of the decisions of our Moral Nature, we remark, in the first place, that there are two kinds of uniformity, viz., uniformity in fact or principle, and uniformity in manifestation or appearance. Uniformity in principle, which is the most important view of the subject, necessarily implies a rule or law, by means of which the uniformity which is alleged to exist may be measured and known. And the rule or law upon which the uniformity of the moral nature is unquestionably based is, that its decisions (excepting those extremely perverted acts which may justly be supposed to imply a state of moral alienation or insanity, and which do not properly come into considera-

tion here) *will in all cases conform to the facts perceived;* in other words, will conform to the facts and their relations, as they exist in the view of the intellect.

Estimated by this law, we can hardly entertain a doubt that the decisions of conscience may justly be regarded as being, at the bottom, uniform throughout the world. It is not true, as some seem to suppose, that nature has established one code of morals for civilized and another for Savage nations, one law of rectitude on the banks of the Thames, and another on the banks of the Ganges · but in all parts of the world, in every nation and in ev ery clime, on the borders of every river and on the declivities of every mountain, she utters the same voice, announces the same distinctions, and proclaims the unchangeableness of her requisitions.

§ 265. The nature of conscience, considered as a uniform principle of action, requires that it should vary in its decisions with circumstances.

It is well known, that one of the greatest and the only formidable objection which has been brought against the doctrine of a connatural moral sensibility or conscience is a want of uniformity in its decisions; in other words, that it approves at one time and in one place what it condemns at another time and place. The remarks which have been made enable us to meet this objection fairly and satisfactorily. We admit that there is a want of that kind of uniformity which, by way of distinction, we have denominated uniformity in manifestation or appearance; but it is not true (with the exception of those extreme perversions which come under the denomination of moral insanity or alienation) that there is a want of uniformity in fact or principle. It is the latter kind of uniformity only which we are desirous to witness as an attribute of the conscience. A uniformity of decision based upon any other view would be disastrous to its own authority. In meeting the objection, therefore, which has been referred to, all we have to do is to show that the moral sense or conscience conforms to its own law; in other words, is uniform in its action, relatively to the facts that are placed before it. As a general thing, we have already shown this in the Chapter on the Proofs of a

Moral Nature; it appears to be unnecessary to prosecute that view of the subject further; and what alone seems to be requisite in order to complete the inquiry, is to explain the apparent deviations.

And our first remark here is, that the nature of conscience itself involves that it must vary in its decisions in accordance with a variation or change of circumstances. And the important law of its own uniformity not only permits this, but requires it. As its uniformity exists in relation to the facts perceived, and involves the uniformity or sameness of those facts, it follows that a change in the facts and their relations will be attended by a change in the moral cognizance. The decisions of conscience, therefore, although erected upon a basis of uniformity, and although, in fact, uniform in reference to the principle which has been laid down, are nevertheless in their manifestations exceedingly diverse; like the multiplied forms of the kaleidoscope, which, although they always exist in accordance with fixed optical principles, are susceptible of almost every possible variety.—Going on the supposition, therefore, that the general uniformity of the decisions of conscience is understood and acknowledged, inasmuch as we have already had occasion to give some proofs of it, and particularly as it is not generally denied, we proceed now to give some account of its variations. And, in doing this, shall endeavour to show that they all take place in entire consistency with the permanent principle of its own nature; in other words, that the uniformity is real, and that the deviations are merely apparent.

§ 266. Differences in the decisions of conscience dependant in part on differences of intellectual power.

The diversities in the decisions of conscience will depend partly, in the first place, on differences of intellectual power.—We may illustrate this view of the subject by a case of this kind. Two men are required to give an opinion on some question which involves moral duty The question we will suppose to be, whether it would be right, in a supposed case, to attempt a revolution in the civil government. Of these two individuals, one will

pronounce it to be right, the other will pronounce it to be wrong.—It is admitted that we have here a manifested or apparent deviation in the moral action. At the same time, it is unquestionably the fact, that it is not owing to a difference of structure in their moral nature, but rather to a difference in their perceptive and comparing powers.

The one who pronounces the attempt to be right, in consequence of his greater reach of thought, is able to foresee, after the first convulsive struggles, the subsidence of the angry passions into a state of permanent quiet, and the reorganization of the convulsed frame of society into greater strength and beauty. With these views, he thinks it right to attempt to introduce a change into the government of the country. The other, whose intellectual vision is more limited, unable to extend the perceptive eye into the future, sees only the evils of the present moment; the discord and clamour, the breaking up of old habits and associations, the agony, and the blood. With these views, he thinks it would be wrong to attempt the change in question. The moral nature in each instance pronounces according to the light which is placed before it, and in each case does what it would naturally be expected to do.

The want of uniformity in this case, so far from being an evidence, as some seem to suppose, that there are no good grounds for the doctrine of a moral sense, is rather an evidence of the contrary. Although there is not an external or apparent uniformity, there is a uniformity in principle; that is to say, the conscience in each case decides according to the facts before it, which is the only proper ground of decision.

§ 267. Diversities in moral decisions dependant on differences in the amount of knowledge.

Diversities in the decisions of conscience will depend, in the second place, on differences in the amount of knowledge, whether such differences in knowledge be owing to differences of intellective power or to any other cause. In other words, the conscience may be led astray, so far as to decide otherwise than it would under other circumstances, either by a want of facts, or by false state-

ments of facts, or by an incorrect combination of facts. This simple statement, if properly applied, can hardly fail to explain numerous mistaken moral judgments which have been adduced in opposition to the doctrine of conscience. When, among other things, it is said, that the conscience of the heathen decides, on many points of a moral and religious nature, differently from that of a Christian people, it must be recollected that the latter, through the medium of the Scriptures, have a vast amount of moral and religious knowledge which the heathen have not.

The objector to the doctrine of an original moral nature alleges, for instance, in support of his views, that the inhabitants of some countries, as is alleged to be the case in some parts of India, worship the sun, and that they appear to be conscientious in it; while the inhabitants of other countries, particularly those where the Christian religion prevails, condemn such worship as morally wrong. But if the worshippers of the sun, in the destitution of those sources of information which other nations possess, are fully convinced that the orb of day is not only the source of light, as it obviously is, but the source of being also; that it not only has in itself the principle of vivification, but is also the quickening and vivifying spirit to all things that exist, it is no evidence against the existence of a Moral Nature that they stand, in the view of their own conscience, morally approved in the matter of the worship which they render. The result, so far as the action of the conscience is concerned, is what might reasonably be expected. The difficulty is not in the operations of the conscience, but in the antecedent operations of the intellect, which, either from a want of facts or a false application of facts, have ascribed the attributes of Deity to a mere mass of matter. If the people referred to possessed the same amount of knowledge in relation to moral and religious subjects which Christian nations generally possess, the probability certainly is, that there would be no diversity in their moral judgments.— It will be noticed, we do not say that the worshippers of the sun are to be regarded as guiltless in the course which they take. What we assert here has reference merely to

the matter under consideration; and merely goes to show that the conscience, in deciding in accordance with the facts before it, conforms to the principles of its own nature, and that the seat or ground of the error, whatever the amount of that error may be, lays somewhere else than in the action of the moral sensibilities.

§ 268. Of diversities in moral judgment in connexion with differences in civil and political institutions.

We may reasonably expect, in the third place, to find diversities and occasional oppositions of moral judgment in connexion with differences of civil and political institutions.—This statement might be illustrated by numerous instances from history. The objectors to a moral nature maintain that theft, or the unlawfully taking of the property of another, is a crime; and that conscience, if it exists as a part of the mental constitution, will not fail to condemn it universally. And, in connexion with this, they bring forward the fact, that in some countries, theft, instead of being condemned as it should be, prevails very much, and is scarcely regarded as a crime. They state, among other things that are brought forward in support of their views, that theft was not only permitted, but approved and rewarded by the laws of Sparta.

The fact that we may reasonably expect to find diversities of moral judgment in connexion with differences of civil and political institutions, throws light upon the case last mentioned. The Spartans, it is well known, were trained up by their political institutions to regard property as of little value; their lands were equally divided; they ate at public tables; and the great end of all their civil regulations was to render the citizens athletic, active, patient, and brave. Everything else was considered subordinate. The permission which was given to the Spartan lads to steal was a part of the public regulations. It was a sort of tax, which the citizens voluntarily imposed upon themselves, in order to encourage vigilance, endurance, and address in the younger part of the community; and hence, when they were detected immediately after the theft, they were severely punished for deficiency of skill. Accordingly, the theft, which was per-

mitted and approved by the Spartans, was a very different thing from what goes under that name with us. The mere act may have been the same, but there was no correspondence in the results and attendant circumstances, and in the degree of evil intention.—Similar inquiries in other instances will go far in explaining many apparent deviations from the permanent distinctions between vice and virtue, and will reduce the number of cases of supposed want of uniformity in moral sentiments.

§ 269. Additional illustration of the same view of the subject.

Under this head we may properly notice, in particular, the statement made by travellers, that some Savage tribes are very much given to theft. Captain Cook informs us, that, when he visited the Sandwich Islands in 1778, the inhabitants exhibited a thievish disposition, taking everything which came within their reach. In explanation of this statement, it is to be remarked, first, that the idea of theft involves the idea of property; and that the right of property is more or less strict and absolute in different countries and under different political systems. In consequence of the richness of their soil and the favourable nature of their climate, there is no question that the right of property was held by the Sandwich Islanders to be less strict and exclusive than it is found to be in less productive countries. The familiar distinction of MEUM and TUUM, of our own and another's, was not so clearly drawn and so strenuously adhered to as it generally is in civilized nations; and the probability is, that nearly all the various forms of property were held in common. As the right of property was in their estimation less strict, the violation of it was less criminal; and they did not look upon the offender with that decided disapprobation which in other places would attach to him in taking the same articles. They probably regarded him with nearly the same feelings with which we regard a man who, in passing through an orchard that belongs to us, takes a few apples, or who occasionally draws water from our well. He takes our property, it is true; but as the right of property in those cases is held, by common consent, to be a loose or mitigated one, we do not call it theft, nor regard it as criminal.

And further, in looking at Captain Cook's account a little more minutely, we see evidence in the narration itself of the correctness of this view. "At first," he says, "on entering the ship, they endeavoured to steal everything they came near, *or, rather, to take it openly, as what we either should not resent or not hinder.*" In another place he says, in explanation of their conduct, "they thought they had a *right* to everything they could lay their hands on." We learn also, that, after they were made to understand the English notions of property and the penalty attached to a violation of it, they soon laid aside such conduct.—It is obvious, if they had attached the same ideas to taking property which we attach to stealing, they would not have taken it *openly*, as much so as if they supposed they either had a right to it, or that the owners would not resent or hinder their taking it.

§ 270. This view of the subject further illustrated from cases of assassination.

It would be easy to introduce other illustrations, which would seem properly to come under this head. For instance, there is no crime in respect to the enormity of which the opinion of mankind is more decided and unanimous than that of assassination. But the objector to the doctrine of an original moral sense assures us, that about two centuries ago assassinations were frequent in Scotland, and that they appeared to be committed without any symptoms of compunction. A state of things which is sometimes alleged to be inconsistent with an implanted and universal moral nature.

As to the fact of the frequency of assassinations at that period, and of their being perpetrated with but little remorse, there can be no doubt. But, before we can properly pronounce this state of things to be inconsistent with a moral nature, we ought to inquire into the civil and political condition of the country. It appears from Dr. Robertson that the power of the Scottish princes was at that time limited; so much so that an attempt to punish the crimes of a chieftain, or even of his vassals, often excited rebellions and civil wars; and that, as a general thing, the administration of justice was extremely feeble and

dilatory. "Under a government so feeble," he adds, "men assumed, as in a state of nature, the right of judging and redressing their own wrongs." There seems to have been a practical abandonment of all just public authority; and each man was in a great degree left, in the protection of his person and rights, to his own efforts. Under such circumstances, might we not reasonably expect that assassinations would be frequent? Was not this state of things essentially a mere transfer of the right of Capital Punishment, which was then universally supposed to exist, from the hands of the magistrate to the hands of individuals? If the right of taking life was acknowledged to be possessed by magistrates, might not private individuals naturally be led to suppose that the same right, in extreme cases, devolved upon them when the magistrate failed to afford protection? And, furthermore, if this condition of things, dreadful as it undoubtedly was, proves that the Scotch people were by nature destitute of a moral sense then, does it not follow that they have no moral sense, no conscience now?

§ 271. Reference to a cruel law of the Athenians.

In connexion with the view of the subject which is now before us, we ask the attention of the reader to a single instance more. At one period of the history of Athens, it was decreed, that when the city was besieged, all the useless people should be put to death. "This," says Montesquieu, "was an abominable political law, *in consequence of an abominable law of nations.* Among the Greeks, the inhabitants of a town taken lost their civil liberty and were sold as slaves. The taking of a town implied its entire destruction, which is the source not only of those obstinate defences and of those unnatural actions, but likewise of those shocking laws which they sometimes enacted."

§ 272. Of diversities and obliquities of moral judgment in connexion with speculative opinions.

Furthermore, we may reasonably expect, in the fourth place, that there will be diversities of moral judgment, based upon diversities in important speculative opinions in morals, politics, and religion, and, in truth, upon almost

any subject.—Some years since, the speculative opinion seems to have been prevalent through nearly the whole of the civilized world, that the Negroes were an inferior race, located in the graduation of rank somewhere between the brute animals and man. This was the speculative belief. And what has been the consequence? The fires of desolation have been kindled upon the coast of Africa; villages and towns have been destroyed; a continual war has been kept up among the native tribes; and probably forty millions of persons have been torn away from their native country, and consigned to perpetual slavery.

While this erroneous speculative opinion held possession, to a considerable extent, of the minds of men, the authority of conscience was paralyzed; her voice, if it was heard at all, was feeble, and scarcely excited notice. And why should it be otherwise? If the Negroes are truly an inferior race to white men, darkened in intellect and imbruted in the affections, incapable of taking care of themselves, and, still more, of any intellectual and social advancement, what harm is there in bringing them into vassalage, and making them grind, like the brute animals to which they are so nearly related, in the prison-house of the more favoured species? The difficulty is not so much with the conscience as with the erroneous opinion.

We learn from the memoirs of the Rev. John Newton, of England, a man as much distinguished for his piety as for his intelligence and eloquence, that he was for some years personally engaged in the Slave-trade; and that, too, after he had professed, and, to all appearance, with great sincerity, to be guided by the principles of the Christian religion. Such were the prevalent notions in regard to the blacks, that the traffic does not appear to have occurred to him as being morally wrong. He expressly says: "During the time I was engaged in the Slave-trade, I never had the least scruple of its lawfulness." He pursued it without any of those compunctious visitings, which could not fail to have troubled him if he had regarded them, as surely they ought to be regarded, as children of the same common parent, and as partici-

pators, in the view of unprejudiced justice, in the same common inheritance of natural rights. But, at the present time, owing to the meritorious exertions of such men as Clarkson and Wilberforce, and the general progress of just and liberal sentiments, the speculative opinion is in a great degree demolished; the black man stands forth in the eye of philosophy and religion as our brother; and he who engages in this nefarious traffic is branded as an outlaw and a pirate.

§ 273. Further illustrations of the influence of wrong speculative opinions.

The speculative opinion has formerly existed very extensively, and does still to some degree, that the civil authority has a right, in relation to its own subjects, to exact conformity in the matters of religion. And the result has been, that thousands and hundreds of thousands, at various times and in different countries, have been subjected to imprisonment, the torture, exile, and death. And those who have been the leading agents in these horrible transactions, from an unconverted Saul of Tarsus down to the Lauds and Bonners of later times, have perpetrated them, in their own estimation, with washed hands and a pure heart. They have gone from the Oratory to the dungeon of the Inquisition; they have, with unquestionable sincerity, looked up to heaven for a blessing, as they have applied to their mangled victims the screw and the wheel of torture; they have arisen from the knee of supplication, to kindle, with a pious haste, the fires of Smithfield, and to wield the exterminating sword of the St. Bartholomew. They have done all this merely in consequence of entertaining a wrong speculative opinion *conscientiously*.

§ 274. Of the effect of wrong speculative opinions among heathen tribes.

And if such are the effects of wrong speculative opinions in civilized and Christian lands, what can we reasonably expect will be the result of erroneous opinions in lands which are neither Christian nor civilized? "If they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?"—It is a truth of universal application, that a wrong intellect will make a wrong conscience, because

it is the nature (and although it sometimes suffers under the application of its own principles, yet, on the whole, it is the excellence and glory of its nature) that it acts in conformity with the intellectual perception.

It is said that Indian mothers on the banks of the Ganges sometimes throw their children into the sacred stream. Is this a proof that they are by nature destitute of the natural affections? Certainly not. Nor is it a proof that they are naturally destitute of a conscience. The whole is probably the result of a wrong speculative opinion, viz., that the gods whom they worship are in some cases propitiated by these precious sacrifices, and require them to be made. Under these circumstances, they hush, with a fortitude worthy of a better cause, the clamours of parental affection; and in the belief that the will of their gods is paramount to every other claim, they consummate the act of unparalleled cruelty with scarce a whisper of internal condemnation.

It is on the ground, also, of a false speculative opinion of a similar kind that we are probably to account for the system of self-torture, such as falling on spikes of iron, dancing with bamboos thrust through the sides, and swinging on hooks, which is to this day so prevalent in some Eastern nations. Conscience naturally condemns any uncalled-for injury to our persons, and all infliction of unnecessary suffering; but when it is a part of men's settled speculative belief that the will of the gods imposes such suffering and exacts such injury, conscience, acting in conformity with the principles of its own nature, necessarily approves.

§ 275. Influence of early associations on moral judgments.

Our moral judgments, in the fifth place, are sometimes perplexed, and led in a direction different from what they would otherwise be, by means of early associations.—The principle of association does not operate upon the moral capacity directly; it operates indirectly with considerable influence. When a particular action is to be judged of, it calls up, in the mind of different individuals, different and distinct series of accessory circumstances. It has the effect to place the thing, intellectually

considered, in a different position. This difference in the tendencies of the associating principle can hardly fail to have considerable effect in modifying the sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, resulting from the consideration of any particular action.

Accordingly, when vices are committed by near friends, by a brother or a parent, although they fill us with the deepest grief, it is frequently the case that they do not excite within us such abhorrence of the actual guilt as we should be likely to feel in other cases. Our prepossessions in favour of the persons who have committed the crime, suggest a thousand circumstances which seem to us to alleviate its aggravation. We frame for them a multitude of plausible excuses, which we should not have thought of doing had it not been for the endearments and intercourse of our previous connexion.—Savage life also gives us an illustration of the views now expressed. Owing to the peculiar situation of those in that state, and the consequent early associations, a factitious and exaggerated importance is attached to mere courage; and gentleness, equanimity, and benevolence are, as virtues, proportionally depressed.

§ 276. Illustration of the principle of the preceding section

In the late expedition to the Rocky Mountains, undertaken by order of the Government of the United States, various interesting facts were ascertained concerning the Savage tribes through which the party passed. Among other things, it was ascertained that the Omawhaws,* a tribe of some note, dwelling a little distance from the river Missouri, are wanting in respectful regard to their old people, and that they look upon them as useless burdens to the community. When the aged go out on a hunting-party, or on warlike expeditions against an enemy, they are sometimes left under a hastily-erected shelter, and are thus permitted to perish after consuming the scanty stock of provisions with which they are furnished.

Here, in all probability, we see the influence of early associations. The Omawhaws are taught, even from the

* Long's Expedition to the Rocky Mountains, vol. i., chs. x. xi.

cradle, to attach their chief honour to *active* bravery, to feats in battle, and to achievements in hunting. And they transfer (as a Savage would be likely to do) the unquestionable discredit of moral and physical debility in the earlier periods of life to the period of old age. They carry these views so far, that when, through want of provisions, some of the tribe or of the party must die, the lot inevitably falls on the aged instead of the young. But we hold that this fact does not necessarily prove these Savages destitute of natural conscience. It does not appear that they expose their old men to death in this way before the exhaustion of their provisions. And the probability is, that when, in that exigency, they leave them to perish, they do it with feelings of regret, and with the consent and choice of the aged sufferers themselves. On the supposition that such are the circumstances under which their old men are exposed, the most that can justly be said is, that the feelings of nature, already weakened by the influence of unfortunate associations, are made to bow to the exigencies of their situation. It may appear that they have a wrong or perverted conscience (that is to say, a conscience led astray by their early habits and associations), in permitting the sacrifice of the aged in preference to that of the young; but it by no means follows that they have no conscience at all. Especially as they are described as being hospitable, so far as they have anything to give; courteous and respectful in their general intercourse, affectionate in their families, and not wanting in justice in the ordinary distribution and management of what little they possess.

Let those who, in civilized lands and under equal governments, are comparatively free from suffering, remember, before they pronounce unfavourably and harshly upon the moral obliquities of others, the intense and uncounted evils which they sometimes endure. The heart that thrilled with sensibility, and was alive to every moral impulse, may be left, in the intensity of bitter experience and of agonized recollections, to the perpetration of deeds of unspeakable horror. A missionary, dwelling among the Natives of South America, once reproached a woman with the fearful crime of having put her own

infant daughters to death. She replied to the missionary in words of the following purport:

"Father, if you will allow me, I shall tell you what passes in my mind.—Would to God that my mother, when she brought me forth, had shown as much regard and compassion for me as to have spared me the pain I have hitherto suffered, and must continue to suffer until the end of my days. Had she buried me when I was born, I should not have felt death, and she would have preserved me from all I am indispensably subjected to, as well as from labours more cruel than death is terrifying. Alas! who knows the troubles awaiting me before it arrives? Can a mother do anything more profitable to her daughter than save her from multiplied disasters and a slavery worse than death? Would to God, father, I repeat, would to God that she who gave me life had testified her affection by depriving me of it at my birth: my heart would have had less to endure, and my eyes less to weep."*

§ 277. Of diversities of moral judgment in connexion with an excited state of the passions.

Furthermore, there may be diversities of moral judgment; in other words, the moral nature may occasionally be perplexed and led astray in its action, under the influence of a state of excited passion.—The action of all the parts of the mind is a *conditional* one; that is to say, it takes place only under certain assignable circumstances. It is, for instance, one condition of moral action, as we have repeatedly had occasion to notice, that there must be an antecedent perception of the thing, whatever it is, upon which the moral judgment is to be passed. This condition of moral action is violated in the case under consideration, as well as in others. In a time of great excitement of passion, the moral emotion, which would have existed under other circumstances, has failed to arise, because the soul is intensely and wholly taken up with another species of feeling. The perceptive and comparing part of the mind is not in a situation to take a right view of the subject, whatever it is. But after the

* Historical Illustrations of the Passions (Anonymous), vol. i., p. 162.

present passion has subsided, so as to give the person an opportunity to inquire and reflect, the power of moral judgment returns. And at once the individual, who has been the subject of such violence of feeling, looks with horror on the deeds which he has committed. So that the original susceptibility, the existence of which has been contended for, cannot justly be said to be extinct in such cases, although its due exercise, as is sufficiently obvious, is prevented by the accidental circumstance of inordinate passion.

Further: those who imagine that there are no permanent moral distinctions, because they are not regarded in moments of extreme passion, would do well to consider, that at such times persons are unable rightly to apprehend any truths whatever, whether they relate to morals or anything else. A murderer, when drawing the blade from the bosom of his victim, probably could not tell the quotient of sixteen divided by four, or any other simple results in numbers; but certainly his inability to perceive them under such circumstances does not annul numerical powers and distinctions, nor prove the absolute want of a power to perceive them. Why, then, should the same inability take away moral distinctions, or prove the absolute absence of a moral susceptibility?

§ 278. Of the action of the conscience in connexion with strong temptation.

We may add to the considerations which have now been brought forward, that there may be expected to be some diversities in the decisions of the moral sensibility, occasioned by diversities in the degree of temptation which happens to bear upon it. The moral sensibility or conscience, as it developes itself in the feelings of moral obligation, is in immediate contact with the will, and furnishes a powerful motive to action. But the power of these feelings, considered as motives to action, is of course limited; it has its boundaries; it cannot overcome everything. Of course, if our desires, which are the antagonist principle of action, are very strong, there is a possibility, at least, of the sentiments of duty being overcome. And, in point of fact, this is sometimes the case.

But how does it happen that the feelings of obligation, or sentiments of duty, which so frequently predominate, have less power in these particular cases than the desires? It is because the intellect, under the instigation of the desires, gives a distorted view of things, representing our own claims in the most favourable light, and darkening and depressing the claims of others. The conscience labours under the disadvantage of having before itself an erroneous view of the facts; which have the twofold effect of reacting upon and increasing the intensity of the desires, and, at the same time, of blunting the edge of moral perception. Hence another class of what are called violations of conscience; that is to say, of apparent want of uniformity in its decisions.

Under this head we may properly introduce a statement from the travels of Mungo Park. He is speaking of a tribe of Africans called the Mandingoes. After saying that they discovered an insurmountable propensity to steal the few articles of property which he possessed, he goes on to remark as follows: "For this part of their conduct no complete justification can be offered, because theft is a crime in their own estimation; and it must be observed, that they are not habitually and generally guilty of it towards each other. This, however, is an important circumstance in mitigation; and, before we pronounce them a more depraved people than any other, it were well to consider whether the lower order of people in any part of Europe would have acted, under similar circumstances, with greater honesty towards a stranger than the Negroes acted towards me. It must not be forgotten, that the laws of the country afforded me no protection; that every one was at liberty to rob me with impunity; and, finally, that some part of my effects was of as great value in the estimation of the Negroes, as pearls and diamonds would have been in the eyes of a European. Let us suppose a black merchant of Hindostan to have found his way into the centre of England with a box of jewels at his back, and that the laws of the kingdom afforded him no security; in such a case, the wonder would be, not that the stranger was robbed of any part of his riches, but that any part was left

for a second depredator. Such, on sober reflection, is the judgment I have formed concerning the pilfering disposition of the Mandingo Negroes towards myself. Notwithstanding I was so great a sufferer by it, I do not consider that their natural sense of justice was perverted or extinguished; it was overpowered only for the moment, by the strength of a temptation which it required no common virtue to resist.

"On the other hand, as some counterbalance to this depravity in their nature, allowing it to be such, it is impossible for me to forget the disinterested charity and tender solicitude with which many of these poor heathens, from the sovereign of Sego to the poor women who received me at different times in their cottages when I was perishing of hunger, sympathized with my sufferings, relieved my distresses, and contributed to my safety."*

§ 279. Of the existence of a moral nature in connexion with public robbers and outlaws from society.

In concluding this subject, there are one or two topics remaining which may be worthy of a brief notice.—Those who object to the doctrine of a moral sense will be likely to appeal, in support of their own view of the subject, to the conduct of robbers and outlaws from society. In regard to these persons, we are to consider, in the first place, that they are few in number compared with the whole number of mankind. And the fact that a few persons appear to be destitute of a conscience ought not to be admitted in positive disproof of a doctrine which is supported by the evidence presented in so great a majority of cases. Furthermore, before the cases of those persons referred to can be entitled to much weight in the present discussion, it might be important to know under what circumstances they seceded from society, and became the enemies of their species. Is it not possible that some, perhaps many, of these individuals were driven into their present evil course by cruel disappointment and poverty, combined with contempt, injustice, and oppression on the part of their fellow-men? It is certainly supposable, under circumstances so trying,

* Park's Travels in Africa, p. 297.

that misanthropy, deeply rooted and terrible, may spring up in hearts that, in better days, were distinguished from others only by a higher degree of sensibility and honour.

It is somewhere related, that, a few years since, an Englishman was impressed on board a ship of war. He left behind him a wife and a number of children. The woman some time afterward was found guilty of stealing a piece of cloth, and was executed. At her trial and execution she confessed the crime, and simply mentioned, in extenuation of her guilt, that the deed was committed under the influence of temptation, originating from the extreme want and suffering of herself and her children, consequent on the cruel and constrained absence of her husband. Is it easy to imagine the terrible feelings which must have convulsed the bosom of the husband on his return? With the bitter recollection constantly present to his thoughts, that he had himself been torn away from his family by the unfeeling hand of arbitrary power, and that his wife was ignominiously put to death by the same power, for a crime of which, unquestionably, his own forced absence was the occasion, it would not be greatly surprising if he became from that moment the enemy of his country and his species, and lived only for revenge. But as we see him afterward a pirate and a robber, burning with hatred and clothed with blood, we are not at liberty to say absolutely that he has no conscience. The truth is, that such overwhelming feelings of grief, hatred, and revenge have seized the mind, that the conscience, if we may so express it, is smothered beneath them. In the fever and madness of the brain, in the convulsions and clamours around, and above, and beneath it, its still small voice has ceased to be heard.—Things of this nature are obviously to be taken into consideration in forming a just estimate of all cases of this kind.

§ 280. Illustration of the fact that there are the remains of conscientious feeling even in the most depraved of men.

But there is another view which is worthy of notice in connexion with this subject, viz., that among the most depraved and hardened of mankind, among thieves and robbers, we sometimes discover a kindness to one another.

and a strict regard to their word as it has been pledged among themselves, and in some cases to others not of their own party, which shows the remains of a moral nature.— Some years since, the island of Sicily, in the Mediterranean Sea, was infested with Banditti. Mr. Brydone gives his readers to understand, in his well-known Tour into that country, that he took some pains to inquire into the character of these robbers. A certain individual, in whom he seems to have had confidence, gave him the following account of them:

"He says, that in some circumstances these banditti are the most respectable people of the island, and have by much the highest and most romantic notions of what they call their point of honour. That, however criminal they may be with regard to society in general, yet, with respect to one another, and to every person to whom they have once professed it, they have ever maintained the most unshaken fidelity. The magistrates have often been obliged to protect them, and even pay them court, as they are known to be perfectly determined and desperate; and so extremely vindictive, that they will certainly put any person to death who has ever given them just cause of provocation. On the other hand, it never was known that any person who had put himself under their protection, and showed that he had confidence in them, had cause to repent of it, or was injured by any of them in the most minute trifle; but, on the contrary, they will protect him from impositions of every kind, and scorn to go halves with the landlord, like most other conductors and travelling servants, and will defend him with their lives if there is occasion. That those of their number who have thus enlisted themselves in the service of society are known and respected by the other banditti all over the island, and the persons of those they accompany are ever held sacred. For these reasons, most travellers choose to hire a couple of them from town to town, and may thus travel over the whole island in safety."

Mr. Brydone himself further adds in a subsequent passage, "I should have mentioned that they have a practice of borrowing money from the country people, who never dare refuse them; and if they promise to pay it,

they have ever been found punctual and exact, both as to the time and the sum, and would much rather rob and murder an innocent person than fail of payment at the day appointed; and this they have often been obliged to do, only in order (as they say) to fulfil their engagements and to save their honour."

§ 281. Of errors in the statements of travellers.

The views which have been presented in this Chapter obviously explain, so far, at least, as to make them consistent with the doctrine of a natural conscience, many of those cases of wrong and cruelty in the conduct of Savage tribes which have attracted so much of the notice of travellers. It is proper, however, in order to have a fair view of the subject, to make one remark more, viz., that the statements which travellers have given of the immoralities, irreligion, and cruelties of such tribes, are in some cases either mistakes of the facts or exaggerations of the facts. Mr. Stewart distinctly asserts, that this is the case to a considerable extent; without supposing, however, that, as a general thing, such mistakes or exaggerations are intentional. In this view Sir James Mackintosh seems to concur. Speaking of the universality of those great social and moral principles which are the guardians of human society, he remarks, "the exceptions, few as they are, will, on more reflection, be found *rather apparent than real.* If we could raise ourselves to that height from which we ought to survey so vast a subject, these exceptions would altogether vanish; the brutality of a handful of Savages would disappear in the immense prospect of human nature, and the murmurs of a few licentious sophists would not ascend to break the general harmony."*

Certainly the probability is, that a full and just statement of the moral condition of Savage tribes, containing not only an exact specification of the facts, but a philosophical analysis of them considered in reference to the peculiarities of their situation, has never been given to the world. In some instances, travellers have been so much influenced by first impressions as to give an intensity and vividness of colouring to their statements, which

* Discourse on the Law of Nature and of Nations, 2d ed., p. 36.

is far from being warranted by subsequent inquiry. In other instances they have been too hasty in their inductions, and have ascribed a trait of immorality or cruelty to a tribe or nation, which in strictness should have been limited to individuals; and perhaps it may be said, have not, as a general thing, exhibited that degree of philosophical perception and analysis which is requisite to an accurate and just understanding of this subject.

§ 282. Instances in proof of the preceding views.

In some of the early accounts of the Savage tribes of North America (those of Winslow, Hearne, and Colden, for instance), it was confidently asserted that those tribes were destitute of any religion whatever. This was unquestionably a mistake. Winslow afterward corrected it in his Work, entitled, Good News from New-England. "Whereas," he says, "myself and others, in former letters, wrote that the Indians about us are a people without any religion or knowledge of any God, therein I erred, though we could then gather no better."*

Niebuhr, a traveller of deserved celebrity and weight, in speaking of the Arabians, makes the following statement, which may be considered as confirmatory of the suggestion that the narrations of travellers are, in some respects at least, to be received with some degree of caution.

"Several travellers accuse them of being cheats, thieves, and hypocrites. An arbitrary government, which impoverishes its subjects by extortion, can have no favourable influence indeed upon the probity of the nation; yet I can say, from my own experience, that the accusations laid against them have been exaggerated above the facts. The Arabs themselves allow that their countrymen are not all honest men. I have heard them praise the fidelity with which the Europeans fulfil their promises, and express high indignation against the knavery of their own nation, as a disgrace to the Mussulman name."†

A single other instance will tend to illustrate and con-

* See Francis's Life of Eliot, p. 33.

† Niebuhr's Travels through Arabia and other Countries in the East, sect. xxix., chap. 4.

firm what has been said on this subject. It has been narrated by travellers, as a prevalent custom among the uncivilized tribes of Africa, that those mothers who bear twins immediately put one of them to death. On this subject Vaillant speaks of himself as having made particular inquiries The result of his inquiries was, that some of the tribes, the Gonaquas, for instance, are exempt from this reproach. In other tribes he admits that the crime exists, but asserts it is very rare. He represents the people as revolting at the very idea of it. And in those few cases in which it actually exists, he expressly adds: "It has its source, however incredible it may seem, in the tenderest love. It is a dread of not being able to nourish two children, or of seeing them both perish, that has induced some mothers to sacrifice one of them." And he subsequently makes the further remark: "It would therefore be a great calumny against these people, to give as a constant practice a few barbarous actions, which they condemn, and which they belie so well by their conduct."*

CHAPTER IV.

IMMUTABILITY OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

§ 283. Remarks on the reality of right and wrong, and on the standard of rectitude which is involved in their existence.

If on some occasion we are asked why we approve of some actions and disapprove of others, the answer which we are very likely to give is, because the action which is approved is RIGHT, and the action which is disapproved is WRONG. If we are asked again why we feel under moral obligation to do some things and to avoid the doing of others, the answer of the same purport will probably be, because the performance in the one case would be RIGHT, while the performance in the other would be WRONG.—This language, if it be properly em-

* Vaillant's Travels in Africa, p. 296

ployed, evidently involves that there is such a thing as right and such a thing as wrong. And the existence of right and wrong further involves, that there is a great standard of Rectitude, by a reference to which the morality of every action is to be measured. This idea we hold to be in the highest sense an important one.

If there is such a thing as right and wrong, and if there is such a thing, as we shall endeavour in this chapter to show, as an immutable distinction between them, it is impossible that the character of human actions, so far as they are done deliberately and voluntarily, should be indifferent. There is a great law, a great rule and measurement of justice held over them, expansive as creation, and lasting as eternity.

§ 284. Of the origin of the ideas or abstract conceptions of right and wrong.

Of the origin of the ideas of right and wrong we have formerly had occasion to speak (vol i., § 192). Of course it will be the less necessary to delay upon that subject here. It may be proper, however, to remind the reader, that the terms right and wrong (which some, perhaps, might regard as a reason for distrusting the reality and permanency of rectitude) do not express anything which is perceptible by the senses. Whatever Right or Rectitude may be, in itself considered, it is obviously not an object of the mere outward perceptivity; we cannot see it nor touch it; we cannot define its shape nor designate its locality. Nevertheless, it is not a matter in any sense remote or doubtful, but is brought home and fully made known to us in a manner less liable to uncertainty and skepticism, viz., by means of the action of the Internal or Pure Intellect; that is to say, the Intellect, operating in virtue of its own nature, and independently of the instrumentality of the senses. It is in this way that we know it, although not under a material shape. Like the Deity himself, it is ever present, but ever invisible; silent, but always operative; enthroned in the centre of the universe, but pervading its utmost limits; and estimating, by the standard of its own perfect and unalterable purity, all moral actions.

It is the business of the moral Sensibility or Conscience, by means of the moral Emotions and the feelings of moral Obligation, to bring us into conformity to this standard, and to indicate all deviations from it. The standard of right, as we have just had occasion to intimate, is revealed in the Intellect; and not in the Intellect acting on the doubtful information of the senses, but by its own inherent and unerring promptings. The power, the object of which is to secure a conformity to this standard, exists in the Sensibilities. Accordingly, it may be added, although men may go astray, and, in point of fact, this is too often the case, notwithstanding the admonitions of the Conscience, yet Rectitude itself remains unchanged. It is not a mere outside, a mere superficies without any substantiality. Nor is it a mere image, of which it can be said, in the spirit of cavilling and skepticism, that it is inscribed over with characters of doubt and uncertainty. In its developement in the inward vision, it not only reveals itself with a stamp and likeness of its own, which cannot possibly be mistaken for anything else, but it is also true, which is both philosophically and practically of great importance, that it stands in its own nature immutably and eternally based, not, as some seem to suppose, in the fickle foundations of personal interest and of mere positive enactment, but in the unalterableness of the constitution of things.—This, at least, is essentially the view which we feel ourselves obliged to take of it, and which we now propose to support by the following considerations.

§ 285. The immutability of moral distinctions supported by the views which men take of things in their nature or essence.

The doctrine of the permanent nature of Rectitude, and of the immutability of Moral distinctions, seems to find support, in the first place, from the views which men are generally found to take of things in their nature or essence.—Everything which exists necessarily has a *nature*; not merely in the general sense of that term, but a specific nature of its own. "Everything," says Bishop Butler, "is what it is, and not another thing." In other words, there is something (although perhaps that some-

thing is wholly unexplainable) which renders the thing that exists what it is in distinction from everything else; some element, some distinctive quality, some primordial characteristic, *something* (we do not profess nor consider it necessary to be exact in the expression of it) which is truly and absolutely essential both to its existence and the mode of its existence, and without which it would not be what it is. And this is equally true, whether the thing in question be made known to us as something material or immaterial; whether it is objective or subjective, an object which the mind contemplates exterior to itself, or an internal and purely mental modification; whether it be regarded as an independent entity, an attribute, or a mere relation. This seems to be self-evident and undeniable; because, if the thing which exists has not a specific or distinct nature, then it is not a distinct existence, but is identical with something else. And this is so clear that we need not hesitate to assert, although God, to the full extent of his omnipotence, can create things even out of nothing, and can modify them with every possibility of modification, He cannot do either without giving them a nature; without imparting some distinctive element. These simple and common-sense views we may apply to everything which exists or is conceived to exist, to the whole universe of mind and of matter, of thought and of objects of thought.

§ 286. Illustrations of the views of the preceding section.

(1.) Beginning with those things which are addressed to the senses, we may remark, in illustration of what has been said, that every kind of *colour* has something in it by which it is distinguished from every other colour which is truly diverse from it. Every variety of the sensations of taste also, such as sweet, bitter, acrid, sour, has its specific nature (whether we consider the sensation merely, or include the outward cause that produces it), which stamps and characterizes it as such a sensation, and not another one. All the varieties of sound, numerous as they are, have each their peculiarity, their distinctive trait or quality, and which cannot fail, really and for ever, to separate them from all other varieties of sound.

In no one of these cases can one sensation or perception be another; each stands by itself in its own nature and essence, and it is not possible even to conceive of them as interchangeable.—(2.) If we turn our attention to those objects of thought which are internal, and which are not so closely connected with and dependant on outward causes, as those things just mentioned, we shall find it to be the same. We are able, by means of that power of Original Suggestion, which constitutes one of the effective elements and characteristics of our mental structure, to frame the abstract notions of existence, unity, identity, succession, number, power, time, space, and the like. And all these have respectively a nature appropriate and peculiar to themselves. Although we are unable to give a verbal definition of Unity or of Time, yet every one knows what is meant by these terms; every one has a knowledge for himself, sufficiently clear and satisfactory for all the common purposes of reasoning and practice. But while, in themselves considered, they lie clear and distinct in our perceptions, we also perceive, with the entire clearness of intuition, that they are not the same; that each has its appropriate sphere; that they stand truly and for ever apart from each other. The same may be said of Space and Power. Both of these are made known to us by the original, the suggestive power of the mind alone; and as the mind is the source, so it is the measure of the knowledge which we have of what we thus term. And we may confidently assert, that the mind pronounces them not only wholly distinct, but wholly unlike. And it is utterly impossible for the human mind (as we doubt not every one will find on fully making the experiment) to conceive of Power becoming Space, or of Space becoming Power, as much so as to conceive of the actual identity of UNITY and TIME, or of the identity of mere EXISTENCE and SUCCESSION. And it is the same with every other simple notion which we form, whether of external or of internal origin; that is to say, whether wrought in the mind by the presence of some external object, or flowing from its own fulness. Whatever we perceive or feel to exist which is elementary and simple, we never can perceive or feel to exist otherwise

than it is; and perceiving it to be just what it is, and nothing else, we cannot possibly perceive it to be something different.—(3.) We might carry these illustrations into the Sensitive part of our nature. As an example, every man is capable of putting forth, or, what is, perhaps, a more proper expression of the fact, of *experiencing* the emotions of pleasure and pain; and although it is admitted we cannot give an available definition of these emotions, still every one knows what they are. And if there is any elementary proposition whatever, which is so simple as to be beyond doubt and to possess a truly *intuitive* character, it is, that our experience of pleasure is not the experience of pain, and, on the contrary, our experience of pain is not the experience of pleasure. And, furthermore, the abstract notions which we are obviously able to form of the emotions of pleasure and pain, and which, in point of fact, we always do form whenever we make them the subjects of abstract inquiry and philosophical analysis, are entirely distinct from each other, as well as the emotions themselves. But, in respect to the *emotions* in particular, the pleasure and pain actually experienced, the difference which by nature exists between them, is perhaps more fully and promptly recognised. Without the least hesitation, we may appeal to the testimony of any man's consciousness, whether it is not utterly impossible for him even to conceive (we do not say of the mere *substitution* of pleasure and pain for each other, which is a wholly different thing) of pleasure, in itself considered and in its own nature, as actually being pain, or of pain, while it exists as pain, as actually being pleasure. In themselves considered and in their own nature, they are utterly, fundamentally, and entirely distinct; so much so that the human mind itself cannot mingle and confound them, without confounding and subverting its own nature as a percipient. Even the Supreme Being, although he may cause, and prolong, and diminish them in particular cases, cannot make them identical. While they exist, there is necessarily something which constitutes and authenticates their existence; and this constitution or nature of the thing can never be any otherwise than what it is.

§ 287. Application of the foregoing views to the doctrine of the immutability of moral distinctions.

The views which have been given, and which are obviously fundamental, apply to the abstract conceptions of RIGHT and WRONG, as well as to any other thoughts, emotions, or objects of thought which have been referred to As to the fact that men universally form the notions of RIGHT and WRONG, there can be no question. These ideas take their place as clearly and distinctly in the series of our intellectual conceptions as the notions of *existence*, *personality*, *duration*, *space*, and the like. A person who should be known to be incapable of forming them, would be considered an anomaly; a creature altogether out of the line of the ordinary precedents of human nature. And if we are able to frame these notions, as we obviously are, then each of them has its distinctive nature; and if there is any foundation for the remarks and illustrations already given, as we cannot doubt there is, we cannot possibly conceive of them as identical, or interchangeable with each other. They are as truly unlike as our conceptions of *unity* and *time*, or of *space* and *power*. We can no more conceive of their being identical, than we can conceive of the identity of black and white, of bitter and sweet, of pleasure and pain, of love and hatred, of a square and a circle, of a triangle and a hexagon, or of any other things in nature which are entirely diverse from each other. They are placed for ever apart; they respectively occupy their own sphere, and stand upon their own basis; they do indeed sustain a sort of relation to each other, and perhaps it may be said that we cannot have a conception of them without at the same time having some conception of this relation; but this relation itself not only involves their entire diversity, but places them at the greatest possible remove, and stamps them as the direct opposites and antipodes of each other.

Hobbes maintained, and in this he seems to have followed in the track of some ancient philosophers, that our ideas of right and wrong are not representative of something permanently existing in the nature of things, but are relative to the enactments and operations of human laws and systems of government. In other words, he

maintained that nothing is either right or wrong in its own nature, but is made either the one or the other by the laws of the land: what they pronounce to be right *is* right, and what they pronounce to be wrong *is* wrong, without regard to anything else. This is a great fallacy. It is true that the laws of the land can make our conduct, considered in relation to those laws, very different from what it was before their enactment; but this is not because they can, by a direct operation, change virtue into vice or vice into virtue, but simply because they change the circumstances and relations under which that conduct exists. It is just as inconceivable that a mere human law can make an action either virtuous or vicious, while the circumstances under which it is performed remain the same, as that such a law can make black white, pleasure pain, truth falsehood, space time, a square a circle, or make anything else *identical* which is at the same moment and in its very nature *diverse*.—We stand here upon strong ground, because we go to the bottom; there is no mistake; the human mind must be demolished, and undergo a rebuilding and reconstruction before it can verify any other result. Such, at least, it seems to ourselves; but we willingly leave others to judge, while we proceed to other considerations.

§ 288. The immutability of moral distinctions shown, secondly, from the terms and the structure of languages.

(II.) The unchangeableness of rectitude and the immutability of moral distinctions is shown, in the *second* place, from the terms and the structure of all languages. —So far as we have been able to notice, those writers who object to the doctrine under consideration do for the most part resolve rectitude into some form of good and happiness on the one hand, or into some form of enactment and law on the other. This is the predominant direction and train of thought among them. But do the terms and the structure of the different languages which are spoken by men sustain this course? Certainly not. We are not ignorant that Horne Tooke, in his Diversions of Purley, has endeavoured to show, by etymological considerations, that the English word *right* is, in its ori-

ginal import, synonymous with the words *commanded* or *ordered*. But the question is, not what is the derivation of the English word *right*, nor what was the specific import of its root, but what is its precise meaning at the present time? There certainly can be no great obscurity or misapprehension in regard to it; it is a word used by writers of no doubtful powers of discernment; it is often enough found in those great masters of pure English, Fox and Burke, Junius and Chatham.

But while we assert that it is not obscure, we do not hesitate to admit that it is undefinable, which is necessarily the case when we consider that it is the name of a simple, inseparable element of thought. It nevertheless lies clear and distinct in every one's conceptions; and if, in consequence of its being the name of a simple idea, we cannot define what it is, we can unhesitatingly assert what it is *not*. And, accordingly, we do not hesitate to insist, that the term *right* is used at the present time as expressive of something distinct from mere personal good, interest, or happiness. On a multitude of occasions, men use the terms interest, personal good, and happiness as expressive of what, in their own opinion at least, is so far from being identical with right or justice, that it is at the very greatest remove from it. There are some men who have unceasingly pursued their interest all their days, and who, if interest and rectitude are identical, ought to be accounted exceedingly *upright* men, instead of being stigmatized by the unanimous voice of the public, as they very justly are, with the character of base, dishonest, and unrighteous. There is hardly any practical distinction so frequently made, and made with so good reason, too, as that of acting from views of interest in the shape of some personal good, and acting from views of right and duty. If men have occasion to intrust their property and the management of their affairs to others, they invariably make distinctions; they inquire as to traits of character; it is not enough to tell them that their proposed agents are men more or less influenced by views of interest; they wish to know, and are not often satisfied short of knowing, whether they are men of honesty, men of uprightness. If they have occasion to address motives to their

fellow-men, in order to induce them to pursue a certain course, we again find them making distinctions, and addressing some motives to their views of interest, and, as a distinct consideration, addressing others to their convictions of rectitude. But it can hardly be considered necessary to give instances of what is so palpable in the transactions of the whole mass of society. What is true of the English language, what is true of the Latin—where we find the terms *utile* and *honestum* conveying what we express in English by the interested or beneficial and the upright—will undoubtedly be found to be true of all other languages, which are so far developed as to be anything like an adequate mirror of the perceptions and feelings of those who speak them.

Men also universally make a distinction between what is right and what is merely ordered or commanded; between the legality of an action or course of action, and its moral rectitude, as we shall have occasion to remark more particularly hereafter.—Now it is to be kept in mind, that language, in its terms and in its structure, is an index, an expositor (and, perhaps, more completely so than almost anything else) of the opinions and belief of mankind. If it be indisputably true that men in all parts of the world use words with this distinction of meaning, we may look upon it as absolutely certain, that they suppose and fully believe that such a distinction actually exists. And this universality of belief, like everything else, must have its adequate cause; but we are unable to lay our hands on such a cause, except it be that the very structure and action of the human mind does of itself develope clear and abundant evidence of the distinction in question, marking out lucidly the province of rectitude or virtue, and separating it from that of every other possible motive. The human mind, in its structure and its original and natural action, cannot lie, if the God from whom it came is a God of truth; and constructed as it is, and acting as it does, if it clearly announces the distinction between rectitude on the one hand, and mere personal interest and mere authoritative command on the other (insulating it, and placing it on an immoveable basis of its own), then it is certainly true that such a distinction actually has place,

and that there is truly such a separate, appropriate, and unchangeable position of virtue.

§ 289. The immutability of moral distinctions shown, thirdly, from the operation of the passions of gratitude and anger.

(III.) We have evidence, in the *third* place, of the independent and immutable nature of moral right, from the manner in which feelings of gratitude and anger are exercised in view of the reception of supposed benefits or injuries.—Men are so constituted that, if a favour is bestowed upon them, they are grateful for it. We do not assert that the exercise of gratitude always exists in different individuals with precisely the same degree of intensity, or that feelings of this kind may not in some cases be entirely subdued. But, as a general characteristic of human nature, it is true that gratitude follows favours or benefits bestowed. And, on the other hand, feelings of dissatisfaction and anger follow the infliction of injuries. The argument which we here offer depends upon the alterations which are found suddenly to take place in the exercise of these feelings. If, for instance, in some period of great misfortune and poverty, a stranger freely gives us a sum of money, and thereby relieves us from our distresses, we feel a degree of gratitude to him. We have received an essential benefit, and we cannot help feeling grateful. But if we shortly afterward discover that, in bestowing this gift, he was influenced exclusively by personal and selfish motives, by some anticipation of ultimate benefit to himself, our feelings of gratitude at once cease; it is impossible that we should be grateful to him under such circumstances. We very justly conclude that no moral merit attaches to him, in consequence of the bestowal of his gift, and that he has not the least possible claim upon us for feelings of that description. But it will be noticed, that we ourselves are just as much benefited by his gift as if he had bestowed it from purely benevolent motives, while, at the same time, we may suppose that the personal and self-interested objects of the donor are secured. Here are benefits on both sides, to the giver and the receiver. Now if mere interest, if mere benefit either to ourselves or others, did of itself, and independently of all other considerations, constitute right or

virtue, then our feeling of gratitude would not change; the circumstance of the man's acting from interested motives would make no difference; we should be just as grateful to him for his kindness as we were at first. But this is not the case; and such is the constitution of our nature that it cannot possibly be the case. We accordingly have here very striking evidence, that the circumstance of an action's being a beneficial one to the agent, or even to any one else, does not necessarily make it a right one; and that mere self-interest or good to ourselves is very far from being identical with uprightness.—And it is essentially the same under the reception of supposed injuries. We are at such times dissatisfied, indignant, angry, and have reason to be so. But if we subsequently discover that the sufferings which we have endured were occasioned by mere accident or by some unavoidable necessity, without any degree of ill feeling or evil intention, our feelings at once change; we may grieve and lament at what has happened, but it is impossible, in any proper sense of the term, to be longer angry. Now, although our feelings in respect to the person who has injured us are changed, we may suppose that we ourselves suffer just as much as we did before, but still we do not feel at liberty to make our suffering the measure of the evil intention or wrong. That is something which we intuitively perceive to stand by itself, independently of any results which may have happened, and which is to be estimated, not by a reference to any accidental circumstances whether favourable or unfavourable, but from a contemplation of its own nature. All these considerations go to show, that in every case of voluntary conduct which is not perfectly indifferent, there is a right or wrong; which right or wrong, whatever may be their attendants and accessories, cannot be resolved into mere happiness and unhappiness, into mere good and evil, or into anything else.

§ 290. Shown, in the fourth place, by the character of the emotions, which arise in view of actual instances of right and wrong.

(IV.) That there is an immutable standard of right and wrong, is shown, in the fourth place, by the existence and character of those emotions which are always found

to arise within us when any instance of right or wrong in actual life comes under our notice. The origin of the abstract notions of right and wrong is, where Cudworth has placed it, in the INTELLECT, using the term in distinction from the sentient part of our nature. We are so constituted, that, whenever occasions of actual right or wrong occur, these ideas or *intellections* (if we may use a good term, though somewhat antiquated) naturally and necessarily arise within us. God has so constituted us, that, in the matter of Morals, the intellect has a share as well as the sensibilities. It is the intellect, sometimes we say the *pure* intellect (that is to say, the intellect, wholly disconnected in its action from the senses), which makes known to us the abstract conception, the pure and beautiful ideality of rectitude, and which, therefore, constitutes for every action an inflexible rule or standard of right or wrong; but it is the Moral Sensibility or Conscience which makes known to us and to others whether we or they approximate to or diverge from that standard. Now, if we look into this interesting and important part of our mental nature (that is to say, into the *conscience*), and consider the emotions which have their origin there, we shall have additional evidence of the truth of our doctrine. In every instance of moral conduct, there is abstractly a right or wrong pertaining to that conduct; it is the province of conscience, in the exercise of those emotions of approval and disapproval which are appropriate to it, to determine which of the two it is. In other words, there is applicable to every instance of moral conduct the immutable standard of rectitude; and it is the province of conscience to determine whether the action in question is conformable to that rule or not. Conformity to the standard of rectitude is approved, divergency from it is disapproved; and the intensity of the emotions of approval or disapproval, if the conscience be not perverted, as it sometimes is, will be in proportion to the greater or less degree of divergency from the immutable rule. Now here is a distinct class of emotions, the emotions of moral approval and disapproval, which, when we consult our consciousness in respect to them, we know to be essentially different from emotions of beauty, of sublimity, of

the ludicrous, and from all other emotions; we know them to have a specific nature of their own, to be *sui generis*. Every person who is acquainted with the philosophy of the mind, knows that every class of emotions has its specific and appropriate objects. And what are the objects which are the basis of these emotions? in other words, what are the objects in connexion with which they are found to exist, and not otherwise? Undoubtedly human actions, in connexion with the great fact derived from the original and unalterable suggestions of the intellect, that they are placed under the surveillance and the requisitions of the immutable standard of rectitude. Actions thus circumstanced, and nothing else (neither beauty, nor interest, nor fame, nor any other possible object of contemplation and pursuit), are the appropriate objects of these emotions. They do not arise on any other occasions; they disdain to have anything to do with lower objects; they elevate themselves to a higher mark; they inquire not for the pleasure of actions nor for the emolument of actions, but for the right or wrong of actions. This is the true account of these emotions; and they therefore take for granted, in their very nature, the reality of Right in distinction from everything else, and the real and immutable separation of right from wrong.

But perhaps it will be said, that if mere personal interest, good, or happiness does not constitute right, that authority and law does. Is not human law, within the acknowledged sphere of its operation, the rule of duty? Does it not constitute the standard of right to those who come within its reach? And especially the Divine law, the express will of the Supreme Being, is not that the source of rectitude on the one hand and of crime on the other; of rectitude when it is obeyed, and of crime when it is disobeyed? These questions undoubtedly are worthy of consideration. We do not feel disposed to avoid an answer to them, even if it were practicable. Something has already been said having a bearing upon them; but we will let them have a distinct place, without, however, breaking the train of thought or altering the form of the argument.

§ 291. Shown, in the fifth place, from the deportment and conduct of individuals, and from the character of codes of law and civil institutions.

(V.) The doctrine of the permanent nature of Rectitude and of the Immutability of moral distinctions, finds support, in the *fifth* place, from what we notice of the moral judgments of mankind in respect to the deportment and conduct of individuals, and also in respect to the character of codes of law, civil institutions, and forms of government. If the human mind were so constituted as to receive the doctrine as a fundamental truth, that Law of itself, whether human or divine, necessarily within the sphere of its operation, constitutes whatever it ordains *right*, and whatever it prohibits *wrong*, then men would universally agree in the application of this standard of rectitude, and would not feel the least compunction or hesitation in justifying all actions whatever which might happen to be performed under the requisitions of law. But this is not the fact. In a multitude of cases, the conduct of men, acting under the forms and requisitions of law, is condemned by the general voice of mankind as utterly unjustifiable and wrong.

One or two instances (perhaps, however, less to the purpose than some others which might be adduced) will illustrate what we mean. In the year 1605, the Dutch government, being then engaged in a fierce war with Spain, gave orders that Spanish prisoners, in retaliation of like severities alleged against the Spaniards, should be put to death. With these orders the Dutch Admiral Hautain set sail to intercept a re-enforcement of Spanish soldiers that were understood to be on their way to Flanders. Having succeeded in capturing them, as was expected, he ordered five companies, in obedience to the commands of the Dutch Government, to be tied together in pairs, and, at a given signal, to be thrown overboard into the sea. This diabolical transaction certainly finds no response in the human bosom. The heart and the conscience of mankind rise up against it as a great abomination, however it may have been sanctioned by law, and provoked by the severities of the opposing party.

The massacre of St. Bartholomew was perpetrated by public authority, and under the plausible forms of law;

but it was a requisition on the very face of it so high-handed and atrocious, that a number of Roman Catholic officers, acting at the almost certain risk of the displeasure of the French Government, refused to lend their agency to carry it into effect. Did they, or does any one else suppose that the mere order of the French Government affected either the right or wrong of that massacre? Had it not in itself a character heaven-daring, atrocious, black, even to the utmost limit of moral turpitude? But this could not be, if human law were in itself and necessarily a source of rectitude, and could spread the mantle of justice over all its requisitions. But it is not necessary to take up time with such instances. It is enough to observe, that men everywhere and in all ages of the world make a distinction between a legal enactment and the *justice* of that enactment, between the *form* and *matter* of a law and its *rectitude;* constantly pronouncing, with the utmost propriety of language and with the utmost truth in fact, one law to be right and another to be wrong, which would be abundantly absurd if the law itself were the source and the measure of right. In the same way men pronounce their opinions upon codes of law, taken as a whole, and upon systems of government. When the laws of Solon are pronounced to be wise and just, and, on the other hand, the code of Draco to be unjust, and in all similar cases, there is an obvious implication that justice is not necessarily identical with the mere requisition of government; that *right* is something above and beyond mere human law; revolving in a higher sphere; spreading abroad a light of its own, and holding all actions, all minds, all systems of government, and all laws amenable to itself.

It will be seen that we bring the subject here to the test of the common feeling and the common sense of mankind. Although sound philosophy clearly asserts and confirms the doctrine of the immutability of moral distinctions, and wholly denies the opposite doctrine that the distinction between right and wrong is a merely prescribed and arbitrary thing, dependant upon the enactment or will of some lawgiver, and, of course, subject to change with every change in such enactment, still it can-

not be said with any justice, that the doctrine in question rests solely upon abstract, philosophical inquiry. It is emphatically, as is evident from the remarks which have just been made, the doctrine of common sense. There is hardly a day passes when we do not hear in common conversation, and from those who have not had the advantages of a philosophical education, remarks made and opinions expressed which obviously involve it. You may be able to perplex a plain and illiterate man with subtile distinctions, to such a degree, perhaps, that he will not be able to give a prompt and satisfactory answer; but you will as soon overthrow his belief in his own personal identity, as convince him that right is not right, or that wrong is not wrong, or that any power on earth, to say the least, can make right wrong or wrong right. This is one of those cases where philosophy may confirm the opinions of the great mass of mankind if she pleases; but to overthrow or even to unsettle them is not at her option.

§ 292. The doctrine further shown from the opinions which mankind entertain of the character and government of God.

(VI.) The doctrine under consideration is supported, in the *sixth* place, by the opinions which mankind generally entertain of the character and the administration of the Supreme Being.—Some persons may be disposed to admit, that human laws are not in themselves the source of right and wrong; and, at the same time, be strongly inclined to maintain that it is otherwise with the laws which emanate from God. They hold that the will of God, and nothing but the will of God, constitutes whatever of a moral nature takes place throughout the universe, either right or wrong. But the doctrine of the immutability of moral distinctions (in other words, that moral right and wrong always has its foundation ultimately in the nature and relations of things), if it be capable of being established at all, and has any real basis whatever, is of universal application; it reaches everywhere, and everywhere asserts the distinction between mere will and justice, between power and equity.—We proceed then to remark, that this doctrine, notwithstanding the exceptions

now hinted at, is supported by the opinions of the great mass of mankind in relation to the character and the administration of the Deity.

In the opinion which mankind generally form of the Supreme Being, we notice that they always include the idea of right, equity, or justice. They never think of him as a God possessed of knowledge or power merely, but as a God of righteousness. And they constantly speak of Him as a just, holy, or righteous Being. Whatever He does, they assert, is done rightly or justly. Now, unless we suppose, which we certainly are not at liberty to do, that they apply these epithets without any meaning, we are to regard these terms as expressing a distinct and important fact in their belief. But this is not true if the doctrine under consideration be false. For, if God's will or mere enactment constitutes of itself, and independently of everything else, all right and wrong, then the assertion that God is right or just, and does justly, is obviously an identical proposition; and is the same as to say that he is what he is, and does what he does. But we do not suppose any one will pretend to say that men use terms with such an absence of all meaning. They obviously have a clear perception of the distinction between power and equity, between the mere command and the justice of that command in their own case, and in the applications of human power and laws generally; and they apply the distinction without any hesitation to the character and doings of the Supreme Being. And they not only apply the distinction, but they obviously involve in it the same great ultimate fact which is implied when they apply it to men, viz., that Rectitude is a thing which is not dependant on mere power, enactment, or will in any case whatever.

For instance, a preacher asserts, in the presence of his congregation, that the law of God is holy, just, and good; everybody understands it; everybody assents to it. But if he should go on to state that the Law is just because it is a Law, and for that reason solely, and that, if it were directly the opposite, it would be equally just for the same reason, they would undoubtedly reject the statement at once as utterly inconsistent with the common feelings

and common sense of mankind. If they are not capable of making philosophical distinctions, they are so constituted, in the very elements of their moral nature, as to entertain a far higher notion of a *just* law than such a statement would imply. They may be asked what they mean by right; what they mean by the immutability of moral distinctions; what they mean by the nature of things; but although, as has already been remarked, they may be puzzled in giving an answer, they are not at all perplexed and darkened in their perceptions; and would as soon be brought to disbelieve in the truth of the simplest mathematical axioms, as to disbelieve in the distinction, the utter and immutable distinction, between right and wrong, justice and injustice.

§ 293. Further remarks on the subject of the last section.

It will, of course, be understood, that we would not be guilty of the impiety of suggesting that God ever does in fact otherwise than right, or that his Law ever is, or can be, otherwise than perfectly just. What we mean to say is, that God is not just in his acts simply because he has power to perform those acts, and that his Law is not just simply and solely because it is a Law; which, if we are not wrong in our views, would involve the annihilation of all justice whatever. The doctrine of the immutability of moral distinctions does not, as some might be led to suppose on a slight examination of it, set up an authority in opposition to that of God, but merely asserts a great fact in the nature of things, which, in whatever point of view it may be contemplated, is entirely, and in all cases whatever, consistent with his character and his acts. If it be true, as undoubtedly it is, that God cannot, by a mere volition, make right wrong or wrong right, it is not the less so that this does not in any respect militate with his essential attributes. It constitutes no derogation from his perfections, and interposes no obstacle to the administration of his affairs. And we here take the liberty to inquire of those who hold that the doctrine under consideration is derogatory to the character of the Supreme Being, whether there are not other things, besides the distinction of right and wrong, which do not depend upon

his mere arbitrary will. It certainly, so far as we can perceive, does not depend upon the mere enactment or will of God, whether a thing shall exist or not exist at the same time. The mere supposition implies something which is inconceivable. It does not depend upon his mere choice or will (and we hope it may be said without incurring the suspicion of any want of due reverence for his exalted character) whether three and three shall make six, and four multiplied by four shall make sixteen; whether the whole shall be greater than a part, and things equal to the same shall be equal to one another; whether there shall be motion without change of place, or figure without extension; whether the three angles of a triangle shall be equal to two right angles; or whether a square, circle, and triangle shall be different figures. These are things which it seems to be universally conceded do not depend upon the will of God or of any other being; and it is impossible that they should. But if we are right in our supposition that no one regards this as derogatory to the character of the Supreme Being, why is it more so that there is an immutable distinction between right and wrong; that whatever is right or wrong to-day will be right or wrong (all the circumstances of the action remaining precisely the same) to-morrow, next day, next year, and forever?

§ 294. Further proof from a consideration of the relation which the doctrine bears to the original and permanent character of the Supreme Being.

(VII.) In the *seventh* place, if the distinction between right and wrong be not permanent and immutable, but depends wholly upon God's volition, then, antecedently to such volition, God himself could not have possessed a moral character, but must have been wholly destitute of all moral excellence.—Obviously the act of volition implies, whenever it takes place, the antecedent existence of the being who puts forth such volition. If there is anything self-evident, it certainly is so that there can be no volition unless there is a being already actually existent from whom the volition proceeds. But if moral distinctions be not involved in the nature of things, but are subsequent to a particular volition, which volition creates them, and brings them into entity and form, then moral rectitude was

not predicable of God nor of any other being until he had put forth such volition. If morality, which of course involves the distinction between right and wrong, be a matter of *creation*, then the Divine character must necessarily have been a moral blank until the act of creation had taken place. It was necessarily, in a moral point of view, neither morally good nor evil; because, by the supposition, the distinction between moral good and evil was not yet established. The volition had not yet come to its birth; the resolve of the Most High was still dormant; the command had not been issued which was destined to call up virtue from its unexistent state, to dislodge it from the chaotic mixture of other elements, and give it an impress and character. The Supreme Being, therefore, antecedently to the origination of morality (whether that origination took place sooner or later, after the lapse of a million of years or of a single moment), was necessarily destitute of moral perfections.

And this is not all. If right and wrong are not immutable, but are liable to be abolished or to be interchanged with each other by a mere enactment or volition, then it cannot be said with propriety and truth that God is *immutably* a holy or just being. If he can, by a mere command, change virtue into vice or vice into virtue, he can certainly destroy all moral excellence whenever he pleases, and blot it out from the universe. If his Law can create the distinction of right and wrong, his Law can also annihilate it. If morality depends upon his arbitrary and unrestricted volition, it of course depends upon it in the same way in which the creation or destruction of a world depends upon it. And whenever he issues his overwhelming fiat, the columns of the moral universe will crumble and fall to pieces as readily as those of the physical. On this system, the Being whom we worship and adore to-day as holy, just, righteous, may to-morrow undergo the erasure of his own volition, and not exhibit one trait of holiness, justice, righteousness.— It will perhaps be said that we have the authority of his own word for the permanency of his moral perfections; in other words, that he has promised he will continue to manifest and to do justice. Granted. But why is he

bound to keep his word? Because there is a right and wrong in the case; because, as an incident to this right and wrong, there is a moral obligation, a duty, which is firm and immutable. Here, undoubtedly, is firm footing; but on the opposite system, which makes right and wrong depend on a mere enactment or volition, the obligation to keep his word may cease whenever he wills it to be so; and his word, his law, his moral excellences may all suddenly sink together, and the Being whom we worship as perfectly spotless and holy, may become a Spirit of unmixed and unmitigated evil.

§ 295. Of the proofs of this doctrine from the appeals which are made in various parts of the Scriptures.

(VIII.) Finally, if we rightly understand the Revelation which God, in his great goodness, has made to the children of men, He has himself taken the ground, not only that the principles of rectitude are eternal and immutable, but that he himself, with all his transcendent excellences, is amenable, and desires to be considered as amenable, to them. He speaks of his throne not only as established, but as established in *righteousness*. He speaks of himself not merely as the Creator, not merely as a God of wisdom and power, but as a just, a holy, a righteous God. And these expressions are employed so frequently and in such connexions as to place it beyond all doubt that they have a distinct and substantive meaning, and are not identical in their import with expressions which intimate his ascendency, power, or greatness. And not only this, he seems to have authorized the whole universe of moral and intelligent beings (the human race in particular, among others) to act as arbiters and judges in the case, whether his character and conduct are not in all respects in perfect accordance with the requisitions of that fixed and immutable rectitude, which exists interwoven and imbedded in the very nature and constitution of things. He does not, in moral things, impose mere arbitrary commands, but only such commands as he can support by an appeal to their own moral judgments. And such appeals are actually made in a number of instances, as in the following passages: "Oh, my people, what

have I done unto thee? And wherein have I wearied thee? *testify against me!*" "Come, now, and let us *reason* together, saith the Lord." And again he says, in a tone of authority and rebuke: "Yet ye say, the way of the Lord is not equal. Hear now, oh house of Israel, is not my way equal? Are not your ways unequal?" He then goes on to state the great principles of his moral government, in their application to the wicked and the righteous, and appeals to them as judges whether he is not just. And again he says, "And now, oh inhabitants of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, *judge*, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard. What could have been done more to my vineyard that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?" And in another passage, "Thus saith the Lord, what *iniquity* have your fathers found in me, that they are gone far from me, and have walked after vanity, and have become vain?"*

From these, among other passages of Scripture, it appears that God does not require his rational offspring to approve his enactments on the ground solely of their proceeding from himself, but is willing that they should exercise their own powers of examination, and judge for themselves whether they are right or not. But this implies that justice on the one hand, and command or law on the other, are different; and that, whenever the law is just, it is not so merely because it is commanded, but for other reasons. And we may here with propriety inquire, whether there is not much satisfaction in the thought that the foundations of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, are thus deeply and immutably laid. If it were true that God himself could overthrow or demolish them, would it not be a source and occasion of great perplexity and dismay? For such a supposition would necessarily involve the possibility of an utter change in his own character. If, in our contemplations of the Supreme Being, it should occur to us, as a thing merely possible, that those high perfections which we now reverence and adore could be transmuted into vices, it would certainly diminish our reverence, disturb our confidence, and fill us

* Ezek. xviii., 29. Micah vi., 8. Isaiah i., 18; v., 3, 4. Jerem. ii., 5

with unspeakable alarm. But this certainly is possible, if the distinction of right and wrong is not fixed and immutable, but depends wholly on the Divine Will.

§ 296. Remarks in conclusion of what has been said on this subject.

Such are some of the considerations which are commended to the attention of the reader. There are others which we shall not particularly notice. For instance, the doctrine that right and wrong depend wholly upon law or enactment, even that of the Supreme Being, implies, of course, a knowledge of that Being. And yet there can be no doubt of the fact of our being so constituted, that tribes of men, who are destitute of any correct knowledge of the Supreme Being, and also atheists, who deny and disbelieve in his existence, are capable of forming the notions of right and wrong, of believing in a standard of right and wrong, and of conforming their ordinary conduct to that standard, much in the same way and degree as the great mass of mankind. But we do not consider it necessary to remark further; evidence more than enough has already multiplied upon us.

In view of what has been said, we leave the subject in the hand of the reader with this single practical remark, That uprightness or virtue is an object to be contemplated in itself, and to be loved and practised for its own sake.—It is to be loved, and honoured, and practised, not simply because it is commanded, not simply because it may in its results be beneficial, but solely for itself, and out of a regard to its own exalted nature. This is a great practical truth, which strikes at the roots of certain systems of moral philosophy, that have too long had an influence in the halls of education. There can be no question that it has a very injurious effect to teach youth that a certain thing is virtuous or vicious, right or wrong, merely because it is commanded, or because it is beneficial. It is pernicious, because it lowers the standard of moral excellence; and it is as false as it is pernicious. Virtue is not secondary to something else, but is primary; it has an entity and a character of its own; of all the objects in the universe, it is highest in rank; it is the great illuminating point of mind, as the sun is the great illumi-

nating centre of matter. And youth, instead of being permitted to gaze upon the IGNIS FATUUS of expediency or any other false fire of earth, should be taught to fix their eye upon that great and heavenly light, to contemplate it, to honour it, to love it. They should be so imbued with the love of virtue as to inquire, as it were by a sort of *instinct*, not whether an action is required by one high in power or promises to be beneficial, not whether it will advance the interests of a particular sect or party, but, in all cases, whether it is RIGHT. With such a training of their moral dispositions, they will stand firm when everything is shaken and in commotion around them; they will have strength in themselves, a strength not of earth; they will go forth amid the scenes of this dark world, surrounded with a light emanating from their own bosoms, and under the smiles of an approving God.

CHAPTER V.

MORAL EDUCATION.

§ 297. Suggestions on the importance of moral education.

WE do not feel at liberty to leave the subject of the Moral Sensibilities without offering a few remarks, chiefly of a practical nature, on the subject of moral education in general. It is perhaps unnecessary to occupy time in attempting to show the importance of such education, since no one can be ignorant of the deplorable consequences which follow from an utter neglect of it. But, notwithstanding the general concession of its importance, it has ever held a subordinate rank compared with that purely intellectual education which deals wholly with the mere acquisition of knowledge.

While no one presumes to assert that moral education is unimportant, it must be acknowledged that it has been exceedingly neglected, in consequence of the greater value which has generally been attached to that training of the mind which has exclusive relation to its intellect-

ual part. It seems to be a fact generally admitted, that children and youth have been taught with great zeal in everything where the head is concerned, in grammar, geography, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and the like, and in almost nothing which concerns the heart. No pains have been spared in favour of the intellect; while the sensitive part of our nature, the moral emotions, the lower modifications of desire, and the affections, have been left to take care of themselves.

Supposing this to be nearly the true state of things, every reflecting mind must contemplate it with regret, and will look forward with great interest to the time when moral education shall at least be put on a footing with intellectual, if it do not take the precedence of it. Certain it is that a firm and ample foundation is laid for this species of mental training, if the doctrines which have been advanced in the course of this Work are correct: FIRST, that we have *intellectually* the power of forming the abstract conceptions of right and wrong, of merit and demerit, which necessarily involves that there is an immutable standard of rectitude; and, SECOND, that, in the department of the Sensibilities, we have, in correspondence with the fact of such an immutable standard, the implanted principle of the Moral Sensibility or Conscience, which, in the Emotive form of its action, indicates our conformity to the standard of rectitude or divergency from it, and in its Obligatory action authoritatively requires conformity. We assert that we have here basis enough for a consistent and durable moral education, especially when we take into view the close connexion existing between the conscience and the intellect, particularly the reasoning power.

§ 298. The mind must be occupied at an early period either with good or bad principles.

It may perhaps be suggested here, admitting the general fact of the great importance of moral education, that it would be better to leave the subject of morals until persons are old enough to decide on all subjects of this nature for themselves. This suggestion would be entitled to more weight, if it were possible in the mean while for

the mind to remain a moral blank. But this does not appear to be the case. As the mind is continually operative, it is almost a matter of course that it receives, and, as it were, incorporates into itself, moral principles either right or wrong. We are surrounded with such a variety of active influences, that he who is not imbued with good cannot reasonably expect to be uncontaminated with evil. In order, therefore, to prevent the contaminations of vice, it is necessary to preoccupy the mind by the careful introduction and the faithful cultivation of the elements of virtue. Let the young mind, therefore, the minds of children and youth, be made the subjects of assiduous moral culture.

The doctrine which was formerly advanced by Rousseau and others, that children and youth are incapable of receiving moral and religious ideas, and of sustaining a character on moral principles, is unsound in point of fact and most pernicious in its tendency. All experience goes against it. In France, where it has found its most numerous advocates, its evils have been very deeply felt. A recent French writer, who cannot be suspected of giving unfavourable representations of his countrymen without a cause, thinks that the widely-spread domestic corruption and miseries which he acknowledges to exist can be corrected only by a greater attention to early moral education. This remark implies that the origin of those evils is chiefly to be found in the abandonment (or, at least, great *neglect*) of such education, without which, it must be obvious to every judicious mind, that individual happiness will be exceedingly diminished, that the peace of families will be put at hazard, and that the props and securities of the commonwealth will be dislocated and swept away.

§ 299. Of the time when moral instruction and discipline ought to commence.

We cannot but conclude, therefore, that a course of moral training ought to be commenced at an early period. It is a truth sufficiently established, that we begin to learn as soon as we begin to exist. The infant no sooner comes into the world, than the mind expands it

self for the reception of knowledge as naturally as the flower opens its rejoicing leaves to the rising sun. The earnestness which it discovers as it turns its eye towards the light or any bright object, its expression of surprise on hearing sudden and loud sounds, its strong propensity to imitate the actions and words of its attendants, all show most clearly that the work of intellectual developement is begun.

While no one doubts this early developement of the intellect, it has not been so generally admitted to be true of the pathematic and moral part of our nature. But there is no sufficient ground, as we have already had occasion to intimate, for a distinction in this respect; the developement of the head and the heart, of the intellect and the sentient nature, begins essentially at one and the same time. It is true that the perceptive or intellectual action is necessarily antecedent in the order of nature; but the sensitive action, both natural and moral, follows closely and perseveringly in its train. And this also may be added, viz., that the developement of the moral nature in its leading outlines appears to be sooner completed. Facts and the relations of facts, which are the subjects of the intellectual activity, are infinite. But the great principles of morals, however multiplied they may be in their applications, are in themselves few and simple. How few persons of the age of fourteen or sixteen years have completed their attainments in knowledge, and have fully unfolded and strengthened all their intellectual powers! And yet how many at the same age have established such a decided moral character, either for good or evil, as almost to preclude the hope of a correction of its deformities in the one case, or the enhancement of its beauties in the other!

§ 300. Of the discouragements attending a process of moral instruction.

And here we would remark upon one discouragement which frequently attends the efforts of those who are so situated as to render it especially their duty to impart instruction to the young. We refer to the fact that it is sometimes, and but too frequently the case, that they see but little immediate good results from their labours.

They can see distinctly the advancement of their pupils in that knowledge which is appropriate to the intellect, but are less able to measure their progress in what pertains to the moral culture. Indeed, they too often believe that their instruction is seed sown upon stony ground, which is not only unproductive at present, but is absolutely and forever lost.

This is a great mistake. The truth is, that nothing is lost. The moral and religious instruction which is communicated to the youthful memory, is deposited in the keeping of a power which may sometimes slumber, but can never die. It may long be unproductive; it may remain for years without giving signs of vivification and of an operative influence, and yet it may only be waiting for some more favourable and important moment, when it shall come forth suddenly and prominently to view. No one, therefore, ought to be discouraged in the discharge of this duty. In nothing is the Scriptural declaration more likely to be fulfilled in its richest import. "Cast thy bread upon the waters, and thou shalt find it after many days."

Multitudes of illustrations might be introduced to confirm the views of this section. How natural is the following incident! And how agreeable, therefore, to sound philosophy!—"When I was a little child," said a religious man, "my mother used to bid me kneel beside her, and place her hand upon my head while she prayed. Ere I was old enough to know her worth, she died, and I was left much to my own guidance. Like others, I was inclined to evil passions, but often felt myself checked, and, as it were, drawn back by the soft hand upon my head. When I was a young man I travelled in foreign lands, and was exposed to many temptations; but when I would have yielded, *that same hand was upon my head*, and I was saved. I seemed to feel its pressure as in the days of my happy infancy, and sometimes there came with it a voice in my heart, a voice that must be obeyed: Oh, do not this wickedness, my son, nor sin against thy God."

◊ 301. Of the importance, in a moral point of view, of adopting correct speculative opinions.

But while we assert that there is ample basis in the

mental constitution for a moral education, that this education ought to be commenced at an early period, and that such a course of training has its due share of encouragements, we acknowledge that it is not an easy thing in a few words to point out the characteristics, and to indicate the outlines of a system of moral culture. Accordingly, we shall not attempt it any further than to add a few general suggestions. We proceed, therefore, to remark, that suitable pains ought to be taken to introduce into the young mind correct speculative opinions.

It was seen in a former Chapter that the conscience acts in view of the facts which are before it. It will follow, therefore, if we adopt wrong opinions, whatever they may be, they will have an effect upon the conscience. If these opinions be important, be fundamental, they will be likely to lead us in a course which, under other circumstances, we should regard as wrong in the very highest degree. The belief that men by nature possess equal rights, is in itself nothing more than a speculative opinion; but this opinion, simple and harmless as it may seem in its enunciation, is at this moment shaking thrones, unbinding the chains of millions, and remodelling the vast fabric of society. The opinion that the rights of conscience are inalienable, and that no one can regulate by violent means the religion of another, is breaking the wheel of torture, and quenching the fire of persecution, and quickening into life the smothered worship of the world. The speculative opinion that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, appeared in the form of man, and by his death made an atonement for sin, is a truth, simple and ineffective as it may at first sight appear, which has already changed the face of domestic and civil society, and, like a little leaven which leaveneth the whole lump, is secretly regenerating the whole mass of human nature.

We infer, therefore, that it is highly important to consider well what truths we adopt. The doctrine that it is no matter what we believe, if we are only sincere in it, is derogatory to the claims of human reason, and full of danger. What persecutor, what tyrant, what robber, what assassin may not put in his claim for a sort of sincerity, and, in many cases, justly too? It is a sincerity, a con-

scientiousness, based on all the wisdom which human intelligence in its best efforts can gather up, and nothing short of this, which stands approved in the sight of human reason and of a just Divinity.

§ 302. Further remarks on the same subject.

The important remark of the Saviour to his disciples, "and ye shall know the TRUTH, and the TRUTH shall make you free," seems to have a connexion with this subject. It indicates that the truth, in other words, substantial and well-balanced knowledge (whatever other aids and appliances may be requisite in the progress of the religious life), is naturally effective, in a very high degree, in the renovation of the character and the support of just morals. In that great day when all hearts are tried, our Conscience itself will frown upon us, as guilty of a great dereliction of duty, if we have not taken every possible means to enlighten it.

The false practices of heathen nations, as we have had occasion to see in a former chapter, are very many of them based on false speculative opinions. The effect of their reception of the truth, as it is revealed in the Christian system, is at once to do away these practices. Touched by the quickening influences of divine knowledge, the benumbed and torpid conscience starts into a newness of life, and exercises once more its long-abdicated authority. The whole heathen world, so far as it has come under the influence of the Gospel, is a proof of this remark. It is the Word of God, filled as it is with moral and religious truth, which is destined to be instrumental, under the superintendence of a beneficent Providence, of the rectification of the moral errors of the human race.

§ 303. Of the knowledge of the Supreme Being, and of the study of religious truth generally.

And, in connexion with what has been said in the preceding section, we proceed to remark further, that all morality must necessarily be defective, in a greater or less degree, which proceeds on the principle of excluding RELIGION. It is true that a man who is not religious (in other words, who has not a sincere regard for the char-

acter and institutions of the Supreme Being) may do many things which are right and are morally commendable, but he does not do *all* that is right; he comes short in the most essential part; and he thus throws doubt and perplexity, a sort of dimness and obscuration, over whatever lustre might otherwise have shown itself in his other acts. In fact, the amount in which such a person fails to do right is so very great, as compared with the amount in which he does not fail to do right, that it is almost a common remark, although not strictly true, that an irreligious person does *nothing* right. At the same time, although he may do some things right, yet his failure in infinitely the most essential point renders it impossible to speak of him, with any degree of propriety and truth, as a right, that is to say, as a just or holy person.

We assert, therefore, that moral education must include, as a leading element, some instruction in regard to the existence and character of God, and those religious duties which are involved in the fact of his existence and character. Our conscience, the office of which is to adjust our duties to our ability and the relations we sustain, imperatively requires this. In the eye of an enlightened intellectual perception, God stands forth, distinct from and pre-eminent above all others, as an object infinitely exalted; and a want of love to his character and of adhesion to his law is, in the view of conscience, a crime so grossly flagrant in itself as not to be atoned for by any other virtue. And not only this, a proper regard for the character of the Supreme Being has such a multiplicity of bearings and relations, in consequenee of the diffusion of his presence, and the multiplicity of his acts and requirements, that the crime involved in the want of it seems to spread itself over the infinite number of transactions, which, taken together, constitute the sum of life. So that the doctrine of the existence of God, received into the intellect, and attended, as it should be, with perfect love in the heart, is beyond all question the great foundation and support of a truly consistent moral life.

§ 304. Of the application of the principle of habit in morals.

The law of HABIT, the nature of which, and some of its

applications, have been explained in former chapters, has an important bearing here also. The more scrupulous and exact we are in the observance of the practical part of morals, the more easy it will become. Every repetition of morality, in whatever acts it may show itself, will strengthen the moral tendency. So that, at last, the whole life will run easily and vigorously in the path of rectitude.

The utterance of the truth is morally right; deviation from the truth, or utterance of falsehood, is morally wrong. And here, perhaps, we may find an illustration of the effects of the law of Habit, in its connexion with morals. It probably has come within the reader's notice, that there are some men who, in practice as well as in principle, are exceedingly scrupulous in the utterance of the truth. When they repeat either what has come under their own observation or what they have learned from the narrations of others, they are strictly and seriously exact in their statement. They are conscientiously anxious not to admit the slightest deviation; and this anxiety extends not only to the statement itself, but to the manner in which it is received and understood by others. They thus form a HABIT of veracity; and those results, which might naturally be supposed to be involved in a case of habit, are witnessed. Such persons have so long and so steadily exhibited this trait of strict veracity, that it seems to be inherent in them, something incorporated in the constitution itself. No temptations, whether sudden or remote, are able to make them swerve from the truth; and their assertion, whenever and wherever made, instead of being met with misgivings and monitory cautions, is readily and fully received by those who hear it.

There is a second class of persons, who would esteem themselves injured in having their veracity suspected, but who have formed habits which render it necessary that their testimony should be carefully examined. We allude particularly to the habit which some have formed, of telling extraordinary stories, or anecdotes of whatever kind, which are intended and are calculated to interest. They consider themselves, in a measure, pledged to meet the interest which they know to be excited on the part of those present, and are, therefore, under an extraordinary

temptation to enliven and embellish their narration. If any circumstances have escaped their memory which were essential to the unity of the story, their own invention is taxed to furnish them, since it is too late to search for, and of too much consequence to omit them. In this way they become in time not a little insensible to the false colouring which they give to their statements, and convey erroneous impressions without being conscious of an intention to deceive.

The former habit, that of great and conscientious strictness in what we say, is not only favourable to truth, but is favourable to character; it raises a man in our estimation, and gives him a weight which he might not otherwise possess. The latter contributes, in a greater or less degree, to falsehood; and, by inevitably throwing some perplexity and doubt over his integrity, essentially lowers the subject of it in the general confidence.

§ 305. Further views on the influence of moral habits.

The effects of HABIT, in its connexion with moral character, may be seen frequently in the outward deportment; in simplicity and modesty, in a benevolent civility in the common intercourse of life, in strict propriety of demeanour and expression, and in many other things, which, taken by themselves, seem to be of small consequence, but which, in their collective influence, have unquestionably an important bearing on morals.

The effects of HABIT, both for good and evil, are constantly seen in the various exercises of the appetites and passions. Whatever is good and commendable in that part of our nature, may be strengthened by repetition and encouragement; and, on the other hand, whatever is evil may be weakened and gradually done away by an opposite system of repression. It is very desirable, in a moral point of view, to keep the angry or resentful passions entirely under control, which it is difficult to do without the aid of the law of habit. These passions, like all the other natural and implanted passions, reveal themselves outwardly by certain natural signs, such as a kindling eye, a flushed countenance, violent gesticulation, and a hurried and raised tone of voice. And it is an interest-

ing fact, that the suppression of the outward signs, which, in general, is a thing entirely within our power, operates powerfully to suppress the internal passion. While, on the other hand, the outward manifestation, whenever it exists, the fierce look, the angry tone, the violent action, generally imparts a renovated impulse to it. Accordingly, a habit of repressing the outward signs of Resentment will be found to give great power in properly regulating a state of mind which, whatever may be its character under other circumstances, cannot be otherwise than wrong, and deeply wrong, in its excess.

It would certainly not be difficult to point out other applications of the principle of habit where it may obviously be made auxiliary to moral improvement. Our moral principles, however correct they may be, will be of but little value to us, unless they are put into practice by being incorporated into the daily and hourly series of living acts. It is thus that habits are formed, which give strength for the present, and abundant encouragement for the future.—Nor is this all. If our habits are the opposite of conscientious; in other words, if we disregard the suggestions of the moral sense, and, in repeated and frequent instances, throw contempt upon its authority, the probability is, that the edge of its perception will be blunted, and that it will be partially paralyzed and weakened in its operation. It may be difficult, in some respects, to explain how this result takes place; but the result itself seems to be beyond doubt. In truth, it may be regarded as only one form or instance of what appears to be a general fact in our mental constitution, viz., that all the powers of the mind suffer under a system of inactivity and repression. Action, and action, too, in a given manner, is their natural food, their appropriate aliment; and when, in consequence of any obstacles that may be thrown in their way, they are deprived of this, they wither away, and become gradually more and more undiscriminating and powerless, although it cannot be said as a general thing, certainly not in the case of the conscience, that they suffer an absolute extinction.

§ 806. Of the importance of correct morals in connexion with our civil and political situation.

We bring what has been said to a conclusion, necessarily brief as it is, by the single remark more, that this subject, while it is exceedingly important to all persons, is particularly so to the citizens of this country. In this remark we have particular reference to the popular form of our government. A government which is based in power that is lodged somewhere else than in mere public sentiment, may by possibility sustain itself amid the prevalence of loose moral principles. But it is otherwise in a government which depends for its support upon the opinions of the people. If there be any truth which the history of all ages has clearly established, it is, that a republican form of government cannot be sustained for any length of time without purity in the public moral sentiment. In this country, everything of a civil and political nature depends upon public opinion. There is nothing in the whole length and breadth of our civil and political institutions, from the Constitution of the Union down to the charters of the humblest municipal corporations, which is not susceptible of being changed, amended, and even abrogated by the power of the popular voice. So that it may be said with a great degree of truth, that the permanent law of the country, that which creates, regulates, and preserves the whole vast system of written and prescriptive law, is to be found in the intelligence and the virtue of the community. How deplorable, then, will be our situation, if the time shall ever come when the people of the United States shall permit themselves to disregard or to underrate the important subject of correct morals!—It is an easy matter to proclaim in the corners of the streets the excellence of democratical institutions; but it is beyond all question, that every man is to be set down as essentially indifferent to their welfare who is not willing to sustain the testimony of his declarations by the substantial verification of a virtuous life. He who deviates from the standard of strict rectitude, whatever may be his professions in behalf of popular rights, deviates in an equal degree from the standard of genuine republicanism.

THE SENSIBILITIES, OR SENSITIVE NATURE.

SENSITIVE STATES OF THE MIND OR SENTIMENTS.

PART THIRD.

IMPERFECT OR DISORDERED SENSITIVE ACTION.

CHAPTER I.

DISORDERED AND ALIENATED ACTION OF THE APPETITES AND PROPENSITIES.

§ 307. Introductory remarks on disordered sensitive action.

With what has now been said on the subject of our moral nature, we bring the interesting and important department of the Sensibilities, in its two leading forms of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities, and of the Moral Sensibilities, to a conclusion. In saying this, however, we have reference to its regular and ordinary action, or that action which takes place in accordance with the ordinary and permanent principles of the Sensitive nature. But it remains to be added further, that there are instances here, as well as in the Intellect, of marked and disastrous deviations from the salutary restraint which these principles impose. In other words, there is not unfrequently an action of the Sensibilities which is so far out of the ordinary or natural line of the precedents of the heart and the morals, that it may be properly described, sometimes as an imperfect or disordered, and sometimes as an alienated action.—It is to the examination of this subject, a knowledge of which is obviously necessary to a comprehensive and complete view of the Sensibilities, that we now propose to proceed.

§ 308. Of what is meant by a disordered and alienated state of the sensibilities.

It may be proper to remark here, that an imperfect or disordered action of the Sensibilities may express merely an irregularity of action, something out of the common and ordinary course of action; or, as the form of expression is obviously a somewhat general and indefinite one, it may indicate something more. When, for instance, this irregular and disordered state passes a certain limit, goes beyond a certain boundary, which is more

easily conceived than described, it becomes Insanity or Alienation. That is to say, the merely irregular action becomes an insane or alienated action when it becomes so great, so pervading, and so deeply rooted in the mind that the individual has no power of restoration in himself. So that it would seem to follow, in view of this remark, that there may be a disordered state of the mind which is insanity; and, under other circumstances, a disordered state of the mind which is not insanity, or, rather, which is less than insanity. But, in either case, this condition of mind is not to be regarded, nor is it, in point of fact, a sound mental state. Although we may not be able to say specifically in a given case that the disorder has reached the point of insanity, yet it is certain that the mind in this disordered state, whether the disorder be greater or less, is presented to our view in a new and important aspect.

Unquestionably a wide and interesting field of remark is opened here. Nevertheless, what we have to say will necessarily be brief, indicating rather the general trains of thought which naturally present themselves, than following them out into minuteness of detail. And, in executing this plan, imperfect as it can hardly fail to be, we shall conform, so far as may be practicable, to those classifications of our Sensitive nature which have hitherto helped to aid our inquiries.

§ 309. Of the disordered and alienated action of the appetites.

Accordingly, we remark, in the first place, that there may be a disordered and alienated action of the Appetites.—It is well known that the appetites grow stronger and stronger by repeated indulgence. While the process of increased appetitive tendency is going on, there still remains, in the majority of cases, enough of remonstrance in the conscience, and of restrictive and aggressive energy in the Will, to ward off that state of thraldom which is rapidly approaching. But in some melancholy cases it is otherwise; the line of demarcation, which separates the possibility and the impossibility of a restoration, is passed; and from that time onward there is nothing but interminable sinking. Such cases as these may undoubt-

edly be regarded as coming within the limits of some of the multiplied forms of mental alienation.

The most frequent instances of mental alienation, originating in a disordered and excessive energy of the appetites, are to be found in that numerous class of persons who habitually indulge in the use of intoxicating drugs, particularly ardent spirits. When the person who indulges in the use of intoxicating liquors has so increased the energy of this pernicious appetite as really to bring himself within the limits of mental alienation, there is no hope of a return by means of any effort which he himself is capable of making. He may have a clear perception of the misery of his situation; the desire of esteem may still arouse within him the recollection of what he once was and of what he still ought to be; the conscience may still speak out in remonstrance, though probably with a diminished voice; the will may continue to put forth some ineffectual struggles; but it is found to be all in vain. If left to himself, and not put under that restraint which is proper to persons in actual insanity, it may be regarded as a matter of moral certainty, that he will plunge deeper and deeper in the degrading vice of which he is the subject, so long as the remaining powers of life shall support him in the process.

The individuals who are in this situation seem themselves to have a consciousness of this. They see clearly that in their own strength there is no hope. In repeated instances, such persons have gone to keepers of penitentiaries and other prisons, and earnestly entreated for admission, on the ground that nothing short of strict seclusion within their massy walls would secure them against the ruinous indulgence of their appetite.—"The use of strong drink," says Dr. Rush (Diseases of the Mind, chap. x.), "is at first the effect of free agency. From habit it takes place from necessity. That this is the case, I infer from persons who are inordinately devoted to the use of ardent spirits being irreclaimable by all the considerations which domestic obligations, friendship, reputation, property, and sometimes even by those which religion and the love of life can suggest to them. An instance of insensibility to the last, in an habitual drunkard, occurred some

years ago in Philadelphia. When strongly urged by one of his friends to leave off drinking, he said, 'Were a keg of rum in one corner of a room, and were a cannon constantly discharging balls between me and it, I could not refrain from passing before that cannon in order to get at the rum.'" (See, in connexion with this subject, vol. i., § 100.)

§ 310. Disordered action of the principle of self-preservation.

As we advance upward from the Appetites to the region of the Propensities, such as the principle of self-preservation, the desire of knowledge, the desire of society, and the like, we shall find the latter as well as the former, probably without an exception, subject, in certain individuals, to a greater or less degree of what may be termed a diseased or disordered action. We begin with the propensive principle of Self-preservation, or what may be designated, in other terms, as the natural desire of a continuance of existence. This principle, like the others of the same class, although not generally in so marked a degree, will sometimes manifest itself under such circumstances and in such a manner as obviously to show that its action is not a natural, regular, or healthy action. Persons under the influence of the disordered action of the principle which is connected with the preservation of life, multiply, as they would be naturally supposed to do, images of danger and terror which have no existence, nor likeness of existence, except in their own disordered minds. They not only see perils which are invisible to others, but are led to take a multitude of precautions, which, in the estimation of those around them, are altogether unnecessary, and even ridiculous.

Pinel, under the head of Melancholy, mentions a case which may be considered as illustrating this subject. "A distinguished military officer," he says, "after fifty years of active service in the cavalry, was attacked with disease. It commenced by his experiencing vivid emotions from the slightest causes; if, for example, he heard any disease spoken of, he immediately believed himself to be attacked by it; if any one was mentioned as deranged in intellect, he imagined himself insane, and retired into

his chamber full of melancholy thoughts and inquietude. Everything became for him a subject of fear and alarm. If he entered into a house, he was afraid that the floor would fall, and precipitate him amid its ruins. He could not pass a bridge without terror, unless impelled by the sentiment of honour for the purpose of fighting."*

§ 311. Disordered and alienated action of the possessory principle.

There are instances, occurring with a considerable degree of frequency, of a disordered or alienated action of the desire of possession or the Possessory principle. Some of these are voluntary; that is to say, are brought about by a course of action, of which the responsibility rests upon the individual. Others appear to be congenital or natural.—Among the class of confirmed misers we shall be likely, from time to time, to find instances of the first class. There are individuals among this class of persons who have so increased the energy of the Possessory principle (Acquisitiveness, as it is sometimes conveniently termed) by a long voluntary course of repetition, that its action is no longer under the control of the Will, but has obviously passed over into the region of mental alienation. Such probably must have been the case with a certain individual mentioned by Valerius Maximus, who took advantage of a famine to sell a mouse for two hundred pence, and then famished himself with the money in his pocket.—It is difficult to tell, however, although a person may unquestionably become insane in his avarice, whether this is actually the case in any given instance, or whether, notwithstanding its intensity, it falls in some degree short of alienation.

The reader will be able, probably, by consulting the resources of his own recollection, to understand the applications of this subject. Nevertheless, we take the liberty to delay a moment upon the well known and somewhat singular case of Sir Harvey Elwes, of Stoke, in the county of Suffolk, England. Sir Harvey Elwes inherited from a miserly mother, and an uncle of the same parsimonious disposition, the large property of £350,000. This singular individual, as is sometimes the case with

* Pinel, as quoted in Combe's Phrenology, Boston ed., p. 241

misers, is said to have punctually discharged his obligations towards others, and in some instances even to have conducted with liberality; but, in whatever concerned himself, his parsimony, notwithstanding his great riches, was extreme and unalterable. When travelling, he accustomed himself to great abstinence, that he might lessen the charge of his maintenance; and for the same reason, he supported his horse with the few blades of grass which he could gather by the sides of hedges and in the open commons. Like his predecessor Sir Harvey, from whom he seems to have derived his title, and who was hardly less miserly than his nephew, he wore the clothes of those who had gone before him; and when his best coat was beyond the ability of any further service, he refused to replace it at his own expense, but accepted one from a neighbour. He was so saving of fuel that he took advantage of the industry of the crows in pulling down their nests; and if any friend accidentally living with him were absent, he would carefully put out his fire and walk to a neighbour's house, in order that the same chimney might give out warmth to both. Although he never committed any of his transactions to writing, he could not have been ignorant of his immense wealth; but this did not prevent his being exceedingly apprehensive that he should at last die with want. "Sometimes hiding his gold in small parcels in different parts of his house, he would anxiously visit the spot to ascertain whether each remained as he had left it: arising from bed, he would hasten to his bureau to examine if its contents were in safety. In later life no other sentiment occupied his mind: at midnight he has been heard as if struggling with assailants, and crying out in agitation, 'I will keep my money, I will; nobody shall rob me of my property!' though no one was near to disturb him in its possession. At length this remarkable person died, in the year 1789, aged nearly eighty, and worth nearly a million."*

§ 312. Instances of the second kind or form of disordered action of the possessory principle.

There are other instances of the disordered action of

* Origin and Progress of the Passions (Anonymous), vol. i., p. 310.

the principle of Acquisitiveness, which appear to be congenital or constitutional. In the case of the persons to whom we now have reference, the disposition to get possession of whatever can be regarded as property, whether of greater or less value, shows itself, not only in great strength, but at a very early period of life. There are a considerable number of cases of this kind to be found in the writings of Gall and Spurzheim; and there are some notices of similar cases in a few other writers. Dr. Rush, for instance, in his Medical Inquiries, mentions a woman who was entirely exemplary in her conduct except in one particular. "She could not refrain from *stealing*. What made this vice the more remarkable was, that she was in easy circumstances, and not addicted to extravagance in anything. Such was the propensity to this vice, that, when she could lay her hands on nothing more valuable, she would often, at the table of a friend, fill her pockets secretly with bread. She both confessed and lamented her crime."

Some of the facts which are given by Dr. Gall are as follows: "Victor Amadeus I., king of Sardinia, was in the constant habit of stealing trifles. Saurin, pastor at Geneva, though possessing the strongest principles of reason and religion, frequently yielded to the propensity to steal. Another individual was from early youth a victim to this inclination. He entered the military service on purpose that he might be restrained by the severity of the discipline; but, having continued his practices, he was on the point of being condemned to be hanged. Ever seeking to combat his ruling passion, he studied theology and became a Capuchin. But his propensity followed him even to the cloister. Here, however, as he found only trifles to tempt him, he indulged himself in his strange fancy with less scruple. He seized scissors, candlesticks, snuffers, cups, goblets, and conveyed them to his cell. An agent of the government at Vienna had the singular mania for stealing nothing but kitchen utensils. He hired two rooms as a place of deposite; he did not sell, and made no use of them. The wife of the famous physician Gaubius had such a propensity to pilfer, that when she made a purchase she always sought to take something.

The Countesses M. at Wessel, and P. at Frankfort, had also this propensity. Madame de W. had been educated with peculiar care. Her wit and talents secured her a distinguished place in society. But neither her education nor her fortune saved her from the most decided propensity to theft. Lavater speaks of a physician who never left the room of his patients without robbing them of something, and who never thought of the matter afterward. In the evening his wife used to examine his pockets; she there found keys, scissors, thimbles, knives, spoons, buckles, cases, and sent them to their respective owners."*

§ 313. Disordered action of imitativeness, or the principle of imitation.

The proof that there is in man a principle of IMITATION, which impels him to do as others do, is so abundant as probably to leave no reasonable doubt upon the candid mind. This principle, as compared with its ordinary operation and character, is found in some individuals to exhibit an irregular or diseased action. M. Pinel, as he is quoted by Dr. Gall, speaks of an idiot woman "who had an *irresistible* propensity to imitate all that she saw done in her presence. She repeats *instinctively* all she hears, and imitates the gestures and actions of others with the greatest fidelity, and without troubling herself with any regard to propriety."†—Under the form of Sympathetic Imitation, the disordered action of this principle becomes very important; so much so that we shall leave the subject here, for the purpose of considering it, more at length than we could otherwise do, in a separate chapter

§ 314. Disordered action of the principle of sociality.

The principle of Sociality, obviously one of the implanted propensities of our nature, may exist with such a degree of intensity as justly to entitle its action to be called a disordered, and, in some cases, even an alienated action. In connexion with this remark, it may be proper to revert a moment to the precise idea which we attach to the term alienation, considered as expressive of a state or condition of the mind. There may be an imperfection

* Gall's Works, vol. iv., Am. ed., p. 132. † The same, vol. i., p. 320

of mental action, there may be a disorder of mental action, which is nevertheless not an alienation of mental action. The term alienation properly applies to those forms of mental action which are so much disordered as to set at defiance any efforts of the Will to control them; in a word, they are involuntary. So that, in accordance with this statement, there may be either a disordered state of the principle of sociality, or of any other principle (that is to say, one which is irregular, but still is susceptible of correction under the efforts of the will), or there may be, when this disorder is found to exist beyond certain limits, an alienated, an insane state. But, although this distinction should be fully understood, it is not necessary, in the remarks which, for the most part, we have occasion to make, that we should always keep it distinctly in view.

But to return to our subject. An irregular action of the social principle, whether it be truly alienated or exist in some lighter form of disorder, may show itself in two aspects which are entirely diverse from each other, viz., either in a morbid aversion to society, or in a desire of society inordinately intense.—Persons to whom the first statement will apply are generally, and, for the most part, justly designated as Misanthropes. Under the influence of some sudden revulsion of the mind, of some great disappointment, of some ill treatment on the part of near relatives and supposed friends, or of some other powerful cause, the natural tie of brotherhood, which binds man to his fellow-man, is snapped asunder, and the soul flees to the rock and the desert never more to return. Such instances, the Timon of Athens of Shakspeare, the Black Dwarf of Walter Scott, and numerous others, are too frequently found, not only on the recorded annals of human nature, but in almost every one's personal experience, to require any minuteness of notice.

§ 315. Further remarks on the disordered action of the social propensity

There is another class of cases, which in their character appear to be directly the reverse of those which have just been mentioned.—Individuals, when they are cut off from society, particularly the society of their friends, are sometimes the subjects of a misery inexpressibly intense

We have already had occasion to allude to the case of the young Foscari, who was banished from Venice, and who died apparently in consequence of the mere mental anguish which he suffered. Cases were also mentioned of death resulting from solitary confinement in prison (§ 148). There is an exceedingly painful disease, founded, in a great degree, upon the disordered action of the social principle, which is termed by physicians Nostalgia, but which is more commonly known under the familiar designation of HOME-SICKNESS. This disease, which is sometimes fatal, is said to have frequently prevailed among the Swiss when absent from their native country. The beautiful sky which shone over them in their absence from their native land, the works of art, the allurements of the highest forms of civilization, could not erase from their hearts the image of their rugged mountains and their stormy heavens. They had society enough around them, it is true; but it was not the society which their hearts sought for, or in which, in existing circumstances they could participate. They bowed their heads under the influence of a hidden and irrepressible sorrow; and in many cases not merely pined away, but died in the deep anguish of their separation.

In the year 1733, a Russian army, under the command of General Praxin, advanced to the banks of the Rhine. At this remote distance from their native country, this severe mental disease began to prevail among the Russians, so much so that five or six soldiers every day became unfit for duty; a state of things which threatened to affect the existence of the army. The progress of this home-sickness was terminated by a severe order from the commander (designed, probably, and which had the effect to produce a strong counteracting state of mind), that every one affected with the sickness should be buried alive.*

§ 316. Of the disordered action of the desire of esteem.

There may be a disordered action of the desire of Esteem. This principle is not only an original one, but, as a general thing, it possesses, as compared with some of the other Propensities, a greater and more available

* Dr. Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, 2d ed., p. 113.

amount of strength. It is a regard for the opinions of others (a sense of character, as we sometimes term it), which, in the absence or the too great weakness of higher principles, serves to restrict the conduct of multitudes within the bounds of decency and order. This principle is good and important in its place, and under due regulation; but it is exceedingly apt to become irregular, unrestrained, and inordinate in its exercise. This view throws light upon the character of many individuals. It is here, probably, that we may discover the leading defect in the character of Alcibiades, a name of distinguished celebrity in the history of Athens. His ruling passion seems to have been not so much the love of POWER as the love of APPLAUSE. In other words, his great desire was, as has been well remarked of him, "to make a noise, and to furnish matter of conversation to the Athenians."

Pope, in the First of his Moral Essays, illustrates this subject, in his usual powerful manner, in what he says of the Duke of Wharton; the key to whose character he finds in the excessive desire of human applause.

> "Search then the ruling passion. There alone
> The wild are constant, and the cunning known;
> This clew, once found, unravels all the rest,
> The prospect clears, and Wharton stands confess'd.
> Wharton, the scorn and wonder of our days,
> Whose ruling passion was the LUST OF PRAISE.
> Born with whate'er could win it from the wise,
> Women and fools must like him, or he dies."

The inordinate exercise of this propensity, as is correctly intimated by Mr. Stewart, tends to *disorganize* the mind. The man who is under the influence of such an excessive appetite for the world's smiles and flatteries, has no fixed rule of conduct; but the action of his mind, his opinions, desires, hopes, and outward conduct, are constantly fluctuating with the changing tide of popular sentiment. It is nearly impossible that the pillars of the mind should remain firm, and without more or less of undermining and dislocation, under the operations of such a system of uncertainty and vicissitude.—Nor is this all. When persons who are under the influence of this excessive desire are disappointed in the possession of that ap-

probation and applause which is its natural food, they are apt to become melancholy, misanthropic, and unhappy in a very high degree. In fact, numerous cases of actual Insanity, if we look carefully at the statements of writers on the subject of Mental Alienation, may probably be traced to this source.

And, where insanity does not supervene, there are sometimes consequences scarcely less unfavourable. It is well known, that within a few years a number of gifted individuals have been hurried to an early grave, in consequence of being held up to public contempt and ridicule in anonymous Reviews. The case of Henry Kirk White, too keenly alive to the frowns and favours of popular sentiment, notwithstanding his great and unquestionable excellences, will illustrate what we mean.* The circumstance that the inordinate exercise of this desire is sometimes connected with distinguished vigour of intellect and purity of moral sentiment, does not necessarily secure the disappointed and calumniated individual who is the subject of it against great anguish of mind; so great, in some instances, as not only to destroy happiness, but life itself.

§ 317. Disordered action of the desire of power.

Men become disordered in mind, and sometimes actually insane, not only by the inordinate indulgence of the desire of esteem and the desire of possession, but also, perhaps with no less frequency, under the influence of the exaggerated and intense desire of POWER. They are looking onward and upward, with an excited heart and constrained eye, to some form of authority, honour, and dominion, till this desire, strengthened by constant repetition, becomes the predominant feeling. Instances where the disorder of the mind arises in this way and exists to this extent are innumerable. But it is not always that it stops here. If the desire is suddenly and greatly disappointed, as it is very likely to be, the reaction upon the whole mind may be such as to produce disorder in all its functions, and leave it a wide mass of ruins.

* Keats, the author of Endymion, may probably be regarded as another recent instance.

The history of those who are confined in Insane Hospitals furnishes a strong presumption that such results are not unfrequent. Although the mind is deranged, the predominant feeling which led to the derangement seems still to remain. One individual challenges for himself the honours of a Chancellor, another of a King; one is a member of Parliament, another is the Lord Mayor of London; one, under the name of the Duke of Wellington or Bonaparte, claims to be the commander of mighty armies, another announces himself with the tone and attitude of a Prophet of the Most High. Pinel informs us, that there were at one time no less than three maniacs in one of the French Insane Hospitals, each of whom assumed to be Louis XIV. On one occasion these individuals were found disputing with each other, with a great degree of energy, their respective rights to the throne. The dispute was terminated by the sagacity of the superintendent, who, approaching one of them, gave him, with a serious look, to understand that he ought not to dispute on the subject with the others, since they were obviously mad. "Is it not well known," said the superintendent, "that you alone ought to be acknowledged as Louis XIV.?" The insane person, flattered with this homage, cast upon his companions a look of the most marked disdain, and immediately retired.

§ 318. Disordered action of the principle of veracity.

The principle of veracity, or the tendency of mind which leads men to utter the truth, appears to be an original or implanted one. This principle, either through habit or by natural defect, sometimes exhibits itself in strangely perverted forms.—Dr. Rush speaks of a LYING disease. "It differs from exculpating, fraudulent, and malicious lying in being influenced by none of the motives of any of them. Persons thus diseased cannot speak the truth on any subject, nor tell the same story twice in the same way, nor describe anything as it has appeared to other people. Their falsehoods are seldom calculated to injure anybody but themselves, being for the most part of a hyperbolical or boasting nature; but now and then they are of a mischievous nature, and injurious to the

characters and property of others. That it is a corporeal disease [that is to say, in some way connected with a diseased state of the body], I infer from its sometimes appearing in mad people, who are remarkable for veracity in the healthy states of their minds, several instances of which I have known in the Pennsylvania Hospital. Persons affected with this disease are often amiable in their tempers and manners, and sometimes benevolent and charitable in their dispositions."*

Enough perhaps has been said on this part of our subject to give at least a general idea of it. The same train of thought, and with scarcely any modification, will apply to all the original appetites and propensities. They are all implanted by the Creator of the mind; they are all good in their place and under proper regulation; they are all not only morally evil in their exaggerated and inordinate form, but are attended with more or less of mental disorder, from the slightest shades of disorganization to the deep and terrible miseries of permanent insanity.

CHAPTER II.

SYMPATHETIC IMITATION.

§ 319. Of sympathetic imitation, and what is involved in it.

WE endeavoured, in its proper place, to illustrate the natural origin and the prevalence of the propensity to IMITATION. In connexion with the general truth of the existence of such a propensity, it is proper to observe here that there is a subordinate and peculiar form of imitation, which is deserving of a separate notice, and particularly so on account of its practical results. We speak now of what has been appropriately termed Sympathetic Imitation.

It is implied, in all cases of Sympathetic Imitation, that there is more than one person concerned in them; and it exists, in general, in the highest degree, when the num-

* Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, 2d ed., p. 265.

ber of persons is considerable. Some one or more of these individuals is strongly agitated by some internal emotion, desire, or passion; and this inward agitation is expressed by the countenance, gestures, or other external signs. There is also a communication of such agitation of the mind to others; they experience similar emotions, desires, and passions. And these new exercises of soul are expressed, on the part of the sympathetic person, by similar outward signs. In a single word, when we are under the influence of this form of imitation, we both act and feel as others. And this happens, not only in consequence of what we witness in them, and apparently for no other reason, but it happens *naturally;* that is to say, in virtue of an implanted or natural principle. The view which we are inclined to take of this principle is, that, although we may properly speak of it, on account of its close resemblance, as a modification of the more ordinary form of Imitativeness, yet, on the whole, it is so far distinct and specific in its character as to entitle it to be regarded as a separate part of our sensitive nature. As such it might have been treated of in another place; but in its ordinary action it is generally well understood; and we have delayed the consideration of it till the present time, because it is our principal object to give some account of its disordered or alienated action.

§ 320. Familiar instances of sympathetic imitation.

Abundance of instances (many of them frequent and familiar) show the existence of SYMPATHETIC IMITATION; in other words, that there is in human feelings, and in the signs of those feelings, a power of contagious communication, by which they often spread themselves rapidly from one to another.

"In general it may be remarked," says Mr. Stewart, "that whenever we see in the countenance of another individual any sudden change of features, more especially such a change as is expressive of any particular passion or emotion, our own countenance has a tendency to assimilate itself to his. Every man is sensible of this when he looks at a person under the influence of laughter or in a deep melancholy. Something, too, of the

same kind takes place in that spasm of the muscles of the jaw which we experience in yawning; an action which is well known to be frequently excited by the contagious power of example. Even when we *conceive*, in solitude, the external expression of any passion, the effect of the conception is visible in our own appearance. This is a fact of which every person must be conscious, who attends, in his own case, to the result of the experiment; and it is a circumstance which has been often remarked with respect to historical painters, when in the act of transferring to the canvass the glowing pictures of a creative imagination."*

To these statements, illustrative of sympathetic imitation, may be added the fact, that if there are a number of children together, and one of them suddenly gives way to tears and sobs, it is generally the case that all the rest are more or less affected in the same manner. Another case, illustrative of the same natural principle, is that of a mob when they gaze at a dancer on the slack rope. They seem not only to be filled with the same anxiety which we may suppose to exist in the rope-dancer himself, but they naturally writhe, and twist, and balance their own bodies as they see him do. It has also been frequently remarked, that when we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink, and slightly draw back our own leg or arm, with a sort of prophetic or anticipative imitation of the person on whom the blow is about to be inflicted. Hysterical paroxysms are said to have been sometimes produced at witnessing the exhibition of the pathetic parts of a drama. And even the convulsions of epilepsy have been excited by the mere sight of a person afflicted with them.

§ 321. Of sympathetic imitation in large multitudes.

It has been often noticed, that the power of sympathetic imitation has been rendered intense nearly in proportion to the numbers assembled together.—In a large army, if the voice of triumph and joy be raised in a single column, it immediately extends through the whole. On the other

* Stewart's Elements, vol. iii., chap. ii.

hand, if a single column be struck with panic, and exhibit external signs of terror by flight or otherwise, the whole army is likely to become rapidly infected. The tremendous power of the mobs which are often collected in large cities, may be explained, in part, on the same principle. The dark cloud that is standing upon the brow of one is seen soon to gather in darkness upon the brow of his neighbour, and thus to propagate itself rapidly in every direction, till one universal gloom of vengeance settles broadly and blackly upon the moving sea of the multitude.

Similar results are sometimes witnessed in large deliberative assemblies. The art of the orator introduces a common feeling, which glows simultaneously in their bosoms. Soon some one, either sustained by weaker nerves or under the influence of stronger internal impulses, gives signs of bodily agitation. Those who sit nearest will probably next imbibe the contagion, which spreads and increases until the whole assembly is in a tumult. The spread of this sympathetic communication will be particularly rapid if the first instances of emotion and action are of a decided and strong character.—The statements which have been made are matters of common observation, and can hardly be supposed to have escaped the notice of any. But there are various other facts on record of a less common character, although involving essentially the same principles.

§ 322. Of the animal magnetism of M. Mesner in connexion with this subject.

About the year 1784, M. Mesner, of Vienna, professed to perform various and important cures by what he called animal magnetism. As this new mode of healing was introduced into France, and much interest was felt on the subject, Louis the Sixteenth appointed a number of persons to examine into it; among whom were Lavoisier, Bailly, and Dr. Franklin, at that time American minister at Paris. On inquiry, it appeared that it was common in the process to assemble a considerable number of patients together. The patients were placed round a circular box or bucket of oak, the lid of which was pierced with a

number of holes, through which there issued moveable and curved branches of iron. These branches were to be applied by the patient to the diseased part. The commissioners, who were witnesses to these proceedings, found that no effect was produced at first. The patients usually sat an hour, and sometimes two, before the crisis came on; being connected with each other, meanwhile, by means of a cord passed round their bodies. At length some one, wearied and nervous, and with feelings evidently much excited, was thrown into extraordinary convulsions. And, in a short time, the whole body of patients became similarly affected, in a greater or less degree. But the commissioners themselves, after having witnessed these singular results, consented to become the subjects of these experiments in their own persons. But they testify that no effect was produced upon them. They also aver, when the process was gone through on persons alone, the same effects were not produced as when a number were together, provided the attempt were made for the first time. In the following extract they seem to attribute the results partly to imagination and partly to sympathy, that is to say, to Sympathetic Imitation.

"The magnetism, then," the commissioners remark, "or, rather, the operations of the imagination, are equally discoverable at the theatre, in the camp, and in all numerous assemblies, as at the bucket; acting, indeed, by different means, but producing similar effects. The bucket is surrounded with a crowd of patients; the sensations are continually communicated and recommunicated; the nerves are at last worn out with this exercise, and the woman of most sensibility in the company gives the signal. In the mean time, the men, who are witnesses of these emotions, partake of them in proportion to their nervous sensibility; and those with whom this sensibility is greatest and most easily excited, become themselves the subjects of a crisis.

"This irritable disposition, partly natural and partly acquired, becomes in each sex habitual. The sensations having been felt once or oftener, nothing is now necessary but to recall the memory of them, and to exalt the imagination to the same degree in order to operate the

same effects. The public process is no longer necessary. You have only to conduct the finger and the rod of iron before the countenance, and to repeat the accustomed ceremonies. In many cases the experiment succeeds, even when the patient is blindfolded, and, without any actual exhibition of the signs, is made to believe that they are repeated as formerly. The ideas are re-excited; the sensations are reproduced; while the imagination, employing its accustomed instruments and resuming its former routes, gives birth to the same phenomena."*

§ 323. Instance of sympathetic imitation at the poorhouse at Haerlem.

Multitudes of other facts, equally well attested, show the sympathetic connexion between mind and mind, and the sympathy between the mind and the nervous and muscular system. Few are more interesting or decisive than what is stated to have occurred at Haerlem under the inspection of Boerhave.—"In the house of charity at Haerlem," says the account, "a girl, under the impression of terror, fell into a convulsive disease, which returned in regular paroxysms. One of the by-standers, intent upon assisting her, was seized with a similar fit, which also recurred at intervals; and on the day following another was attacked; then a third, and a fourth; in short, almost the whole of the children, both girls and boys, were afflicted with these convulsions. No sooner was one seized, than the sight brought on the paroxysm in almost all the rest at the same time. Under these distressing circumstances, the physicians exhibited all the powerful anti-epileptic medicines with which their art furnished them, but in vain. They then applied to Boerhave, who, compassionating the wretched condition of the poor children, repaired to Haerlem; and, while he was inquiring into the matter, one of them was seized with a fit, and immediately he saw several others attacked with a species of epileptic convulsion. It presently occurred to this sagacious physician, that, as the best medicines had been skilfully administered, and as the propagation of the disease from one to another appeared to depend on the imagination

* Rapports des Commissaires chargés par le Roi, de l'Examen du Magnetisme Animal (as quoted by Stewart).

[the sympathy of imagination], by preventing this impression upon the mind, the disease might be cured; and his suggestion was successfully adopted. Having previously apprized the magistrates of his views, he ordered, in the presence of all the children, that several portable furnaces should be placed in different parts of the chamber, containing burning coals, and that iron, bent to a certain form, should be placed in the furnaces; and then he gave these further commands; that all medicines would be totally useless, and the only remedy with which he was acquainted was, that the first who should be seized with a fit, whether boy or girl, must be burned in the arm to the very bone by a red-hot iron. He spoke this with uncommon dignity and gravity; and the children, terrified at the thoughts of this cruel remedy, when they perceived any tendency to the recurrence of the paroxysm, immediately exerted all their strength of mind, and called up the horrible idea of the burning; and were thus enabled, by the stronger mental impression, to resist the influence of the morbid propensity."

§ 324. Other instances of this species of imitation.

It would not be difficult to multiply cases similar to those which have been mentioned. A few years since, there was a man in Chelmsford, Massachusetts, who had a family of six children, one of whom became affected with the CHOREA, or St. Vitus's dance. The others, in the indulgence of that thoughtless gayety which is natural to children, amused themselves with imitating his odd gestures, until, after a time, they were irresistibly affected in the same way. At this state of things, which seems to be susceptible of an explanation in no other way than on the principles of sympathetic imitation, the family, as may be naturally supposed, were in great affliction. The father, a man of some sagacity as well as singularity of humour, brought into the house a block and axe, and solemnly threatened to take off the head of the first child who should hereafter exhibit any involuntary bodily movements, except the child originally diseased. By this measure, which proceeded on the same view of the human mind as the experiment of Boerhave just mention

ed, a new train of feeling was excited, and the spell was broken.*

It may be added, that not only those in the same family and in the same building have been seized, but the contagion has sometimes spread from one to another (by the mere imitation of sympathy as we suppose) over whole towns, and even large districts of country. This was the case in a part of the Island Anglesey, in 1796; and still later in this country, in some parts of Tennessee.†

§ 325. Application of these views to the witchcraft delusion in New-England.

The doctrines of this chapter furnish, in part at least, an explanation of the witchcraft delusion which prevailed in New-England about the year 1690. In the first place, it is to be recollected, that the existence of witches and wizards, possessing a powerful but invisible agency, was a part of the popular creed, and was generally and fully believed. It is further to be recollected, that the people were, as a general thing, very ignorant at that time, a state of mind exceedingly favourable to any superstition or delusion of that sort; and also that their minds were kept in a state of constant and high excitation, not only in consequence of living scattered abroad and remote from each other, but by residing, in many cases, in the midst of dense and dark forests.

Under these circumstances, certain individuals, probably under the influence of some form of nervous disease, became affected with pains in certain parts of the body, resembling the pain occasioned by the pricking of pins, or by sudden and heavy blows; and in some cases became subject to certain involuntary motions of the body, similar to those of the CHOREA, or St. Vitus's dance. Of course, in accordance with the common belief, those mysterious personages, popularly denominated Witches, were at their work, and the whole country was at once thrown into a ferment. It is not easy to conceive a more favourable basis than this for the operations of the powerful principle of Sympathetic Imitation. The few cases of nervous and

* Powers' Essay on the Influence of the Imagination. p. 33

† See Edinburg Med. and Surg. Journal, vol. iii., p. 446.

muscular disease which existed at first, were rapidly propagated and multiplied on every side; and as the popular belief ascribed them to the agency of Satan, manifested in the subordinate agency of witchcraft, the infatuation soon arose to the highest point. The accusations of innocent individuals as exercising the art of witchery, and the scenes of blood which followed, were the natural consequence. — Similar views will probably apply to the witchcraft delusions which, to the ruin of thousands of individuals, have prevailed in other periods and countries.

§ 326. Practical results connected with the foregoing views.

As sympathetic imitation, if it be correctly considered as a distinct and specific modification of the more ordinary form of Imitativeness, is to be regarded as an original part of our mental constitution, we may well suppose it has its beneficial ends. But it is evident, from the facts which have been given, that it may also be attended, and, under certain circumstances, is very likely to be attended, with results of a different kind. Hence the direction has sometimes been given by physicians, that a free intercourse with persons subject to convulsive attacks ought not to be unnecessarily indulged in, especially by such as are inclined to nervous affections. And this precautionary rule might be extended to other cases; for instance, of madness. "It is a question," says Mr. Stewart, in the chapter already referred to, "worthy of more attention than has yet been bestowed upon it by physicians, whether certain kinds of insanity have not a contagious tendency, somewhat analogous to that which has just been remarked. That the incoherent ravings and frantic gestures of a madman have a singularly painful effect in unsettling and deranging the thoughts of others, I have more than once experienced in myself; nor have I ever looked upon this most afflicting of all spectacles without a strong impression of the danger to which I should be exposed if I were to witness it daily. In consequence of this impression, I have always read, with peculiar admiration, the scene in the Tragedy of Lear, which forms the transition from the old king's beautiful and pathetic reflections on the storm, to the violent madness in which, with-

out any change whatever in his external circumstances, he is immediately after represented. In order to make this transition more gradual, the poet introduces Edgar, who, with a view of concealing himself from Lear, assumes the dress and behaviour of a madman. At every sentence he utters, the mind of the king, '*whose wits*' (as we are told in the preceding scene) were '*beginning to turn*,' becomes more and more deranged, till at length every vestige of reason vanishes completely."

§ 327. Application of these views to legislative and other assemblies.

We have already had occasion to intimate, that the effects of sympathetic imitation have been strikingly experienced in public assemblies; and we may here add, when those effects have been strongly marked, they have seldom been beneficial. In all political deliberative assemblies, external signs of approbation and disapprobation should be in a great degree suppressed. There is generally enough in the subjects which are discussed to excite the members, without the additional excitement (to use a phrase of Buffon) of "*body speaking to body*." It is said of the famous Athenian tribunal of the Areopagus, that they held their deliberations in the night, in order that their attention might not be diverted by external objects. And, without expressing an opinion on this practice, it is certainly not unwise to guard against the terrible influences under consideration; otherwise truth, honour, and justice will often be sacrificed to feeling. Every public deliberative assembly has probably furnished facts illustrative of the propriety of this caution.

Similar remarks will apply to religious assemblies, and, perhaps, with still more force; as religious subjects are more important, and, in general, more exciting than any other. If, in such an assembly, the feelings of a few individuals become so strong as to show themselves very decidedly in the countenance, and the movements of the body, and particularly by sobs and loud outcries, it will not be surprising if this state of things should quickly spread itself through the whole body. In this way it is probable that serious evils have sometimes been experienced, and that true and false religious feelings have

been confounded. It is true that people may sometimes be led, by the mere power of sympathy, to attend to religious things; and so far, if there are no collateral evils, the result may be regarded as favourable; but, at the same time, it should be kept in recollection, that the feelings which are really propagated from one to another by mere sympathy, are not in themselves religious feelings in any proper sense of the terms, though they are often confounded with them.

CHAPTER III.

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE AFFECTIONS.

§ 328. Of the states of mind denominated presentiments.

We now proceed to remark, that there may be a disordered action of the Affections or Passions, as well as of the lower principles of the Sensitive nature; and this remark is designed to apply to both classes of the affections, the benevolent and those of an opposite kind. We do not propose, however, in this Chapter to confine ourselves very strictly to the Affections properly so called, but shall introduce some collateral or connected subjects, which may be regarded as too interesting to be omitted, and, at the same time, as too unimportant to require a distinct place. They may be expected, moreover, to throw indirectly some light upon the leading topic of the chapter. We begin with the subject of PRESENTIMENTS.

Many individuals have had, at certain times, strong and distinct impressions in relation to something future; so much so that not the least doubt has remained in their own minds of its being something out of the common course of nature. It is related, for instance, of the nonconformist writer, Isaac Ambrose, whose religious works formerly had some celebrity, that he had such a striking internal intimation of his approaching death, that he went round to all his friends to bid them farewell. When the day arrived which his presentiments indicated as the day

of his dissolution, he shut himself up in his room and died. Mozart, the great musical composer, had a strong presentiment that the celebrated Requiem which bears his name would be his last Work. Nothing could remov this impression from his mind. He expressly said, "It is certain I am writing this requiem for myself; it will serve for my funeral service." The foreboding was realized. It is stated of Pendergrast, an officer in the Duke of Marlborough's army, that he had a strong foreboding that he would be killed on a certain day. He mentioned his conviction to others, and even made a written memorandum in relation to it. And the event was such as he had foretold it would be.* Henry IV. of France, for some weeks previous to his being assassinated by Ravaillac, had a distinct presentiment, which he mentioned to Sully and other men of his time, that some great calamity was about to befall him.

Some cases of Presentiments can undoubtedly be explained on natural principles. Some accidental circumstance, a mere word, the vagaries of a dream, any trifling event, which happens, in the popular belief of the time and country, to be regarded as a sinister omen, may have been enough in some cases to have laid the foundation for them; and the subsequent fulfilment may have been purely accidental. Nor is it necessary, so far as we are able to perceive, to suppose that, in any cases whatever, there is any supernatural or miraculous interposition. But, if this is not the case, it is difficult to account for the deep conviction which sometimes fastens upon the mind, a conviction upon which arguments and persuasions are found to make no impression, except upon the ground that the action of the Sensibilities is in some degree disordered. But of the specific nature of that disorder, the trait or circumstance which distinguishes it from other forms of disordered mental action, it is difficult to give any account.

§ 329. Of sudden and strong impulses of mind.

There is another disordered condition of the mind, different from that which has just been mentioned, and yet, in some respects, closely allied to it. Some persons,

* Boswell's Life of Johnson, vol. ii., p. 48.

whose soundness of mind on all ordinary occasions is beyond question, find in themselves at certain times a sudden and strange propensity to do things which, if done, would clearly prove them, to some extent at least, deranged. As an illustration, a person of a perfectly sane mind, according to the common estimate of insanity, once acknowledged, that, whenever he passed a particular bridge, he felt a slight inclination to throw himself over, accompanied with some dread that his inclination might hurry him away. Such slight alienated impulses are probably more frequent than is commonly supposed. And they exist in every variety of degree, sometimes scarcely attracting notice, at others bearing the broad and fatal stamp of dangerous insanity.

Dr. Gall mentions the case of a woman in Germany, who, having on a certain occasion witnessed a building on fire, was ever afterward, at intervals, subject to strong impulses prompting her to fire buildings. Under the influence of these impulses she set fire to twelve buildings in the borough where she lived. Having been arrested on the thirteenth attempt, she was tried, condemned, and executed. "She could give no other reason, nor show any other motive, for firing so many houses, than this impulse which drove her to it. Notwithstanding the fear, the terror, and the repentance she felt in every instance after committing the crime, she went and did it afresh."* Would not sound philosophy, to say nothing of the requisitions of religion, have assigned such a person to an insane hospital rather than to the block of the executioner?

The same writer, who has collected numerous valuable facts in relation to the operations of the human mind, mentions the case of a German soldier, who was subject every month to a violent convulsive attack. "He was sensible," he proceeds to remark, "of their approach; and as he felt, by degrees, a violent propensity to kill, in proportion as the paroxysm was on the point of commencing, he was earnest in his entreaties to be loaded with chains. At the end of some days the paroxysm and the fatal propensity diminished, and he himself fixed the period at which they might without danger set him at lib-

* Gall's Works, vol. iv., Am. ed., p. 105.

erty. At Haina we saw a man who, at certain periods, felt an irresistible desire to injure others. He knew this unhappy propensity, and had himself kept in chains till he perceived that it was safe to liberate him. An individual of melancholic temperament was present at the execution of a criminal. The sight caused him such violent emotion, that he at once felt himself seized with an irresistible desire to kill, while, at the same time, he entertained the utmost horror at the commission of the crime. He depicted his deplorable state, weeping bitterly, and in extreme perplexity. He beat his head, wrung his hands, remonstrated with himself, begged his friends to save themselves, and thanked them for the resistance they made to him."*

§ 330. Insanity of the affections or passions.

From the instances which have been given, it will be seen that sudden and strong impulses, indicating a disordered state of the mind, may exist in reference to very different things, and also in very various degrees. The cases last mentioned were of such an aggravated nature, that they may properly be regarded as instances (and perhaps the same view will apply to some other cases of a less marked character) of actual alienation or insanity. And, as such, they may be correctly described as instances of the insanity of the Affections or Passions.

The insanity of the passions is a state of mind somewhat peculiar, even as compared with other forms of insanity. The powers of perception, in cases of insanity of the passions, are often in full and just exercise. The mind may possess, in a very considerable degree, its usual ability in comparing ideas and in deducing conclusions. The seat of the difficulty is not to be sought for in what are usually designated as the intellectual powers, in distinction from the sensitive nature, but in the passions alone. The victim of this mental disease does not stop to reason, reflect, and compare; but is borne forward to his purpose with a blind and often an irresistible impulse.

Pinel mentions a mechanic in the asylum BICETRE, who was subject to this form of insanity. It was, as is fre-

* Gall's Works, vol. i., Am. ed., p. 329.

quently the case, intermittent. He knew when the paroxysms of passion were coming on, and even gave warnings to those who were exposed to its effects to make their escape. His powers of correctly judging remained unshaken, not only at other times, but even in the commission of the most violent and outrageous acts. He saw clearly their impropriety, but was unable to restrain himself; and, after the cessation of the paroxysms, was often filled with the deepest grief.

§ 331. Of the mental disease termed hypochondriasis.

The seat of the well-known mental disease termed Hypochondriasis is to be sought for in a disordered state of the Sensibilities. It is, in fact, nothing more nor less than a state of deep depression, gloom, or melancholy. This is the fact; and we never apply the term hypochondriasis to a state of mind where such gloom or melancholy does not exist; but it is nevertheless true, that the occasion or basis of the fact may sometimes be found in a disordered condition of some other part of the mind. One or two concise statements will illustrate what we mean.

One of the slighter forms of hypochondriasis can perhaps be traced to inordinate workings of the Imagination. The mind of the sufferer is fixed upon some unpromising and gloomy subject; probably one which has particular relation either to his present or future prospects. He gives it an undue place in his thoughts, dwelling upon it continually. His imagination hovers over it, throwing a deeper shade on what is already dark. Thus the mind becomes disordered; it is broken off from its ordinary and rightful mode of action, and is no longer what it was, nor what nature designed it should be.

There is another and still more striking form of hypochondriasis, which is connected in its origin with an alienation of the power of belief. As in all other cases of hypochondriasis, the subject of it suffers much mental distress. He is beset with the most gloomy and distressing apprehensions, occasioned, not by exaggerated and erroneous notions in general, but by some fixed and inevitable false belief.—One imagines that he has no soul;

another, that his body is gradually but rapidly perishing; and a third, that he is converted into some other animal, or that he has been transformed into a plant. We are told in the Memoirs of Count Maurepas, that this last idea once took possession of one of the princes of Bourbon. So deeply was he infected with this notion, that he often went into his garden, and insisted on being watered in common with the plants around him. Some have imagined themselves to be transformed into glass, and others have fallen into the still stranger folly of imagining themselves dead.—What has been said confirms our remark, that, although hypochondriasis is, in itself considered, seated in the sensibilities, yet its origin may sometimes be found in a disordered state of some other part of the mind.

It is also sometimes the case, that this disease originates in a violation of some form of sensitive action. It is not only, as its appropriate position, seated in the sensibilities, but it sometimes has its origin there. It is rela ted of a certain Englishman, a man of generous and excellent character, that his life was once attempted by his brother with a pistol. He succeeded, however, in wresting the pistol from his brother's hand, and, on examination, found it to be double charged with bullets. This transaction, as might be expected in the case of a person of just and generous sentiments, filled him with such horror, and with such digust for the character of man, that he secluded himself ever after from human society. He never allowed the visits even of his own children. It is certainly easy to see, that, under such circumstances, the sensibilities may receive such a shock as to leave the subject of it in a state of permanent dissatisfaction and gloom. In other words, he may in this way and for such reason become a confirmed hypochondriac.

§ 332. Of intermissions of hypochondriasis, and of its remedies

The mental disease of hypochondriasis is always under stood to imply the existence of a feeling of gloom and depression; but this depressed feeling does not exist in all cases in the same degree. In all instances it is a source of no small unhappiness, but in some the wretchedness is

extreme. The greatest bodily pains are light in the comparison. It is worthy of remark, however, that the mental distress of hypochondriasis is in some persons characterized by occasional intermissions. An accidental remark, some sudden combination of ideas, a pleasant day, and various other causes, are found to dissipate the gloom of the mind. At such times there is not unfrequently a high flow of the spirits, corresponding to the previous extreme depression.—As this disease, even when mitigated by occasional intermissions, is prodigal in evil results, it becomes proper to allude to certain remedies which have sometimes been resorted to.

(1.) The first step towards remedying the evil is to infuse health and vigour into the bodily action, especially that of the nervous system. The nerves, it will be recollected, are the great medium of sensation, inasmuch as they constitute, under different modifications, the external senses. Now the senses are prominent sources of belief and knowledge. Consequently, when the nervous system (including, of course, the senses) is in a disordered state, it is not surprising that persons should have wrong sensations and external perceptions, and, therefore, a wrong belief. If a man's nerves are in such a state that he feels precisely as he supposes a man made of glass would feel, it is no great wonder, when we consider the constitution of the mind, that he should actually believe himself to be composed of that substance. But one of the forms of the disease in question is essentially founded on an erroneous but fixed belief of this kind. Hence, in restoring the bodily system to a right action, we shall correct the wrong belief if it be founded in the senses; and, in removing this, we may anticipate the removal of that deep-seated gloom which is characteristic of hypochondriasis.—(2.) As all the old associations of the hypochondriac have been more or less visited and tinctured by his peculiar malady, efforts should be made to break them up and remove them from the mind, by changes in the objects with which he is most conversant, by introducing him into new society, or by travelling. By these means his thoughts are likely to be diverted, not only from the particular subject which has chiefly interested him, but a

new impulse is given to the whole mind, which promises to interrupt and banish that fatal fixedness and inertness which had previously encumbered and prostrated it.—(3.) Whenever the malady appears to be founded on considerations of a moral nature, the hypochondriasis may sometimes be removed, or at least alleviated, by the suggestion of counteracting moral motives. If, for instance, the despondency of mind has arisen from some supposed injury, it is desirable to suggest all well-founded considerations which may tend to lessen the sufferer's estimate of the amount of the injury received. When the injury is very great and apparent, suggestions on the nature and duty of forgiveness may not be without effect.—But, whatever course may be taken, it is desirable that the attention of the sufferer should be directed as little as possible to his disease, by any direct remarks upon it. It was a remark of Dr. Johnson, whose sad experience enabled him to judge, that conversation upon melancholy feeds it. Accordingly, he advised Boswell, who, as well as himself, was subject to melancholy of mind, "never to speak of it to his friends nor in company."

§ 333. Disordered action of the passion of fear.

The passion of FEAR, inasmuch as there are various objects around us which are or may be dangerous, is obviously implanted in us for wise purposes. But it not unfrequently exhibits an irregular or disordered action. This disordered state of the affection may discover itself, when considered either in reference to the occasion on which it exists, or in reference to the degree in which it exists. In some cases, for instance, it is connected with objects which, in the view of reason and common sense, ought not to excite it. Some persons are afraid to be alone in the dark; it is exceedingly distressing to them. Others are afraid (so much so, perhaps, as to be thrown into convulsions by their presence) of a mouse, or a squirrel, or an insect. It will be necessary to refer to, and to give some explanation of, cases of this kind, under the head of Casual Associations.

Again: fear may exist with such intensity as essentially to affect the mind, and even cause insanity. Probably

the power of this passion is not well understood. Certain it is, that terrible results have often followed from the attempts of persons, particularly of children, to excite it in others, even in sport. Many instances are on record of individuals who have been permanently and most seriously injured, either in mind or body, or both, by a sudden fright.

Sometimes, especially when connected with permanent causes, it gradually expands and strengthens itself, till it is changed into DESPAIR. The distinctive trait of Despair, in distinction from all other modifications of fear, is, that it excludes entirely the feeling of hope, which exists in connexion with fear in other cases. Despair may exist, therefore, in a greater or less degree, and with a greater or less amount of mental anguish, in accordance with the nature of the thing, whatever it is, which occasions it. When great present or future interests are at stake, and the mind, in relation to those interests, is in a state of despair, the wretchedness which is experienced is necessarily extreme.

§ 334. Perversions of the benevolent affections.

There are some singular perversions of the benevolent affections which are worthy of notice here. It is not unfrequently the case, that persons in a state of mental alienation are entirely indifferent to, and sometimes they even hate, those whom at other times they love most sincerely and deeply. It is, perhaps, difficult to explain this, although it is practically important to know the fact.—Dr. Rush, in speaking of a singular apathy or torpor of the passions, which is sometimes found to exist, says, "I was once consulted by a citizen of Philadelphia, who was remarkable for his strong affection for his wife and children when his mind was in a sound state, who was occasionally afflicted with this apathy, and, when under its influence, lost his affection for them all so entirely, that he said he could see them butchered before his eyes without feeling any distress, or even inclination to rise from his chair to protect them."—(2.) There are other cases where there seems to be not merely an extinction of the benevolent affection, but its positive conversion into ha-

tred. The same philosophic physician mentions the case of a young lady who was confined as a lunatic in the Pennsylvania Hospital in the year 1802. One of the characteristics of her insanity was hatred for her father. She was gradually restored; and, for several weeks before she was discharged from the Hospital, discovered all the marks of a sound mind, excepting the continuance of this unnatural feeling of hatred. On a certain day she acknowledged with pleasure a return of her filial attachment and affection, and soon after was discharged as cured.* —(3.) There are other cases where insanity is the indirect result of the mere intensity of the benevolent affections. In cases of this kind the affections are so strong, so intense, that they are unable to withstand the shock of sudden and great opposition and disappointments.—"A peasant woman," says Dr. Gall, "became insane three times; the first at the death of her brother, the second at the death of her father, and the third at that of her mother. After she had recovered the third time she came to consult me. As she was very religious, she complained to me of her unfortunate disposition to be afflicted, at the loss of persons who were dear to her, more than religion permits; an evident proof that she had yielded to grief, although she had combated it by motives which were within her reach." Pinel also mentions the case of a young man who became a violent maniac a short time after losing a father and mother whom he tenderly loved. It is true that in these cases the proximate cause of the insanity is sorrow or grief; but the remote cause, and that without which the unfortunate result would not have existed, is an unrestrained and excessive position of the benevolent affections.—It may be proper to add here, that sudden and strong feelings of joy have, in repeated instances, caused a permanent mental disorganization, and even death itself.—"The son of the famous Leibnitz died from this cause, upon his opening an old chest and unexpectedly finding in it a large quantity of gold. Joy, from the successful issue of political schemes or wishes, has often produced the same effect. Pope Leo X. died of joy, in consequence of hearing of a great calamity that

* Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, p. 255, 345.

had befallen the French nation. Several persons died from the same cause, Mr. Hume tells us, upon witnessing the restoration of Charles II. to the British throne; and it is well known the doorkeeper of Congress died of an apoplexy, from joy, upon hearing the news of the capture of Lord Cornwallis and his army during the American Revolutionary war."*

CHAPTER IV.

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

§ 335. Nature of voluntary moral derangement.

THE moral, as well as the natural or pathematic Sensibilities, the Conscience as well as the Heart, may be the subject of a greater or less degree of disorder and alienation. There are probably two leading forms, at least, of moral derangement, viz., VOLUNTARY, and NATURAL or CONGENITAL.—In regard to voluntary moral derangement, we remark, as an interesting and practically important fact, that man may virtually destroy his conscience. There is sound philosophy in the well-known passage of Juvenal, "NEMO REPENTE FUIT TURPISSIMUS." The truth implied in this passage is unquestionably applicable to all persons, with the exception of those few cases where the moral derangement is natural or congenital. A man is not in the first instance *turpissimus*, or a villain, because his conscience makes resistance, and will not let him be so. But if the energies of the will are exercised in opposition to the conscience; if, on a systematic plan and by a permanent effort, the remonstrances of conscience are unheeded and its action repressed, its energies will be found to diminish, and its very existence will be put at hazard. There is no doubt that in this way the conscience may be so far seared as to be virtually annihilated. Multitudes have prepared themselves for the greatest wickedness, and have become, in fact, morally insane,

* Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, p. 339.

by their own voluntary doing. There is a passage in Beaumont, in his "King and no King," which strikingly indicates the progress of the mind in such cases.

> "There is a method in man's wickedness;
> It grows up by degress. I am not come
> So high as killing of myself; there are
> A hundred thousand sins 'twixt it and me,
> Which I must do. *I shall come to't at last.*"

We say in such cases the conscience is virtually annihilated. And by this remark we mean, that it is inert, inefficient, dormant, paralyzed. We do not mean that it is dead. The conscience never dies. Its apparent death is impregnated with the elements of a real and terrible resurrection. It seems to gather vivification and strength in the period of its inactivity; and, at the appointed time of its reappearance, inflicts a stern and fearful retribution, not only for the crimes which are committed against others, but for the iniquity which has been perpetrated against itself.

§ 336. Of accountability in connexion with this form of disordered conscience.

If the moral sensibility, under the system of repression which has been mentioned, refuses to act, the question arises, whether, at such a time, a person is morally accountable for his conduct. As his conscience does not condemn him in what he does, is the transaction, whatever its nature, a criminal one? There can be but one answer to this question. If the individual is not condemned by his conscience, it is the result of his own evil course. We may illustrate the subject by a case which is unhappily too frequent. A man who commits a crime in a state of drunkenness, may plead that he was not, at the time, aware of the guilt of his conduct. And this may be true. But he was guilty for placing himself in a situation where he knew he would be likely to injure others, or in some other way commit unlawful acts. His crime, instead of being diminished, is in fact increased. It is twofold. He is guilty of drunkenness, and he is guilty of everything evil, which he knew, or might have known, would result from his drunkenness.

In like manner, a man is not at liberty to plead that he

was not, in the commission of his crimes, condemned by conscience, if it be the fact that he has, by a previous process, voluntarily perverted or hardened the conscience. On the contrary, it would be fair to say, as in the case of drunkenness, that he has increased his guilt; for he has added to the guilt of the thing done the antecedent and still greater crime of aiming a blow at the mind, of striking at the very life of the soul. Practically he is not self-condemned, for the mere reason that he has paralyzed the principle by which the sentence of self-condemnation is pronounced. But in the eye of immutable justice there is not only no diminution of his guilt, but it is inexpressibly enhanced by the attempts to *murder*, if we may so express it, the principle which, more than anything else, constitutes the dignity and glory of man's nature. (See § 236, 237.)

§ 337. Of natural or congenital moral derangement.

The other form of moral derangement is NATURAL or CONGENITAL. We do not know that we are authorized to say that men are by nature, in any case whatever, absolutely destitute of a conscience; nor, on the other hand, have we positive grounds for asserting that this is not the case. There is no more inconsistency or impossibility in a man's coming into the world destitute of a conscience, than there is in his being born without the powers of memory, comparison, and reasoning, which we find to be the case in some idiots. But certain it is, that there are some men who appear to have naturally a very enfeebled conscience; a conscience which but very imperfectly fulfils its office; and who, in this respect at least, appear to be constituted very differently from the great body of their fellow-men. They exhibit an imbecility, or, if the expression may be allowed, an *idiocy* of conscience, which unquestionably diminishes, in a very considerable degree, their moral accountability. A number of those writers who have examined the subject of Insanity have taken this view, and have given instances in support of it.

"In the course of my life," says Dr. Rush, "I have been consulted in three cases of the total perversion of

the moral faculties. One of them was in a young man, the second in a young woman, both of Virginia, and the third was in the daughter of a citizen of Philadelphia. The last was addicted to every kind of mischief. Her wickedness had no intervals while she was awake, except when she was kept busy in some steady and difficult employment." He refers also to instances in other writers.

Dr. Haslam, in his Observations on Madness, has given two decided cases of moral derangement. One of these was a lad about ten years of age. Some of the traits which he exhibited were as follows. He early showed an impatience and irritability of temper, and became so mischievous and uncontrollable that it was necessary to appoint a person to watch over him. He gave answers only to such questions as pleased him, and acted in opposition to every direction. "On the first interview I had with him," says Dr. Haslam, "he contrived, after two or three minutes' acquaintance, to break a window and tear the frill of my shirt. He was an unrelenting foe to all china, glass, and crockery-ware. Whenever they came within his reach, he shivered them instantly. In walking the street, the keeper was compelled to take the wall, as he uniformly broke the windows if he could get near them; and this operation he performed so dexterously, and with such safety to himself, that he never cut his fingers. To tear lace and destroy the finer textures of female ornament seemed to gratify him exceedingly, and he seldom walked out without finding an occasion of indulging this propensity. He never became attached to any inferior animal, a benevolence so common to the generality of children. To these creatures his conduct was that of the brute. He oppressed the feeble, and avoided the society of those more powerful than himself. Considerable practice had taught him that he was the cat's master; and, whenever this luckless animal approached him, he plucked out its whiskers with wonderful rapidity; to use his own language, '*I must have her beard off.*' After this operation he commonly threw the creature on the fire or through the window. If a little dog came near him, he kicked it; if a large one, he would not notice it. When he was spoken to, he usually said, 'I do

not choose to answer.' When he perceived any one who appeared to observe him attentively, he always said, 'Now I will look unpleasant.' The usual games of children afforded him no amusement; whenever boys were at play, he never joined them: indeed, the most singular part of his character was, that he appeared incapable of forming a friendship with any one; he felt no considerations for sex, and would as readily kick or bite a girl as a boy. Of any kindness shown him he was equally insensible; he would receive an orange as a present, and afterward throw it in the face of the donor."

This unfortunate lad seems sometimes to have been sensible of his melancholy condition. When, on a certain occasion, he was conducted through an insane hospital, and a mischievous maniac was pointed out to him who was more strictly confined than the rest, he said to his attendant, "This would be the right place for me." He often expressed a wish to die; and gave as a reason, "that God had not made him like other children."

§ 338. Of moral accountability in cases of natural or congenital moral derangement.

The question recurs here, also, whether persons who are the subjects of a natural or congenital moral derangement are morally accountable, and in what degree. If there is naturally an entire extinction of the moral sense, as in some cases of Idiocy there is an entire extinction of the reasoning power, which, although it may not frequently happen, is at least a supposable case, there is no moral accountability. A person in that situation can have no distinct perception of what right and wrong are, nor can he be conscious of doing either right or wrong in any given case; and, consequently, being without either merit or demerit in the moral sense of the terms, he is not the proper subject of reward and punishment. He is to be treated on the principles that are applicable to idiots and insane persons generally.

In other cases where the mental disorder is not so great, but there are some lingering rays of moral light, some feeble capability of moral vision, the person is to be judged, if it is possible to ascertain what it is, according to

what is given him. If he has but one moral talent, it is not to be presumed that the same amount of moral responsibility rests upon him as upon another who possesses ten. The doctrine which requires men, considered as subjects of reward and punishment, to be treated alike, without regard to those original diversities of structure which may exist in all the departments of the mind, not only tends to confound right and wrong, but is abhorrent to the dictates of benevolence. Many individuals, through a misunderstanding of this important subject, have suffered under the hands of the executioner, who, on principles of religion and strict justice, should have been encircled only in the arms of compassion, long-suffering, and charity.

CHAPTER V.

CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBILITIES.

§ 339. Frequency of casual associations, and some instances of them.

In the first volume of this Work, which had especial relation to the INTELLECT, we gave some instances of Casual Association, directing our attention to those that were of great strength, and were wholly caused by accidental circumstances. Reference was made to the casual associations in respect to the place of sensation, the ideas of extension and time, of extension and colour, &c. It is necessary, however, to resume the consideration of the subject in this place, and to illustrate the vast power which the laws of ASSOCIATION possess over the Sensitive as well as over the Intellectual part of our nature.

By a thousand circumstances and in thousands of instances, the feelings are wrenched from their natural position, and shoot forth and show themselves in misplaced and disproportionate forms. Casual associations, in the shape of antipathies, fears, aversions, prepossessions, remorse, &c., are found seated in many a mind, which is otherwise unembarrassed and unexceptionable in its action; they have established their empire there on immove-

able foundations, and are incorporated with the whole mental nature.

If it were otherwise, how could a man that would willingly face a thousand men in battle, tremble at a mouse, a squirrel, a thunder-shower, at the trivial circumstance of placing the left slipper on the right foot, or any other very trifling thing! And yet such instances are without number.—It may be considered singular enough, but so it is, that some men cannot endure the sight of a fish, eel, or lobster; another person is disgusted at the sight of cheese, honey, eggs, milk, or apples; another is exceedingly distressed and even convulsed at the sight of a toad or a cat, a grasshopper or a beetle.

§ 340. Of association in connexion with the appetites.

We now proceed to give a few illustrations of this interesting subject, which has hitherto received so little attention. In doing this, it may be incidentally remarked, that the instinctive tendencies in man, which are but few in number, are in their own nature of such a fixed and decided character, as apparently to be placed, in a great measure, beyond the reach of association. But it is not so with the Appetites. On the contrary, they are subject to very strong influences from that source, as will appear by some statements.

(I.) Almost every article which is capable of being masticated and digested, is made, in one country or another, an article of food. It is the case, at the same time, that there are many articles used as food in one country which are not used as food in another. This difference in the manner of living is to be ascribed, in many cases, to some early and fixed association. In some countries the people eat rats, mice, frogs, lizards, horse-flesh, dogs, locusts, caterpillars, &c.* In other countries, in our own for instance, the associations adverse to the use of such kinds of food are so strong, that it is next to impossible to overcome them.

(II.) There are appetitive associations of a different kind. It is well known, for instance, that the appetite

* Lander's Niger, vol. i., Am. ed., p. 170, 179.—Lives of Celebrated Travellers, vol. i., Am. ed., p. 102, 215.

for drink may be inflamed by a mere name, or the sight of a particular building or place, or the return of a certain hour of the day. This unquestionably is the result of a casual association. And the association may have become so strong, that the appetite is rendered wholly irrepressible whenever such objects recur.—This is particularly true when the liquor itself, the rum, gin, wine, or brandy, is placed directly before the thorough-going drunkard. The appetite in a moment becomes so strong as to convulse the whole soul. He is agitated and rent with a sort of madness; and rushes upon the object before him much as the furious lion seizes and rends his keeper when he has accidentally seen and tasted his blood.

§ 341. Of casual associations in connexion with the propensities.

As we pass on from the Appetites to the consideration of that part of our Sentient nature which was examined under the head of the Propensities, we find some instances of the power of association, both in strengthening and in annulling them.—Among other Propensities which have a distinct and natural origin, is the desire of society; but it is undoubtedly the case, that peculiar circumstances may operate either to increase this desire or to annul it altogether. All cases of decided and permanent Misanthropy, for instance, are the work, with perhaps a few exceptions, of congenital alienation, not of nature, but of circumstances. If a man of kind and benevolent feelings is exceedingly ill treated by one whom he has often favoured, it is possible, at least, that it will result in a fixed aversion to that person, which nothing can afterward overcome.

If a deep and permanent injury were inflicted, not merely by a friend, but a brother, the effect on the mind might be so great as not only to break up the original principle of sociability, but implant a decided and unchangeable hostility to the whole human race. Such treatment would be so contrary from what the injured person had a right to expect, that the mind would be thrown entirely out of its original position, and with such force as to be unable to recover it.

§ 342. Other instances of casual association in connexion with the propensities.

The desire of power, in the remarks which were formerly made upon that subject, was regarded as an original propensity. This principle may become disordered in its action by becoming inordinately intense, and also in connexion with some casual association. Mr. Locke, in his Letters on Toleration, mentions the case of an individual, whose mind was so long and intently fixed upon some high object that he became partially insane. He was, for the most part, rational at other times; but, whenever the object he had so earnestly pursued was mentioned, it brought into exercise so many intense associations, that he immediately became deranged.

Although we might find it difficult to illustrate this subject from the ordinary forms of the propensity to Imitation, the power of casual associations may distinctly be shown in *sympathetic* imitation. If a person's feelings be from any cause so strongly excited as to show themselves in involuntary bodily action, subsequently the mere sight of the person, place, or instrument that was prominently concerned in the original excitement of the mind, will generally be attended with a recurrence of the sympathetic bodily action. After such results have followed a number of times, the association will become so strong, that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the sympathetic person to repress the outward bodily signs in all cases coming within the reach of the association.

§ 343. Inordinate fear from casual associations.

The same views may undoubtedly be carried into the higher department of the Affections or Passions. It is sufficiently evident, for instance, that the passion of FEAR is an attribute of man's nature; and, in ordinary cases, it is susceptible of being subjected to the control of reason and the sentiments of duty. But this is not always the case. Casual associations are sometimes formed which no effort of reason and no calls of duty can rend asunder.—We will endeavour to illustrate this subject by some familiar instances.

Some persons have been exceedingly frightened by

thunder and lightning at early periods of life. The fright may have been occasioned either directly, or by the actual terrific power and nearness of the explosion, or by merely seeing an exhibition of great fear in parents or others more advanced in years. And from that hour to the end of life, they have never been able, with all possible care and anxiety, to free themselves from the most distressing fear on such occasions.

Casual associations, occasioned by some unfortunate circumstances in early life, have been the source of very great and irresistible fears in respect to death. The fear of death is natural, and perhaps, we may say, is instinctive; but it does not ordinarily exist in such intensity as essentially to interrupt one's happiness. And yet, from time to time, we find unhappy exceptions to this statement. Miss Hamilton, in her Letters on Education, gives an interesting account of a lady who suffered exceedingly from such fears. She was a person of an original and inventive genius, of a sound judgment, and her powers of mind had received a careful cultivation. But all this availed nothing against the impressions which had been wrought into her mind from infancy. The first view which she had of death in her infancy was accompanied with peculiar circumstances of terror; and the dreadful impression which was then made was heightened by the injudicious language of the nursery. Ever afterward, the mere mention or idea of death was attended with great suffering; so much so, that it was necessary, by means of every possible precaution, to keep her in ignorance of her actual danger when she was sick; nor was it permitted at any time to mention instances of death in her presence. So that the estimable writer of this statement asserts, that she often suffered more from the apprehension than she could have suffered from the most agonizing torture that ever attended the hour of dissolution.*

§ 344. Casual associations in respect to persons.

That the Affections may be more or less disordered by means of casual associations, is further evident from what

* Elementary Principles of Education, Letter iii.

we notice in the intercourse of individuals with each other. Men sometimes form such an aversion to others, or associate with them such sentiments of dread, that the connexion of the persons and the feelings becomes permanent and unconquerable.—It has sometimes been the case, that a man of distinguished talents has been defeated and prostrated by another, in an argument perhaps, on some public occasion; and, although he harbours no resentment against his opponent, and has no sense of inferiority, yet he never afterward meets him in company without experiencing a very sensible degree of uneasiness and suffering.

Persons have sometimes been ill treated by others; and this occasionally forms the basis of an invincible association either of aversion or dread. The poet Cowper, in early life, suffered in this way. A boy of cruel temper, his superior in age, made him the object of long-continued ill treatment and persecution. "This boy," he remarks, "had impressed such a dread of his figure upon my mind, that I well remember being afraid to lift up my eyes upon him higher than his knees; and that I knew him by his shoe-buckles better than by any other part of his dress."

An individual was once perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation. During all his life after, he acknowledged, with the most sincere gratitude, that he could not have received a greater benefit; and still he was utterly unable to bear the sight of the operator, it suggested so strongly the dreadful suffering which he underwent.*

Some men have an exceeding and unaccountable aversion to the mere features and countenance of another, and cannot bear to be looked upon by them. A statement is somewhere given of a person of a noble family who was not able to bear that an old woman should look upon him. Certain persons, in a season of merriment which is not always wisely directed towards these humbling infirmities of our nature, succeeded in suddenly and unexpectedly introducing him into the presence of one such, but the shock to his feelings was so great as to terminate in his death.

* Locke's Essay, bk ii., chap. 32.

§ 345. Casual association in connexion with objects and places.

The mental operations, in consequence of strong casual associations, may be perplexed in their action in connexion with particular places and objects. "Some persons," says Dr. Conolly, in reference to this subject, "are mad and unmanageable at home, and sane abroad. We read in Aretæus of a carpenter, who was very rational in his workshop, but who could not turn his steps towards the Forum without beginning to groan, to shrug his shoulders, and to bemoan himself. Dr. Rush relates an instance of a preacher in America, who was mad among his parishioners except in the pulpit, where he conducted himself with great ability; and he also speaks of a judge who was very lunatic in mixed society, but sagacious on the bench."

"I have known patients," says the same writer in another place, "in whom there was a tendency to mania, complain of the difficulty they found in guarding against dislike, not only of particular individuals, but of particular parts of a room or of the house, or of particular articles of furniture or dress; those momentary feelings of uneasiness or antipathy to which all are subject, becoming in them aggravated or prolonged."* In connexion with the facts just stated, he mentions the case of an individual who could not bear the sight of white stockings; and of a certain Russian general, who entertained a singular antipathy to mirrors; so much so that the Empress Catharine always took care to give him audience in a room without any.

In connexion with this class of facts, it may be proper to refer a moment to a singular practice which is related of Dr. Johnson, and which is unquestionably to be ascribed to some early and unfortunate association. His biographer has given an account of it in the following terms: "He had another particularity, of which none of his friends ever ventured to ask an explanation. It appeared to me some superstitious habit, which he had contracted early, and from which he had never called upon his reason to disentangle him. This was his anxious care to go out or in at a door or passage, by a certain number

* Conolly on Insanity, Lond. ed., p. 98, 218.

of steps from a certain point, or at least so that as either his right or left foot (I am not certain which) should constantly make the first movement when he came close to the door or passage. Thus I conjecture: for I have, upon innumerable occasions, observed him suddenly stop, and then seem to count his steps with a deep earnestness; and, when he had neglected or gone wrong in this sort of magical movement, I have seen him go back again, put himself into a proper posture to begin the ceremony, and, having gone through it, break from his abstraction, walk briskly on, and join his company."

§ 346. Of casual association in connexion with particular days.

The same marked tendencies of mind may sometimes be discovered in connexion with particular days or other periods of time. Pinel mentions a lady who fancied that Friday was a day of ill omen and ill luck. "She at length carried this notion so far that she would not leave her room on that day. If the month began on a Friday, it rendered her extremely fearful and miserable for several days. By degrees, Thursday, being the eve of Friday, excited similar alarms. If ever she heard either of those days named in company, she immediately turned pale, and was confused in her manner and conversation, as if she had been visited by some fatal misfortune."*

Statements, much to the same effect, have been made of an individual no less distinguished than Lord Byron. From some circumstance or other, he became deeply impressed with the belief that Friday was destined to be, in relation to himself, an unlucky or ill-omened day. This was not a mere transitory feeling, which was under the control of his philosophy, but was deeply seated and operative. And, with his characteristic frankness, he did not hesitate to declare, or, rather, he took no pains to conceal, that his mind was actually under the despotism of this strange influence.†

We will subjoin here, as bearing some affinity to the cases which might properly be arranged under this head, an instance mentioned in the Encyclopedia Americana

* Treatise on Insanity, Davis's translation, p. 140.
† Moore's Life of Byron, vol. ii., p. 458.

by the author of the article on Memory. The statement is as follows: "How strange are the associations of ideas which often take place in spite of us. Every one must have experienced such. The writer recollects a melancholy instance in the case of an insane boy in a hospital, whose derangement was referred to an irreverent association with the name of God, which occurred to him while singing a hymn in church, and of which he could not divest himself, the painfulness of the impression making it occur to him more forcibly every time he sung in church, till his reason became unsettled."

§ 347. Antipathies to animals.

Nothing but the fact of the existence and great power of casual associations can explain the circumstance that individuals have, from time to time, discovered a very great antipathy to certain animals. Tasso, according to his biographers, would fall into convulsions at the sight of a carp. Henry III. of England could not be persuaded to sit in the room with a cat. Admiral Coligni, a name justly renowned in the history of France, was so afraid of a mouse, that he could not be induced to admit one to his presence unless he had his sword in his hand.

No man ever gave more decided proofs of courage than the celebrated Marquis de la Roche Jacquelin; but it is a singular fact (although no account is given of the origin of this strange association), that he could not look in the face of a squirrel without trembling and turning pale. He himself ridiculed his weakness in this respect, but with all his efforts he could not prevent the physical effects which have been referred to whenever he was in the presence of that harmless animal.

But we have an incident nearer home, which appears the less surprising, because we know the origin of it. The late Governor Sullivan, of Massachusetts, when a boy, fell asleep under a tree, and was awaked by a serpent crawling over him. He arose in great terror, ran towards the house, and fell down in a convulsive fit. Afterward, through life, he retained such aversion for everything of the serpent kind, that he could not see one, or even the picture of one, without falling into convulsions.

Peter the Great, of Russia, who certainly was not wanting in expansion and force of mind, was subject to a strong and invincible aversion of this kind. His biographer, without giving any explanation of it, merely mentions the fact as follows: "Nothing was so much the object of the Czar's antipathy as a black insect of the scarabeus or beetle kind, which breeds in houses that are not kept clean, and especially in places where meal and other provisions are deposited. In the country, the walls and ceilings of the peasant's houses are covered with them, particularly in Russia, where they abound more than in any other part of the world. They are there called *taracan;* but our naturalists give them the name of *dermeste*, or dissecting scarabeus.

"Although the Russian monarch was far from being subject to childish fears or womanish fancies, one of these insects sufficed to drive him out of an apartment, nay, even out of the house. In his frequent journeys in his own dominions, he never went into a house without having his apartment carefully swept by one of his own servants, and being assured that there were no taracans to fear. One day he paid a visit to an officer who stood pretty high in his esteem, at his country house, which was built of wood, at a little distance from Moscow. The Czar expressed his satisfaction with what was offered him, and with the order he observed in the house. The company sat down to table, and dinner was already begun, when he asked his landlord if there were taracans in his house.

"'Not many,' replied the officer, without reflecting, 'and, the better to get rid of them, I have pinned a living one to the wall.' At the same time he pointed to the place where the insect was pinned, and still continued to palpitate. Unfortunately, it was just beside the Czar, in whom the unexpected sight of this object of his aversion produced so much emotion, that he arose instantly from table, gave the officer a violent blow, and left his house with all his attendants."*

* Stælhin's Original Anecdotes of Peter the Great.

APPENDIX ON LANGUAGE

CHAPTER I.

NATURAL SIGNS.

¶ 1. Of the natural and necessary communication of the mental states from one to another.

It requires but a slight acquaintance with the predominant traits and the history of the human race, to be fully satisfied of the intention of Providence, that our internal experiences, including both the suggestions of the intellect and the emotions of the heart, shall be communicated to others. The saying is not more common than true, that man is not born for himself alone. Not only his family, and the friends who share in his private personal intercourse, but his country and the whole human race, possess a positive degree of interest in him. He comes into existence in society; he is trained up in society; his home, his permanent residence, is in society. It is there that he finds the theatre of his sufferings and his joys; of all that he expects to endure, and of all that he permits himself to hope for, in the present life.

And if it were otherwise; if man had not, in fact, the society of his fellows, he would still not be in utter solitude. Let him be doomed to suffer the fate of the King of Babylon, to be driven out, and to dwell with the beasts of the field, and he will not fail to make companions of them, and will take delight in it. He will even, where nothing else can be found to respond to the wants of his heart, converse with inanimate nature, with the flowers and trees, with the storms and the lightning; he will bless the fruit that nourishes him, and the shade that protects him; he will thank the blossom for its fragrance, and the distant waterfall for its pleasant sounds.—It may be asserted, therefore, with good reason, that a foundation is evidently laid in the human constitution for the intercourse of man

with his fellow-man, and that such intercourse is essential to his existence and his happiness. And hence it happens that not merely our thoughts and feelings, in themselves considered, but the mode in which they are to be communicated from one to another, becomes an interesting subject of inquiry. The mode, or, rather, the instrument by which this communication takes place, is Language in its various forms.

§ 2. Mental states first expressed by gestures and the countenance.

The term LANGUAGE, which is employed here in its most general sense, and as standing for all signs of thought and feeling, embraces everything that proposes itself for consideration in this part of our inquiries. But, in order to render what we have to say the more easily understood, we shall consider the general subject under the distinct and important forms of Natural signs, Oral or spoken signs, and Written signs. And in the prosecution of this plan, we are first to consider NATURAL SIGNS, or such as a person would use who found himself incapable of employing either written signs or speech.

It is worthy of notice in respect to any individual who is separated in very early life from the human family, and permitted to grow up without any instruction in the use of the organs of speech, that he will be entirely ignorant in what way to employ such organs, with the unimportant exception of being able to utter a few inarticulate cries. The story of the wild boy found in the forests of Lithuania in 1695, which is introduced, with some comments of his own, in Part First of Condillac's Origin of Knowledge, may be referred to, among other instances, by way of confirming this remark. The same inability of articulate speech is noticed in those unfortunate individuals who are born deaf, and are commonly known under the designation of DEAF and DUMB persons.

But these persons are not without language, although they are incapable of articulate speech, and although we may suppose them ignorant of all artificial aids whatever in communicating thought. The kindness of nature has not failed to make a provision for them, which serves, although in a limited degree, to enable them to reveal to

each other their thoughts and feelings. In the absence of other methods of mental communication, they are furnished with the visible and impressive language of gestures and of the countenance.

The expression of the countenance, exclusive of the eye, depends chiefly upon two things, the change of colour in the face, and the movement or play of the muscles. But in most cases we find the intimations of the face combined with movements of other parts of the body. Thus, the flushed countenance, with the hand uplifted, denotes in general an emotion of rage. In admiration or wonder, the countenance is animated with a quick play of the blood and muscles, the hand is elevated, and the body thrown back. A look, slightly illuminated with a smile, with none, or but a small motion of the body, is an indication of satisfaction or peace.—But, without entering into a full description of these signs, it may be said with great certainty, that fear, contempt, derision, grief, disappointment, malice, feelings of the ludicrous, anxiety, deep thought, terror, despair, have their natural signs. Without the aid either of written or spoken language, they can be distinctly expressed by means of gestures, inarticulate sounds, and changes in the countenance.

§ 3. Of the use made of natural signs by the deaf and dumb.

In proof of what has now been said of the capacity of natural signs for the expression of certain mental states, we may refer particularly to the DEAF and DUMB. As already intimated, these unfortunate persons have a language of their own; that is to say, they have a system of signs, partly natural and part of which they have been led to invent, either by their wants, or because they have found pleasure in the employment. Let any person who has been familiar with the deaf and dumb, and has paid attention to their modes of communicating their feelings, be introduced into the company of an individual afflicted with that calamity who is an utter stranger to him. They are no sooner met together than they have the appearance of old acquaintances, speaking a common language. The deaf and dumb person will enter readily, and with much earnestness, into the mute conversation which has

been commenced; and by means of that language to which he has been accustomed, will answer the various questions that are put to him. But the system of signs brought into use on such an occasion is founded, in a considerable degree at least, in nature; it employs those elements of expression which God has given to all mankind, and seldom goes beyond mere bodily movements and the language of the looks.

There have been instances of a number of individuals in the same family unable to hear or to articulate. It is exceedingly pleasing to witness their quickness of invention in framing their vocabulary of gestures, and their readiness in conversing with each other by means of them. They interpret an inclination of the head, a movement of the hand or arm, a contraction of the muscles of the face, even the slightest motion of the finger, as readily as another person who is able to hear can interpret the most familiar words.—What a striking declaration do we here have, that, in the defect of oral and written signs of thought, nature has a resource which is antecedent to all other forms of language!

There are some slight gestures which appear to be arbitrary, but which are found to be susceptible of being traced back and resolved into others. Mr. Stewart remarks, that an instructer of Deaf and Dumb informed him that his pupils (whatever part of the country they came from) agreed, in most instances, in expressing assent by holding up the thumb, and dissent by holding up the little finger. "It can be explained," he observes, "only by supposing that these gestures are abbreviations of those signs by which assent and dissent are generally expressed in the language of nature; and, in truth, the process by which they were introduced may be easily conceived. For the natural sign of assent is to throw the body open, by moving the hand from the breast with the palm towards the body and the thumb uppermost. The natural sign of dissent is the same movement, with the back of the hand towards the body and the little finger uppermost. The former conveys the idea of cordiality, of good-humour, and of inviting frankness; the latter of dislike and aversion. If two dumb persons were

left to converse together, it is reasonable to suppose that they would gradually abridge their natural signs for the sake of despatch, and would content themselves with *hinting* at those movements, which could be easily anticipated from the commencement, and in this manner might raise those apparently arbitrary marks of assent or dissent which have just been mentioned."

§ 4. Further illustrations of the great power of natural signs.

The facts which have been already referred to are a sufficient proof of its having been wisely and kindly ordered that there should be a Natural language. The beneficial results of this provision cannot be misunderstood in the case of persons who are by some accident cast among a people whose oral or written language is unknown, and especially in its connexion with the DEAF and DUMB. These persons come to their instructers not only weighed down by the pressure of other incidental evils, but ignorant, speechless, and wanting in confidence. The pupil and instructer have never before seen each other, and they are unable to communicate either by means of speech or of written signs. But nature speaks in the dialect of the countenance and of action; the pupil enters on his course of instruction, and in a single year learns, by the aid of signs, and chiefly by the aid of natural signs, the meaning of thousands of words. This is unquestionably ascribing great efficacy to natural signs, but not greater than seems to be warranted by the following authentic statements.

"In the summer of 1818, a Chinese young man passed through Hartford, Connecticut, in which place there is an Asylum for the education of the deaf and dumb. He was so ignorant of the English language that he could not express in it his most common wants. The principal of the Asylum invited the stranger to spend an evening within its walls, and introduced him to Mr. Laurent Clerc, the celebrated deaf and dumb pupil of the Abbé Sicard, and at that time an assistant teacher in the Ayslum. The object of this introduction was to ascertain to what extent Mr. Clerc, who was entirely ignorant of the Chinese language, could conduct an intelligent

conversation with the foreigner by signs and gestures merely. The result of the experiment surprised all who were present. Mr. Clerc learned from the Chinese many interesting facts respecting the place of his nativity, his parents and their family, his former pursuits in his own country, his residence in the United States, and his notions concerning God and a future state. By the aid of appropriate signs also, Mr. Clerc ascertained the meaning of about twenty Chinese words. When the conversation began, the stranger seemed to be bewildered with amazement at the novel kind of language that was addressed to him. Soon, however, he became deeply interested in the very expressive and significant manner which Mr. Clerc used to make himself understood; and, before one hour had expired, a very quick and lively interchange of thought took place between these so lately entire strangers to each other. The Chinese himself began to catch the spirit of his new deaf and dumb acquaintance, and to employ the language of the countenance and gestures with considerable effect to make himself understood.

"About a year afterward, the principal of the Asylum visited Cornwall, a small village in Connecticut, where upward of twenty heathen youths were receiving education under the patronage of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. With the consent of the principal of that institution, the principal of the Asylum one evening gathered around him several of these interesting strangers, from the islands of the South Sea, and from different tribes of the North American Indians. The object of this interview was to ascertain how far a conversation could be conducted with them merely by signs and gestures. The result was similar to that in the case of Mr. Clerc's intercourse with the Chinese. Questions were proposed to them on a variety of topics relating to their own individual history and that of their families, to the state of manners and morals in their respective countries, and to their early religious knowledge For example, Thomas Hoopoo, a native of Owhyhee, was asked if his parents were living; how many brothers and sisters he had; when he left his native shores; whether his countrymen worshipped idols and sacrificed

human victims; how the women were treated by the men; what was the climate of his country; what its productions; with many inquiries of a similar nature, all of which he well comprehended, and to many of which he replied by signs. The meaning, too, of a number of Owhyhee words was ascertained by signs merely, and found to correspond with the import which had been previously assigned to them in a dictionary which had been for some time preparing in the school; and, indeed, in a variety of instances, the most correct meaning of such words was established by the medium of signs in a more satisfactory way than had been previously attempted. Throughout this conversation the heathen youths appeared to take a deep interest, and to have a peculiar aptitude both in comprehending the signs which were proposed to them, and in inventing such as were necessary for a reply.

"On the testimony of several of the South Sea islanders, it appeared that not a few of the signs employed in the instruction of the deaf and dumb are precisely the same which their countrymen use to supply the deficiency of, or to give emphasis to, their own comparatively barren language; a fact which had indeed been anticipated from the circumstance so often observed by the teachers of the deaf and dumb among their pupils, that mutes who meet for the first time are able to understand each other fully on many common topics; the Author of nature having laid the foundation in the very constitution of our species, and in the structure and processes of the visible creation, for a universal expression of the same ideas, on a vast variety of subjects, by similar signs."*

§ 5. Of the system of signs existing among the North American Savages.

It is an interesting fact in relation to the present subject, that a system of natural signs is affirmed, on the most respectable authority, to exist among the Savage tribes throughout North America, which is universally understood by them. A considerable catalogue of these signs has been given to the public by persons who have

* T. H. Gallaudet's Essay on the Language of Signs, in the (London) Christian Observer, Sept. and Oct., 1836.

travelled and resided among the aboriginal inhabitants, and have thus had ample opportunities of knowing. The following, among others, are instances.

(1.) SUN. The forefinger and thumb are brought together at the tip so as to form a circle, and held up towards the sun's track. To indicate any particular time of the day, the hand with the sign of the sun is stretched out towards the east horizon, and then gradually elevated, to show the ascent of that luminary, until the hand arrives in a proper direction to indicate the part of the heavens in which the sun will be at the given time.—(2.) NIGHT, or SLEEPING at night.—The head, with the eyes closed, is laterally inclined for a moment upon the hand. As many times as this is repeated, so many nights, either with or without the additional notion of sleep, are indicated. And it will perhaps occur to the recollection here, that this is the sign for the same thing which is generally found to be adopted by deaf and dumb persons.—(3.) COMBAT. The clinched hands are held about as high as the neck, and five or six inches asunder, then waved two or three times laterally, to show the advances and retreats of the combatants; after which, the fingers of each hand are suffered to spring from the thumb towards each other, as in the act of sprinkling water, to represent the flight of the missile weapons which are used by them. — (4.) PRISONER. The forefinger and thumb of the left hand are held in the form of a semicircle, opening towards and near the breast; and the forefinger of the right, representing the prisoner, is placed upright within the curve, and passed from one side to the other, in order to show that it will not be permitted to pass out, &c.*

The epithet SYMBOLIC is sometimes applied to such combinations of gestures as these, but appears to be more generally applied to representative actions, which are either more formal and complicated, or in which the resemblance to the thing signified is less obvious, however simple the action may be in itself. So that SYMBOLS

* See vol. i. of the Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Long's Expedition from Pittsburg to the Rocky Mountains, and Flint's Valley of the Mississippi, Letter xv.

(if there be truly any distinction worthy of being retained) differ rather in degree than in kind; implying either greater complexity, or greater remoteness between the sentiment and the action, than in ordinary imitative gestures.

All travellers among our Savage tribes furnish illustrations of symbolic actions, although until recently they have not been generally aware of the existence of a system of imitative signs by mere gesture. They accordingly tell us that friendly and peaceable sentiments are symbolically intimated when a stranger appears among a tribe carrying or smoking a large pipe of clay or marble, adorned with feathers, which the Indians call a CALUMET. The method of confirming a treaty of peace is also symbolical, it being done by means of what the Savages call a belt of WAMPUM. This belt is composed of shells of different colours, wrought into the shape of beads, which are strung upon thongs and strongly united together. The parties concerned hold the ends of the belt, and are thereby understood to signify reciprocal truth and sincerity.

§ 6. Of the symbolic exhibitions of the Hebrews.

Symbolical action is known to have been frequently employed in Oriental countries, owing in some measure to the great vivacity and bodily activity of the people. Those who are acquainted with the Bible know how frequently it was resorted to among the ancient Hebrews. It will be sufficient merely to allude to the following instances, which may be more fully understood by a reference to the Scriptures.—Elisha directs Joash to shoot arrows out of a window eastward. Jeremiah, acting under divine direction, hides the linen girdle in the hole of a rock near Euphrates; he breaks a potter's vessel in the sight of the people; he puts on bonds and yokes, and casts a book into Euphrates. Ezekiel weighs his beard, delineates the siege of Jerusalem on a tile, &c.

It has sometimes been thought that such symbolic actions were below the dignity of the prophetic office. In the view of the opposers of the Bible they have appeared mean, absurd, and fanatical. But it ought to be remem-

bered that it was the spirit of the times, the feeling of the people themselves, which dictated those exhibitions. It may further be said, that this is the spirit of all times and all countries where it is not controlled and subdued by civilization, and that even civilization does not always subdue and exclude it.

§ 7. Of the instinctive interpretation of certain natural signs.

The meaning of many of those signs which are called natural is learned from experience. The action being a representative or imitation of the thing itself, it necessarily suggests whatever is intended to be signified. But there are some which appear to be understood instinctively, and, of course, independently of experience; for instance, a smile, or frown, or the signs of terror. The opinion that there is to a certain extent an original or instinctive interpretation of signs, appears to be maintained by writers chiefly on the following grounds.

(1.) We are clearly led in all our inquiries, whether of an intellectual or a physical kind, to the conclusion, that the great Author of nature has some purpose or design in his works. Now there can be no dispute that he has furnished men with a large apparatus of natural signs. Almost every desire and passion of the human soul is capable of being expressed in that way. Peace of mind, the desire of knowledge, especially when quickened by any peculiar circumstances, the benevolent affections, intensity of thought, the passions of joy and grief, all have their appropriate language, beaming in the eye, quivering on the lips, contracting in the forehead, reddening and dimpling in the cheeks; and are rendered yet more emphatic by the attitude, the gestures, and the tones of voice. It being, therefore, an admitted fact, that his Creator has furnished man with a system of natural signs, it is but reasonable to suppose that he has furnished him also with a corresponding power of interpretation; and that man is thereby enabled, at the very earliest period, to avail himself of the price which has thus kindly been placed in his hands. It is maintained that this is the probability or presumption arising in the mere view of the facts; and also that such presumption is supported by the anal-

ogy of other cases. We not only find, for instance, in human nature, a love of the truth and a disposition to utter it, but a corresponding principle of belief; and, by analogy, we should be led to expect, in like manner, a corresponding power of interpretation, where we find a system of signs susceptible of being interpreted

(2.) But there are other circumstances which seem to afford direct and positive proof of what we should thus be led to expect.—The power of interpreting natural signs is noticed at a very early period, long before the ability to interpret arbitrary signs. Children understand the meaning of smiles and frowns, of a soothing or threatening tone of voice, of the expressions of joy and grief, at a time of life when they cannot be supposed capable of so much observation as to remark the connexion between a passion and its external effect. While they are months learning the alphabet, and years elapse before they can read a book with facility, they read and understand the signs of nature as soon as their ears are opened to hear and their eyes to see, and without the aid of a laborious system of training.

§ 8. Further evidence of the instinctive interpretation of natural signs.

(3.) There is another train of thought tending to illustrate this subject. It is an undoubted matter of fact, that the knowledge of the intellectual operations and of the passions cannot be fully communicated to their pupils by instructers of the deaf and dumb in the ordinary modes. They cannot here, as in the case of external objects, write the name, and then point to the object in explanation of it. They are obliged to rely almost wholly on natural signs, particularly those of the countenance, in the explanation of what is taking place within. And when an instructer, who is well versed in the language of such signs, throws the workings of the soul into the looks, it is interesting to see with what avidity and ease his unfortunate pupils decipher this dialect of flesh and blood and muscular motion. It cannot be said here that the power of interpretation depends on the previous experience of the pupils, because we suppose the instructer (which is often the fact) is expressing mental acts and operations with

which they have hitherto been unacquainted, or with which, as existing in the mind of another, they cannot possibly be made acquainted in any other way.

(4.) Those signs which are maintained to be susceptible of an instinctive interpretation affect us more than others. The passions of hatred, love, and anger interest us much more strongly when they are represented in the countenance than when they are expressed by mere written or spoken words. So that, unquestionably, we give to some natural signs a significancy which we do not and cannot give to others, and still less to those forms of language which are purely arbitrary. This being the case, it seems to be reasonable to conclude that the mind has an original power of interpreting to some extent.

(5.) This power seems to be necessary as an introductory step to the formation of all conventional language. Artificial language, whether we regard it as written or spoken, is arbitrary, and a matter of mere agreement. But if it were not of divine original, as many writers have contended, it is evident that there must have been some antecedent signs, by means of which such agreement was first formed. And we can think of no instrument which could have been employed to this end, except the instinctive power of interpreting those signs of gesture, tones of voice, and movements of the countenance, which we find, from the earliest period of life, to be expressive of emotions and the passions.

There is another consideration on this subject, in addition to those already alluded to, which it is proper to mention, although the train of thought cannot be pursued to any length.—The brute creation, as well as men, have their natural signs. They are destitute, it is true, of the natural language of the countenance, but they are rich in that of the voice. Every mountain and forest is vocal with the lowing of herds, the bleating of flocks, the threatening cries of animals of prey, and the infinitely varied notes of birds. By the sounds which are continually sent forth, they communicate to each other their joys and sorrows, their jealousies and hopes, their attachments and their aversions; and probably no one doubts that

they are instinctively interpreted, for it is not easy to see in what other way they could be understood. But if the Creator has given this power of interpretation to brutes, we cannot well suppose that he has altogether withholden it from men, when he has given them the same natural signs, and with an originally equal necessity of their being interpreted.

§ 9. Considerations on the use of natural signs.

Before dismissing the subject of this chapter, it remains to be remarked, that it is one of no little practical importance, although it may often be thought otherwise.

An attention to natural signs could hardly fail to be of advantage in infant schools, and in all cases of instruction of very young children. The knowledge which is suited to their minds is that which we have already described as having an external origin. Consequently, the objects or actions with which they are to be made acquainted must be presented to the sight or some other of the senses. But, in the absence of objects, the instructer, if he have studied the language of natural signs, will be able to convey the meaning of many words by gestures; a method which will secure the purpose designed, and will not be wanting in interest to the little pupils.—"Notwithstanding," says Dugald Stewart, "the decline of natural language in consequence of the use of artificial signs, the acquaintance we still have with the former (however imperfect) is of essential service in teaching children the meaning of the latter. This may be easily exemplified by first reading over to a child one of Æsop's fables without taking your eye from the book, or using any inflexion of voice; and afterward telling him the same story with the commentary of your face, and gestures, and tones."

Again, the doctrine of natural signs is deserving of greater attention than it has received, when it is considered in connexion with the Deaf and Dumb. No small acquaintance with them is implied in being able to fix upon such as are suitable in the instruction of these unfortunate persons. And the worth of such acquaintance, therefore, can be conjectured from its subserviency to their

improvement and happiness. If there were no other result, the labour attending the study of natural signs would be amply repaid by this.

Furthermore, some knowledge of natural signs might be found profitable to all travellers and sojourners among nations of an unknown tongue, and, among others, to Missionaries. It is one of the pleasing features of the present times, that men from almost all the civilized parts of the world are gone out to announce in heathen lands the glad news of the Gospel. One of the American missionaries in India, remarking on the acquisition of languages, observes that, in receiving lessons from his instructer, they were often compelled to resort to signs and gestures in order at all to understand each other.—Similar aids may be expected to be afforded from this source in all other cases analogous to this. Lucian has somewhere made mention of a king, whose dominions bordered on the Euxine Sea, who, happening to be at Rome in the reign of Nero, and having seen a pantomime perform, begged him of the emperor as a present, in order that he might employ him as an interpreter among the nations in his neighbourhood, with whom he could have no intercourse on account of the diversity of language.*—These are not unimportant considerations; and there is ground for making this remark also, that a knowledge of natural signs is subservient, in some measure, to the success of the fine or liberal arts, particularly sculpture and painting, and also to the successful exhibition of the art of oratory.

The arts of sculpture and painting are addressed to the eye; and one great object in those arts is to express emotions. Those, therefore, who practise them, must study the connexion between the illuminations of the eye, the colour and muscular movements of the face, and the general attitude, which are the natural outward signs, and the internal feelings which correspond to them. It is not possible that a single trait of character or even a single feeling should be conveyed by those admirable arts except by means of natural signs. And hence the obvious conclusion, that no man can excel in them without a knowledge of that form of language.—Similar remarks

* See Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind, part ii., chap. i., § 1

will apply to the orator. He addresses the eye as well as the ear; and, whenever he combines the language of looks, tones, and gestures with the arbitrary signs of articulate speech, he cannot fail to increase the interest of his hearers.

CHAPTER II.

ORAL SIGNS, OR SPEECH.

§ 10. Remarks on the original formation of oral signs.

ALTHOUGH we cannot but admire the wise provision of nature in furnishing men with natural signs, it ought to excite our gratitude that they are not left, in the communication of their thoughts and affections from one to another, to the assistances merely which are given them in that way. Possessed of the organs of speech, they are capable of forming signs, which are addressed to the ear, and which, from their very nature, are in a great degree conventional and arbitrary.—And we stop a moment to remark here, that we find, in this use of the organs of speech, a striking instance of the direction and power which the mental nature is capable of giving to the bodily action, and of the value of mental endowments in general. The brute animals are known to possess the physical requisites of articulation in a considerable degree; and some of their tribes have been frequently taught to utter the names of persons, and even distinctly to repeat whole sentences. Nevertheless, we do not find among the brute animals an oral language, a system of conventional sounds of their own making, and the general use and intercourse of speech. They are not only destitute of the preliminary requisite of the natural signs of the countenance, but the formation of a conventional language implies also the exercise of a degree of intellect, which they do not possess. Nothing short of the high capacities of the human mind is capable of securing this great result.

And such is the undeniable difficulty of employing the complicated machinery of articulation so as to form words, it is proper to remark in this place, that there has even been a doubt in the minds of some whether men, if wholly left to their own efforts, would ever have acquired this power. Such persons admit that others may acquire the power by a long and laborious process of imitating after it has been once attained (and, in fact, we daily see this in the case of children); but they cannot easily persuade themselves that the unaided faculties of the mind were equal to the original acquisition.

Hence it has been the opinion of the persons now alluded to, that we are indebted for the power of forming oral signs, or of speaking, to the direct interference of the Deity himself in behalf of our first parents. This is undoubtedly a matter of opinion, and we may even add, of probability, although it does not appear to be susceptible of clear and decided proof. The Bible, which is designed rather to subserve the moral and religious interests of mankind than to gratify antiquarian curiosity, does not entirely set us at rest on this point. It does indeed say that God brought the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air to Adam to see what he would call them, but it is not said that God gave the names himself, or that he directly aided Adam in giving them; although the supposition that such assistance was granted may be held to be supported by the circumstance that he either then or before obviously stood in need of it, and also by the consideration of that beneficence which is continually manifested in the dealings of the Supreme Being with his creatures.

§ 11. Of the possibility of forming an oral language without Divine aid.

With the assurance, which is so abundantly given in Revelation, that in ancient times the Supreme Being had communication with his creatures in diverse ways, no reasonable objection can be felt to the doctrine which makes God the direct author of oral language, provided there be found in the Scriptures sufficient evidence in favour of it. At the same time, notwithstanding the difficulties that beset the whole inquiry, it cannot be denied that some rea-

sons may be proposed in support of the opinion that the formation of an oral language is within the unaided reach of the human faculties, of which God also is the author.

It is admitted, that if a man be placed in utter solitude, and be permitted to grow up in that situation, there is no reason to anticipate that he will ever have the command of articulate speech. The effort to obtain it is too great when he finds no one around him with whom to compare his labours, to sympathize in his discouragements, and to cheer him on to a successful termination. But his prospect is very different in the bosom of society; he there finds a multitude of incitements and assistances which in the other situation he would be destitute of, and, although it would cost him many a struggle, he would probably find himself rewarded at last for his labours in the possession of their object.

But if it be admitted that man, existing in society, would be able to acquire the power of articulate speech, the next inquiry is, What more is wanting in order to institute an oral language? Simply this: he must form a convention or agreement with his associates, by means of which, distinct and separate sounds shall be made to stand for separate and definite objects. And, having arrived at this point in the inquiry, we shall no doubt be called upon to show how such convention or agreement could possibly be made. And it must be acknowledged there is but one answer; it can be made by means of Natural Signs, and in that way alone.

Natural signs are not only indispensable in the original formation of oral language, but, were it not for their assistance, it would be impossible to teach Oral language to children, even after it had been once formed. When a mother teaches her native tongue to her children, she utters a particular sound; the child himself, perhaps, utters the same sound; but how does the child know that the sound is to stand for a particular object, for a watch, a chair, a table, a man, &c.?—It is evident that he can form the association of the sign with the thing signified only through the agency of the antecedent language of natural signs. By means of tones of the voice, changes of the countenance, and gestures, the mother succeeds in

awakening an interest in the child, and in communicating her general design; she then points to the object at the same time with the utterance of the sound or name; and she repeats this process till the child, by the aid of its instinctive power of interpreting natural signs, fully comprehends the meaning of the articulate sound.*

It will be remembered, that the inquiry which has been attended to in this section is not whether the original formation of oral language by man's unaided effort is probable, but merely whether it be *possible*. "Let us suppose," says Chateaubriand, "a Savage in possession of his senses, but not having speech; this man, pressed by hunger, meets in the forest some object proper to satisfy it; he utters a cry of joy at seeing it or at carrying it to his mouth. Is it not possible, that, having heard the cry, the sound, be it what it may, he retains it, and repeats it afterward every time he perceives the same object or is pressed with the same want? The cry will become the first word of his vocabulary, and thus he will proceed on till he arrives at the expression of ideas purely intellectual."

§ 12. Oral signs or words are in general arbitrary.

In oral language, sounds stand for things, or, rather, the ideas of things; but there is no resemblance between the sign and the thing signified. The fact that articulated sounds or words are representative of the states of the mind, is founded on arbitrary agreement. And as this agreement necessarily involves the consent of the great mass of any people, by whom oral signs are employed, the alleged confession of the Emperor Augustus was made with good reason, that he was of himself unable to introduce a single new word into the Latin tongue.

If this statement were not correct; if words had any natural fitness for that purpose for which they are employed, and were not conventional, there would be but one language. Instead of the multiplied diversities in dialects and languages which we now witness, there would be the same words for things of the same nature through-

* See De Gerando's Histoire des Systemes de Philosophie, tome i., chap. iii., note B.

out the world. But this is not the case. On the contrary, every body of men, as it happens to be separated from other communities by mountains, oceans, and other causes both physical and political, forms for itself its own arbitrary system of signs.

It ought to be observed, however, that there is a slight exception to this general view of the arbitrary nature of oral signs. We allude to a class of terms, of which the words CRASH, TWANG, BUZZ, WHISTLE, SHRILL, HISS, RATTLE, may be mentioned as specimens. There is evidently some resemblance between these words, as they are enunciated by the voice, and the things for which they stand; in other languages, some words similar to these, that is, having a like relation to the things for which they stand, are to be found. But with this exception, which is one of very limited extent, words are truly arbitrary and conventional sounds, formed in the progressive history of the human race, on such occasions of want or of convenience as seemed to call for them. These occasions, on which words were first employed, and their arrangement into classes (what grammarians call Parts of Speech), merit a brief consideration.

§ 13. Words at first few in number, and limited to particular objects

In the infancy of the human race, men were without a knowledge of the arts; they had no laws but the dictates of conscience, no regularly instituted form of government; their food was the fruits of the earth, and they lived under the open sky, except when they retreated from the storm or the sunshine to the shade of trees or the cooler recesses of caverns. Their ideas, therefore, were few; the articulate sounds which either the active ingenuity of nature or the special interference of Providence had taught them not only to frame, but to employ as the instituted signs of things, must have been few also; even more so than their ideas.

The few names which they were able thus early to employ, related chiefly to the objects with which they were more immediately and particularly conversant. They gave a name to the sun that shone by day, and to the moon which ruled the night; they invented an oral sign

for the tree under which they sat at noon; for the cavern to which they occasionally retired; for the fruit which relieved their hunger, and for the running water at which they slaked their thirst. Afterward they were led to form general names, standing for a number of objects, and probably in the following manner.

§ 14. Of the formation of general names or appellatives.

Naturally possessed of too much activity of spirit to rest satisfied with remaining in one place, or to quiet their curiosity with a small number of objects, they engaged in some new enterprise, explored new tracts of country, and thus enlarged their knowledge. In going from place to place, they necessarily met again with those particular objects with which they had formed such an intimate acquaintance in their first residence. They met with other trees, with other animals, with other caves and fountains, which they at once perceived to be of the same kind with those that had previously come under their observation.

The recurrence of these new objects instantly called up the others. This happened by a law of their nature which they could not control; and the recollection was the more intense, as, in the infancy of things, curiosity is more alive, and astonishment more readily and deeply felt. The objects with which they had become first acquainted could not be recalled without a remembrance, at the same time, of the names which they had given them. As they perceived the objects which they now beheld to be the same in kind with those which they first knew, they at once concluded, and very naturally, that they had an equal right to the names with those to which those names were first appropriated. They therefore exclaimed, *a tree! a cave! a fountain!* whenever and wherever they met them. And thus what was at first a particular term, and was employed to express only an individual, had its meaning extended, and came in time to stand for a whole class of objects.

Such, there can hardly be a question, was the origin of general names; and the statement is not only agreeable to the natural course of things, but is indirectly confirmed by many incidents. When the Spaniards first ar-

rived at a certain region bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, and found that the soil was rich, the dwellings good, the people numerous, they cried out, it is another Spain, and after that it bore the name of New Spain. When they first sailed along the coast of Columbia, they noticed an Indian village built on piles, to raise it above the stagnant water; and being, from that circumstance, reminded of the mistress of the Adriatic, they called that region VENEZUELA (Little Venice), which is the name of the province to this day.* And it is on the same principle that people so often find themselves in this country giving names to the objects around them in allusion to what exists on some other continent; calling a large river another Thames, and mountains of great altitude the American Alps. So readily does the mind connect together things which are remote, and seek for analogies between what is novel and what is familiar.

§ 15. The formation of appellatives implies the feeling of resemblance.

We discover, in the way which has just been mentioned, the origin of appellatives or common names (in treatises of a scientific nature more commonly termed GENERA and SPECIES), the formation of which has sometimes been considered a matter of difficult solution. If the statement which has been given in the preceding section be a correct one, the mental process, so far from being difficult, is definite and simple. Nature has made a provision which is prompt and easy in its applications, and abundantly successful in its results. There is, first, the perception of different objects of the same kind; then the suggestion or feeling of resemblance in respect to those objects; and, finally, the giving of the common name to such objects or parts of objects as are reached by the feeling of resemblance.

The feeling of resemblance is a distinct thing from the previous perception of the individual objects. If there had not been, between the perception of the objects and the giving of the common name, an intermediate feeling of resemblance, the primitive framers of language would have been as likely to have assigned the same appella-

* Am. Quar. Rev., March, 1831, p. 167.

tive to the cave, and the mountain, and the river, or to any other things altogether dissimilar, as to those resembling objects to which it was assigned.

When, therefore, those persons who hold to the doctrine of the Nominalists assert that all general abstract ideas are but names, they appear to mistake. There is something more than the mere name, viz., that feeling of resemblance which has been mentioned, and which, although it is difficult to explain it, except it be by referring each one to his own intellectual experience, is clearly too important a circumstance to be hastily overlooked and thrown out of the question. (See the Chapter on General Abstract Ideas.)

§ 16. On the increase in the number of nouns or appellatives.

After a certain number of sounds had been selected and agreed upon as the signs or names of objects, the extension or increase of this part of oral language became comparatively easy. We may suppose that objects in nature were from time to time discovered, such as trees, plants, flowers, minerals, &c., which were unknown before; but, instead of uttering and agreeing upon altogether new sounds as their names, men searched among the treasures already in their possession, and found them there. This was particularly, and, we may suppose, almost uniformly the case, when there were words already existing which could be rendered, by their combination, descriptive of traits or qualities in the newly-discovered objects. Nor are these statements wholly conjectural. They appear to be confirmed by what we notice every day in the history of languages. When, for instance, a new word is wanted in the English language to express some distinct idea not yet provided for, a sign entirely new is not invented for it. Every one knows that there is a great repugnance felt to coin new words out of sounds that have hitherto had no meaning attached to them. But the practice is to form a new word by a combination of others, or perhaps by an alteration, either in the beginning or the termination of the word, according to the settled analogy of the language. In case there are no words in the language which can either be com-

pounded or altered so as to answer the purpose, resort is frequently had, in preference to framing a sound entirely new, to foreign languages. Many words in the English language have been introduced from the Greek, the French, and the Italian, although these are not its great and original sources.

It is this tendency to alter rather than invent new words which lays the foundation of the well-known fact, that there is a regular system of composition, of increase, and of diminution in words, running through every language. A single word (for instance, the verbs of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages) may assume ten, twenty, and even fifty different forms, and every form is expressive of a distinct idea. And hence the primitive words of all languages, even those that are most copious, are comparatively few in number.

§ 17. Of the formation of verbs.

In the exercise of their power of appointing articulate sounds as signs of thought, we now suppose men to have proceeded so far as to form general nouns or appellatives, and to employ them with facility. But they soon find that there is need of another class of words, which are of great consequence both in the construction and the application of oral language, viz., VERBS.

As the ideas expressed by verbs concern actions rather than objects, and the attributes, affections, and relations of things rather than the things themselves, and cannot, therefore, be so easily defined to the understanding and fixed upon by it, words of this kind were not, we may suppose, so rapidly formed as appellatives, although some of them must have been of very early origin.

Their origin may be illustrated in this way. Let it be admitted that the primitive inhabitants have given names to certain wild animals; Condillac supposes that such names were given first, before those of trees, fountains, &c. It soon happens, as is very natural and reasonable to be imagined, that they see one of these animals advancing towards them with great speed and apparent ferocity. Certainly they would have an idea of the motion of the animal as something different from the animal it-

self; and if they could give a name to the animal, why not to the fact of his coming towards them or running from them, as the fact might be?

In the formation of the noun substantive or general term, they exclaimed, The tiger! The lion! and this exclamation became in time the common name. But now they discover a new attribute or action of the animal, which affects them strongly, and deserves a distinct appellation, and hence they utter some new exclamation; it may be conjectured, the word COMES or RUSHES; and the cry now is, tiger—rushes! lion—comes! The articulate sounds which, under such circumstances, are adopted, whatever they may be, are eventually fixed upon as the conventional and permanent representations of certain actions, attributes, and affections of things; and in the maturity of society and of knowledge, when man finds all that he has learned subjected to a more exact and scientific classification, they are accordingly classed as VERBS

§ 18. Formation of adjectives and other parts of speech.

It has been conjectured that nouns and verbs were, in time of origin, the earliest of all the parts of speech, and, in truth, the hypothesis does not rest solely upon conjecture. It was the object of men at first to express their ideas as they could; and they reckoned it of but little consequence whether they did it with great precision or elegance. Adjectives, conjunctions, adverbs, prepositions, relative pronouns, were introduced by degrees, as they were found to be needed; but nouns and verbs could never be dispensed with. And, in addition to this consideration, that these classes of words could not at any time be dispensed with, there is much reason to suppose, from a variety of investigations, that adjectives and some other subordinate parts of speech were derived either from verbs or substantives, and, of course, they must have been subsequent in the period of their formation.

Agreeably to this statement, it is found that, in the dialect of some Savage tribes, those qualifying words which we call ADJECTIVES, or adnouns, do not exist. "The Mohegans," says an American writer, "have no adjectives in all their language. Although it may at first seem not

only singular and curious, but impossible, that a language should exist without adjectives, yet it is an indubitable fact."* This fact, strange as it may seem at first, is undoubtedly consistent with what we notice in many of the most improved languages. Thus in the English we say, a *clay* colour, a *lead* colour, a *sea* fish, a *wine* vessel, a *gold* ring. But clay, lead, sea, wine, gold, are originally nouns, and are still used as such. We here call them adjectives, and not nouns, merely because they are employed as subordinate to other nouns, and for the purpose of qualifying them.

In other cases, adjectives can be traced back to verbs. Thus the adjective *proud* is ascertained to be the Anglo-Saxon PRUT, which is the past participle of PRYTIAN. The adjective TALL may also be traced to the Anglo-Saxon, being the past participle of the verb TILIAN, *to lift up*. The epithet RIGHT is from the past participle of the Latin verb REGO, *to govern* or *order*.

§ 19. The foregoing principles confirmed from the deaf and dumb.

The statements of the last section, introduced to show that some adjectives were originally nouns, are confirmed by what is almost invariably noticed in the Deaf and Dumb. Massieu, the celebrated pupil of the Abbé Sicard, is a proof.

He had acquired a clear conception of the qualities of objects, in distinction from the objects themselves to which they belonged. But when he first attempted to express those qualities in words, he invariably made use of other nouns, and not adjectives; selecting, of course, the names of such objects as were remarkable for the qualities in question.—If, for instance, he wished to express the quality or attribute of speed in one of his companions, instead of saying Albert is swift, he would say Albert is a BIRD. If he wished to express the quality of courage, instead of saying Paul is bold, he would say Paul is a LION. He would express his perception of sweetness of disposition in another, not by saying William is amiable, but William is a LAMB.†

* Dr. Jonathan Edwards's Remarks on the Mohegan Indians.

† See Cours d'Instruction d'un Sourd-muet de Naissance, par Roch Ambroise Sicard, 2d ed., p. 47.

§ 20. Of the formation of prepositions.

We should remember, in considering the subject of artificial language, that it was originally framed by comparatively artless men, and that its different parts appeared, not in obedience to a sort of prophetic invention merely, but as they were called for by an urgent necessity. There is good reason to suppose, in view of the considerations already advanced, that the earliest denominations or classes of speech were those which were subsequently called verbs and common nouns. But soon there were framed other parts or classes of speech, that were not permanently included under the names of verbs and appellatives, but in time assumed a distinct denomination. And this was the case not only with adjectives, but with prepositions.

Prepositions are the names of real objects, actions, attributes, and relations, not less than the parts of speech from which they are, in a great measure, derived. The preposition WITH, for instance, is asserted by etymologists to have been originally the imperative mode of a Saxon verb, which means to unite or join. The sun *with* his rays enlightens and warms the earth; that is, the sun, JOIN his rays, enlightens, &c. In like manner, the preposition *through* is said to have been originally the Teutonic substantive THURUH, meaning a door, gate, or passage. The beams of the sun pass *through* the air; that is, the beams of the sun pass; the air is their door or passage-way. The preposition *from* is the Anglo-Saxon FRUM, which means beginning or origin. In the proposition, The rays came from the sun, we have the two distinct propositions, viz., the rays came, and the sun their beginning or source. The lamp falls *from* the ceiling; that is, the lamp falls; the ceiling is its beginning, or the place where the falling begins.*

§ 21. Of the origin and original import of conjunctions.

The general doctrine that nouns were first formed, afterward verbs, and that these were the sources of other classes of words, is strengthened by what we know in respect to that species of connectives called conjunctions.

* See this subject more fully considered in the EPEA PTEROENTA OR Diversions of Purley of Horne Tooke.

The conjunction IF was originally a verb in the imperative mode, viz., GIF, the imperative of the Saxon word GIFAN, which is the same with the modern English infinitive TO GIVE. If we consider the original import of the words in this sentence, viz., If ye love me, ye will keep my commandments, it will stand thus: Give or grant this, viz., ye love me, ye will keep my commandments.

The conjunctions UNLESS, LEST, and ELSE, are derivatives from the Saxon verb LESAN, to dismiss. The meaning conveyed in this sentence, viz., Unless ye believe, ye shall not understand, may be thus analyzed: Dismiss, ye believe (the circumstance of belief being out of the way), ye shall not understand.

The conjunction THOUGH was originally a verb in the imperative, from the Saxon THAFIAN, meaning to grant or allow. The word was originally THAF or THOF, and is thus often pronounced by the people in some parts of England to this day. This sentence, Though he slay me, I will trust in him, may be thus explained, in conformity with the etymological derivation: Allow, grant this, he will slay me, I will trust in him.

§ 22. Further remarks on the meaning of conjunctions and other particles.

Observations similar to those which have been made in reference to conjunctions and prepositions, will apply to other subordinate parts of speech (which, including conjunctions and prepositions, are sometimes known under the name of particles). Accordingly, it will be found, on examination, that many adverbs were originally either nouns, verbs, or the participles of verbs. But this inquiry, interesting and important as it unquestionably is, cannot be further prosecuted here. It is proper, however, to guard the foregoing views by saying, that when a language is fully formed and settled upon, we would not advise a confident and indiscriminate reference to the etymology of particles, in order to determine their present significancy, although in many cases, as in those mentioned in the preceding section, such a reference throws light upon them. Whatever particles may have been at first, whether nouns or verbs, or whatever direct and positive significance they may have once had, they are at last, when the

language is fully formed, evidently without meaning, except so far as they are connected with other words.

The proper use of them seems to be, to express the states of our mind as we pass from one clause of a sentence to another, or from one proposition to another; also the restriction, distinction, and opposition of our thoughts. Admitting, then, that, in some instances, we can derive considerable aid from etymology, the surest method of ascertaining the meaning of this class of words is by observing the operations of our own minds as we connect together our ideas in clauses, sentences, and consecutive propositions.

§ 23. Of the origin of particular or proper names.

Although general names or appellatives, as appeared in § 13, were first applied to particular objects, as soon as they became general and were employed to denote classes of objects, they were no longer of use in the specification of individuals. Their utility in that respect necessarily ceased. Hence arose the class of substances or nouns called particular or proper names, designed especially to indicate individual objects. In ascertaining to what objects terms of this kind shall be assigned, it can only be said that we give proper names to such things as we have frequent and urgent occasion to mention; no other rule can readily be laid down.—We accordingly give particular names to rivers, lakes, cataracts, mountains, because we have frequent occasion to speak of them individually; of the Mississippi, the La Plata, the Alps, and the Apennines. There is still greater reason why we should give names of this sort to our fellow-beings, with whom we constantly associate, and on whom our happiness is in no small degree dependant. But the assignation of proper names is far from being limited to men, or to rivers, or to mountains, or to cataracts. We continually meet with them.—The merchant gives names to his vessels, the farmer to his oxen, the hunter to his dogs, the jockey to his horses, on the same principles and for the same reason that one river is called Ganges and another Danube, and that one man is called John and another William.

§ 24. Principle of selection and significancy of proper names.

But a question arises, On what principle are the names themselves selected? Proper names undoubtedly were at first expressive of some qualities or events pertaining to the individuals or objects to which they were applied. Thus, in the Hebrew, certainly one of the most ancient of languages, the name Benjamin signifies a favourite or prosperous son; Joshua intimates help or deliverance; Samuel implies a disposition to hear or obey God; Moses, although perhaps not originally a Hebrew word, is supposed to denote a person drawn from the waters.

In the Gaelic language, Cairbar, the strong man, Morna, the well-beloved; Cathmor, great in battle; and a multitude of other significant names might be referred to, as illustrating and confirming this view.

In the Latin, the celebrated name of Brutus alludes to the fact that Lucius Junius acted the assumed part of a brutish or foolish person in order to conceal his patriotic designs. The renowned cognomen of Coriolanus was first given in reference to the assault of Corioli by a Roman soldier. The name of Publicola expressed the attachment of the first individual who bore it to the rights and interests of the people. Every reader of Roman history knows what splendid associations of an historical kind are connected with the names of Capitolinus and Africanus. And names were not only given by the Romans in reference to personal achievements and historical events, but as expressive of mental qualities, occupations, and situations in life. Accordingly, one man is called Egerius for his poverty; another is called Serranus in allusion to his business as a cultivator of the soil; another is called Cato out of regard to his wisdom.

§ 25. Of the origin and significancy of the names of places.

The names of places also have a meaning; it is sometimes a direct and positive significancy, at other only an allusion to historical facts. There is ample reason for believing that this is true almost without exception, although the original import is now, in many cases, lost

The ancient Hebrews came to a mountainous ridge; they saw that it was plentifully watered, and that it was

clothed, even to its summit, with oaks and firs, with laurels and olives; and they named it Mount Carmel, which means in the Hebrew tongue the mount of the *garden of God.* An early Christian teacher, according to the traditions of the country, having been put to death on a certain hill, it was thence called Montmartre; the name, to this day, of a celebrated eminence in the neighbourhood of Paris. When Columbus entered a capacious and safe harbour, with a rich and beautiful surrounding country, he called the place Puerto Bello, by a name descriptive of its predominant features. And so of instances without number.

On this subject a careful examination of the various dialects of the North American Savages would undoubtedly throw light. The meaning of very many proper names has already been ascertained, with a greater or less degree of probability, by careful inquirers into those languages. A company of Indians, seated on the banks of a river, and seeing it opposed and violently driven in different directions by the projecting rocks, would naturally enough call it the Kenaway, which means, in the Shawanese tongue, the river of whirlpools. Among many other similar instances, the words Mississippi and Niagara, which have no meaning for an Anglo-American, are accurately descriptive in the Aboriginal dialects; the former signifying the great river, and the latter the thunder of waters.

CHAPTER III.

WRITTEN SIGNS.

§ 26. Of the causes which led to the formation of written signs.

THE formation of oral language preceded that of WRITTEN language, by which we understand those artificial signs which are addressed to the eye instead of the ear. With all the advantages of oral language, men could not long be insensible to the great convenience of a mode of

communication which did not require personal presence. Previously to resorting to written signs, the transmission of commands from one place to another required the agency of persons especially commissioned for that purpose. Laborious and expensive as was this method of sending communications, it was not always a successful one. The most faithful messenger was liable to misunderstand the subject of his embassy, or to fail in communicating it with precision to others.

All history, likewise, during the period antecedent to the invention of written language, was necessarily imbodied in traditions. The father, who had himself participated in great national events, told them to the son, and the son repeated them in the ears of the succeeding generation. It was thus that the poems of Ossian are said to have been handed down. It was thus, according to Tacitus (DE MORIBUS GERMANORUM, § 2, 3), that the legends and heroic songs of the ancient tribes of Germany were transmitted. And it was from traditions, repeated through succeeding ages, that Garcillasso composed the history of the Incas of Peru.

Sometimes the rude nations of antiquity assisted their traditionary recollections by planting groves, throwing together monumental heaps of stones, and instituting games; but even these precautions did not avail. Various mistakes were found to arise; statements became confused and perplexed, till the unadorned truths of real history could no longer be separated from the embellishments of fiction.—Being, therefore, put upon some other artificial method of making their thoughts known to each other at the present time, and of transmitting their knowledge to future ages, men at last invented the different forms of written language.

§ 27. The first artificial signs addressed to the eye were pictures.

Although they did not find oral language suited to all their purposes, it seems to have been beyond their power immediately to invent alphabets. The object of their earliest efforts was exhausted in making visible sketches of actions and events precisely as they exist.

The expression of ideas in this method has been more

or less practised in all nations during the early periods of their history, and has been of considerable aid to them in making out the record of their early annals. We are informed in the Pentateuch that figures were embroidered in the curtains of the HOLY OF HOLIES; and learn from the ancient poems of Homer that Helen wrought in embroidery the pictures of the battles in which the attractions of her own person had caused the Greeks and Trojans to be engaged.—The expression of ideas by painting in colours, or by pictorial writing in other ways, is found to exist among the Savages of North America. Bows and arrows, hatchets, animals of various kinds are imprinted on the bodies of their chiefs, the indications of their calling, and of their heroic qualities. They go further, and are able to point out actions, situations, and events, although imperfectly. They often, in their journeyings, leave behind them figures, either painted or rudely carved, which convey much important information to those who happen afterward to come the same way.

A recent and somewhat striking illustration of this topic cannot well be omitted. It is found in the Journal of an expedition that was sent out in 1820 to explore the northwestern region of the United States. A part of the company, in passing across from the river St. Louis to Sandy Lake, had missed their way, together with their Indian attendants, and could not tell where they were. In consequence of being in this situation, the Indians, not knowing what might be the result, determined to leave, at a certain place, a memorial of their journey, for the information of such of their tribe as might happen to come in that direction afterward. In the party there was a military officer, a person whom the Indians understood to be an attorney, and a mineralogist; eight were armed; when they halted they formed three encampments. The Savages went to work and traced out with their knives upon a piece of birch bark a man with a sword for the officer, another human figure with a book in his hand for the lawyer, and a third with a hammer for the mineralogist; three ascending columns of smoke denoted the three encampments, and eight muskets the number of armed men, &c.*

* Schoolcraft's Narrative Journal, chap. viii.

We find pictorial delineations to have been practised, in particular, among the original inhabitants of Mexico. It is related by historians, that when the Spaniards first landed upon that coast, the natives despatched messengers to the King Montezuma, with a representation painted on cloth of the landing and appearance of the Europeans. The events and appearances which they wished to describe were new to them, and these pictured representations were the methods which they adopted, in preference to any other, to express those ideas which they deemed it important the king should immediately possess.

Pictures, like the language of mere gesticulation, are a very imperfect mode of communicating ideas, as they must, from their very nature, be limited, in a great degree, to the description of external events. They fail in disclosing the connexions of those events, in developing dispositions, intricate trains of thought, and, in some measure, the passions. Attempts were therefore soon made to introduce another form of writing, called hieroglyphics.

§ 28. Of hieroglyphical writing.

HIEROGLYPHICS (from the Greek words HIEROS, sacred, and GLUPHO, to carve) are figures, sometimes painted or embroidered, and at others carved out, used to express ideas. They differ from pictorial writing chiefly in being an abrigdment from it, and also in this particular, that they select, by the aid of analogies more or less remote, figures for the purpose of expressing the less obvious mental emotions and abstract truths.

Hieroglyphics were employed much more among the Egyptians than elsewhere, and the whole art probably arose in this way. The method of communicating thoughts by means of paintings, as among the Mexicans, and which undoubtedly existed among the Egyptians previous to the invention of Hieroglyphics, was found inconvenient. The work was difficult in the execution, and bulky when it was completed; and there was, accordingly, very soon an attempt at the abridgment of that method. Hence the head was used to designate a man; two or more

hands, with weapons opposed, a battle; a scaling ladder set against a wall, a siege; a man's two feet in water, a fuller of clothes; a leafless tree, the winter.—Thus the first step towards the formation of a hieroglyphical system was taken.

But when those who depended upon this mode of expressing their thoughts came to certain classes of the passions, the moral qualities, and a variety of abstract truths, they were under the necessity of selecting certain visible objects, the delineation of which would be likely to suggest such truths and qualities. The eye was accordingly selected to signify wisdom; ingratitude was expressed by a viper biting the hand that gave it food; courage by a lion; imprudence by a fly; cunning by a serpent.—As the number of ideas among the people increased, and became more and more abstract, greater ingenuity was required in the invention of hieroglyphical characters to express them. Thus, a winged globe, with a serpent issuing from it, came to denote the universe, or universal nature.

In the opinion of Goguet, by no means an incompetent judge on any question of this kind, the methods of pictorial delineation and of hieroglyphics have prevailed, in a greater or less degree, in the early periods of almost every nation on earth. And he takes occasion to make the remark, which appears to be sufficiently sustained by the fact, that such a universal concurrence cannot be considered as the effect of accident or imitation; we must discern in it the voice of nature speaking, in a uniform tone, to the gross capacities of the first generations of men.*

§ 29. Of the written characters of the Chinese.

The third step in the progress of the human mind towards the invention of an alphabetical character was the framing of such arbitrary signs as are employed by the Chinese at the present day.

It is a peculiarity of the written language of the Chinese, that it employs artificial and arbitrary delineations. Thus, for the idea expressed by the English word PRISONER, we have this delineation, which is less complicated

* Goguet's Origin of Laws, Arts, and Sciences, bk. ii., chap. 6.

than many others, viz., a figure approaching in its form to a square, with another figure nearly in the shape of an equilateral triangle placed in the centre of it. The character, which, as it is articulated, is EUL, and answers to the English word ear, is somewhat in the shape of a PARALLELOGRAM, crossed at nearly equal distances from the ends by lines drawn at right angles to the sides.

§ 30. The Chinese character an improvement on the hieroglyphical.

As hieroglyphics are an improvement on the mode of expressing ideas by painting, the characters employed by the Chinese may, with good reason, be considered the next step in advance of hieroglyphics. It is a proof of this, that many of the characters, particularly those called elementary, bore originally an analogy or resemblance to the objects for which they stand. They were, of course, anciently hieroglyphics, although now arbitrary characters. The fact on which this conclusion is founded is ascertained by consulting ancient inscriptions on cups of serpentine stone, on vases of porcelain, on seals of agate, and the characters used in editions of very ancient books. The characters which at present stand for the sun, moon, a field, and the mouth, are quite arbitrary, and we discover no analogy between them and the object; but it was otherwise at first.—The sun was originally represented by a circle with a dot in the centre; the moon by the segment of a circle; a field by a figure resembling a square, set off into smaller divisions by two lines intersecting each other at right angles in the centre; a mouth by a figure intended to represent the projection of the lips.

The progress of the system of the Chinese from a hieroglyphical to a purely arbitrary character, may perhaps be better illustrated by the following story than by any abstract statement.

A tavern-keeper in Hungary, unable to write, kept account of the sums due to him by strokes chalked on his door; to each series of strokes was annexed a figure to denote the customer to whom they applied. The soldier was represented by the figure of a musket, the carpenter by a saw, the smith by a hammer. In a short time, for

convenience, the musket was reduced to a straight line, the saw to a zigzag line, the hammer to a cross; and thus began to be formed a set of characters, gradually receding from the original figure. The resemblance might at last be entirely lost sight of, and the figures become mere arbitrary marks.

§ 31. Artificial delineations employed as signs of sound.

But it is to be recollected, that the artificial delineations, towards the formation of which the human mind has thus gradually advanced, were used to denote ideas merely, and not *sounds* or words as they are enunciated. The two systems of oral and written signs are supposed as yet to have been entirely independent of each other. It could not be long, however, before they would assume new relations, and written characters would gradually be employed as significant of sounds as well as of thought.

The idea which we express by the word PRISONER had its correspondent delineation, its appropriate arbitrary figure; it also had its appropriate oral sign or sound. The oral sign would, by association, call up both the thing itself and the written delineation. And, on the other hand, the written character would naturally suggest both the idea and the oral sign. It was in this way arbitrary written characters gradually gave up their original office, and came to stand as directly representative of sounds, and indirectly of ideas. This was coming back to the original intention of nature, which seems to have framed the powers of the human voice with the design of making them the predominant instrument of intellectual communication, whatever aid might be derived to them from other sources.

§ 32. Formation of syllabic alphabets.

But it was desirable that every possible benefit should be derived from this new application of arbitrary written marks as signs of words. The next step, therefore, was to fix upon such sounds as are elementary, and also upon certain characters to represent them. But to ascertain what sounds were elementary, and their exact number, was exceedingly difficult; and it is highly improbable that it was done at once.—The improvers of language,

however, not only succeeded in detecting monosyllables in their vocabulary of words, and in distinguishing them from polysyllables, but also in resolving compound words into their monosyllabic parts. The first alphabets, therefore, as is generally supposed, were syllabic; that is, were single syllables, consisting of a consonant sound combined with a vowel sound. The base of these syllables being single consonants, variously modified by vowels, the distinction was at some subsequent period made between consonant and vowel sounds; characters and names were appropriated to each; and alphabets consequently assumed a new form.—Such, after many laborious investigations, seems to be the general sentiment as to the progress of human invention through the successive forms of pictures, hieroglyphics, the arbitrary delineations of the Chinese, and syllabic alphabets, to alphabets of letters. Abundant proofs are extant that these various methods of artificial writing have been employed at different periods; and such is their mutual relation, it is not difficult to conceive of the progress of the human mind from one to the other.

§ 33. The preceding views confirmed by recent researches.

The general views of the preceding sections receive some confirmation from the recent laborious and learned researches into the antiquities of Egypt. The prosecution of these researches, and the accumulation of light on the various monuments of that remarkable country, render it probable that the present inquiry will not always be regarded as a conjectural one, but that it may at last be satisfactorily settled. It appears to be even now sufficiently ascertained that there existed among the ancient Egyptians an alphabet, representative of simple sounds. The visible characters standing for the sounds are either the exact pictures or the hieroglyphics of objects. On examination, it appears that the pictures and hieroglyphics are taken from objects, the oral signs or names of which begin with the same articulate sounds which they are themselves destined to represent. Thus the image of an eagle, which in the Egyptian oral language is called ACHOM, became the sign of the vowel A. Hence it is

probable they began in the examination of this subject with the names of objects. It was by the analysis of these names that ultimately the resolution of the human voice into its syllabic and primary elements was made. And, in giving signs to elementary sounds, they selected those pictures or hieroglyphics of objects, the names of which had particularly assisted them in their analysis.

The same is essentially true of other ancient languages. The names and forms of the Hebrew alphabet were, for the most part, designations of sensible objects. The first word of the alphabet is called ALEPH, which means an ox. It may be conjectured, therefore, that the broad sound of A was first separated from other elementary sounds in the analysis of that word. And, after such analysis and separation, the name and figure of the ox were retained as its permanent written and oral signs. Perhaps it should be added, that the resemblance between the written signs and their original archetypes is to be sought chiefly in the ancient Hebrew character, and not in that at present in use.

§ 34. On the recent formation of the Cherokee syllabic alphabet.

Great expectations have justly been directed towards the learned labours of Champollion and his associates; but it was probably not anticipated, that an uneducated North American Savage would throw light on these obscure inquiries. The Cherokees, like the other Aboriginal inhabitants of America, had their pictorial delineations, and probably some hieroglyphic characters, but nothing more; the sounds of their language had never been expressed by an alphabet either of single letters or of syllables. This was the work of the Cherokee See-quayah (known more generally by the English name of George Guess), who deserves to be remembered with honour.

About the time of the defeat of the American general St. Clair, when Guess was a young man, a letter fell into the hands of the Indians which greatly excited their curiosity. In some of their deliberations in respect to it, the question arose among them, Whether the mysterious power of the *talking leaf* was the gift of the Great Spirit

to the white man, or the discovery of the white man himself? Most of his companions were of the former opinion, while Guess as strenuously maintained the latter. It was this incident which first directed the thoughts of Guess to the subject of written signs. The following statements were taken from his own lips in the winter of 1828, when he was on a visit to the city of Washington with some other persons of his tribe, and its accuracy can be relied on.*

§ 35. Facts relative to the invention of the Cherokee alphabet.

The letter, and the discussions connected with it, "frequently became a subject of contemplation with him afterward, as well as many other things which he knew, or had heard, that the white men could do; but he never sat down seriously to reflect on the subject, until a swelling in his knee confined him to his cabin, and which at length made him a cripple for life, by shortening the diseased leg. Deprived of the excitements of war and the pleasures of the chase, in the long nights of his confinement, his mind was again directed to the mystery of *speaking by letters*, the very name of which, of course, was not to be found in his language. From the cries of wild beasts, from the talents of the mocking-bird, from the voices of his children and his companions, he knew that feelings and passions were conveyed by direct sounds from one intelligent being to another. The thought struck him to try to ascertain all the sounds in the Cherokee language. His own ear was not remarkably discriminating, and he called to his aid the more acute ears of his wife and children. He found great assistance from them.

"When he thought that he had distinguished all the different sounds in the language, he attempted to use pictorial signs, images of birds and beasts, to convey these sounds to others, or to mark them in his own mind. He soon dropped this method as difficult or impossible, and tried arbitrary signs, without any regard to appearances, except such as might assist him in recollecting them and distinguishing them from each other. At first these signs

* See Knapp's Lectures on American Literature, lect. i

were very numerous; and when he got so far as to think his invention was nearly accomplished, he had about two hundred characters in his alphabet. By the aid of his daughter, who seemed to enter into the genius of his labours, he reduced them at last to eighty-six, the number he now uses. He then set to work to make these characters more comely to the eye, and succeeded. As yet he had not the knowledge of the pen as an instrument, but made his characters on a piece of bark with a knife or nail. At this time he sent to the Indian agent, or some trader in the nation, for paper and pen. His ink was easily made from some of the bark of the forest trees, whose colouring properties he had previously known; and after seeing the construction of the pen, he soon learned to make one, but at first he made it without a slit; this inconvenience was, however, quickly removed by his sagacity. His next difficulty was to make his invention known to his countrymen; for by this time he had become so abstracted from his tribe and their usual pursuits that he was viewed with an eye of suspicion. His former companions passed his wigwam without entering it, and mentioned his name as one who was practising improper spells, for notoriety or mischievous purposes; and he seems to think that he should have been hardly dealt with if his docile and unambitious disposition had not been so generally acknowledged by his tribe. At length he summoned some of the most distinguished of his nation, in order to make his communication to them; and, after giving the best explanation of his discovery that he could, stripping it of all supernatural influence, he proceeded to demonstrate to them, in good earnest, that he had made a discovery. His daughter, who was his only pupil, was ordered to go out of hearing, while he requested his friends to name a word or sentiment which he put down, and then she was called in and read it to them; then the father retired and the daughter wrote; the Indians were wonder-struck, but not entirely satisfied; See-qua-yah then proposed that the tribe should select several youths from among their best young men, that he might communicate the mystery to them. This was at length agreed to, although there was some lurking suspicion of necro

mancy in the whole business. John Maw (his Indian name I have forgotten), a full-blood, with several others, were selected for this purpose.—The tribe watched the youths for several months with anxiety, and when they offered themselves for examination, the feelings of all were wrought up to the highest pitch. The youths were separated from their master and from each other, and watched with great care. The uninitiated directed what master and pupil should write to each other, and the tests were viewed in such a manner as not only to destroy their infidelity, but most firmly to fix their faith."

§ 36. Conventional written signs as expressive of numbers and quantities.

The invention of written signs, as well as oral, gave increased power to the action of the mind; and the assistances thus rendered were so obvious and decisive, that the principle of expressing thoughts by conventional written signs was extended to other cases. Hence the origin of numerical and algebraic expressions. In the science of Algebra, the subjects of mathematical analysis, such as extension, quantities, forces, and their relations, instead of being expressed by words and sentences in the ordinary way, are represented by the letters of the alphabet. At first the large or capital, and afterward the small letters, being in some respects more convenient, were used for this purpose. And the system has been by degrees fully extended, not only to the quantities and forces thus represented, but to the operations performed in respect to them. It was regarded by scientific persons as an improvement worthy of some notice, when the processes of adding and subtracting in algebra came to be expressed by the Latin terms *plus* and *minus;* it was considered a further improvement when these terms were in writing abridged into the initial letters *p* and *m*, and when they were subsequently altered into the signs + and —, &c.

The late Mr. Playfair, in his Historical Sketch of the Discoveries and Improvements in Science from the Revival of Letters to the present Century, has the following instructive remarks on the subject before us.—Speaking of some improvements by Des Cartes, he adds, "the lead-

ing principles of algebra were now unfolded, and the notation was brought, from a mere contrivance for abridging the common language, to a system of symbolical writing, admirably fitted to assist the mind in the exercise of thought.

"The happy idea, indeed, of expressing quantity and the operations on quantity by conventional symbols, instead of representing the first by real magnitudes, and enunciating the second in words, could not but make a great change in the nature of mathematical investigation. The language of mathematics, whatever may be its form, must always consist of two parts; the one denoting quantities simply, and the other denoting the manner in which the quantities are combined, or the operations understood to be performed on them. Geometry expresses the first of these by real magnitudes, or what may be called natural signs; a line by a line, an angle by an angle, an area by an area, &c.; and it describes the latter by words. Algebra, on the other hand, denotes both quantity and the operations on quantity by the same system of conventional symbols. Thus, in the expression $x^3 - ax^2 + b^2 = o$, the letters a b x denote quantities, but the terms x^3 ax^2, &c., denote certain operations performed on those quantities, as well as the quantities themselves; x^3 is the quantity x raised to the cube; and ax^2 the same quantity x raised to the square, and then multiplied into a, &c.; the combination, by addition or subtraction, being also expressed by the signs + and —.

"Now it is when applied to this latter purpose that the algebraic language possesses such exclusive excellence. The mere magnitudes themselves might be represented by figures, as in geometry, as well as in any way whatever; but the operations they are to be subjected to, if described in words, must be set before the mind slowly and in succession, so that the impression is weakened and the clear apprehension rendered difficult. In the algebraic expression, on the other hand, so much meaning is concentrated into a narrow space, and the impression made by all the parts is so simultaneous, that nothing can be more favourable to the exertion of the reasoning powers, to the continuance of their action, and their security against error."

CHAPTER IV.

CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGES.

§ 37. All languages have their characteristic traits.

From the consideration of the origin and use of particular words and phrases, we naturally proceed to the characteristic peculiarities of languages. It is with nations, in some degree, as with individuals; every nation has a character, as each man has; and, in like manner, every language possesses its distinctive traits, not less than the mode of expression which is employed by individuals.

Let us, therefore, look a moment at this subject in reference to particular writers.—The style of a writer is understood to have relation chiefly to his choice of words and his manner of arranging them. Every writer of genius employs a style in some degree peculiar to himself. It cannot well be otherwise, since the mind of every individual is, in some respects, unlike that of all others. There are differences in situation; differences in intellect and feeling, in knowledge and taste, which necessarily lay the foundation for differences in style. Whenever, therefore, a writer attempts to imbody and set forth to others the series of his intellectual operations and feelings, such exposition will necessarily have a form and impress of its own. So true is this, that it is hardly more difficult to detect an author's style when it is once well-formed, than it is to distinguish one man's handwriting from another's.—And what is true of his manner of expression in the case of an individual, is equally so of national dialects. The languages of all nations have a style or peculiarity of manner. They are marked by certain prevailing characteristics, which readily distinguish them from those of other nations.

§ 38. Characteristics of the languages of uncivilized nations.

In the first place, there are certain general traits, which

are characteristic of all languages that are spoken by the rude, uncultured tribes of men. As such uncivilized communities are in general ignorant of alphabetical writing, they cannot be expected to furnish us with numerous specimens of mental effort. Their glory is committed to the traditions of their country; and we rarely find among them anything more than some brief historical sketches, war songs, and speeches. But, even from these imperfect sources, we can form a judgment on the present subject.

The words which such tribes employ are generally few in number compared with the vocabulary of civilized nations. Their knowledge is very limited; their ideas are few; and it is a necessary consequence that their words should be few likewise. Incapable of aiding their perceptions by remote deductions of reasoning, they draw instruction from the visible teachings of the woods, the waters, and the sky; but even the external world is very imperfectly learned, while they are almost wholly ignorant of the world within. And the range or compass of their language corresponds to the compass of their knowledge.

It is further worthy of remark, that only a small proportion of the words employed by uncivilized tribes are the signs of abstract ideas. Having but few abstract notions, and, consequently, but few names for them, they are under the necessity of resorting continually to figurative illustrations; so that their language seems to partake of the materiality of the external objects with which they are chiefly conversant. But aided, as they are, by metaphorical expressions, their stock of words still remains small; and the sentences which they utter must therefore, of necessity, be short.

These short and figurative sentences are inspirited by the infusion of the untamed passions of a savage mind. There is a vivacity in their griefs, their joys, and their anger, which is almost peculiar to uncivilized life.—"The bones of our countrymen," say the Chiefs, "lie uncovered; their bloody bed has not been washed clean; their spirits cry against us; they must be appeased; sit no longer inactive upon your mats; lift the hatchets; console the spirits of the dead."

§ 39. Characteristics of language in civilized and scientific nations.

As a nation advances in knowledge, its language becomes more strictly conventional, losing by degrees that metaphorical aspect which it presented in its earlier periods. A variety of new words are introduced, which previously had no existence, because the things for which they stand were not then known. New arts have their technical names and epithets, and new sciences furnish us with their novel nomenclatures.

The distiller speaks of the cohobation of liquors; the worker in mines of collieries; the chymist of sulphates and muriates; the botanist and mineralogist employ a variety of terms peculiar to their respective departments. An increased refinement and abstraction discovers itself in terms appropriated to moral, political, and literary subjects; and the language in all respects is more removed from the senses, and becomes more intellectual. But while it is, by a natural consequence of mental improvement, more exact and scientific, it is less directly and strikingly indicative of external objects and of the passions of men, and is, therefore, less poetical. As terms become more abstract, they are necessarily less picturesque. This is the natural consequence of their not being limited to particular objects, but extended over a vast surface of things. A Savage, if he had the most refined language of Europe at his command, would be at a loss to express in it the strong emotions which agitate him, and the outward and living beauties of his woodland scenery; he would choose for that purpose the dialect of his tribe.

§ 40. Characteristics of languages depend much on the people's habits.

Individual writers, as already observed, have a style, that is, characteristics of expression, of their own; for every one has a tendency to connect together thoughts, or words which are the signs of thought, agreeably to his peculiar intellectual habits and passions. But languages also, considered in their whole extent, have a style; because the nations, the whole mass of people that make use of those languages, have their characteristics as well as individuals. It follows, then, from this, that

languages assume their general character or style, in a good measure, from that of the people; and this is what we are willing to maintain.

It will certainly be found, on inquiry, that the language of every people has words, combinations of words, peculiarities of grammatical construction, &c., springing entirely out of the national habits and the exigencies of their peculiar circumstances. Thus, as was remarked on a former occasion, we have the word CORBAN in Hebrew, OSTRAKISMOS in Greek, PROSCRIPTIO in Latin, and we may add, ANGGAROS in Persian, ROTURIER in French, and many others, which are either wholly peculiar to their respective languages, or employed with some peculiarity of meaning not elsewhere acknowledged. No modern language had originally words precisely corresponding to the Latin terms TRIBUNUS, CONSUL, PROCONSUL, PRÆTOR, ÆDILIS, LICTOR, &c. The terms by which they are translated into the modern languages of Europe are the Latin words themselves, with only a slight alteration of form.

The Greek and Latin Languages are distinguished by the practice of transposition; and for this purpose they have furnished certain classes of their words with particular variations, by means of which they are made to refer to other words, with which they are naturally connected by the meaning or the sense of the passage. We find combinations of words and peculiarities of grammatical construction in the Hebrew and its cognate dialects, which we do not find either in the languages of Greece and Rome, or in those of modern Europe; and this will be found to be more or less the case in all other languages or classes of languages which we may compare together. It is owing both to a deficiency of appropriate terms and to peculiarities in grammatical construction, that Missionaries have often met with great perplexities in translating the Bible into the dialects of heathen countries.

The single fact, without going into particulars, that no person can become fully acquainted with the true import and spirit of a language, without an acquaintance with the geography of their country and its natural scenery, without a knowledge of the dress, buildings, arts, religion,

customs, and history of the people, seems enough in support of the remark that languages take their character from the circumstances of those who speak them. If the fact on which the conclusion is founded be doubted, then we ask why instructers consider it so essential that their pupils should have a knowledge of the antiquities of the Romans, of the antiquities of the Greeks, of the antiquities of the Hebrews? and why this course is pursued, or is acknowledged to be requisite, in respect to every other dead language?*

§ 41. Languages aid in forming correct ideas of national character.

If the statements in the preceding section be true, it follows that a knowledge of languages very much helps us in acquiring a knowledge of the character of the people who speak them. The study of every language is the examination of a new chapter in the history and operations of the mind; that is, of the mind as it is modified by the peculiar circumstances, the climate, government, habits, &c., of a people. Without an acquaintance, therefore, with their vernacular tongue, the critic will in vain take it upon him to judge of the philosophy of their literature and character. It is this, more than anything else, that breathes the national spirit; it fixes and retains it when all its other monuments and memorials are gone, and after the nation itself is extinct.

We may, perhaps, even go further, and assert that changes in languages are indices to particular events. In other words, that events of an extraordinary nature, whether they have relation to the sciences or politics, are often accompanied with corresponding effects on language. No one can be ignorant that great and radical changes in the sciences are usually attended with alterations, improvements, and accessions of this kind. Some years since, the French chemist Lavoisier laid the foundation of a new system of chemistry. In order to complete and sustain the revolution of which he had been so conspicuous an instrument, he and his associates invented

* See, for some further illustrations of this subject, Heckewelder's and Duponceau's correspondence respecting the Languages of the American Indians, Letter viii.

a new nomenclature, which has since been pretty generally adopted.

Nearly at the same time happened the great political convulsions in France, which also had its effects on the French language. The patriotic Necker remarked this, and complained with no small degree of feeling of the barbarisms which he asserted had sprung up within a short time. He instanced, in particular, the words, *influencer, utiliser, exceptioner, preconiser, fanatiser, patrioser, petitioner, vetoter, and harmonier.*

§ 42. Of the correspondence between national intellect and the progress of a language.

Whatever may have been at any time thought, it will be found, on examination, that those individuals who are looked up to as the eminent writers of a nation, seldom arise until its language is nearly or quite completed. They employ it as the people have formed it, and the people have formed it as their feelings and habits prompted.

The circumstance that language is a great and admirable instrument of intellectual power, is of itself no small confirmation of the doctrine that developements of intellectual strength will correspond to the progressive improvement of a language, and that its great men, those who are to speak in it as long as it shall exist, will not make their appearance until it shall have arrived to some degree of perfection.

Let it be supposed that, in the midst of a Savage tribe, whose language is rude, a person is found of perfect mental organization, capable of remembering, separating, and comparing ideas, with a quickness of invention and other qualities of genius above the common lot. He has influence over the minds of others; he is consulted in difficult emergencies; he is accounted wise; but how far he falls short of the mark, which is reached by others of originally no greater genius, who appear in a civilized community, and with the advantage of a perfect language!

"It is with languages," says Condillac, "as with geometrical signs; they give a new insight into things, and

dilate the mind in proportion as they are more perfect. Sir Isaac Newton's extraordinary success was owing to the choice which had already been made of signs, together with the contrivance of methods of calculation. Had he appeared earlier, he might have been a great man for the age he would have lived in, but he would not have been the admiration of ours. It is the same in every other branch of learning. The success of geniuses who have had the happiness even of the best organization, depends entirely on the progress of the language in regard to the age in which they live; for words answer to geometrical signs, and the manner of using them to methods of calculation. In a language, therefore, defective in words, or whose construction is not sufficiently easy and convenient, we should meet with the same obstacles as occurred in geometry before the invention of algebra. The French tongue was for a long time so unfavourable to the progress of the mind, that if we could frame an idea of Corneille successively in the different ages of our monarchy, we should find him to have been possessed of less genius in proportion to his greater distance from the age in which he lived, till at length we should reach a Corneille who could not give the least mark of abilities." *Origin of Knowledge*, pt. ii., § i.

This writer thinks it may be demonstrated that there can be no such thing as a superior genius (meaning probably a developement of superior genius) till the language of a nation has been considerably improved. And certainly it must be admitted, that the expectation of great and successful mental efforts of a literary kind, before the developement and organization of the national language, can hardly be better expected than the forming of statues, and the building of temples, and the execution of paintings, before men have invented those auxiliary instruments by which the trees of the forest are hewn into shape, and the marble is cut and drawn up from the quarry, and the colours are to be prepared and laid upon the canvass. There is soundness of thought as well as power of expression in the remark of a modern critic. "The first works of the imagination are poor and rude, not from the want of genius, but from the want of materials. Phid-

ias could have done nothing with an old tree and a fish-bone, or Homer with the language of New Holland."*

§ 43. Different languages suited to different minds and to different kinds of subjects.

Some languages are more suited to certain minds than they are to others; more adapted also to the discussion of certain subjects than to others.—Accordingly, the French language is simple, clear, precise, and, therefore, favourable to abstract investigations. And it is here, it may be conjectured, that we find one cause of the great excellence of the mathematicians and the philosophers of that nation. There is also a facility in its construction, and a conciseness and expressiveness in its particles, which render it eminently a *colloquial* language; and in this respect it is precisely such as the lively and sociable disposition of the French people requires it to be. The French themselves concede that other languages are better adapted to express the higher flights of imagination, and the more profound displays of the passions.

The Italian language, which has the Latin for its basis, although abundantly modified by the intermixture of the inflexions and phrases of the successive conquerors of Italy, is characterized by exceeding harmony. There is perhaps a want of diversity in its sounds, so much so that even its harmony is apt to prove tiresome. But it appears, notwithstanding, to be well suited to poetry of a plaintive and serious cast, particularly elegiac. It also furnishes a number of expressive and nicely discriminated terms, having a relation to the science of music.

The Spanish language seems to indicate, in its sonorous fulness, that dignified and measured solemnity which is so well known to be characteristic of the people who speak it. But it is as courteous as it is dignified. It has abundance of terms precisely suited to express every form and degree of deference, courtesy, and honour. The order of chivalry first arose among the Spaniards; and as all the members of that romantic institution were bound to practice the most refined courtesy as well as the most devoted heroism, it naturally happened that many ex-

* Edinburgh Review, vol. xlvii., p. 11.

pressions of respect and politeness were introduced in that way, which have since been retained.

§ 44. Such differences shown by attempts at translating.

The remarks of the preceding section lead us further to observe, that differences in their power of expression and other specific peculiarities of languages disclose themselves in all cases of a translation from one language to another. The remark has often been made, and probably with great correctness, that there are many languages into which the Paradise Lost of Milton could not be translated; and perhaps none where it could be done with perfect safety to the various and peculiar beauties of the original work.

But the difficulty of representing in a translation the entire shape and value of an original, is not limited to works of imagination. There are some languages which are almost wholly destitute of particular classes of terms, both of a scientific and of a moral and philosophic nature; a state of things which of course renders translation extremely difficult, so far as such classes of words are concerned. The Greek language is said to have been destitute of suitable terms in philosophy till after the time of Socrates; and it was the same with the Latin till after the time of Cicero, who introduced, by means of his philosophic writings, many new terms on those subjects. Both languages are destitute of a multitute of terms, which have a place in such abstract and experimental sciences as have received new developements and applications, or perhaps a new existence, in modern times.*—The Bohemian and the Swiss languages are spoken by nations that are shut up in inland and mountainous countries, and, being separated from the ocean, are ignorant of all navigation, excepting such as they are acquainted with on the limited scale of their own lakes and rivers. They are accordingly found to be greatly deficient in the terms that are employed in the building, rigging, and managing of ships.†

* Degerando, Histoire des Systemes de Philosophie, part i., chap. 9.

† See the Dissertation of Michaelis on the Influence of Language on Opinions, § iv.

Sometimes whole classes of terms acquire a specific character, in consequence of the prevalent pursuits and habits of the people. In one country a high degree of honour is attached to the life of a shepherd, as among the ancient Hebrews and the Arcadians; in another to that of a cultivator of the soil, as among the Romans; and in another to that of a merchant, as among the Tyrians and Carthaginians; and the supposed value of the calling becomes in time transferred to the terms having a relation to it. The Abbé de Lille translated the Georgics of Virgil into French; but he complains, in the preface of his work, that it was rendered difficult, in consequence of the ideas of want and meanness which the French are accustomed to associate with the life of a husbandman. The same difficulty is said to have been experienced by those who have attempted to translate the Seasons of Thomson into that language.

§ 45. Of the advantages attending the study of languages.

It cannot have escaped notice, that it has been our object throughout to render the present Work, as much as possible, a practical one; and we accordingly propose to conclude the train of thought embraced in this Appendix by offering a few considerations on the utility of the study of languages. It is well known that the study of languages, more particularly the Greek and Latin, has long been made a part of public education. The reasons which are commonly given for occupying a considerable portion of time in this way are chiefly these.

(1.) Much information is locked up in these languages. The original Greek and Roman literature is of itself highly valuable; their poets, historians, and orators are worthy of being compared with those of any age or nation. In vigour of thought and purity of taste, in an enlightened freedom of inquiry, and in exaltation of moral and political sentiment, it is generally conceded that the original literature of no nations whatever, taken as a whole, presents more favourable claims to notice.—In addition to this, vast numbers of literary and other treatises have been written in the Latin language in later periods, particularly on the readings and interpretations of ancient

authors, and on obscure and difficult points of history. A person ignorant of that language is shut out from the greater part of these important documents.

(2.) The intercourse of the world has been so much increased in consequence of the spread of knowledge and the facilities of commerce, that an acquaintance with some of the modern languages, particularly the Spanish, Italian, and French, is considered highly desirable. An entire ignorance of all modern languages is thought to imply a very defective education. But the languages which have been mentioned, together with the Portuguese, have their origin in great part from the Latin, and can be more easily and perfectly learned by previously giving some attention to the parent dialect, than by attempting them without it.

(3.) No one who speaks the English language can deny the importance of a thorough knowledge of it. It imbodies and retains the vast wisdom of many good and learned men, and is the medium by which the thoughts and feelings of our own generation and of our own hearts are to be communicated. But in the knowledge of this language, the student will find himself assisted by an acquaintance with the Latin, since no inconsiderable proportion of the words in the English language are derived from that source.—The Greek, which is a source of many English words, has a similar argument in its favour; and the additional circumstance of being the original language of the New Testament.

(4.) The study of languages answers a good purpose, as a sort of basis of education. During the period from eight to eleven years of age, the intellect may be supposed to be developing itself under the mere guidance of nature. It is a great point in education to aid this developement, to keep the mental powers in exercise, and to promote their growth. This object is known to be secured by the study of languages in a high degree; certainly much more than by the study of ethics, history, mineralogy, chemistry, &c.; or even the more appropriate study of arithmetic. It is thought that the object cannot be secured, in so high a degree, by any other course of study whatever which can be pointed out.

(5.) It has also been strongly contended, that an acquaintance with any language is a valuable acquisition, because it opens new views of mental character. The language of every nation is modified by the exigencies of the people who speak it, and by individual and national traits. It imbodies their emotions, customs, prejudices, domestic and political history. No man, therefore, can make himself fully acquainted with a new language, without having more correct and broader views of the developement of the mind, of the progress of men, as they rise from barbarism to refinement, and of human nature in general. And these advantages can be secured by the study of the Greek and Latin languages, no less than by others.

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